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VARIABLE PRINT QUALITY 
· •• For the arbitrator looks to what is reasonable 
but the judge is concerned with the interpretation of the 
Law. For this reason the arbitrator was conceived so that 
equity might thrive. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 
(Transla~or, B.E. Killian) 
The end crowns all, 
And that old common arbitrator, Time, 
Will one day end it. 
Shakespeare, Troilus & Cressida 
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Abstract 
The thesis examines the nature of third-party intervention in 
industrial disputes, from the perspective of bargaining and 
negotiation. It challenges the common view of the third-party as 
encouraging a concil iatory approach to the dispute. Experimental 
simulation provides evidence that a silent third-party affects the 
nature of agreements reached by negotiators, in this case favouring 
management. The third-party was regarded as an evaluative presence, 
encouraging greater intransigence and emphasising the inter-party 
dispute, at the cost of a more cooperative, personally-oriented 
approach. 
An observational field study of third-party intervention in 
publ ic and private sector disputes examines the functions and process 
of industrial arbitration, through the British Advisory Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service, for relatively inexperienced and experienced 
participants. Arbitration is traditionally regarded as a semi-
judicial, evaluative process, which is distinct from negotiation. It 
is argued that this public image is necessary, in order to maintain 
the credibi lity of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, 
but that the actual process is best understood in terms of the 
social context of collective bargaining. The process of arbitration 
is compared and contrasted with the processes of problem-solving and 
negotiation and two different models of negotiation ('concession-
convergence l and 'formula-detai I I) are used to explain the different 
roles adopted by the arbitrator or board in simpler and more complex 
disputes respectively. A descriptive account of a group of ad hoc 
arbitrations highlights the effects on inexperienced participants of 
the evaluative image of arbitration and reaffirms the distinction, 
identified in the publ ic sector disputes, between simpler and more 
complex cases, requiring different styles of chairmanship. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: Industrial Relations and the 
Contribution of Social Psychology 
Industrial Relations - The Background to the Debate 
Since the recognition of industrial relations as a 
distinct discipline in Britain, there has been a certain 
amount of debate about the proper contribution of the 
social sciences. Its development as a discipline in its 
own right is quite recent, with its most apparent starting 
point in the work of Dunlop (1958) in the U.S.A. and 
Flanders (1965) in Britain. These two influential works 
argued for the study of industrial relations as a system 
of rules: 
'The central task of a theory of industrial 
relations is to explain why particular rules 
are established in particular industrial 
relations systems and how and why they change 
in response to changes affecting the system' 
(Dunlop, 1958, pp 8-9). 
In agreeing with this position, Flanders went one 
step further, to argue that 'The study of I.R. may therefore 
be described as a study of the institutions of job regulation' 
(Flanders, 1965, polO). Both positions provided the 
discipline with a central framework which defined the scope 
of study and relevant issues for research. Both were responses 
to the previously largely a-theoretical nature of I.R. 
studies, which had been 'largely historical and descriptive' 
(Dunlop, 1958, p.6) and which had suffered from the 
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competing attentions of different social science disciplines, 
which 'were never intended to offer an integrated view of 
the whole complex of institutions in this field' (Flanders, 
1965, pp.9-10). 
Unfortunately however, whilst this approach provided a 
central focus of study - the 'system of rules' concerned with 
job regulation - it also concentrated attention (though this 
was not necessarily the intention of Dunlop's or Flanders' 
work) on the system's institutional aspects, to the neglect 
of the dynamic nature of actual working relationships and 
the processes by which the 'rules and regulations' are firstly 
developed and secondly interpreted, used and changed in 
practice. (E.g. Blain and Gennard, 1970; Goodman, Armstrong, 
et al., 1975; Margerison, 1969.) . 
Psychologists have also been interested in using the 
concept of planned, rule-guided actions as theoretical 
frameworks for the analysis of behaviour (£.g. Miller, 
Galanter and Pribram, 1960). Harre and Secord (1972) 
describe rules as 'propositions' which 'guide action'. They 
point out, however, that the mere identification of rules 
does not necessarily explain the person's choice of particular 
actions for achieving a specific end. Indeed the analysis of 
rules per se would not inevitably lead to an understanding of 
thei r. structured organisation, which allows the 
person to manipulate or del iberately avoid them, in favour of 
a newly created course of action. 
Research which concentrates on the formal, official 
rule systems of I.R. will consequently be 1 imited and 
incomplete, in its explanation of the actual functioning of 
the system, which is in the final analysis made up of the 
people who use and create the institutions. The traditional 
approach is described by Hyman (1975) as a 'reification', 
trea t i ng 
'abstract collective entities, which are the 
creations of human activity, as the active 
agencies in social relations and in consequence 
devaluing the part played by human actors' (p.13). 
Bain and Clegg (1973) comment on the inherently 'conservative 
implications' (p.92) of the past use of the systems concept, 
which has implied a 'stable and integrative I.R. system', 
which, in line with a Parsonian analysis of social systems, 
necessarily strives 'to perpetuate itself' (p.92). It is 
further commented by Hyman (1975) that 'the focus is on how 
any conflict is contained and controlled, rather than on the 
processes through which disagreements and disputes are 
generated' (p.ll}. Bain and Clegg (1973) agree with Eldridge 
that such a stance is unacceptable: 
'The sources of conflict and co-operation, order and 
instability must have an equally valid cl~im to 
problem status,' (p.92}. 
The limited and conservative use of the I.R. system could be 
overcome, Bain and Clegg argue, by the broadening of what is 
essentially a 'closed' system to include 'behavioural as well 
as structural variables and unstructured as well as structured 
relationships' (p.9S). This analysis tries to pave the way 
for a more realistic and diverse approach to the study of I.R. 
and also seems to invite potentially fruitful contributions 
and perspectives from a number of social science disciplines. 
Psychology's Past Contributions 
Just two years later, at a British Psychological Society 
Conference, Bain however showed 1 ittle faith in the potential 
contribution of psychology, arguing that it concentrated on 
the individual, restricted itself to quantitative methods and 
was overly concerned with scientific rigour. Around the same 
time, from the perspective of psychology, Brotherton and 
Stephenson (1975) argued that the traditional closed systems 
approach made a Iproper psychological contribution to I.R. 
theory difficult
' 
(p.~~). They suggest that it has led to at 
least three types of misappl ications of psychology: 
I. Extreme limitation of the field of appropriate 
investigation, by the use of over-simp~e and over-
generalised concepts (e.g. frustration-aggression 
theory, Williams and Guest, 1969); 
2. Restriction of the variety of psychological explanations 
to emphasise personality variables and individual 
differences (e.g. Blain and Gennard, 1970); 
3. Application of psychology only to certain levels of 
the system, (e.g. shop-floor rather than national, 
Hargerison, 1969). It is pointed out that industrial 
psychology frequently neglected the social context of 
studies in industry and thus opened itself to criticisms 
of naivete. This is presumably because the psychologist 
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was seen as a tool to be used in the solution of 
'managerial problems' such as worker productivity. 
The role of provider of ad hoc solutions is 
unl ikely to contributeto the development of 
substantial and constructive theories, much less 
the wider study of industrial relations. 
In contrast to Bain's (1975) rather dismal analysis of 
the future prospects for psychology, Brotherton and 
Stephenson (1975) argue that research should develop' in such 
a way as to complement and enhance, rather than contest, the 
approaches of other disciplines' (p.SO). Despite their 
enthusiasm for the development of a social psychology of 
indust~ial relations which chould enhance psychology and 
contribute to a 'theory of I.R. which is truly open' (p.SO) 
and Butler's (1979) assertions that social psychology is 
beginning to contribute usefully to the study of I.R., can it 
now be claimed that social psychology has had any impact? 
What Kind of Impact? 
The answer is probably not a lot. As Cherns (1968) 
points out, the Donovan Commission was probably the first 
Royal Commission to be substantially influenced by research 
papers; but none of these came from psychology, perhaps 
because of the previously mentioned a-theoretical nature of 
occupational psychology in the 1960s. 
In order to make any impact on the practice of 
industrial relations, Butler (1979) suggests that psychology 
has to become not only established in the eyes of I.R. 
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'specialists' as offering an important and creative 
contribution to research, but it should also aim to make its 
findings more widely known and work harder to influence the 
policy-makers themselves. 
This in itself is a potentially restrictive approach to 
the contribution of social psychology. It suggests, if 
anything, a reversion to the traditional closed systems model, 
which concentrates its attentions on the official institutions, 
including government policies, at the expense of understanding 
the practical 'workings' of the system. Whilst it would be 
futi Ie to deny the influential role of the policy-makers, 
concentration on influencing government potentially changes 
the role of the psychologist from 'tool of management' to 'tool 
of government'. 
A similar line of argument suggests that the direction 
of psychological research should be ·determined by current 
interes5 and problems as defined by I.R. specialists. As 
with any 'issue-oriented' approach, however, this would not 
necessarily result in the development of a strong theoretical 
base in social psychology. On the other hand, the psycho-
logist's selection of important questions may lead to the 
pursuit of potentially trivial issues, dictated either by 
past traditions which have long since lost sight of the 
interesting questions to which an original experiment was 
addressed, or by current trends in the discipline, posing 
questions which are easily solved, within the terms of the 
discipline's ready methodology, and existing instruments 
for analysis. Neither approach seems guaranteed to produce 
either a stimulating framework for further research or 
generalisable theories. 
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The starting point for new research is therefore 
problematic. Psychology, it seems, has to identify the 
issues which concern it, in the light of current industrial 
relations practice and thus place itself in a position to 
provide critical commentary on that practice. If this 
promotes a re-examination of the discipline and its methods, 
it must improve the status of psychology, by provoking the, 
development of more adequate means of analysis 9 description 
and explanation. 
A Distinctive Contribution? 
Sooner or later such issues force the researcher to 
question what kind of distinctive contribution social 
psychology should make to the development of knowledge in a 
particular area - in this case Industrial Relations. 
In his 1968 essay, Flanders states lone cannot ignore the 
social psychological aspects of collective bargaining'. He 
cites such factors as parties
' 
expectations of the future, 
perceptions of the immediate situation, sympathy for the 
other side, judgements of relative power and skill in bargain-
ing and persuasion. Strangely enough, Flanders was committed 
to a view of I.R. which excluded the so-called 'unstructured, 
informal I relationships. As already mentioned, other writers 
have suggested that psychology applies only to the study of 
personality factors and indivi'dual differences or shop-floor 
relations. It seems obvious however that to confine social 
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psychology either to the institutional or to the informal 
levels of I.R. is bound to lead to an inadequate conceptual-
isation, because it is over-simple to suggest that a 'level' 
of the 'system' can be isolated from the wider social context, 
to the extent of ignoring that wider context. 
A social psychological analysis should rather be able to 
throw light on the mutual and continuing exchange between the 
formal, institutional ised aspects of the 'system' and the 
relatively unstructured relationships between those people who 
make up that system, and who use and interpret it from day-to-
day. It should offer an understanding of how different levels 
mutually act on, affect and attempt to control each other (see 
also Clegg's (1979) discussion of styles of bargaining). It 
seems particularly important that social psychology should be 
able to recognise the possibility of change in industrial 
relations and indeed contribute to such change. 
This applies to all 'levels' within t~e system, from 
the effect of an individual's role as representative of a 
particular work-group or party on the person's relationships 
with others in the Company, to the understanding of the 
distribution of control over decision-making and the 
implications for genuine participation in decisions about 
industrial practice, to the analysis of the relationships 
between governmental intervention (in the form of increasingly 
complicated legal statutes} and changing definitions of 
industrial procedures and disputes. 
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This analysis overcomes arguments about the location of 
psychology at a particular 'level of the system' and debate 
about whether psychology is only a study of personality and 
individual differences. It attempts to study the individual 
participants in the context of industrial relations institut-
ions and views the institutions in the context of those who 
create them. It avoids the assumptions of a stable I.R. system, by 
recognising the possibi lity of human agency, which makes the formal 
informal (and vice-versa) and which brings about changes in existing 
institutions. through their application in practice. 
Third-Party tntervention in Industrial Disputes 
The focus of attention in this research is on the 
functions and process of third-party intervention in 
industrial disputes. with particular reference to arbitration. 
The thesis asks what the role of the third-party is, in 
industrial relations, as depicted and practised by the third-
parties and as understood by the parties to the dispute. It 
examines the significance and function of the claims to 
impartiality put forward by third-parties and explores the 
social processes behind the traditional evaluative image of 
arbitration. Since previous work on third-party intervention 
has not described the process of decision-making in any detail 
(with the exceptfon of Douglas' (1962) and Landsberger's (1955a,b) 
studies of mediatfon), it was felt that a descriptive study of 
the process of intervention, the roles played by management, 
union and third-party and the kinds of outcomes which result, 
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was very valuable. The eventual aim was to create a model 
of the third-party process. Consequently the thesis moves 
from an experimental study of the 'base-I ine
' 
effect of the 
mere presence of an observer on the process and outcomes of 
negotiation to a detailed observational study of 21 arbitration 
cases. These consist of nine case studies based largely on 
notes of hearings, discussions with the third-party and 
copies of the resulting decisions and 12 case studies based 
on a content analysis of the transcript of each hearing and 
the third-party's decision. 
The generality and significance of experimental findings 
is examined in the context of arbitration. Particular attention 
is paid to the character of arbitration in relation to its 
collective bargaining context. This results in a re-examination 
of the division .between arbitration and negotiation and it 
is argued that the significance of arbitration is best under-
stood not as a semi-judicial, evaluative p~ocess, but placed 
firmly in its social and political industrial relations context. 
Beyond this examination of the third-party's role, the 
thesis is also an attempt to create part of a social psychology 
of industrial relations, whtch is based on the practice of I.R., 
rather than solely on the experimental study of small groups. 
Consequently the methodology fs itself an 'experiment ' • Most 
of the work is based on observations of arbitration hearings, 
analyses of case papers and decisions, and discussions with 
third-parties and officials of the British Advisory 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). Discussion with 
the parties themselves was impossible, because of ACAS reluctance 
to allow any approach to be made to management or union officials. 
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The standpoint of the 'observer' has sometimes been 
criticised because it is an 'outsider's' view-point. In 
retrospect, this seems to be its greatest advantage. The 
position of outside observer is a privileged one: it affords 
an insight into events which is lost to those who are 
ineVitably immersed in the process, by virtue of their status 
as 'inside parties'. Their views of the significance of 
events should inevitably be different from those of the 
observer: they have a different perspective. This does not, 
however, necessarily invalidate the views of the outsider. 
The third-party's own 'outsider' status is renowned for its 
potential to allow a clear vision of the dispute. The 
researcher brings another perspective; in this case the social-
psychological one, foreign to the parties in the more formal 
sense, focussed as they are on the day-to-day machinations of 
relations between management and union, but perhaps less 
foreign than many realise, in the practical sense. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Role of the Thi rd-Party in Industry - Introductory Review 
Increasingly complicated employment legislation and 
interest in industrial relations as a specialist area of 
study reflect the prevalent British concern with the reg-
ulation and disposal of industrial disputes. The intro-
duction of a person, in the role of conciliator, mediator or 
arbitrator, who is formally independent of the di$puting 
parties, is generally seen as one method by which otherwise 
i rresolveable disputes may be settled without either side 
resorting to strike action or lock-out. The third-party is 
usually expected to persuade the parties to act reasonably and 
responsibly and settle their disagreement. In order to achieve 
the apparently impossible, it might be expected that the third-
party must also have access to unique skills, and insights 
which have so far evaded the parties themselves, and thus 
produce the one settlement which will 'stick'. 
The Three Roles of the Third-Party 
In British industrial relations, the third-party is 
conceived of as having three possible roles: conciliator, 
mediator or arbitrator. Conci liation is usually described 
as the most 'passive' role and is the most common form of 
intervention, probably because it is seen as supporting, 
rather than undermining, traditional principles of voluntarism 
in collective bargaining. (Figures for the Advisory Concili-
ation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), for 197$: Requests for 
13 
conci liation: 3,338, compared with 29 references to mediation 
and 391 references to arbitration). The traditional view of 
the conci liator is that of the I go-between , , providing a channel 
of communication between the parties, possibly helping them to 
assess the situation, identify common ground and convey possible 
concessions between sides without giving the appearance of a 
firm commitment from the conceding party. The mediator is 
typically described as more active and forceful than the conciliator. 
Mediation is defined by ACAS as 'a method of settling disputes 
whereby an independent third-party makes recommendations as to 
a possible solution leaving the parties to negotiate a settlement'. 
The mediator according to Warren and Bernstein (1949), must possess 
'powers of analysis and imagination, broader experience 
and knowledge, wider influence ..... His proposals may 
be .•... substantive or procedural' (p 441). 
It seems unlikely that such a clear dichotomy between the 
active and the passive roles can be maintained in practice, 
even in Britain, the relative passivity or forcefulness of 
the third-party depending rather on the nature of the dispute 
and the corresponding requirements of the parties (Warren and 
Bernstein, 1949; Indik et aI, 1966). The more clear-cut 
distinction is that between conciliation/mediation (for present 
purposes treated as closely related, if not identical) and 
arbitration. In the case of arbitration, the third-party is 
expected to determine the outcome of the dispute by making a 
decision or 'award' which the parties agree to accept beforehand 
(Lockyer, 1979). The formal responsibil ity for settlement is 
thus passed to the third-party and, because of this, arbitration 
has generally been distinguished from negotiation. The arbitrator 
is formally concerned with a judgement between party positions, 
as weI I as the production of a decision which will resolve the 
dispute (Morley and Stephenson, 1977; Magenau and Pruitt 1979). 
The Ambivalent Attitude Towards Third-Party Intervention in Britain 
British trade unionists and managers have traditionally 
been reluctant to calIon the services of a third-party, suspecting 
them of either being less than impartial and secretly favouring 
one side or the other or of being too much constrained by 
government policies. Two surveys of attitudes towards concil iation, 
one carried out in Britain (Goodman and Krislov, 1974) and one in 
Ireland (Krislov, 1975) suggest that British management are less 
favourable towards conciliation than their Irish counterparts. 
Only one-thi rd of British management, and a quarter of union 
respondents thought that management accepted conciliation enthus-
iastically, compared with approximately two-thirds of each group 
in Ireland. Only 10% of British managers and trade unionists 
thought that the unions were enthusiastic about conci liation, 
compared with over 60% of Irish managers and 40% of union 
respondents. Over 80% of Irish management and unions, compared 
with less than 50% of British respondents, thought that the 
number of strikes would increase significantly without conciliation. 
Although the difference in sample sizes, and indeed the relatively 
small samples may account for some of the findings (Irish: 120 
management, 36 union; British: 128 management, 95 union), 
the differing views apparently indicate the lack of confidence 
which the British have in conciliation. Answers to open-ended 
questions in the same survey indicate something of the British 
ambivalence. Where 70% of respondents had previously indicated 
that the conciliation officer did not help understanding of 
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the other party's position, written answers to open-ended 
questions stated that the conciliator does provide a clear 
picture of the I real positions of parties and el iminates any 
misunderstandings' (p 343). Simi larly, in set-response 
questions, approximately 80% of respondents did not feel that 
theconcrliator'helped them withdraw from a difficult position' 
(p 340), whi 1st repl ies to open-ended questions claimed that 
the conci liator allowed parties to withdraw from 'untenable 
positions without loss of face' (Goodman and Krislov, 1974, 
p 346). There are two possible inferences to be drawn from 
such conflicting results: either the British are incapable of 
answering questionnaires consistently, or some genuine confusion 
exists about the role of the conciliator, and both management 
and unions are uncertain in thei r regard for the skil Is of 
the third-party. The conciliation officers surveyed by Goodman 
and Krislov (1974) were, in contrast with the parties whom they 
serve, uniformly and, given the doubts expressed by the parties, 
necessari ly confident that the outcomes of industrial disputes 
would be less satisfactory without conci liation. 
The results of such surveys are interesting, not because 
of the light they throw on actual practices, but because they 
reflect the parties' suspicions of each other and reveal some-
thing of the image which each party wishes to create in the 
mi nds of the others. Some time ago. Ann Dougl as (1955), 
commenting on the discrepancies between mediators' accounts 
of what they do and what in fact she observed, argued that the 
dubious status of peace in American society placed the mediator 
in an ambiguous role, which in turn caused the evolution of 
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'fictions' or myths about the nature of the mediation process, 
which were \'iidely known and which are sti II reflected in the 
kinds of articles written about mediation. Hence those myths 
which describe the mediator as a 'neutral' and a 'catalyst' 
(ie unchanged at the end of the process), she argues, stem from 
a fundamental ambivalence towards peace, which results in a 
'need to purge the mediator of liabi lity for the course of 
treatment, regardless of whether the patient gets well or 
succumbs' (Douglas, 1955. p 550). In contemporary Britain. 
the third-party has to be seen simultaneously as a cure for 
industrial ills, in order to appear as especiallyskilful. to the 
parties (otherwise why should they accept his or her intervention). 
and as not responsible for the effects of the treatment, in order 
to maintain the parties ' beliefs in the essentially voluntary 
nature of the settlement and to protect the third-party from 
any possible comment or criticism. 
The third-party's mystique is furthered by descriptions 
of mediation as something of an art-form, which is not susceptible 
to systematic analysis (Cole, 1961; Meyer, 1960). Consequently 
there is very little research on the actual process of mediation: 
Rehmus (1965) concludes that it is one of the least studied areas 
of American industrial relations, and there is a dearth of 
systematic British research on the third-party. Instead. there 
are numerous articles, particularly in the American literature, 
which perpetuate the idea of mediation as an elusive and esoteric 
collection of abilities, thus promoting the view of the third-
party as a strangely insightful person, with a certain advantage 
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over the parties when it comes to the resolution of otherwise 
impossible disputes. 
The Search for the Ideal Mediator 
It has frequently been claimed that mediation techniques 
are highly individual, and dependent on personal qualities, 
making generalizations impossible (see Rehmus, 1965). This 
line of argument led to a number of studies which tried 
unsuccessfully to isolate the personalfty traits of the 
successful third-party. Landsberger (1955; 1958) 
suggests that the lintellectual aspectsl of a mediatorls 
behaviour are more closely related to his overall standing 
than Isofter l interpersonal relations variables. He compares 
mediators with group-leaders of the types identified by Bales 
(1950): those mediators who were highest on task-oriented 
ski lIs tended to be low on interpersonally-oriented ski lIs. 
Wechsler (1950) fai led to find any differences on personality 
variables between Igood l and Ipoorl mediators (as rated by 
colleagues), whi 1st other studies have gone on to show that 
mediators vary on every personality dimension and personal 
attribute imaginable, from patience and persistence to social-
mindedness. Researchers have surveyed everything from their 
marital status and debt-loads to their ski 1 Is in structuring 
and presiding over meetings (Wechsler, 1959; Weisenfeld, 1962; 
Manson, 1958). As might be expected, the array of talents and 
skills generated are suggestive of the super-human and probably 
do more to persuade parties l of the abilities of the mediator 
than they do to establish any satisfactory conclusions about the 
character of the mediation process. 
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" The Technique of the Mediator 
A number of ad hoc and mainly anecdotal studies have 
discussed the range of techniques which may be used by the 
mediator in the resolution of a dispute. These can be divided 
into four areas which affect different features of the 
bargaining process: (1) physical structuring of the situation 
(Peters, 1952); (2) procedure of meetings (Cole, 1961); 
(3) substantive contributions (providing information, making 
suggestions of possible settlement points, etc; Meyer, 1960; 
Rose, 1952; Maggiolo, 1953); and (4) interpersonal relations 
(relieving tension, providing support, controlling hostilities, 
etc;" Perez, 1959; Peters, 1958; Warren and Bernstein, 1949). 
The techniques discussed range across many levels of description 
and compound different kinds of interventions. None of the 
articles make any major attempt to explain how the mediator 
selects one strategy rather than another in relation to the 
different requirements of each dispute or different stages of 
the bargaining process. The ambiguities of bargaining. where 
one side can never be certain of the opponent's reactions to 
its moves, require sensitivity to changes in the relationship 
between parties and the flexibility to act on those changes 
(Young, 1972). Most lists of techniques open to the third-party 
offer little if any assistance in the development of such 
flexibi lity or the choice of techniques according to the changing 
situation which she.or he may face. 
There are occasional insights into the problem of 
differentiating between different types of dispute. Zack (1970) 
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distinguishes between public and private sector cases, suggesting 
that in the public sector 'the pressures and framework for 
potential settlement are less likely to be in the usual terms of 
market, unemployment levels, skill, competition ..... ' (p 264). 
Warren and Bernstein (1949) agree that the form of intervention 
must vary from case to case, since each 'has its own characteristic 
profi Ie' (p 451). They divide cases into disputes of right. which 
concern interpretation of contract terms, and disputes of interest, 
which concern the creation of new contract terms. 
There has, however, been little attempt to create a general 
framework for the analysis of disputes in relation to the third-
party's role. Without such a framework. descriptions of mediation 
wi 11 remain at the level of disconnected anecdotes, and will not 
move towards an understanding of the mediator's "supposed effective-" 
ness. Mediation emerges as an indefinable art, not easily subjected 
to analysis and difficult if not impossible to teach. 
Psychological Studies of Mediation 
Three general points emerge from the industrial relations 
and other descriptive literature on the third-party. First, the 
value of the third-party is seen as residing in hisor her ability 
to resolve otherwise intractable disputes, by the exercise of 
considerable skill and experience and by persuading the parties 
to act reasonably and compromise. Second, the parties. both 
in Britain and North America, hold ambivalent attitudes towards 
the supposed value of third-party intervention. Third, in order 
to maintain credibility in such an uncertain situation. third 
parties have a vested interest in presenting themselves as 
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highly ski lied and knowledgeable as well as impartial and, 
preferably, as above criticism from the parties. 
The Function of the Mediator 
The experimental psychologisrs·· contribution to the 
understanding of the third-party's role has not moved far 
beyond the popular view. Put in simple terms, experimental 
work has concentrated on a theory which suggests that the 
mediator is able to produce compromise and agreement by 'saving 
face' for the parties who would otherwise be unable to retreat 
from thei r current, 'untenable' positions. The experiments 
themselves have been set firmly in a concession-convergence 
model of bargaining (eg Magenau and Pruitt, 1979) and, 
consequently, are structured such that the 'success' of mediation 
has been measured solely in terms of the numbers of concessions 
made or agreements reached. Pruitt and Johnson (1970) argue 
that mediation provides the negotiator with a face-saving device, 
whereby 'he can retreat without feeling he has capitulated' 
(p 246). In standard negotiation groups (no offer of mediation), 
perceived personal strength was inversely related to the size 
of concessions made. Pruitt and Johnson argue"that the 'absence 
of such a relationship in the mediation conditions supports the 
contention that after intervention by a mediator, people are 
able to make concessions without viewing themselves as weak' 
(p 246). Examining the 'face-saving' hypothesis from the 
perspective of the opponent~. Pode! I and Knapp (1969) found that 
subjects made smaller revisions of an opponent's target and 
resistance points when concessions of the same absolute size were 
made through a mediator, rather than coming directly from the 
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opponent. Both experiements, however, base their claims 
about the beneficial effects of mediation on extremely 
restricted situations: bargaining sessions are very brief, 
communication is restricted to an exchange of bids and 
'mediation' is simply a suggestion of a settlement point. 
Given the minimal social relationship between the two 
participants, together with minimal obligation to represent 
a party position, the 'players' are probably relieved to 
be offered a quick solution. In such ci rcumstances it is 
hardly surprising that the 'mediator' saves face and appears 
to be successful in assisting participants to reach agreement. 
The suggestion of a settlement point was not successful in 
promoting agreements when task materials were more complex, 
and communication was face-to-face and unconstrained (Johnson 
and Tullar, 1972). Although the 'face-saving' function is 
often described as a requirement of the mediator's role, it 
is very unlikely that the intervention would be as simple as 
the experimental manipulation suggests and it is unnecessarily 
restrictive to concentrate only on this aspect of the third-
party's function. 
The Process of Mediation 
The third-party has always been described as able to 
achieve settlements where the parties have failed (Meyer, 1960), 
and sometimes as improving the quality of the settlement (Vidmar, 
1971). Such claims are advanced most energetically by those who 
are practising mediators themselves. Very little work, however, 
seriously questions the claim or examines the way in which the 
third-party achieves such success. Bartunek et al (1975) 
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suggest that where a possible contract zone exists, but is 
unknown to the parties, a 'content' intervention, in the form 
of a suggested settlement point in the appropriate region, 
increases the amount of money gained by both sides. The success 
of this kind of intervention of course depends on that unique 
'insight' into the dispute which the third-party is claimed" to 
have. McGrath and Julian (1963) and Vidmar (1971) have claimed 
that simulated negotiation groups with an impartial chai rman 
or mediator, present throughout, produce better quality 
decisions than groups which negotiate alone, where quality of 
outcome was measured according to how satisfactory the solution 
was to each side's initial position and in terms of an overal I 
'constructiveness' rating. 
Vidmar's (1971) mediators were instructed to help the 
group achieve a constructive solution, acceptable to both 
sides and McGrath and Julian's (1963) chai rmen were less hostile 
and more neutral than party representatives and were most active 
in structuring and controlling the p~oceedings which, given the 
nature of the task, proved vital to a successful resolution. 
Vidmar's (1971) findings, however, suggest that members of 
mediated groups did not enjoy the experience, reporting less 
task motivation, lower esteem for partners and hostility toward 
the medi ator. 
Two other studies, in this case conducted in the field, 
have attempted to link the process of mediation to its outcomes. 
These suggest that the function of the mediator is to assist 
the parties in an orderly progression through certain stages 
of the dispute, to its resolution. In an analysis of twelve 
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mediation sessions, Landsberger (1955a, b) relies on Bales' 
(1950) Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) and the phase 
movement hypothesis to suggest that the more closely a session 
adhered to a pattern characterised by the changing emphasis 
over time, firstly, on problems of orientation, secondly, on 
problems of evaluation and finally on problems of control, 
the more successful mediation was likely to be. Exploring 
the relationship between variations in the behaviour of the 
parties and the behaviour of the mediator, he found some 
indications that (1) the less supportive remarks exchanged 
by parties, the more support shown by the mediator; and (2) the 
greater the hostility between sides, the greater the mediator's 
contribution to the discussion and the higher the level of 
supportive remarks made. 
Landsberger's findings that the level of initial inter-
party hostility was negatively related to the success of 
mediation, apparently contradicts Douglas' (1962) description 
of the first stage of mediation, where, she suggests, party 
representatives take up institutionalized party positions and 
emphasise the extent of the disagreement between sides. Shows 
of interpersonal hosti lity are, however, regarded as detrimental 
to the opportunity for subtle, psychological explorations of 
bargaining positions between individuals, which form the second 
stage of mediation. The discrepancy can be explained in terms 
of Landerberger's use of Bales' IPA, which does not discriminate 
between references to parties and references to individuals. 
The distinction is essential to Douglas' account, which relies 
on the changing emphasis from interparty to interpersonal levels 
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of the debate. Douglas' field study of twelve mediation cases 
does not use a content analysis system to describe the process 
of mediation. It does, however, suggest the nature of the 
role played by the third-party, in assisting the parties 
through the three proposed stages of negotiation. Her thesis 
is that 'movement, orderly and progressive in nature, stands 
out as a staid property of the collective bargaining situation 
which terminates in agreement' (Douglas, 1957, p 57). Three 
phases necessary to satisfactory resolution of the dispute 
are identi fied: 
(1) 'Establishing the bargaining range' (p 72), characterised 
by the categorical statement of party positions, and 
emphasis of the disagreement between sides whilst 
avoiding interpersonal hosti lities; 
(2) 'Reconnoiteringthe range' (p 57) which involves careful 
exploration of positions by the individuals present 
for signs of tacit agreement;and 
(3) 'Precipitating the decision-making crisis' at which time 
'parties again take over the centre of the stage' (p 80), 
Douglas (1957). 
If such a phase movement does occur, the mediator should 
act in different ways, dependent on the stage of the dispute. 
In the fi rst phase, the management of detrimental interpersonal 
conflict is all important, whilst if negotiators have become 
fixed in untenable bargaining postures, as suggested by Peters 
(1958), the mediator must assist parties in movement into and 
through a transitional stage. The third-party will not 
necessarily enter the dispute at the beginning of the 'phase 
movement' and must therefore be able to distinguish between 
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stages and recognise the kind of assistance needed by the parties. 
Douglas' study of mediation remains the most substantial 
piece of research in the area and has proved influential in 
later models of the negotiation process * (Morley and 
Stephenson, 1977). 
Conclusion 
The apparently contradictory findings of experimental work 
have left the status of the 'face-saving' hypothesis in an 
uncertain position. Couched as it is in a restricted view of 
third-party intervention (often no more than the suggestion of 
a settlement point), experimental studies bear only a slight 
relationship to field work (Landsberger, 1955; Douglas, 1957). 
While the parties remain uncertain of the desirability of 
third-party intervention, advances in the understanding of the 
thi rd-party's functions are unlikely. The same myths about the 
feats performed by the mediator wil I continue to operate as 
substitutes for more coherent knowledge of what actually happens 
in practice. Obviously such myths serve some function for those 
who play the third-party and for those who receive their offices. 
They promote the status and acceptabi lity of the conci liator 
or mediator to the parties, by attributing to him or her superior 
wisdom and ability, and they protect him or her from comment and 
criticism, by asserting the neutrality of the third-party role. 
The experimental research has not, however, progressed very 
far towards examining the participants' preconceptions of, and 
reactions to, third-party intervention, or indeed any other 
areas pin-pointed as social-psychological by writers in industrial 
* See Chapter 6 for further discussion of Douglas' model of 
n ego t i a t i on 
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relations such as Flanders (1968) and Clegg (1979) Chapter 6. 
Instead, the definition of thi rd-party intervention handed down 
by practitioners and policy-makers has been uncritically 
accepted. The following chapter, therefore, reappraises the 
traditional view that the third-party encourages reasonableness 
and compromise and argues that the avai lable evidence provides 
an equally justifiable, but opposing view, which has received 
I ittle attention in the past. This argument would suggest that 
the disputants reactions to the third-party's presence may 
have the opposite effect to that intended, resulting in greater 
intransigence by the parties and reduced probabi lity of a 
compromise settlement. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A Simulation of the Effects of the Presence of a 
Third-Party on the Process and Outcomes of Negotiation 
But the tiger ••• the tiger ••• with them it's 
your ~ presence which upsets them 
- Krespo Munanwaga (1979) 
Ugandan ex i Ie 
Introduction 
There is one point of consensus in the American third-
party literature: the mere presence of an 'outsider', the 
third-party, changes the behaviour of the disputing parties 
(Rehmus. 1958, p.766). Peters suggests that his or her mere 
presence forces the parties to reconsider their positions and 
to merge their conflicting frames of reference. There is 
however JittJe attempt to explain why the presence of a third-
party affects the bargaining 'climate' and in what ways 
behaviour is changed. There is in short no examination of the 
meaning of the third-party's presence to the parties and it 
is sureJy on their understanding of the significance of his 
or her presence that the explanation of their changed behaviour 
res ts. 
It is possible to derive two contrasting predictions of 
how the presence of a third-party might affect behaviour. 
(j) The third-partyas the· 'voi ce of·reason' 
The first argument is derived largely from pract i t i oners 
of mediation and claims that the third-party represents, to 
the disputants, the 'voice of the community' (Cole, 1961, p.S!). 
In consequence, both sides should adopt a position which 
appears 'reasonable' to an outsider, since they cannot ignore 
the 'moral authority' vested in him or her (Warren and 
Bernstein, 1949). In the tripolar model of negotiation, 
McGrath (1966) argues that the acceptability of a settlement 
to the wider community is an influential force on negotiators' 
desires to appear reasonable and to reach a compromise with 
the opponent. 
In the presence of a third-party, therefore, participants 
should be more will ing to adopt a 'problem-oriented', co-oper-
ative stance, and negotiations should result in more compromise 
solutions. The presumed 'face-saving' role of the third-party, 
discussed in Chapter Two, can be seen to be associated with 
this line of reasoning. If 'public pressure', in the form of 
outside intervention, is brought to bear on the parties, 
negotiators can pass the responsibil ity for concessions on to 
the third-party and thus compromise with the opponent without 
appearing weak. 
(ii) The third-party as 'evaluator' 
If the third-party is, however, seen by the disputants 
as invested with external status, he or she may be perceived as 
fulfilling a primarily evaluative role (Cottrell, 1968). The 
'temperate speech' and increased politeness, discussed by 
Meyer (1960) and Peters (1958) respectively, may indicate the 
greater formal ity resulting from the presence of a third-party. 
It has been demonstrated in experiments by Morley and 
Stephenson (1977) that the more formal the communication system, 
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the lower the occurrence of interpersonal exchange, and the 
greater the attention given to the presentation and 
evaluation of cases. Participants become more party-oriented 
and positions more entrenched. Any differences in strength 
of case, which are inherent in the situation, are consequently 
more likely to become apparent. To the extent that the third-
party is seen to exert some control over the situation, party 
representatives must convince him or her of the validity of their 
bargaining position. 
Following the argument through to its conclusion, the 
presence of a third-party should result in a more competitive, 
party-oriented stance, with fewer compromise solutions and 
more straight victories for one side. 
One experiment which has measured the effects of a 
silent observer on the process and outcomes of negotiation 
(Belliveau and Stolte, 1977) offers some support to the latter 
prediction. The presence of a third-party ~ncreased the 
numbers of offers made in negotiation dyads, but had no effect 
on the number of agreements reached. Increased attention to 
the task may have resulted in an increased number of offers, 
without affecting agreements. Bellfveau and Stolte (1977) do 
not examine the nature of those agreements which were made. 
Consequently no conclusions can be drawn about whether the 
presence of an observer benefited one side or the other, or 
in any way improved the quality of agreements. The number of 
agreements reached is, at best, a limited indicator of the 
effects of a third-party. The findings also demonstrate the 
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potential value of a system of content analysis which 
describes more of the debate than numbers of offers made: 
the correlation (rho) between number of offers and agree-
ments was as low as .21. As long as participants have 
sufficient background material to al low some discussion of 
the issues, the content analysis system should be able to 
account for the effects of the third-party's presence on. 
process as well as outcomes. 
The Significance of the Simulation 
Given the limited knowledge of third-party intervention 
and the conclusions reached in the precedtng chapter on the 
ambivalent attitudes of British managers and trade unionists, 
the above discussion offerred_ a clear starting point for the 
analysis of the third-party role in collective disputes. The 
examination of the effects of a silent observer on negotiation, 
in the light of the two views of the third-party as 'voice of 
reason and force forcompromise
' 
or as 'evaluator', should 
provide the first step towards explaining the psychological 
significance of a third-party's presence for the parties. 
The effects of the 'mere presence' of a third-party cannot be 
measured easily in the field, where the third-party is unlikely 
to be a passive observer and there are no obvious control 
groups. The laboratory setting therefore allowed a simplfied 
model of the real situation to be created while maintaining 
a realistic negotiation task, constructed after the 'role-
playing debate' paradigm (Morley and Stephenson, 1977). 
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In general, simulation of this type 'attempts to identify 
the essential aspects of the task situation and to translate as 
many as possible of these into experimental terms' (Morley and 
Stephenson, 1977, p.43) with the aim of drawing conclusions which 
will apply to the real world. The role playing debate itself 
aims to simulate a collective bargaining situation which allows 
confl ict over inputs as well as over outcomes and which requires 
the participants to act as representatives of the particular 
groups in dispute. Communication between the representatives is 
unrestricted and the task materials, which are used as the basis 
for the debate, identify the terms of the particular dispute. 
The Aims of the Present Experiment 
The present experiment aimed to evaluate the effect of the 
mere presence of a third-party on the process and outcomes of 
negotiation. Two variables were manipulated: the status of the 
third-party (Expert or Naive), and the strength of case 
(management strong or union strong). The main prediction was 
that the party with the stronger case would be more likely to win 
when a third-party, particularly the Expert, constituted a third 
member of the negotiation group. This and oiher expectations are 
discussed in the following section. 
METHOD 
The identity of the third-party, as understood by the 
participants, is clearly an important factor contributing to the 
effect of his or her presence. The 'status' of the third-party 
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was therefore systematically varied between conditions. In the 
'Naive' condition, the third-party was described as a third year 
undergraduate attending as part of required course work. In the 
'Expert' condition, on the other hand, the third-party was 
described as a postgraduate student with experience in industrial 
relations. In each case the observer was instructed to maintain 
an interested but neutral attitude, avoiding eye-contact as far 
as possible. The first expectation, following the argument in 
the Introduction to this chapter, was that the presence of a 
third-party, and especially The Expert, would result in a more 
pronounced interparty orientation than would occur in the Alone 
condition (Hypothesis I). 
The interparty orientation should be manifested in the 
process of debate and decision-making. This was examined using 
Conference Process Analysis (c.p.a.) (see Morley and Stephenson, 
1977), a category system designed for describing behaviour in 
negotiation groups, which is particularly sensitive to comparisons 
bearing directly on the question of the participants' concern with 
the task as a representative of a party (see also Stephenson, 
Kniveton and Morley, 1977, for an example of the detailed use of 
this system in the description of an industrial w~ge negotiation* 
* For further discussion of Conference Process Analysis see pages 
108- 112. 
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In addition, the actual agreements reached should differ 
between the experimental conditons. The presence of the third-
party and, in particular, the Expert, should encourage the 
participants to achieve a solution which reflects the relative 
strengths of case of the two parties in dispute. 'Strength of 
case' was varied systematically, giving first one and then the 
other side the stronger case. Settlements should reflect 
relative strengths of case more in the 'third-party' than in 
the 'alone' condition, this being reflected in a significant 
interaction between third-party presence and strength of case 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Third-party Presence and Role Relationships 
In this experiment subjects enacted the role of management 
or trade union representative. Each participant should have 
some conception of the behaviour typrcally attached to such 
roles. 
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The presence of a third-party may make participants more 
conscious of their representative role, such that the differences 
in their respective positions are made more sal ient than when they 
negotiate alone. In this case, behaviour should become more 
conventionalised, and reflect commonly held stereotypes about 
management-union relationships. Stephenson, Ayling and Rutter 
(1976) showed that when the role relationship was more apparent 
(as in 'face-to-face' rather than 'audio-only' interactions), 
students defending attitudes favourable to management were more 
likely to take the initiative. In that experiment, as in this one, 
such students were selected for roles according to their attitude 
scores on standardized test of attitudes towards industrial 
relations. The authors suggested that social class differences 
between the two groups of management-oriented and union-oriented 
subjects may have contributed to the interaction between role and 
medium of communication. In this case, it was anticipated that 
management subjects, possibly more accustomed to 'publ ic speaking', 
by virtue of their social and educational background, would be 
more I ikely to seek to validate their position as managers, by 
taking the initiative, in the 'third-party' condition than they 
would in the 'alone' condition.' 'This would have the effect of 
making victories for management less likely to occur in the 
'alone' than in the other two conditions (Hypothesis 3). 
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.. PROCEDURE 
Undergraduate students were given a short questionnaire 
designed to assess attitudes towards industrial relations (see 
Stephenson and Dewey, 1976). The results were used to select a 
group of 18 students distinctly favourable towards trade unions 
and a further 18 who were favourable towards management. These 
were randomly paired to form 18 dyads, each dyad consisting of 
one subject favourable towards management and another favourable 
towards trade unions. The task of each pair was to come to an 
agreed decision on a dispute affecting the 'Townsford Company'. 
Instructions were as follows: 
Instructions 
This is an experiment about industrial relations. 
You have been assigned the role of union (management) 
representative in a mock industrial dispute. Please 
read these thoroughly - you have 30 minutes study time. 
You will then be asked to take your assigned role in 
the negotiation, with another person, who has the 
opposing role. You wi 11 have 30 minutes in which to 
reach agreement with the opposing side. You may make 
notes, during the study time, if you wish. You will 
be able to keep both notes and information sheets 
th roughout. 
Assignment as Co~paMy (Union)N~gotiator 
You have been selected by the Townsford Company (the 
Union) to represent it in its negotiations with the 
Union. Negotiations for a new 2-year contract broke 
down last week. You are to do the best you possibly 
can to get a good settlement of the contract for the 
company (union). It is essential to "the company 
(union) that the contract be settled in this bargaining 
period. We real ise that this involves compromises on 
both sides, and you are appointed to carry out binding 
negotiations for us. 
Five major issues were negotiated - sick pay, hourly wage 
rate, cost of living increases, night shift differentials, and 
holiday pay. The participants received background material 
describing the rates paid by other firms, including an average 
for other industries in the country (the ·going-rate t ). 
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Data from an Independent Community Survey (last year) 
The following table gives information on Townsford, four other 
textile plantsand averages for non-textile industries in the 
country. The Moss plant and the Rose plant employ highly 
skilled workers. 
Townsford Moss Rose Baxter Kraft Average for 
other industries 
in the country 
No. of workers 100 300 90 ISO 300 60 
Sick pay scheme 1/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 0 , 1 
Hourly wage 
rate 80p 83p 83p 75p 77p 8Sp 
Cost of 1 iving No camp. Yes Yes No Yes Half 
increases full full camp. fu II compensation 
compo compo camp. 
Night shift 
4 different i a 1 2 5 4 4 
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Paid vacation 3 wks 3 wks 3 wks 3 wks 3 wks 3 wks for 1 year 
for 1 for 1 for 1 for 1 for 1 4 wks for 
year year year year- year- 15 years 
4 wks 
for 
20yrs 
Issues for Bargaining 
1; Sick Pay Scheme 
Past contract: Company pay 1/4 of normal wages minus 
state benefit 
Union demanded that company make up wages in full. 
Company refused to pay more than 1/4 of difference. 
COMPANY 
Total money 
value per 
2 yea rs 
2. Wages 
PROPORTrON OF COMPANY PAYMENT· 
1/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 
o 12,000 24,000 36,000 
Past contract: 80p per hour 
Union demanded an increase of 8p per hour. 
Company refused outright. 
UNION 
INCREASE PER HOUR 
COMPANY 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 UNION 
Total 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 
money 
value 
per 2 
years 
3. Sl iding Pay Scale to conform to Cost of Living 
Past Contract: pay scale is fixed through the terms of the contract. 
Union demanded pay increase in proportion to increase in the cost 
of 1 iving. Company rejected outright. 
COMPANY 
Total 
money 
value 
per 2 
years 
No Quarter Half Three- Full 
compen- compen- compen- quarters compen-
sation sat ion sat ion compen- sat ion 
sat i on 
_______________________________________ UNION 
o 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 
4. Night Shift Differential 
5. 
Past Contract: an extra 2p per hour is paid for night work. 
Union demanded a 2p 
Company rejected. 
COMPANY 0 t 
Tota 1 0 250 
money 
value 
per 2 
years 
Vacat ion Paz: 
increase to 4p per hour. 
.. INCREASE PER HOUR 
1 . lt2 21 3 4 UNION 
500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 
Past Contract: 3 weeks paid vacation for all workers with one 
year's service. 
Union wanted 4 weeks paid vacation for workers with 10 years of 
service. 
Company rejected. 
COMPANY. 3 wks for 4 k f 15 4 wks for 10 UNION 3 wks for 20 w s or 
yrs serviceyrs service yrs service yrs service 
Total 
money 
value 
per 2 
years 
o 500 2000 5000 
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In addition, Background Information, which constituted the mani-
pulation of 'strength of case', was provided as follows: 
Union Strong Case 
Townsford Texti Ie Company - Background Information 
The Townsford Company is a small textile company located in a large 
northern town. Townsford is highly respected for its qual ity work in 
the dyeing and finishing of raw woven fabrics. It employs approx-
imately 100 men. Townsford's men are among the most ski lIed to be 
found in the area. 
The general business conditions of the town are good and the finan-
cial conditions of Townsford are stable. Townsford is operating at 
ful I capacity and has a six month backlog of orders. Profits are 
not as high as at previous times, however, since the company has not 
raised the prices in several years in order to maintain a good 
competitive position with other sections of the industry. The 
company has been able to maintain a 6% shareholders' dividend and 
has made recen t purchases of more modem equ i pmen t. Consequen t 1 y, 
with the co-operation of the union, restrictive and protective 
practices, eg over-manning, interdepartmental transfer and task 
flexibility, were decreased. 
The personnel policies at Townsford are not the most modern but 
are average for the plant size. The past president of the company, 
who retired three months ago, valued the reputation of Townsford as 
a 'good place to work'. His successor is viewed with some suspicion 
by the workers, due mainly to his statements. about changing more of 
the work procedures to achieve greater efficiency. 
For the last 25 years, a majority of the employees have been members 
of the union. Relations of the union with the company, for the most 
part, have been quite good with grievances promptly discussed and 
settled. The first strike occurred, however, three years ago and 
lasted IS days. The workers lost the fight for a sliding scale wage 
based on increases in the cost of living index but did get the sick 
pay scheme, a 2 pence per hour wage differential for night shift 
workers and several other minor fringe benefits. 
Townsford's wage scale of 80p per hour compares unfavourably with most 
other textile firms; it is considerably lower than those textile firms 
which employ workers of equivalent high ski'll and produce a similar 
high qual ity product. Wages in the industry have not increased in 
proportion to increases in the cost of living or increases in other 
industries. 
Despite occasional small wage increases, over a period of years 
Townsford's workers have slipped from a relatively high pay scale 
to a position roughly equivalent to that of lowly skilled workers 
in other industries. This has caused some unrest among the workers and 
there is some danger of the workers shifting into these other higher 
paying industries. Unemployment is below normal in the area, and 
it has been difficult to obtain replacements who meet the skill 
requirements at Townsford. 
Townsford gives seven paid holidays and three weeks of paid vacation 
to all workers with at least one year of service. The company also 
pays some sick pay contributions and grants other fringe benefits. 
More deta i led information on Townsford and other fi rms may be found 
in the table that accompanies this background information. 
The three year contract has now expired. Negotiations for a 
further two year contract broke down in the final week with both 
sides adamant in their positions. The only agreement reached 
was that each side would select a new bargaining agent to represent 
it, scheduled to meet today (the day before the strike) in an 
attempt to reach a quick solution and avoid a long strike. 
Management Strong Case 
Townsford Textile Company - Background Information 
The Townsford Company is a small textile company located in a large 
northern town. Townsford is respected for the consistent quality 
of its work in the dyeing and finishing of raw woven fabrics. It 
employs approximately 100 semi-skilled men. 
General business conditions of the town are good, but the financial 
conditions of Townsford are increasingly unstable. The backlog 
of orders has fallen, while profits have decreased with the rising 
costs of raw materials and transport. 
The company has raised its prices to cover a recent wage increase, 
but is unable to pass full costs on to customers, if it is to 
maintain a competitive position with other sections of the industry. 
If the Union would co-operate with the company in the purchase and 
manning of more modern equipment, i'mprovements in efficiency would 
in the long-term aid the company's financial position. The Union 
have, however, refused any discussion of re-organisation and 
consequent reduction of restrictive practices. 
The personnel policies at Townsford are not the "most modern but 
are better than those of most plants of the same size. The past 
president of the company, who retired three months ago, valued 
the reputation of Townsford as a 'good place to work'. His 
successor intends to continue with the same objectives. 
For the last 25 years a majority of employees have been members 
of the union. Relations of the union with the company have been 
quite good, with grievances promptly discussed and settled. The 
first strike occurred, however, three years ago and lasted 15 days. 
The workers did not get a sliding-scale wage based on increases in 
the cost of living index, but obtained an hourly wage rate 
increase, a sick-pay scheme, a 2p per hour wage differential for 
night shift workers and several other fringe benefits. 
Townsford's wage scale compares very favourably with most other 
textile firms. It is 4% below textile firms which employ workers 
of a higher level of skill, producing a higher quality product, 
but ranks higher than firms employing workers of a similar level 
of skill. Wages in the industry have increased in proportion to 
increases in other industries, and, to some extent, with increases 
in the cost of living. 
With fairly regular wage increases over a period of years, 
Townsford's workers have remained on a high pay scale, relative 
to that of lowly skilled workers in other industries. 
Unemployment is at an average level in the area: it should not be 
very difficult to obtain replacements of similar skill. Management 
are, however, reluctant to dismiss employees of some years standing. 
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Townsford gives seven paid holidays and three weeks of paid 
vacation to all workers with at least one year of service. The 
company also pays some sick pay contributions and grants other 
fringe benefits. More detailed information on Townsford and 
other firms may be found in the table that accompanies this 
background information. 
The three year contract has now expired. Negotiations for a 
further two year contract broke down in the final week with 
both sides adamant in their positions. The only agreement reached 
was that each side would select a new bargaining agent to 
represent it, scheduled to meet today (the day before the strike) 
in an attempt to reach a quick solution and avoid a long strike. 
The effectiveness of the manipulation of strength of case was 
determined in advance by successively re-writing the material until 
independent groups of subjects rated the respective information as 
more favourable to the Union or to the Management, respectively. 
The 18 dyads were randomly allocated to one of three third-
party conditions as follows: 
Expert Observer - in this condition the observer was 
described as an experienced postgraduate student who had considerable 
knowledge of industrial relations, and who would like to sit in on 
their discussions. 
Naive Observer - In this condition the observer was described 
as an undergraduate student who would like to sit in on their 
discussions. 
Alone - In this condition the subjects came to their decisions 
with no other person present. 
The six dyads: in each condition were randomly allocated to 
three Strong Union Case and three Strong Company Case conditions. 
All sessions were audio taperecorded, and recordings later 
transcribed in full. 
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RESULTS 
The outcomes are presented in Table 1 in terms of 
deviations from the going-rate (i.e. the company average 
figure) summed across all five issues. 
Effectiveness of Experimental Manipulation 
The manipulation of strength of case appears to have 
been effective, the unions averaging £5,917 above the 
going-rate when their case is strong, but conceding an 
average of £2,750 below the going-rate when the management 
case is strong. Employing Mann-Whitney U test, this 
difference reaches statistical significance in the Alone 
condition at the 5% level, and over all conditions at the 
10% level. 
Does the presence of a third-party assist the party with 
the stronger case (Hypothesis 2) 
There is a distinct lack of evidence for the expected 
interaction between third-party status and Strength of Case. 
It was expected that the presence of an Observer would 
exaggerate the effect of Strength of Case. _Unfortunately 
for the hypothesis, the Alone condition finds most impressively 
for the unions in both Union Strong and Management Strong 
conditions, and the Expert condition shows least difference 
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TABL E 1 Settt~ment-points summed over the 5 issues, and 
expressed as deviations from the 'going-rater 
in 18 dyadic negotiation groups 
Strength of Case 
Management strong 
I 
I 
Union strong 
Management strong 
Union strong 
Naive observer 
Expert observer 
Alone 
Th i rd-pa rty status 
Naive Observer Expert Observer 
-
1 _ 
-13,000 f x ... 19 500 K II ' I-l,cv~ I 4-ltib -1 
- 1,500 1 9,500 
250 1- 9,000 
I 
>c I 6,500 
''1,'l/h.1 T I 4,000 .... 1-3"'~.11 
23,250 
0 
x 
-£2,750 
£5,917 
2,583 
~ 5,000 
7, ) 67 
,-11,000 
I - 4,000 
I 
Alone 
-1,000 
6,000 
1 ,500 
-
15,500 
10,500 
8,500 
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between Management and Union Strong case conditions. 
Although the Strength of Case manipulation was effective, 
there is no evidence for its differential effectiveness 
in the presence of a thi rd-party. 
Does the presence of a third-party influence which side 
wi II be victorious? (Hypothesis 3) 
The discussion of the findings of Stephenson, Ayl ing 
and Rutter (1976) suggested that the third-party presence 
should induce the management representatives to assume a 
more authoritative role, and, hence influence the outcome 
in favour of the management side. This did in fact occur. 
In the Alone condition, the unions consistently scored 
above the 'going-rate ' - to the tune of more than £7,000 on 
average - whereas in the two Observer conditions, and 
especially in the Expert Observer condition, management were 
considerably more successful J the average in the Expert 
groups being £5,000 below the 'going-rate' (see Table 1). 
Again employing Mann-Whitney U, the six groups in the Alone 
condition score significantly higher (p.=OS) than those in 
the two third-party groups combined, and significantly higher 
than those in the Expert condition (p =.021). The Alone 
and Naive Observer conditions differed at only the 10% level 
of significance. In this experiment, the presence of an 
external observer strengthened the hand of management 
regardless of strength of case, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. 
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Do the third-parties increase orientation to presentation 
of party positions? (Hypothesis 1) 
The outcomes of experimental negotiation groups have 
rarely been effectively related to the process of decision-
making. In this case the results of applying Conference 
Process Analysis (c.p.a.) categories to the negotiation 
transcripts are examined, and considered in the I ight of 
the principal findings with respect to outcomes. 
CPA provides two sets of rules, first for dividing 
transcripts into Acts, each 'act'making a single 'point', 
and a second set for classifying each act according to 
its Mode, Resource and Referent (see Morley and Stephenson, 
1977, Chapter 10). The version employed in the simulation 
is portrayed in Figure 1. Following Longabaugh (1963), each 
act is categorised according to the'meaning of the act for 
the . relationship as a relationship' (p.324). 
The Mode dimension indicates how information is 
exchanged; the Resource dimension indicates the function of 
the information and the Referent dimension indicates who is 
being (expl icitly) talked about or referred to. 
The use of c.p.a. categories is illustrateq in the 
fol lowing hypothetical exchange: 
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A. Perhaps it would be best if we agreed to 
treat this negotiation as a package deal. 
B. I think that's a reasonable suggestion. 
A. On second thoughts, no. Wouldn't it be 
best to examine each issue one by one? 
A. Trust you to suggest that. It's to your 
advantage. 
A. OK. Let's just split down the middle on 
eve ry iss ue . 
A. Perhaps it would be best 
if we agreed to treat 
this negotiation as a 
package dea I . 
B. I think that's a 
reasonable suggestion 
A. On second thoughts, no. 
A. Wouldn't it be best to 
examine each issue one 
by one. 
B. Trust you to say that. 
B. It's to you r 
advantage 
A. OK 
A. Let's just split down 
the middle on every 
issue. 
MODE RESOURCE REFERENT 
Offer Procedure Both pe rsons 
Accepts Procedure Self 
Rejects Procedure No referent 
Seeks P rocedu re No referent 
Offers Acknowledge- Other 
ment minus 
Offers Acknowledge- Opponent 
ment minus 
Accept Acknowledge- No referent 
ment minus 
Offers Settlement Both persons 
point 
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FIGURE 1 - Conference Process Analysis (CPA) categories 
employed in the classification of each 'act' 
(after Morley & Stephenson, 1977) in the 
simulated negotiations. 
MODE RESOURCE REFERENT 
Offer 
2 Accept 
3 Reject 
4 Seek 
Structuring Activity 
P rocedu re 
Outcome Activity 
2 Settlement-point 
3 Limits 
4 Positive 
consequences of 
outcomes 
5 Negative 
consequences of 
outcomes 
6 Other statements 
about outcomes 
Acknowledgement Activity 
7 Acknowledgement 
Plus 
8 Acknowledgement 
Minus 
Information"Activity 
9 Information 
0 No refe rent 
Self 
2 Other 
3 Party 
4 Opponent 
5 Both persons 
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Incidence of c.p.a. Acts": a further test of the 
effectivenss of Experimental Manipulation 
Asa further indication of the effectiveness of the 
strength of case manipulation, the total incidence of 
c.p.a. acts was examined. Strength of case had a marked 
effect. When the union case was strong, the shop 
stewards contributed 56.0% of all acts, management only 
44.0%. With a strong management case, this figure rose 
to 53.9% and that of the union fell to 46.1%, the differences 
being statistically significant beyond the 5% level. 
Overal I Effects of third-party presence 
In the Introduction to this Chapter two strands of argument, 
resulting in contrasting expectations about the. effects of 
the presence of a third-party were discussed. The first 
approach, derived largely from those in the practical business 
of mediation, suggested that the effect of -a thi rd party should 
be to make participants more 'reasonable'. The other, derived 
from laboratory studies by Morley and Stephenson (1977), 
suggested that the presence of the third-party should reduce 
the sal ience of interpersonal exchange and, hence, increase 
the inter-party orientation of the negotiation group, resulting 
in fewer compromises and greater intransigence. The term 
*N.B. Two sessions were recorded so poorly that no transcript 
was available for analysis. Results are, therefore, 
based on 16 negotiations only. 
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linter-party orientation ' indicates the concern of the 
participants with being effective representatives, at the 
expense of maintaining harmonious personal relationships with 
other group members. Morley and Stephenson (1977), 
Stephenson, Kniveton and Morley (1977) and Stephenson, Ayl ing 
and Rutter (1976) have discussed the differences that exist 
between interaction in situations which favour interpersonal 
and those which favour inter-party exchange. It is 
suggested here that the third-party wi I 1 increase the 
representatives
' 
awareness of their role obligations, 
resulting in increased emphasis on the exchange between 
parties, at the expense of the interpersonal relationship. 
On the basis of results obtained in the studies cited 
above, deductions were made about the correlation of each 
c.p.a. category with task orientation, and predictions then 
made concerning the association between each c.p.a. category 
and third-party presence. Table 2 lists these predictions. 
In general third-party presence is expected to result in 
increased emphasis on the representative role (e.g. use of 
Party and Opponent as referents). increased bell igerence 
(e.g. use of Limits, Negative Consequences of Out~omes, and 
Acknowledgement minus as Resources, and Reject as a Mode) 
and increased attention to the presentation of case, and 
probing of the opponent's case (e.g. use of Modes - Offer, 
Seek; and Resource - Information). Conversely, third-party 
presence should decrease interpersonal considerations (e.g. 
use of Referents - Self, Other and Both Persons; and use of 
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. Resource - Acknowledgement plus) and decrease movement 
towards a conclusion (e.g. use of Resources - Procedure 
and Settlement Points; and use of Mode - Accept). 
In 12 out of the 18 instances, both Naive and the 
Expert observers had the predicted effect, i.e. those groups 
negotiating in the presence of an observer had a higher or 
lower incidence of the c.p.a. category than the Alone groups, 
as predicted in Table 2. The exceptions were Modes - Offer, 
Reject and Seek; Resources - Limits and Acknowledgement plus; 
and Referent - Self. Of these, only one (Acknowledgement plus) 
indicated the reverse trend to that predicted in both observer 
conditions. The overall pattern, however, was clearly in the 
expected direction, with twice as many ~ategories (12) fulfilling 
expectations as would be expected by chance (6). 
This yelds a chi-square of 11.86 (2df; p<.Ol). The Referent 
dimension, in particular, points to the increased inter-party 
orientation in the third-party conditions. In the Alone condition 
there was less reference overall to persons and parties, and what 
reference there was tended to persons. In the third-party 
conditions, on the other hand, references tended towards the 
Parties. Differences in the Mode dimension showed greater 
positive response in the Alone condition (increased use of 
Accepts) and on the Resource dimension those negotiating in 
the presence of a third-party were more i~lined to criticise 
(Acknowledgement minus, Negative Consequences of Proposed 
Outcomes), whereas the Alone groups were more constructive 
(Posittve Consequenc~s of Proposed Outcomes). 
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TABLE 2 
Modes 
Resources 
Referents 
CODE: 
* 
Predicted and obtained association of CPA categories 
with presence of third-party 
Predicted Positive 
Association Result 
Predicted Negative 
Association Result 
Offer Accept 
Reject 
Seek 
Li mi ts * Procedure ,~ -I; 
Negative consequences ** Settlement-point ~': if: 
of outcomes 
Acknowledgement ** Acknowledgement 
minus p, .... s-
I nformat ion ** 
Party 
Opponent Self 
Other 
Both persons 
Both Third-Party (Expert and Naive) conditions differ from 
Alone condition in predicted direction. 
One Third-party condition differs from Alone condition in 
predicted direction. 
Neither Observer condition differs from Alone condition in 
predicted direction. 
50 
'Procedure ' has frequently been shown to be associated with 
a joint problem-solving approach to the business in hand (see 
especially Stephenson, 1978; and Stephenson, Kniveton and 
Morley, 1977), and the increased incidence of Settlement Points 
and Other Statements about Outcomes in the Alone condition may 
indicate a greater readiness to reach agreement than in the 
third-party condition. In the presence of a third-party, parti-
cipants seemed to 'talk around' the issues (increased use of 
information). The (unexpected) increased Acknowledgement plus 
probably indicates an increased formal politeness in the third-
party condition. The overall pattern suggests that, by 
increasing the emphasis on participants' obligations to 
represent a party position, the presence of a third-party 
stresses the existence of the inter-party conflict, and makes 
a more personally oriented, problem-solving approach to the 
issues less I ikely to occur. 
Further c.p.a. analysis of the Interactions between 
presence of a Third-Party and Role 
Although the overall pattern of results indicated that the 
presence of third-parties could, if anything, enhance the 
dimensions of the confl ict between parties, ANOVA showed no 
statistically significant differences between conditions on 
individual c.p.a. categories. There were, however, a number of 
statistically significant interactions which, although not 
specifically predicted, were sufficiently interesting to merit 
some tentative discussion. 
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One of the principal determinants of outcomes concerned 
the apparent effect of the observer, especially the Expert, on 
the balance of the relationship between the parties. 
Observers increased the success of management, a finding thought 
to be partly due to a heightening of manage~en~'s conventional 
'leadership' role when under publ ic scrutiny. Is there any 
evidence for this in the c.p.a. results? There was some 
evidence (not statistically significant) that role differentia-
tion was increased in the presence of a third party. Management 
became more critical and less conciliatory, whilst the union 
representative moved in the opposite direction, in a number of 
instances. For example, the union representatives made more 
use of Acknowledgement plus (i.e. 'praise' and 'respect') 
directed towards management in the thi rd-party conditions, 
whilst management representatives made less use of such statements. 
With respect to Negative Consequences of Proposed Outcomes -
statements concerning the disadvantages of proposals - the union 
side tended to decrease this form of bell igerance when a third-
party was present, whereas the management representatives 
increased such behaviour, and the Positive Consequences of Proposed 
Outcomes category showed the reverse pattern. 
Further evidence for role differentiation when exposed to 
third-parties comes from two highly significant three-way interac-
tions. These indicate that Strength of Case may affect tactical 
adaptation to the third party's presence. The use of the Reject 
mode is of interest, in relation to changes made by management 
between the Alone and the thi rd-party conditions. The patterns of 
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TABLE 3 Percentage of CPA acts classified as Mode: Rejec~ calculated 
separately for Management and Union contributions in 
different thi rd-party conditions according to 
Strength of Case 
Third-Party Union Strong Case Management 
Status Mgmt. Union Mgmt, 
Naive 4.46 2.98 0.20 
Expert 0.78 3.32 1. 35 
Alone 1.92 1.42 0.80 
Analysis of Variance: Mode - Reject 
Source SOS OF 
A 12.7711 
B 2.8566 2 
C 1.9890 
AS 11.8083 2 
AC 0.7520 
BC 1.7458 2 
ABC 13.6455 2 
A - Strength of Case 
B - Observer Presence/Absence 
C - Management/Union Role 
VE 
12.7711 
1.4283 
1.9890 
5.9041 
0.7520 
0.8729 
6.8228 
F 
2.32 
0.26 
2.28 
1. 07 
0.86 
1.00 
7.82 
Strong Case 
Union 
1.38 
0.76 
2.66 
OF2 P 
10 0.15830 
10 0.77609 
10 0.16203 
10 0.37773 
10 0.37510 
10 0.40175 
10 0.00903 
change are quite different depending on which party has the 
stronger case, and the direction of change depends on the 
status of the third-party. When the union had a strong case, 
management rejected their proposals consistently if the 
observer was Naive (~=4.46) but adopted the reverse 
strategy when the observer was said to be an Expert (~= 0.78). 
'Naivety' and 'Expertise', however, el icited quite the opposite 
trends when management itself had the strong case. 
This indicates that participants in the two roles are 
affected differently by the presence of a third-party, and that 
these differences vary according to the status of the thi rd-party. 
The picture is further elaborated by two more three-way interac-
tions. Table 4 shows the incidence of Resource Limits, that is 
statements which 'set I imi ts' to an agreement wi thout making 
a specific proposal of a settlement point. Limits are frequently 
employed as an excuse for· intransigence: e.g. statements to the 
effect that' it is the Board' or 'the workforce' who insist on a 
particular figure: the negotiator's hands are tied. It is 
interesting to note first the difference between the two manage-
ment conditions in the Alone groups. When management had the 
upper hand they were more I ikely to set I imi ts (~=: 5.50) than 
when the union was strong (~= 1.60). This picture changes in the 
presence of a third party; then, given a strong case, the 
management representatives showed the reverse pattern. The 
presence of the third-party made them less likely to set limits, 
i.e. they exploited their advantage less in the presence of a 
third-party. On the other hand, when the union had the stronger 
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TABLE 4 Percentage of CPA acts classified as Resource: 
Limits calculated separately for Management and 
Union contributions, in difference Third-Party 
conditions according to strength of case. 
Th i rd-pa rty Union Strong Case Management Strong Case 
S ta tus Mgmt. Union 
Naive 6.53 1.89 
Expert 3.45 4.24 
Alone 1. 60 3. 14 
Analysis of Variance. Resource: Limits 
Source SOS OF VE 
A 0.0824 0.0824 
B 14.0101 2 7.0050 
C 0.1249 0.1249 
AB 20.4314 2 10.2157 
AC 3.1873 3.1873 
BC 3.5227 2 1.7614 
ABC 46.2784 2 23.1392 
A - Strength of Case 
B - Observer Presence/Absence 
C - Management/Union Role 
F 
0.01 
0.45 
0.03 
0.66 
0.67 
0.37 
4.84 
Mgmt. Union 
3.08 6.25 
1. 39 2.23 
5.50 3.03 
OF2 P 
10 0.94325 
10 0.64811 
10 0.87478 
10 0.53764 
10 0.43303 
10 0.70062 
10 0.03380 
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case, the third-party presence seemed to encourage management 
representatives to adopt this particular form of intransigence, 
and the incidence of Limits increased. 
Table 5 portrays the results for the use of Referent Self. 
The Referent dimension is used only when a person or party 
involved in the negotiation is expl iCitly referred to in the 
act, and 'self' is coded only if the act contains no other 
referent. Use of the Referent dimension has ;M the past been 
shown to be a useful indicator of task involvement and confl ict, 
with references to Party (one1s own side) and Opponent (the 
other side) being particularly good indicators of the involvement 
of the negotiators as party representatives (Morley & 
Stephenson, 1977). Inspection of Table 5 shows that variation 
in the union representative's behaviour largely accounted for 
the statistically significant interaction. When the union 
representative had the stronger case, he was roor e 'sel f-
opinionated
' 
when Alone, whereas when faced by strong 
management, he became roore self-opinionated in the presence 
of a third-party, especially the Expert. 
In summary, it is clear that for both management and 
union representatives their response to one another, and to 
differences in their relative power positions, was determined, 
at least in part, by the presence and status (expert or naive) 
of a third-party. In general, management differentiatedroore 
- acted roore strategically - between conditions. But the roost 
important finding is that the significance of their role 
relationship was changed by the presence of a third-party. 
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TABLE 5 Percentage of CPA acts classified as Referent: Self, 
calculated separately for Management and Union 
contributions, in different third-party conditions 
according to strength of case. 
Third-party Union Strong Case Hanagement Strong Case 
Status Mgmt. Union Mgmt. Union 
Naive 5.47 8.64 5.27 9. 16 
Expert 8.43 7.82 8.74 12.65 
Alone 5. 11 17. 12 6.81 5.89 
Analysis of Variance. Referent: Self 
Source SOS DF VE F DF2 p 
A 3.5380 3.5380 0.15 10 0.70621 
8 28.0548 2 14.0274 0.60 10 0.56914 
C 98.5321 98.5321 10.18 10 0.00964 
AB 71.8784 2 35.9392 1.53 10 0.26349 
AC 12.6501 12.6501 1. 31 10 0.27954 
BC 19.4389 2 9.7194 1.00 10 0.40043 
ABC 108.2700 2 54. 1350 5.59 10 0.02342 
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SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS 
1. The mere presence of a third-party, especially an 
expert, is sufficient to change the agreements reached 
by negotiation groups. 
2. The presence of a third-party does not necessarily 
favour the party with the stronger case. There was no 
evidence for the expected interaction between third-
party presence and strength of case in the present 
experiment. 
3. The main effect of the third-party was to increase 
the salience of the role relationship between the 
participants, in this case strengthening the position 
of the management role. This is reflected in a tendency 
for management representatives to improve their 
performance in the third-party conditions. 
4. There was evidence to suggest that the importance 
of the interpersonal relationship was reduced in the 
presence of a third-party, which, compared with the Alone 
condition, resulted in increased emphasis on the dis-
agreement between parties and less concern with co-operative 
problem-solving. 
5. Conference process analysis suggested that the effect 
of the third-party's presence on role relationships varies 
in complex ways according to strength of case. 
The participants in this experiment clearly interpreted 
the presence of the third-party as primarily evaluative in 
nature not as encouraging 'reasonableness' and compromise. 
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The effect is more pronounced when 'expert' status is 
attributed to the observer, which it may be conjectured is 
similar to that status traditionally attributed to the 
third-party. The significance attached to the observer 
emphasised the inter-party dispute. increased task-
orientation and differentially affected the performance 
of management and union roles. benefiting the management 
side. 
The result is surprising, since it contradicts the 
common belief that the third-party has an ameliorative 
influence on unresolved conflict. 
The general ity of the result is of course open to 
question. The simulation examined only the simplest 
aspect of the third-party's role and its significance for 
inexperienced 'negotiators', who may be more susceptible 
to impressions of being evaluated than practising 
negotiators. In real ity, the third-party generally assumes 
a n~re active part in proceedings and the decisions 
reached have long-term consequences both for the relation-
ship between party representatives and for their 
constituents. 
Nothwithstanding the real istic nature of the task 
materials, the extent to which all relevant aspects of the 
behaviour of representatives is reproduced in the simulate 
system is uncertain (Nicholson, 1970; Morley & Stephenson, 
1977). The nature of the exercise may mean that the 
participants act, not as party representatives, but as 
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individuals bargaining with other individuals. 
The already complex results of the present experiment, 
combined with lack of knowledge of actual practice served 
to raise serious doubts about the value of further 
experiments at this stage. Would these merely be 
'experiments in a vacuum', departing further and further 
away from any significance for the real world context which 
they attempted to simulate7 
Whilst experimental studies have the advantages of control 
and (relative) simplicity, the researcher did not feel 
confident that any model of third-party intervention, 
constructed on the basis of simpl ified relationships 
observed in the experimental setting, would be easily 
generalisable to other contexts. If such an analytical 
approach was used it would be essential to create a model 
which could also account for the factors affecting the 
relationship between the simulate system and the real world. 
(See also Druckman, 1973). Without a reasonable knowledge 
of the industrial context in which thi rd-party intervention 
operates the possibil ity of creating such a model seemed 
remote. It would seem more useful to devise experimental 
studies which have a clearly specified relationship to the 
original social context and which can therefore explore more 
precisely the relationships between apparently influential 
factors in that setting. Experimental social psychology 
alone, without the links with the context of interest, is 
I ikely to produce an unnecessarily restricted understanding 
of the factors influencing process and outcomes in industrial 
disputes. In concentrating on the methods of the laboratory, 
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however elegant the experimental design, it is also 
possible to adopt an overly narrow approach to the 
choice of materials, settings and measures, again 
harming the general ity of experimental findings. Field 
study, in combination with experimental simulation, 
seems to offer a fuller and more differentiated under-
standing of the dynamics of industrial disputes and 
negotiation, promising as it does a greater variety of 
situations, cases and measures. 
The experimental results gave a clear indication of 
the significance of the third-party's presence .for the 
role relationship between the negotiators, who behaved 
as if they expected their performanc~ to be evaluated. 
This resulted in an emphasis on the inter-party'orientation 
of the debate and greater concern with the presentation 
of case than with the maintenance of harmonious personal 
relations. The status of this finding, which went against 
common expectations, would remain uncertain without 
extension to fieldwork. In practice, the evaluative role 
of the third-party is most closely I inked to arbitration, 
where the third-party is traditionally regarded as performing 
a semi-judicial function. The significance of the 
experimental findings could therefore be further examined in 
relation to arbitration, which also provided a reasonably 
public, and consequently less sensitive, forum for research 
than conciliation/mediation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Functions and Process of Industrial Arbitration 
Introduction - The Traditional View of Arbitration 
Arbitration is usually described as a semi-judicial, evaluative 
process, where the parties to a dispute surrender their responsibility 
for its resolution to a disinterested third party. For this reason it 
has been treated as quite distinct from negotiation, where the 
responsibility for the decision rests on the parties (Morley and 
Stephenson, 1977: Magenau and Pruitt, 1979). The arbitrator is 
expected to listen impartially to the arguments of both sides and, 
on the basis of the evidence put fo~ard, decide the issue between 
them. 
This chapter questions the validity of the typical image of 
arbitration and suggests that a more comprehensive understanding can 
be developed if it is viewed in the context of different models of 
negotiation. 
The common view of arbitration as a judicial process does 
however serve a particular purpose. Its acceptabi lity as a method 
for the resolution of disputes, is dependent on the perceived 
impartiality and fairness of the process. If the arbitrator's 
decision appears to be politically motivated or otherwise biased, 
the parties have no compelling reason to abide by it, and no reason 
to end their dispute. Consequently it should not be surprising if 
practitioners and officials, concerned to maintain the credibility 
of arbitration, emphasise its evaluative character and stress that 
it is possible, in industrial relations or other contests, to make 
an impartial judgement of the intrinsic merits of the case. 
The arbitrators themselves must be above suspicion: as Lord 
Amulree (1929), first President of the Industrial Court, pointed out, 
the reasons given for the failure of arbitration in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century centred around the competence or 
incompetence of the arbitrators. They were chosen, he said, from 
'what has been described as the "educated and professional 
classes". This did not mean that they were necessari ly 
biased, but it rendered them liable to that suspicion on 
the part of the work people t • (p.54). 
John Lockyer (1979), Director of Arbitration at the British Advisory 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), comments that the 
parties' statements of case should consist of reasoned arguments, 
'based on irrefutable facts' (p.7]), in order to allow the third-
party to exercise his or her skill in reaching a fair decision. 
J.R. Clynes, once a practising arbitrator, quoted with approval by 
Lord Amulree and re-quoted by Lockyer(1979), stated that the 
arbitrator should be a person of 
'known impartiality, judicially minded and capable 
of estimating evidence and reaching a reasonable 
decision according to the revealed facts of the case' 
(Lockyer, 1979, p.57). 
Arbitrators prefer to present themselves as having a specially 
skilful approach to the issues in dispute, thus establishing their 
authority over the parties. Although the trade union experience would 
suggest that compromise ('splitting the difference') is the most 
common outcome of arbitration (Jenkins and Sherman, 1977), arbitrators 
themselves frequently dismiss the compromise option as an inadequate 
display of thei r ski 11 and resolve (Lockwood, 1955 ; Lockyer, 1979). 
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Continual compromise, it is feared, would appear unprincipled and 
would therefore be damaging to the status of arbitration. 
In the past, examination of the consistency and impartiality 
of arbitration decisions has been made difficult by the thi rd-
parties' traditional reluctance to give reasons for their decisions. 
Such a practice, it is argued, may give rise to the~olution of a 
body of 'case law', which would seriously damage the perceived 
'flexibi Ii ty' of arbi tration. In the 1977 Annual Report of the 
Central Arbitration Committee, however, Sir John Wood argued that 
it was necessary to give reasons, in order for the parties to see a 
consistent pattern emerging from decisions on simi lar issues. The 
most common arguments used for not giving reasons, apart from the 
reluctance to creamprecendents, are, fi rst, that such reasons may 
be seen as invalid oy the parties and, rather than settling the 
dispute, may serve to refuel it. Second, in the case of an 
arbitration tribunal, members may reach the same decision for 
different reasons. Presumably the reasoning which lies behind 
these arguments again concerns the arbitrators' fears of undermining 
the parties' faith in the impartiality and fairness of the process. 
Arbitration as a Political Process 
Those presenting arbitration as an evaluative, semi-judicial 
process have usually been the officials or practitioners of arbitration. 
Other writers have not been convinced that arbitration can be 'neutral' 
even if arbitrators could be impartial. The debate about arbitration 
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has therefore chiefly concerned the issue of whether it performs 
a judicial function, producing decisions based on the merits of the 
case, or whether it is a political process which serves to maintain 
an existing status quo. 
The poli tical aspects of the process are pointed out by Hyman 
(1972b). who comments that the choice of arbitrator and the 
principles applied, by him or her, to the 'facts', in reaching a 
decision, can be a potent basis for dispute in their own right. 
Wight-Bakke and Kerr (1948) characterise arbitration, not as an 
authoritative dispensation of justice, but as an instrument of 
collective bargaining: the arbitrator cannot 
'depart so far from a ..• compromise, consistent with 
the respective power and desires of the parties, 
that one or the other of them will be likely next 
time to prefer open hostility to peaceful settlement' (p.484) 
Arbitration is Inevitably a polftical process in the sense 
that fts decisionsare based on certain principles drawn from the 
social context in which collective bargaining takes place. To the 
extent that conflict exists between employer and employees about 
the proper rate for the job and other terms and conditions of 
employment, there is also room for argument about the principles 
to be applied in deciding any particular dispute. Even the 
application by the arbitrator of the common concept of a 'fair wage' 
is far from straightforward. Lockwood (1955) points out that 
'notions of what is fair and just for each particular group 
are sufficiently indeterminate so that even the strictest 
attempt to define wages differentials rationally (according 
to their economic and social justification) gives leeway 
for interpretations that vary fundamentally with the 
different conceptions that (those) groups have of their own 
social role and that of others, or else proves unacceptable 
because its determinateness ignores precisely these 
evaluations' (p.343). 
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It is on this basis that the contribution of arbitration to 
industrial relations has generally been described as the maintenance 
of an existing status quo, with respect to a particular group of 
employees in a particular industry. Arbitration, Lord Amulree (1929) 
argued, moves 
'in the rear rather than in the van of reform., Its 
function is rather to peg down and make secure gains 
which have been won ••• and not itself to lead the 
advance' (p.186). 
Fair wages legislation which provides the union with a right to 
unilateral arbitration, has generally aimed to protect the lowest paid 
and most poorly organized, such that the arbitration award, decided on 
the basis of comparisons with similar groups, becomes a substitute for 
negotiated terms and conditons of employment already gained through 
collective bargaining oy those other groups. 
No matter how closely arbitration may aim to approximate to a 
Judicial process involving the impartial evaluation of arguments in 
the light of established principles, the industrial third-party must 
inevitably consider the implications of any decision for the longer-
term relationship between the parties. This might be described as 
the 'expediency' factor in any decision (Guillebaud, 1970) or the 
choice of an award according to the arbitrator's understanding of what 
will work in practice, rather than what might be suggested by a strict 
consideration of the merits of the case. 'Expediency' in general 
appears to mean the arbitrator's estimate of what the parties would 
probably have settled for, without his or her intervention, thus 
departing somewhat from the image of arbitration as a purely evaluative 
or Judicial process. The so-called 'economic' considerations taken 
into account by the arbitrator, which usually include notions like (I) 
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the employer's ability, in terms of company profits, to meet union 
demands or (2) the 'going-rate' of pay for the job in question, are 
inevitably controversial. When such principles are involved in the 
determination of an award, perhaps it is not surprising that the 
reasons for the decision are either not given or only hinted at. 
The Relationship Between Arbitration and Collective Bargaining 
The 'political' versus 'judicial' argument relating to 
arbitration bears a surprising resemblance to the wider debate on 
the nature of collective bargaining. Both arbitration and 
collective bargaining have been described as inherently conservative, 
laCking the potential for furthering social change and redressing 
inequal i ties. 
It has been argued that psychological models of negotiation 
(e.g. Deutsch, 1973), by dealing with abstract situations removed 
from the social context, have treated conflict as value-free and 
a-political, the result of misunderstandings and poor communication 
between individuals. Social and ideological conflict becomes a 
disruptive factor which merely delays mutual accommodation and 
settlement. Critics have argued that researchers should recognise 
the existence of a non-reducible, ideological conflict which 
exists between groups in society (Muscovici, 1972; Billig, 1975), 
suggesting that bargaining can only be understood in its political 
context. Indeed, it often seems- that the resilience of collective 
bargaining frameworks resides in their conventions for avoiding 
the expression of fundamental ideological differences and 
mechanisms for reaching 'temporary accommodations' between different 
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interests and expectations. When ideological confrontations do 
occur, they are treated as though they were ritual 'asides' to the 
main business of the day. The negotiation continues when the 
attack subsides (Anthony, 1977). 
The underlying balance of power between parties is likely to 
be reflected in the outcomes of negotiation, just as it is reflected 
in the 'expedient' arbitration decision. The participants, 
Anthony and Crichton (1969) suggest, are guided by 'tacit 
expectations' of what an acceptable settlement is, where the 
actual outcome will tend to reflect the relative costs to each side 
of rejecting, rather than accepting a given demand (Morley, 1981), 
The limited usefulness of arbitration in the case of 'institutional 
conflict' casts further light on the relationship between the two 
processes. 
Included in the category of institutional conflicts are 
'struggles for power within the camps of the two main contestants 
in the market' (Lockwood, 1955, p.339) and the es tab Ii shment and 
furtherance of collective bargaining institutions. It could include 
provisions under the now obsolete union recognition clauses in the 
British Employment Protection Act (1975). Voluntary arbitration, 
Lockwood (1955) states, is dependent for its success on the prior 
acceptance of collective bargaining institutions by both parties. 
The adverse publicity and lengthy legal disputes surrounding ACAS's 
attempts to arbitrate on union recognition claims (such as that at 
Grunwick), and the eventual abolition of that section of the 
l.egal statute demonstrated the impossibility of arbitrating on the 
issue of collective bargaining itself, despite the fact that ACAS 
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was vested with the power, by virtue of Section 1 (2) of the 
Employment Protection Act, to encourage the extension of 
collective bargaining and to promote the. improvement of industrial 
relations. Institutional conflict also includes the fight for 
power to decide what constitutes an appropriate issue for joint 
determination and how that issue should be dealt with (Anthony 
and Crichton, 1969; Morley, 1980). Arbitration it seems is 
inseparable from collective bargaining. It is impossible to 
arbitrate on collective bargaining, because what is arbitrable 
is determined by the nature of the underlying collective 
bargaining relationship itself. 
The Characteristics of Negotiation and Arbitration 
In the light of apparent similarities between the two 
debates, one concerning collective bargaini~g and the other 
concerning arbitration, it is important to re-examine and possibly 
revise the long-standing division between the two. The evidence 
so far suggests that they are inextricably related, but the question 
remains as to how far their shared characteristics extend beyond 
their role in British industrial relations to features of the 
processes themselves. Are negotiation and arbitration 
essentially similar processes after all? 
There are numerous attempts to describe the essential features 
of bargaining and negotiation in the literature. It has been 
characterised as a charade, a game of chance and skill, a 
distributive process, a search for mutually beneficial agreements, 
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a competitive struggle, a collaborative process, one of a group 
of situations involving joint decision-making under conditions 
of uncertainty and so on. (See Morley and Stephenson, 1977: also 
Walton and McKersie, 1965; Cross, 1977; 
and Pruitt, 1979; Morley, 1979; 1980). 
Druckman, 1977; Magenau 
Scanning the lists of 
characteristics, it becomes clear that most of the descriptions 
could also be applied to the process of arbitration. Morley's· 
(1980) description of negotiation lists five principle defining 
factors as follows. First, negotiation is described as a joint-
decision-making process: second as involving conflict or struggle 
between opposing sides; third as also requiring a shared belief 
in the existence of a common interest or the possibility of mutual 
gain from the relationship; fourth, negotiation involves each side 
in a form of strategic decision-making where each tries to present 
a certain image to the other, whilst taking a sceptical view of the 
images portrayed by the opposing party representatives (Snyder and 
Diesing, 1977): and lastly, negotiation generally involves talking 
about a relationship before taking any action. 
The only feature which at first sight distinguishes arbitration 
from negotiation is the first mentioned: negotiation involves joint 
decision-making. The remaining four characteristics are undoubtedly 
common to both processes. The parties to arbitration have conflicting 
interests and values which are reflected in their different ordering of 
preferred outcomes. Their willingness to submit the dispute between 
them to arbitration is a clear indication of their continuing mutual 
dependence and their commitment to reaching a settlement. rather than 
terminating the relationship. They face the same issues of inferring 
intentions from statements made by the other side and structuring 
their own responses accordingly. Their position is. if anything, 
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made more complex by the addition of an extra party, the arbitrator, 
who is also likely to adopt a sceptical, questioning attitude towards 
the claims and counter-claims made by the disputants. Finally, 
arbitration in Britain always involves discussion of the parties' 
relationship, in the context of the immediate dispute, before action 
is taken. As in negotiation, the discussion may range from a lengthy 
exposition of each side's case to brief statements of positions. 
The joint decision-making aspect of negotiation has, however, 
generally been thought to exclude arbitration. This claim is re-
examined below in the light of a discussion of the responsibility 
for and control over the process and outcomes of arbitration, as 
distributed between party representatives and the arbitrator. 
The Distribution of Responsibility for the Process and Outcomes of 
Arbitration. 
The extent to which arbitration can, in practice, be treated 
as a process where sole responsibility for decision actually rests 
on the arbitrator is debatable. An experimental study of simulated 
litigation hearings (Thibaut and Walker, 1975) describes the 
possible distribution of control over 
process and outcome, between disputants and third-party, ranglng from 
the inquisitorial system (where only the third-party decides what 
evidence is necessary to the decision) through the adversary system, 
(where the parties have control over selection and presentation of 
evidence and argument) to negotiation, in the absence of third-party 
control. In simulated litigation hearings where the third-party was 
present, participants were more satisfied with the fairness of the 
adversary system than with the inquisitorial system. This result was 
however modified by the existence of two factors: time pressure on 
the parties to reach agreement and the existence of a pre-established 
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standard for agreement. Under these conditions, it seems the 
inquisitorial procedure, which gives most control over outcomes 
to the third-party, can produce a satisfactory resolution. 
With reference to arbitration, Thibaut and Walker's (1975) findings 
innly that different procedures may be more suited to the resolution 
of different kinds of dispute. A reference to arbitration which is 
couched in the terms of an existing agreement or established practice 
may be amenable to a simpler procedure, with greater control over 
the outcome exercised by the arbitrator, than one resulting, for 
example, from an annual wage negotiation. In the latter case, a 
process approaching that of negotiation, with participants sharing 
responsibility for the decision is more likely to produce a 
satisfactory outcome. 
Is there any evidence that such a difference between types of 
case brought to arbitration actually exists? American industrial 
relations practice distinguishes between disputes of 'right' and 
disputes of 'interest', the former involving the interpretation of 
contract terms and the latter concerning a decision over the terms 
of a future contract. 'Grievance' arbitration, or the settlement 
of a dispute of rights, appears to be the closest approximation to 
the 'judicial' process: the 'rules' to be applied in making the 
decision are already set down by the parties and the arbitrator is 
asked to interpret them with reference to a particular situation in 
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dispute. In Britain, however, unlike the United States of America, the parties 
do not generally recognise a distinction between disputes of 'right' 
and disputes of 'interest', since contract terms are not defined as 
precisely or as legalistically as they are in the U.S.A. The statute 
law and common law models of bargaining described by Clegg (1979) are relevant 
in this context· The statute law model, which applies reasonably well 
tQ the U.S.A. 1S based on a substantive agreement, covering 
all those areas currently regarded as open to joint determination. 
The agreement defines relations between the parties until the end 
of its term. A dispute procedure specified by the agreement is used 
to decide issues concerning its interpretation. 
The common law model is based on an agreed disputes procedure 
which deals with issues as they arise. Any relevant substantive 
rule, or customary working practice, may be used to decide the issue, 
but 'the model recognises no sharp distinction between disputes of 
right ••••••• and disputes of interest' (Clegg, 1979, P.117). The 
common law model applies most closely to British manufacturing 
industry, while in comparison public sector bargaining has relatively 
more in common with the statute law model, although the relevant 
substantive agreements tend not to have a definite, 'fixed-term' 
and new agreements may be negotiated at any time. 
It is evident from Clegg's (1979) discussion that, although the 
distinction between 'rights' and 'interests' is blurred in Britain, 
the arbitrator is nevertheless likely to be faced with two different 
types of issue; the first requiring an interpretation of the terms of 
a current agreement, or application of a substantive rule, according 
to a particular grievance; and the second requiring a decision over 
the terms of a new agreement. The latter entails a decision between 
conflicting principles and criteria for settlement •. Certain cases 
may, of course, involve both of these, whilst others may be dealt with 
as though they were open to a solution in terms of an existing agreement, 
if this is likely to improve the acceptability of the arbitrator's 
decision to the parties. 
Additional support for the suggestion that the satisfactory 
resolution of different types of issue is likely to require different 
arbitration procedures, and a different distribution of control over 
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process and outcomes, is prov~~~~ by a study of simulated arbitration 
decisions (Fleming, 1965). The results of the study indicate that in 
those single issue cases where an established criteria or standard for 
agreement exists, a number of decision-makers (in this case legally 
trained students) independently reached the same decision. In such 
cases, the arbitrator could presumably assume greater control over 
proceedines, in order to elicit the 'evidence' necessary to satisfy the 
decision-making criteria. 'fuere the 'experimental' materials (~rived 
from actual cases) were complex and unusual, there were conflicting 
decisions on outcomes and the same decisions were justified on 
different grounds, dependent, as one of Fleming's respondent's commented, 
at least partially on the third-party's initial views on such issues 
as 'the right of management to manage.' If personal predilections are 
influential in such cases, it is all the more important that the major 
responsibility for decisions remains with the parties and that the 
hearing procedure operates to give maximum control over the presentation 
of arguments to the parties, and maximum freedom to answer points raised 
by the other side. Moreover, if part of the ~omplexity'of the dispute 
stems from its concern with the terms of a future pay agreement, the 
decision must be seen to be equitable, according to principles 
justifiable to the parties, and consequently applica~le in practice. 
A restrictive procedure, which vests control over outcome in the 
third-party, is unlikely to be satisfactory in the resolution of such 
cases. 
Control over proceedings does not, however, reside solely along 
a continuum from adversarial to inquisitorial systems, as suggested 
by Thibaut and Walker (1975). In a forum where the outward expression 
of antagonism is considered to be, at best, unhelpful (Lockyer, 1979), 
control may also be imposed in the form of 'procedural conventions' 
where 'procedure' becomes institutionalised through its continued use 
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over a number of years. Its strength appears to reside in the 
ereation of a deliberately artificial situation. As Hyman (1972a) 
points out, in a discussion of the pre-197l engineering industry's 
disputes procedure, at formal conferences between management and 
unions the 'highly formalised' exchanges during the proceedings 
contrasted with the equally contrived jokes and socialising engaged 
in by opposing representatives beforehand. The formality of 
proceedings independently of who has control over the decision, can 
be used to ensure a narrow definition of the issue and function to 
exclude personal hostilities; both may be necessary to achieve at 
least temporary resolution of the dispute. 
The discussion of distribution of control over procedure and 
outcome suggests that the distinction between negotiation and arbitration 
processes is not clear-cut. It is feasible to suggest that the nature 
of arbitration itself will change, according to the type of case and 
the distribution of responsibility between participants for the outcome. 
Control over procedure and decision may vary along a continuum from 
those situations where responsibility is shared between the parties 
(including the third-party) to those where responsibility rests on 
the third-party alone. 
Following Fleming (1965), those cases couched in the terms of 
an existing agreement or framework should be amenable to a simpler 
procedure, where the third-party takes relatively more control than 
the parties. The more unusual, wide ranging disputes outside the 
framework of existing agreements require greater participation from 
the parties in structuring the debate and reaching a conclusion. 
Given the discussions of statute and common law models of bargaining 
(Clegg, 1979), a clearer division between the two types of case may 
be expected in public sector arbitration than in private sector 
arbitration. 
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The Use of Different Arguments to Justify Different Types of Claim 
The two types of case identified are likely to be justified to 
the arbitrator in terms of different arguments and according to different 
underlying principles. Collective bargaining settlements are usually 
justified by reference to a number of 'moral rules'. Magenau and 
Pruitt (1979) distinguish between six different principles which may 
be used. These are equity, which assumes that 'outcomes should be 
distributed according to the relative contributions of the parties' 
(p.185), equality (equal division of goods between parties), needs, 
opportunity (to gain the greatest benefit), equal concessions from 
present positions and historical precedent. The use of one or more 
of the principles described is determined by such factors as background 
culture, the relative status of the parties and the past history of 
negotiation between the sides. 
Evidence from Clegg (1979) indirectly suggests that most claims 
for improved terms and conditions of employment rest on appeals to 
equity and historical precedent, where these principles are predominantly 
interpreted in relation to comparisons drawn between different groups 
of workers. These comparisons are usually made on fairly limited grounds 
of similar jobs, in the same industry and district. Major inequalities 
of the income hierarchy are rarely considered (Hyman and Brough, 1975). 
Comparisons with other groups of workers, Clegg (1979) notes, are 
advanced not on economic grounds, but on moral grounds concerned with 
fair pay. Given the widespread nature of such arguments, the 'merits 
of a case' concerned with improving terms and conditions of employment 
are likely to be advanced on similar grounds at arbitration. The parties 
should expect that the claim will be seen as fair and reasonable to the 
extent that other comparable groups of employees can be shown to be 
relatively advantaged. 
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In relation to grievances where the claim is couched in the 
terms of existing industrial practice or which concern' a discipl inary 
code, evidence of McCarthy and Coker (cited in Clegg, 1979, p.2SJ) 
indicates that union representatives aim to establish precedents which 
can be used as standards of fair practice in later cases. 
This method of establishing a particular claim would appear 
to create an industrial relations equivalent of the 'common law' 
system used in the British courts. It could in theory be based on 
a number of the principles of fair treatment described by Magenau 
£. P r u itt (19 79) • 
Thus at arbitration it is expected that different types of 
arguments wi II be used in different cases. Claims for improved 
terms and conditions of employment, outside the framework of an 
existing agreement, should rely mainly on the use of suitabl~ 
comparison groups to establish the fairness of the claim. Claims 
concerning workplace grievances, couched in the terms of an 
existing agreement, based on custom and practice or relating to 
a disciplinary code, should be structured around the establishment 
of a general rule for judging the fai rness of treatment in other 
similar cases. If such a rule already exists the argument wilt 
centre on the application of that rule to the particular instance 
in dispute. 
Arbitration as a Process of Problem-Solving 
The past treatment of arbitration as an evaluative, a-political 
process could be taken to imply that its process characteristics 
actually share more in common with problem-solving than with 
negotiation, in the sense that a careful weighing up of the pros 
and cons of alternative solutions to an industrial 'problem'is 
cal led for. 
In the psychological literature, the process and characteristics 
of negotiation groups have been compared and contrasted with the 
process and characteristics of problem-solving groups. Morley 
& Stephenson (1977) argued that the two processes are fundamentally 
dissimilar: 'whereas in problem solving groups coping with the 
task leads to conflict, in negotiation groups conflict yields to 
coping with the task' (p.259). The major distinguishing feature 
of the negotiation group has been regarded as the obligation on 
group members to represent a particular party. Negotiators must 
reconcile the conflicting demands of, firstly, representing their 
constitutents and, secondly, reaching a settlement with the other 
side through the medium of their personal relations with each other 
as members of the same, face-to-face group. 
The opposing tradition has claimed that all groups, where 
members are faced with a common task, share certain characteristics 
(Wall,1973). tn particular, Landsberger (1955), in a study of 
twelve mediation sessions, concluded that the more closely the 
session followed Bales' predicted phase movement for co-operative, 
problem-solving groups, the greater the number of disputed issues 
which were resolved. 
When arbitration has been explicitly characterised as serving 
a problem-solving function, however, its process characteristics 
seem to share more in common with those of negotiation. Wood (1979) 
suggests that a problem-solving approach to arbitration allows 
the parties to maintain as much responsibility for the final 
78 
settlement as possible, thus ensuring their commitment to it 
and its long-term viability. This approach is, he suggests, 
particularly important in cases where there are no obvious or 
well-established criteria for the decision. In such cases, 
arbitration is usually depicted as having an 'educational' 
function, assisting and directing the parties on the longer-term 
development of their relationship (Concannon, 1978). 
In an American survey of 101 arbitrators, managers and 
union representatives, Shore (1966) found some evidence that the 
unions were more favourable towards a problem-solving approach, 
with management preferring a more formal, restricted use of 
arbitration, perhaps because the unions believed that allowing the 
third-party to take a wider view of the terms of reference would 
result in the strengthening of collective bargainJng arrangements, 
whilst management preferred to maintain greater independent control 
over the regulation of such institutions. 
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In general, the 'problem-solving' approach removes formal 
authority for the decision from the arbitrator, the role becoming 
more like that of specially. skilled negotiator, or mediator, guiding 
the parties towards the resolution of the dispute and longer-term 
management of their relationship. At the same time it gives the arbit-
rator much greater influence over the nature of that relationship. 
Influence, ho.-Jever, is generally regarded as one of the core 
components of negotiation, rather than problem-solving (Snyder & 
Diesing, 1977; Morley, 1981). Hence it may be conjectured that 
the third-party in the supposed problem-solving role becomes equally 
involved in negotiating the terms of his or her relationship with 
the parties as they are in negotiating the terms of the relationship 
be tween themse I ves. 
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In relation to models of negotiation, problem-solving, with 
what Morley (1980) calls a political component, has also been 
described as one aspect of a larger bargaining process, which moves 
through a series of ordered stages or phases (Morley & Stephenson, 
1977; Morley, 1980; Egan & Loveridge, 1982). It is equally probable 
that problem-solving wi II form part of an arbitration process, which 
is overall closer to the typical process of negotiation than it is to 
the problem-solving process described by Bales (1950). This expected 
simi larity to the negotiation process is based particularly on the 
obligation to represent a party position which is shared by members 
of negotiating teams and those i'ndividuals responsible for the 
conduct of the arbitration. 
The Decision to use Arbitration -A'partof the Strategy of Negotiation 
By virtue of their 'mixed-motfve' relationship, the parties to 
negotiation inevitaoly try to assess the hidden intentions of the 
opposing party and calculate the i'mplications of their o.vn responses 
and manoeuvres for the nature of the relationship between them. Such 
attempts at mutual influence and control are likely to extend to the 
use of arbitration, where arbitration is employed, by one or both 
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parties, as an integral part of a negotiating strategy. 
The first important aspect of strategy is likely to be the 
timing of a claim. Union representatives must choose when to pursue 
an issue to arbitration, in the same way that union negotiators select 
the most opportune moment to advance a wage claim (Batstone,et' al 1977) • 
factors such as government pay policy, member support (or non-support), 
strength of union organisation, long-term plans for the union's 
position in the company and so on are likely to influence the decision 
to use arbitration. The creation of an agreed disputes procedure, 
with provision for arbitration is likely to have inherent strategic 
implications. Representatives must choose which issues to pursue as 
far as the arbitration stage in the light of the long-term 
impl ications for their overall relationship. Arbitration may also 
be used if union representativ6believe that there would be little 
support for industrial action on a particular issue, which nevertheless 
furthers certain long-term aims and improves their credibi lity in 
the eyes of the members. Institutional conflicts, whi 1st being the 
most intractable and least amenable to arbitration, may underly 
other disputes which are superfically more limited in scale. For 
example, a successful union claim for the disclosure of certain 
company Information, under the terms of the Employment Protection 
Act (1975), would allow union representatives to establish a strategic 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the employer. Hence the union may try 
to further its long-term aims, in the short term, by an appeal to 
arbitration. Alternatively, it may demonstrate its determination 
in the preparation for an annual wage negotiation by pursuing a 
number of apparently minor issues to arbitration (Fleming, 1965). In 
each case, arbitration becomes part of a negotiating strategy. 
Models of Negotiation and Their Implications for Arbitration 
The psychological component of negotiation and, by extension, 
arbitration is inextricably linked with uncertainties inherent 
in the process of interpreting the moves made by the other parties and 
responding to the perc~ived fntentions of those moves. Arbitration, 
In the context of the collective bargaining relationship, therefore 
involves the parties in a form of strategic decision-making, which 
requires them to work through the 'core t processes of information-
interpretation (Including search for information and definition of 
81 
the terms of the dispute), influence and decision-making (Snyder.and 
Diesing, 1977; ~orleYt 1981). Much of the psychological literature 
relating to both negotiation and arbitration has neglected the first 
of these, preferring to present a predetermined scenario to participants, 
where negotiators are involved only in an exchange of bids for pre-
dete~ined items of a predetermined value. 
This process of 'concession-convergence' from opposing opening 
positions to a settlement point somewhere between the two, along with 
the concession dilemma (how to 'stand firm' and yet simultaneously 
signal flexibility) and tactics to induce concessions,have all received 
a great deal of attention from psychologists, perhaps because such 
issues promise relatively easy access to the quantitative and less 
elusive aspects of negotiation and because of their intuitive appeal to 
the common view of bargaining as 'haggling over a price' for a 
particular commodity. It is not, however, entirely clear how these 
aspects of the process fit into the wider understanding of bargaining 
and negotiation (Morley, 1981). 
The concession-convergence view of bargaining has been contrasted 
with n~gotiations where the value of the items in dispute is not fixed 
beforehand. The latter, Zartman (1977) argues, result in negotiators 
inventing a formula, 'firstly to cover their own positions and then to 
provide the basis for a mutually satisfactory agreement' (p.80). The 
formula or framework establishes a 'referent principle' which allows 
the parties to determine the detailed values of the items. In Zartman's 
terms, the concession-convergence process is in itself only the 
'implementation of detail' which is subsequent to the negotiation of 
a formula. Theoretically, the formula provides the parties with an 
agreed definition of the issues in dispute, which will allow them to 
reach an agreement under a 'common notion of justice' (p.76). Deciding 
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on the formula is likely to involve not only attempts at mutual 
influence and persuasion, but also, and in parallel, a great deal 
of searching for and interpreting information. 
Loose analogies can be drawn between this description of 
th~ negotiation of a 'formula', descriptions of the 'problem-solving' 
aspect of negotiation (Morley, 1981) and descriptions of the sub-process 
of 'integrative bargaining' identified by Walton and McKersie (1965). 
All three suggest that in certain situations, or at certain stages 
of negotiation, the participants are mainly concerned to define the 
terms of the negotiation this time, in the context of their longer 
term relationship, and work through disagreements about the definition 
of the 'problem' and choice of appropriate criteria for settlement, 
in order to achieve a solution which is of mutual benefit and which 
is viable in practice. There are also parallels between descriptions 
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of the concession-convergence process, Zartman's 'implementation of detail' 
and the sub-process of distributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie,~-
1965). These all refer to decisions about the actual division of goods 
between the parties. The two aspects of negotiation could occur as 
closely inter-related stages of the bargaining process, where the 
particular terms of the settlement can only be decided after a joint 
exercise in issue-definition and problem-solving. The distributive 
aspect could also occur independently and with greater frequency than 
the definition of issues and establishment of formulae, if only 
because a great deal of negotiation assumes certain pre-existing 
definitions and frameworks. Given the present state of knowledge, it 
is however unclear whether the majority of negotiations focus only on 
the distributive aspect, which is generally reverted to when difficulties 
emerge (Morley, 1981). 
None of the experimental work on arbitration has considered the 
implications of a model of negotiation which treats the process as more than 
an exchange of bids to reach an agreed settlement point. By assuming 
a concession-convergence model, the literature has been able either 
to assume that the main tactical use of arbitration is as a face-saving 
device by the parties or to regard it as a 'tactical' threat used 
on both parties. by an external agency, to induce concessions and 
produce more rapid agreements. 
If the concession dilemma has deepened to the point where any 
movement is likely to seem wrong (Xagenau and Pruitt, 1979), negc:iators 
will be unable to resolve for themselves the conflict between the need 
to establish an image of firmness and strength, whilst also indicating 
a willingness to compromise. In such cases, arbitration becomes a way 
of 'saving face' for the negotiators, who wish to concede, but find 
themselves in an impossible position, vis- a-vis their constituents 
and each other. Passing the formal responsibility for the decision to 
an arbitrator may prove convenient, although the actual job of the 
arbitrAtor would be to develop a tacit understanding of the parties' 
unspoken intentions for me outcome of the dispute. 
It is sometimes argued that such a use, or 'abuse', of arbitration 
undermines the parties' own collective bargaining procedures. If 
arbitration becomes the final stage of procedure, negotiators may 
withhold concessions in the belief that if too much is conceded now, 
they will be left in a weak position at arbitration: Walker (1970) 
argues that the Australian system of compulsory arbitration has 
encouraged intransigence in the parties and made them more reluctant 
to reach an independent agreement. Experimental studies have provided 
evidence to the contrary, suggesting that the anticipation of binding 
arbitration increases the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. 
(Johnson and Pruitt, 1972; Johnson and Tullar, 1972; Bigoness, 1976). 
It is however difficult to relate these findings to voluntary 
arbitration arrangements in Britain. When control groups (ie. no 
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expectation of third-party intervention) are compared with 
experimental groups, Johnson and Pruitt (1972) found that the 
only significant difference was in the rate of concessions: 
'negotiators who anticipated binding intervention conceded more 
rapidly' (p.7), while Bigoness (1976) found that subjects in 
normal bargaining conditions conceded almost as much as those 
expecting compulsory arbitration and those expecting voluntary 
arbitration did actually concede less. Johnson and Tullar's (1972) 
findings are made more difficult to interpret because of the 
introduction of a high versus low 'need to save face' variable. High 
need to save face resulted in fewer concessions, regardless of the 
type of intervention anticipated. 
The use of 'final offer' arbitration has been advocated as a 
way of avoiding the parties' tendencies to withhold concessions in 
the expectation of a favourable 'compromise' solution from the 
arbitrator. In final offer arbitration, the third-party must choose 
between the closing positions of the two parties. Magenau and Pruitt 
(1979) argue that this procedure has the effect of increasing the 
uncertainty of the parties about the arbitrator's likely decision and 
thus encourages them to make greater concessions, in order to reach 
a settlement before arbitration. 
The experimental studies cited have presented arbitration as a 
statement of a settlement point, where the settlement point is either 
determined by a compromise rule or an unspecified rule. It has been 
possible to treat arbitration in this simplified way because all of 
the issues have been couched in terms of a negotiation concerning only 
the convergence of the parties towards a settlement point. If this 
model of negotiation is contrasted with the 'formula-detail' model 
(Zartman, 1977), two different types of arbitration are suggested, 
with correspondingly different roles for the arbitrator. A concession-
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convergence model of bargaining would imply that the arbitrator is 
required to manage the process of concession-convergence for the 
parties. Superficially, this is a role close to that traditionally 
assigned to the arbitrator as 'adjudicator' of the dispute. Yet, 
in effect, and viewed in the context of the bargaining relationship, 
it involves the arbitrator in reaching a tacit understanding with the 
parties over the actual outcome. The 'formula-detail' view of 
negotiation suggests that the process of concession management 1S only 
one aspect of the arbitrator's role. From this wider perspective, the 
third-party would need to adopt a more flexible approach to the 
issues, aimed at understanding and resolving the underlying grievances 
and difficulties faced by the parties. The arbitrator's intention 
should be to negotiate with the parties a framework for the resolution 
of the dispute, possibly leaving them to 'implement the detail'. 
The arbitrator may find it necessary to adopt one or other of 
these approaches according to the apparent nature of the dispute and 
must therefore decide when it is necessary to delve into the wider 
implications and intricacies of a claim and when to accept the issues 
at 'face value'. Accepting the dispute at face value, on its merits, 
implies that the third-party would be predominantly responsible for 
managing the process of concession-convergence on an issue which the 
parties want resolved for them. Examination of the underlying 
significance of a particular dispute implies negotiation of a framework 
for its resolution. The complexity of the issues may be one indicator 
which decides the type of approach to be adopted. 
The Effect of Complexity of the Dispute on the Arbitration Process 
There is some evidence that the more complex the negotiation the 
less the emphasis given to questions of the details of concessions on 
either side and the more the concern with developing a common framework 
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for negotiation (Winham, 1977; Morley, 1980). The more complex 
the matters in dispute, the less likely are the participants to have 
a thorough understanding of all the relevant material and arguments. 
Hence they are unlikely to be clear at the outset about what their 
mlnlmum goals are, waiting for the negotiation itself to determine 
what is available. Negotiators are also less likely to know what 
would be acceptable to the other side and are probably uncertain of 
the current position of the other (Balke, et al, 1973). 
As the number of parties increases, the more difficult is the coordination 
of their differing interests and demands (Midgaard and Underda1, 1977). 
Accordingly, it is suggested that where negotiations are complex 
and the implications for party positions of particular outcomes are 
uncertain, the arbitrator will not be able to adopt the adjudicatory 
role, but is more likely to negotiate a formula for the resolution of 
the dispute with the parties. 
The Role of the Parties to Arbitration 
There is a widespread belief that bringing in a third-party 
encourages the disputants to be 'reasonable' and adopt a conciliatory 
stance. An experimental study of the effect of a third-party's 
presence on the behaviour of party representatives and on the outcome 
of a dispute suggests, however, that third-parties can have the opposite 
effect, increasing the likelihood of intransigence between the sides 
(Stephenson and Webb. 1982). The experimental findings suggest that the 
presence of a third-party encourages participants to adopt a relatively 
formal approach to the dispute, resulting in increased concern with 
the presentation of party positions. designed to impress upon the 
arbitrator the validity of the party claims and decreased emphasis on 
the personal relationship between participants, making them less willing 
to compromise over the resolution of the dispute. 
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Allowing for the naivety of the experimental role players 
and taking into consideration related findings on the effects of 
an audience (Zajonc, 1965; Geen and Gange, 1977), it can be argued 
that those representatives who h~ve some experience of arbitration 
are likely to behave differently from those who are inexperienced. 
Social facilitation experiments have shown that the presence of an 
audience has an adverse effect on the learning of a new task. The 
effect is generally increased if the participants believe that the 
audience is evaluating their behaviour. Those with previous experience 
of arbitration should therefore be able to make more skilful and 
strategic use of the procedures than those who are inexperienced. 
The latter should be capable only of striving to create the 'right 
impression' on the arbitrator. This effort may in turn result in 
a poor performance and unnecessarily restricted presentation of 
arguments relevant to the claim, to the detriment of the overall 
strength of the case. As Egan am Loveridge (1982) point out, 'implied 
audiences can become very important in determining the judgements 
made by the actors' (p.3l). It is important to recognise that 
participants at arbitration are striving to create a certain image 
of themselves as individuals, and of the party which they represent, 
for the benefit of the arbitrator. Whereas in negotiation they may 
be imagining the interpretation likely to be put upon their performance 
by favoured superiors and peers, in arbitration negotiators also have 
to make certain projections about the interpretation of their 
behaviour and performance by the third-party, where they are 
removed from the familiar negotiating context and will, if inexperienced 
at arbitration, be unknown to the arbitrator. To some extent, the 
arbitration hearing bears a striking resemblance to the experimental 
simulation. The negotiators are placed in a strange context, expected 
to perform their representative role before an unknown audience who 
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will decide some aspect of their future relationship to each other, 
In a symbolic interactionist critique of the interpretation of 
experiments using the prisoner's dilemma game, Alexander and l~eil 
(1969) show how, in a situation where the 'official task rules' are 
sufficiently ambiguous, the importation of 'unofficial ground rules' 
by the players means that they strive to create and live up to the 
'situated identity' of the 'good player' which is embodied in the 
experimental setting. Just as every social situation has an associated 
set of 'official rules' which define appropriate behaviour, so each 
situation has a related set of 'unofficial rules' which 
'function to import a part of the inclusive 
identity of "person" into the structure of 
social control imposed by merely situated 
rIp layer'" identi ties' (p .124) . 
Thus the norms of the 'good sport' or the 'good player' or, in the 
context of arbitration, the 'good representative' demand that the 
participant lives up to expectations apart from the official 
requirements placed on the individual by virtue of his or her part in 
the situation. Hence the actual goals of the interaction are likely to 
be broader than the formal, structured requirement of 'presentation of 
the case for the union or management at company X' and will extend to 
representatives' efforts to present themselves to the arbitrator as 
'good representatives'. Translating Alexander and tleil' s (1969) 
experimental manipulations into the arbitration context, representatives 
may be concerned to convince the third-party that they are, at one 
and the same time, honest, trustworthy and honourable individuals and 
tough, intelligent, sharp-witted negotiators. It should also be noted 
that the participants are therefore likely to be acting out a role 
which is different from the one expected of them by the formal, official 
structure of arbitration. In the anxiety to create and express an 
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appropriate situated identity, negotiators may lose sight of or misrepresent 
the aspects of the dispute which are in reality most relevant to the 
arbitration. 
Influence of Type of Bargaining Relationship on Arbitration 
It is not only the relative skill and experience of the parties 
which is likely to influence the nature of the arbitration process, 
but also the associated factor of their previous relationship to each 
other. Batstone et a1 (1977) distinguish between 'strong' and 'weak' 
bargaining relationships. Stewards and managers who had strong 
bargaining relationships were more open with each other about the 
internal politics of their respective organisations and aimed to 
protect their opposites from being deceived. Strong bargaining 
relationships require a much greater degree of trust between the two 
sides and imply a better understanding of the significance of each 
other's statements and strategies. Batstone et al (1977) demonstrated 
that shop stewards engaged in a strong bargaining relationship with 
management gained more benefits for the workforce with fewer outright 
confrontations than those in weak bargaining relationships, where the 
shop stewards saw their job as representing the wishes of their members. 
Those negotiators with a strong bargaining relationship are 
therefore less likely to use arbitration, but when it is used it is 
more likely to be an extension of their bargaining relationship. Those 
with a weak bargaining relationship, adopting a conf~ontation approach, 
are more likely to pursue claims to arbitration where arbitration itself 
becomes a threat used by one side against the other. 
The Role of the Arbitrator 
In negotiations which take place in the absence of any third-party, 
the behaviour of each side is generally expected to parallel the 
behaviour of their opposites. The arbitrator is not, however, necessarily 
expected to mirror the behaviour of the parties. In both of the potential 
models of arbitration discussed previously, it is however, assumed that 
th~ arbitrator may have to act as an especially skilled negotiator, 
either as adjudicator and manager of the concession-convergence process, 
able to perceive and correctly interpret the parties' signals, which have 
remained misunderstood by the parties themselves, or as a 'guide' during 
the process of negotiating a framework for resolution of the dispute 
with the parties. 
Descriptions of the 'effective negotiator' may therefore be able 
to cast some light on the requirements of the arbitrator's role. On the 
whole, these descriptions distinguish between those negotiators who are 
able to work in terms of a careful, systematic forward plan, related to 
the issues, which is flexible enough to allow them to derive maXlmum 
benefit from information gained about the other party's intentions, and 
those negotiators who are more rigidly fixed on one Vlew of the dispute 
and one objective. 
In terms of these descriptions, effective arbitrators should be able 
to explain their understanding of the actions and intentions of each 
party to the other in a number of different ways, summarising positions 
and testing the parties' own understanding of events so far. They should 
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be able to assist the parties in surveying a wide range of alternative 
solutions, rather than narrowly focussing on one type of outcome (Rackham and 
Carlisle, 1978; 1979; Morley, 1980; 1981; Snyder and Diesing, 1977). In 
general the effective arbitrator might be expected to structure the 
session into a smooth series of steps and organise the parties to allow 
implementation of the overall plan, rather than allowing the hearing 
to become side-tracked by trivial issues (Winham and Bovis, 1978). 
It may be important for the arbitrator to distinguish those cases 
where the parties are locked into an 'irrational' bargaining mode. 
In terms of Snyder and Diesing's (1977} model of the bargaining process 
the irrational bargainer is over-deterministic in outlook and unable 
to vary the image of the other according to feedback received from the 
events of this particular negotiation. The bargainer's rigid system 
of beliefs results in the retention of fixed images of the other and 
defence of the same policies even when, to an outsider, they are clearly 
out-dated. The representative's beliefs 'are organised so that all 
considerations point to the same strategic choice' (Morley, 1981, p.118). 
An arbitrator meeting parties with such inflexible postures is 
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faced with the task of attempting to vary the image of each to the other, 
much as Douglas (1962) suggests that the mediator acts as a 'perceptualiser' 
of the sides to each other. According to Snyder and Diesing's (1977) 
description of the rational bargainer, the effective arbitrator, in order 
to find a solution to such a dispute, would need to forestall over-rapid 
judgement of the case, initiate an active search for information designed 
to test a series of alternative hypotheses about the underlying 
circumstances of the dispute and reasons for the current impasse, aim 
to understand the problem from the perspective of both sides and clarify 
their positions and expectations in order to determine which aspects of 
party positions remain open to change and by how much (Snyder and Diesing, 
1977). 
At present it is unclear how far these considerations apply to the 
arbitrator's role in general and how much they are specific to the 
'integrative' approach to bargaining rather than those disputes which 
require the arbitrator to decide between party positions. It is 
tempting to suggest that what the arbitrator may be doing in the 
'irrational' case is widening the terms of the dispute, thus allowing 
the adoption of a more integrative approach. 
Summary & Conclusions 
Arbitration is generally believed to be a peaceful means to the 
resolution of conflict between two or more parties. Practitioners of 
arbitration have generally described it as an evaluative, semi-judicial 
process, conducted by impartial, authoritative chairmen, who will temper 
their evaluations with common sense, according to the perceived needs 
of the parties' future relationship and the present econorrdc context. 
A different picture has however emerged from the social sciences, where 
arbitration has been treated as a political process which has more to 
do with the regulation of conflict than its resolution. The extent to 
which it is possible to assume the existence of a consensus, in 
collective bargaining, over such concepts as the 'fair wage' and other 
conditions of employment has been questioned and doubts about the nature 
of 'impartiality' ~n such a context have been raised. Little, if any, 
research has examined the actual process of arbitration, or 
explored in depth the arbitrators' claim to impartiality and fairness 
and the effects of the arbitration process on the parties' presentation 
of issues in dispute. There has been only minimal examination of the 
relationships between types of. issues, procedure and outcomes and little 
suggestion as to how variations in procedure might affect the nature 
of decisions reached. 
It is, however, possible to gain some insig~ts into these issues by 
examining arbitration from the perspective of collective bargaining. 
This entails a reassessment of the long-standing division between the 
two processes. Arguments about the fundamental character of arbitration 
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in fact share much in common with arguments about the fundamental character 
of collective bargaining: both are generally described as inherently 
conservative in nature, regulating and accommodating conflict between 
two sides of industry rather than producing any change in the underlying 
conflictual relationship itself. 
It is argued here that arbitration is inextricably linked with 
negotiation. In particular, and reiterating Douglas' (1962) argument 
relating to mediation, it is asserted that the process and functions of 
arbitration cannot be understood apart from the collective bargaining 
process. An arbitrated dispute can be conceptualised as part of the 
continuing pattern of negotiation between the parties. Whether it is 
a planned part of a negotiating strategy or an unexpected consequence 
of the 'concession dilemma', its use at a particular time will playa 
part in influencing the parties' views of their relationship and of 
the value of the immediate stake and prize. 
Arbitration shares the main defining characteristics of negotiation, 
the only potentially significant difference resting on the responsibility 
for the decision itself. The extent to which this actually differentiates 
the two processes does however appear to have been exaggerated by 
traditional claims that the arbitrator bears sole responsibility for the 
outcome of the dispute. The discussion of the potential distribution of 
control over procedure and outcome between the participants suggests that 
it is important to distinguish between two types of case which may be 
dealt with by arbitration. Those issues requiring the interpretation 
of an existing agreement or working practice, in the light of a specific 
grievance, may be amenable to a simpler procedure, which vests relatively 
more control over outcomes in the third-party, than those disputes over 
the establishment of a new agreement, which require a greater degree of 
participation from the parties in structuring and defining the issues, 
examining alternative solutions and creating the framework of future 
practice. Essentially, the more complex the issues in dispute, the 
less likely it is that the arbitrator will be able to take the 
traditional role of adjudicator. Two contrasting models of the 
negotiation process (the 'concession-convergence' model and the 
'formula-detail' model) in fact suggest two contrasting roles for the 
arbitrator. Those relatively narrow issues, defined according to 
established practice or current agreements, are likely to be amenable to 
a decision between party positions, with the arbitrator managing the 
process of concession-convergence for the parties. If the dispute is 
however relatively diverse, poorly defined and unstructured with no 
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clear-cut decision available, the ski Iful arbitrator is more likely 
to negotiate an overall structure or framework for agreement with 
the parties. 
It may prove possible to achieve the latter only with experienced 
participants. The public image of arbitration as a semi-judicial, 
evaluative process, which on the one hand functions to maintain its 
credibi lity as a method of dispute resolution, may also have a 
detrimental effect on the performance of those who are inexperienced 
at arbitration. If participants approach the situation expecting to 
be evaluated, both professionally and personally, they are likely to 
be most concerned to establish thei r identity as a 'good representative' 
in the eyes of the arbitrator. Such a strategy may carry hidden costs 
if it misleads negotiators about the relative importance of different 
aspects of their party's position and arguments. 
The effective arbitrator, apart from having to counteract such 
'evaluation anxiety', is expected to behave as a particularly skilful 
negotiator who is efther able to achieve a tacit understanding of the 
desires of the parties as to the most appropriate resolution of the 
dispute or is able to ease the parties through the process of 
negotiation, assisting them in the creation of a future agreement. 
The following chapters (5-8) examine the predictions made and 
issues raised in relation to two contrasting groups of arbitrated 
disputes. The first group of cases, containing the most detai led 
material (chapters 6, 7 and 8), concerns the use of established 
arbitration provisions in the public sector where the arbitration 
board and parties have a great deal of experience of both the 
arbftration process and each other. The second group of cases 
(chapter 9) consists of a series of ad'hoc arbitrations with 
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inexperienced parties. All of the issues wi 11 be examined as far 
as possible in relation to both sets of cases and relevant comparisons 
drawn. In general, however, the public sector arbitrations carry the 
bulk of the analysis, with the ad hoc. arbitrations serving as 
illustrations of particular points which have significance for the 
overall argument. 
The initial claim to similarity between the processes of 
negotiation and arbitration is examined in Chapter 6. The rationale 
behind the two most established stage or phase models of the 
negotiation (Douglas, 1962; Morley and Stephenson, 1977) and problem-
solving (Sales, 1950) processes are reviewed in some detai 1. These 
two mod~ls are compared with the process of arbitration in order to 
establish the relationship between them and to cast further light on 
the significance to be attached to such phase movement models in 
general. Questions relating to control over procedure and the 
responsibility for outcomes, and the extent to which predictions 
based on the two models of negotiation ('concession-convergence and 
'formula-detai'l
'
) fit the process of arbitration are raised in 
Chapter 7, in relation to a discussion of the relative simplicity or 
complexity of the issues in dispute, and in Chapter 9 in relation 
to adhocarbitration. The respective roles of arbitrator and 
parties, and their effectiveness with respect to resolution of the 
issues, are examined firstly in relation to the established group of 
negotiators who use arbitration regularly and therefore have a good 
understanding of the process and the particular arbitration board 
(chapter 8) and secondly in relation to the series of ad hoc 
arbitrations with inexperienced parti~s (chapter 9). 
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FIELD STUDY ANALYSES 
CHAPTER FIVE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE FIELD STUDY 
The Historical Background to the ACAS. Arbitration Service 
in Bri ta i n 
The British government's official provfsions for arbitration can 
be traced back to legislation in 1800, 1824, 1867 and 1872. None of 
these acts were particularly successful, the first preventing 
collective references to arbftration, the next two excluding claims 
about rates of pay, except by mutual consent, and using the 
magistrates courts to enforce the exclusfon, and the last Act 
attempting to encourage legally binding agreements (Concannon, 1978). 
The Conciliation Act (1896) was the first to draw on the principle of 
voluntarism, seeing the state as providing a reserve settlement 
mechanism, if all else failed. The Industrial Courts Act (1919), 
following the advice in the Fourth Report of the Whitley Committee 
(1918) which was set up to consider the experience of compulsory 
arbitration during World I-/ar I, limited the role of state intervention, 
by stating that arbitration should be invoked only after the exhaustion 
of the parties own procedures. As well as providing for the Minister 
of Labour to refer disputes to an ad hoc Board of Arbitration or a 
sfngle arbitrator, the Act created a standing body of arbitration, 
called the' Industrial Court'. The 1896 and 1919 statutes establ ished 
the context in which arbitration is still regarded in Britain: its 
success is to some extent measured by the infrequency of its use. Both 
Acts were passed during, what Wedderburn and Davies (1969) call, 
'a formative era of •.. labour law and practice
' 
(p.160). The trade 
union movement managed to persuade the government to exclude legal 
sanctions, for collective action in trade disputes, from the 
legis lation, and further support for· voluntary regulation was 
encouraged by the emergence of a, now familiar, collective bargaining 
structure after the War. The development of voluntary collective 
bargaining arrangements was further supported in the reports produced 
by the Whitley Committee. 
The Industrial Court,Britain's standing body of arbitration, 
became the Industrial Arbitration Board, in 1971 (under the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971) and was similar in composition to the present 
Central Arbitration Committee, created in 1976. 
The Conciliation and Arbitration Service was set up as a body 
independent of government in 1974. I t was renamed the Advisory 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service in January 1975, and became a 
statutory body; under Part t of the Employment Pr~tection Act 1975, 
in January 1976. Its staff were transferred from the old Department 
of Employment Conciliation and Arbitration Service and the Commission 
for Industrial Relations, but its tindependence' was vested in its 
tripartite governing Council, made up of representatlves of employers 
and trade unions as well as independent members. 
The case-load dealt with by arbitration has increased steadily 
since the inception of the service. In 1973, Department of Employment 
appointed arbitrators heard 54 cases, whi 1st in 1975, 292 cases were 
heard by ACAS, appointed arbitrators. This figure had increased to 
315 cases by 1978. 
Between 1974 and 1978, the distribution of cases heard was as 
fo II ows: 
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General pay claims 
Other pay matters and terms 
and conditions of employment 
Recogn i t i on 
Dema rca t j on 
Other trade union matters 
Redundancy 
Dismissal and Discipline 
Others 
Per cent of total cases 
referred to arbitration 
10.4 
70.3 
0.3 
1.6 
0.9 
0.7 
12.4 
3.4 
100.0 
(Lockye r, 1979. p.14-l5) 
As the table shows, the most common references to arbitration 
concerned aspects of employees t terms and conditions of employment. 
Recognition and redundancy issues, on the other hand, are rarely 
brought to arbitration. 
Cases may be heard by a single arbitrator, an ad hoc board of 
arbitration, or, in the public sector, by a relatively permanent 
board of arbitration. The single arbitrator arrangement is said to 
guarantee a speedier disposal of the claim. A board of arbi tration, 
consisting of an independent chairman and two side members, one each 
from management and trade union backgrounds, is likely to be 
requested when the parties fear that the technical complexities of 
the dispute may be beyond the capabilities of one person. All 
participants, acting as arbitrators or side-members, are drawn from 
lists of 'suitable
' 
people, compiled by ACAS. These are frequently 
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academics (some wi th previous experience in i'ndustry), reti red 
conciliation officers, lawyers, trade union officials and managers. 
ACAS officials do not themselves arbitrate. 
The ACAS Arbitration Process 
Arbitration, through ACAS, fs generally arranged only with the 
mutual consent of both parties,who normally agree on the 'Terms of 
Reference' to be dealt with by the arbitrator. These terms define 
the limits of the arbitrator's authority and prescribe the terms in 
which any award may be couched. tnsufficient care in framing the 
terms of reference may result in a decision which is unacceptable to 
the parties (Jenkins and Sherman, 1977). 
Following the appointment of an arbi'trator, a heari'ng is 
arranged where the parties present their case to htm or her. Prior 
to the hearing, the parties are asked to prepare a written statement 
of their case, thus ensuring that the arbitrator' has some knowledge 
of the issues in dispute, before the hearing. Parties are also asked 
to exchange their written statements beforehad, so that they will be 
prepared to answer the arguments raised by the other side. 
The hearing itself may be conducted in private or in public, 
with each side electing one main representative. In the official 
version of procedure, the 'claimant' party is usually asked to state 
its case first, followed by a reply from the opposing side. 80th 
parties and the arbitrator may then ask questions and discuss the 
statements. Finally, each side is asked whether it wishes to make 
a closing statement, this time in reverse order with the claimant 
speaking last. 
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The arbitrator or board makes a decision after the end of the 
hearing. A written report and award is then submitted to ACAS for 
distribution to the parties. 
Public Sector Arbitration 
Background to the study 
The examination of public sector arbitration offers an 
opportunity to study its use by experienced practitioners, in the 
context of relatively stable arrangements. This section of the 
field study consists of a process analysis of twelve arbitration 
hearings. Ten of these concerned the same parties (management 
and up to three unions) from a public sector industry, and the 
same arbitration board chairman. These ten cases were analysed 
in the context of thirty arbitration awards, made by the same 
board, always with the same chairman, for the same parties. The 
remaining two cases came from public sector i"ndustries and had 
arbitration arrangements which were si"milar to those of the other 
indus t ry. 
Detailed analysis of the sample was felt to be well justified, 
because of the rarity of such material in social psychological 
analyses. The ad hoc nature of experimental problem-solving or 
decision-making and negotiation groups is a frequent source of 
criticism of conclusions. Whatever the limitations of the case 
study method, this research goes some way towards answering 
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questions about the generality of experimental findings, by examining 
some of these in the context of established and continuing groups of 
negotiators, who are well known to each other and whose actions have 
long-term consequences for their future working relationship. The 
study should furthermore contribute in its own right to theories of 
group behaviour. 
Background to the Arbitration Board 
The board which presided over the majority of these cases 
originates in the parties' long-established negotiation machinery. 
Appeal to the Board of Arbitration forms the final stage of procedure, 
as shown in the diagram below: 
Diagram: Machinery of Negotiation 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Local committees 
Sectional councils 
Jo i nt counei 1 
National counei 1 
Arb i trat i on 
The Board of Arbitration consists of an independent Chairman, 
jointly appointed by the parties, and two side members; one selected 
by the management, one selected by the trade unions. The arbitration 
may also be assisted by assessors, one nominated by each party. The 
Board's function is not insignificant. In the event of a failure to 
agree at National Council level, and at the request of one or more 
parties, it has the p"",er to Award on issues as varied as wages, hours 
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of duty, and other conditions of service, or proposals to vary a 
National Agreement, where the proposals are, in the words of the 
the parties, of Imajor importance'. 
The decision to use arbitration may come from one or more 
parties, the only necessary condition being a failure to resolve 
the dispute at National Council level, or, in other words, the 
exhaustion of the parties
' 
internal negotiation procedures, The 
parties may agree, before the hearing, that the arbitration decision 
wi 11 be binding, or they may proceed on the understanding that the 
Award may form the bas is for future settlement. In common wi th the 
majority of arbitration, the parties set down their case in writing 
and exchange statements with the opponent before the hearing. In 
the subsequent written Award, the board's decision is preceded by 
a summary of the facts and arguments submitted by the parties. 
Diagram: 
Yea r 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
The Distribution of Arbitration Awards, 
in Public Sector fndustry I, between 
1974 and 1980· 
Numbe r of Cases 
2 
2 
2 
13 
8 
2 
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The number of cases heard is steady, except for the period 
covered by restrictive government pay policies. Many of the cases 
heard during this period concerned issues relating generally to 
working conditions. Improvements in these would result in benefits 
to employees, without infringing pay policies. 
The Twelve Case Studies 
The Hearing Procedure 
The hearings attended covered the period between 1976 and 1978 
and varied in length from approximately one and a half to three and a 
half hours. Each of the twelve cases was decided by a Board of 
Arbitration, consisting of an independent chairman and two side 
members: one from a trade union background and one from a management 
background. The employees were in all cases represented by trade 
union officials. Management was represented by lndustrial relations 
or personnel officers. 
The procedure used at the hearings was typical of arbitration in 
general, if somewhat formal. Each party commenced with an opening 
statement of case (sometimes a lengthy process), followed by replies 
to arguments raised by the opposing party, questions and comments from 
arbitratIon board members and finally a summing-up period, where major 
points of disagreement were re-stated and arguments clarified. The 
decision was not made explicit during th~ arbitration hearing, although 
a range of possible settlements was generally explored and evaluated 
and some issues moved towards agreement. Since the length of time 
between hearing and formal, printed statement of the Award may be as 
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long as eight months (or as short as two weeks) it must be inferred 
that; at least in some cases, the hearing itself is not the sole source 
of advice and information available to the arbitration board. Indeed, 
in one or two cases, the Award refers to an inspection by the board of 
certain sites or working conditions whrch were the subject of a dispute 
between the parties. Nevertheless the decrsfon is ultimately dependent 
. 
on arguments raised at the hearing, and the researcher wi th 1 imi ted 
access is forced to imagine the rest! 
Physical Setting 
The hearings were generally held in large hotel rooms, and 
microphones were available for use by the participants. Hearings were 
held in public although the audience was never very large (usually 
six or so people) and rarely vocal. 
Diagram: Typical Seating Arrangement in the Arbitration Hearing 
AS 
c 
STG 
~ 
lINln~---
AUDIENCE 
AS - ASSESSORS 
STG - STENOGRAPHER 
Sf1 
\ECRETARY 
~NAGEMENT 
C - CHAIRMAN 
~1 - SIDE MEMBER 
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The Nature of the Issues 
With the exception of one case, all issues were claims brought 
by one union, sometimes supported by one or two other unions, and 
concerned improvements in employees working conditions or pay, in the 
immediate future. The remaining case, brought to arbitration by 
management, was supported by two trade unions. In this instance, an 
outcome which favoured management would also have benefited the wages 
grade employees. The salaried staff union, however argued that such a 
decision would disadvantage their members. 
Description of the Issues 
1 •. Pub I it Sector· Industry 
1976 
(j) A claim by one union, disputed by the other two, that the basic 
rate of pay (used for the calculation of bonuses,·etc.) should not 
fal I, during the application of the £6.00 pay supplement and that such 
supplements (which are not used in the calculation of bonuses and 
other benefits} should be consolidated into the basic rate as soon as 
possible. 
1977 
(i i.l A claim by the management for a relaxation of restrictions on 
the advertising of salarfed supervisory staff vacancies to wages grade 
employees. The management claim was supported by the two unions 
representing primarily wages grade staff. It was opposed by the union 
representing salaried staff, who argued that the proposed changes would 
damage the promotion prospects of its members. 
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1978 
(ii j) A claim by one union, supported by two others, for a quarterly 
review of meal and lodging allowances, previously reviewed on an annual 
bas'is. 
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(iv) A claim by one union for the payment of a meal allowance to groups 
of staff, not previously eligible, who were working in construction gangs 
more than one mile distant from their booking-on point. 
(v) A claim by one union that driving duties in works' yards should be 
carried out only by staff who were traditionally employed and qualified 
as drivers, rather than as at present a mixture of both drivers retired 
from normal duties and employees involved in engineering work in the 
yards. A second union supported the position taken by management, 
preferring the existing arrangement, since any changes would displace 
some of its own members. 
(vi) A claim by one union, supported by one other, for an increase 
from ten to twenty minutes in the signing-on allowance for a particular 
group of staff. 
(vii) A claim by two unions, supported by a third, for the creation 
of a booking-on and -off allowance for staff involved in changeovers, 
when working on continuous (twenty-four hour) duty shifts. 
(viii) A claim by one union, supported by another, for the rescindment 
of two long-standing provisions which allowed the management to roster 
employees, without consultation, for up to nine hours. 
(ix) A claim by one union, supported by another, for staff passed 
to act as drivers, though not yet engaged on driving duties, to 
receive the same rates of pay and conditions of service as a driver. 
(x) A claim by one union, supported by another, for the introduction 
of a mileage limitation for drivers on shift work. 
2. The Remaining Two Cases 
(i) A claim by one union concerning the rate of pay for juveniles (under 
eighteen), in relation to the interpretation of the 'pro rata' rate for 
junior staff, during the implementation of the government's £6.00 pay 
s upp 1 emen t . 
(ii) A claim by one union for the regrading of a group of employees, 
within an established job evaluation system. 
Method of Analysis 
Materials used 
1. Written statements of case provided background information to the 
dispute and listed the main points of disagreement between the parties. 
2. A copy of the arbitration Award was obtained in each case. 
3. A transcript of each hearing was prepared by stenographers, with 
the aid of a tape-recorder. The transcripts were, .as far as it is 
possible to tell, a very accurate record. 
Observat i ens 
The researcher was present at each hearing, in order to make notes 
on the physical setting, administrative arrangements, and other officially 
unrecorded details of participants, and 'off the transcript' events. 
The Use of Conference Process Analysis 
Hearing transcripts were coded by the researcher using an adapted 
form of Conference Process Analysis (Morley and Stephenson, 1977) shown 
in Figure 2. CPA was used, because of its particular relevance for face-
to-face groups where the participants have an explicit obligation to 
108 
represent a party position and because of its comprehensIve coding 
system, which allows each act to be coded in terms of each of three 
dimensions, the Mode, Resource and Referant. This is in contrast with 
Bales' interaction Process Analysis which describes each unit in terms 
of one (and only one) of twelve possible categories. Bales' grouping 
of categories into four areas (task-orfented: questions; task oriented: 
answers; social-emotional: negative; social-emotional positiv"e) conceals 
a distinction between the function of information being exchanged (ie to 
deal with problems of orientation, evaluation and control) and the way 
in which that information is made salient (ie given, asked for, agreed 
with, disagreed with). This results in an inconsistency in the sense 
that different types of information which can be asked for (categories 
7-9) or given (categories 4-6) are distinguished, but no distinction is 
drawn between the content of information which is accepted (category 3) 
or rejected (category IO). These distinctions are central to CPA. 
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Figure 2 Conference Process Analysis (CPA) (Adapted) form, 
as Used in Content Analysis of Arbitration Hearings 
Dimension Mode Resou rce Referent 
O. O. O. No refe ran t 
1. Offers 1. P rocedu re 1. Self 
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2. Accepts 2. Se tt lemen t poi nt 2. Management person 
3. Rej ec ts 3. Limits 3. Un ion pe rson 
4. Seeks 4. Positive consequences of 4. Management party 
present practices 
5. Negative consequeces of 5. Union party 
present practices 
6. Other statements about 6. Arb i trator 
present practices 
7. Positive consequences of 7. All pe rson s 
proposed outcomes 
8. Negative consequences of 8. All parties 
proposed outcomes 
9. Other statements about 
outcomes 
10. Pos i tive acknowledgement 
11. Negative acknowledgement 
12. Information. 
In the resource dimension, three categories were added to allow the 
description of that part of the arbitration hearing which is concerned 
with 'present practices', These were defined as follows: 
Resource Category 4: Positive consequences of present practices. This 
contains all units referring to the advantages of continuing to operate 
an existing agreement or maintaining an established custom. E.g. 'Modern 
equipment has made the job safer ••• and less stressful I. 'Longer turns of 
duty add to the variety of work'. 'The agreement ••• diminishes the 
likelrhood of fatigue'. 'This operation is a good revenue earner'. 
Resource Category 5: Negative consequences of present practices. This 
contains all units referring to the disadvantages of continuing to 
operate an existing agreement or maintafning an established custom. E.G. 
'It is almost impossible to persuade anyone to accept the job of press 
shop operator'. ' ••• Such a haphazard situation can only lead to 
disgruntled staff. •• 
' 
'Present arrangements restrict our choice of 
appl icants'. 
Resource Category 6: Other statements about present practices. 
This contains all other statements about present or customary practices 
or agreements or the consequences of those practices. E.g. 'The basis 
of the grading scheme is a "forced pairing" system'. 'The written log 
only relates to controllers .•. and in many instances this is only 
brought up to date after the (shfft) changeover'. 
These three categories parallel the three categories concerned 
with 'outcomes' ie: 
resource category 7: positive consequences of proposed outcomes; 
resource category 8: negative consequences of proposed outcomes; 
resource category 9: other statements about outcomes. 
The structure of the referent dimension was changed slightly 
in order to cope with the increased number of parties to the dispute. 
The referent dimension is still scored only when the attitudes or 
behaviour of a person or party involved are expl icitly described 
(Morley and Stephenson, 1977). The categories used aimed principally 
to distinguish between references to a person in the group and 
references to a particular party to the dispute (referent category 2: 
management person; referent category 3: union person; referent 
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category 4:·management party; referent category 5: union party, etc.). 
Referent category 6: arbitrator, was scored whenever someoneexplicitly 
referred to a member of the arbitration board or to the board as a whole. 
Reliabi lity of coding was measured by the investigator re-coding 
sections drawn at random from each transcript approximately six months 
after the initial coding. The correlation between (a) first and 
second divisions of transcript into units was .98; (b) first and 
second classification of units in terms of mode, resource and referent, 
was .85. 
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Coded transcripts were analysed firstly in terms of proportions 
of acts of each kind, in each dimension (i.e. proportions of 'offers', 
'accepts, 'rejects', and 'seeks', totalling 100% in the Mode 
dimension; proportions of 'procedure', 'limits', etc. totalling 100% 
in the Resource dimension, and so on). Secondly, transcripts were 
analysed in terms of the proportions of acts of each kind contributed 
by management, union and arbTtrator. 
Analyses of variance were carried out on the twelve cases, for 
each c.p.a. category. ( . 'ff ' , k I. Ie. 0 ers,. .. see s , I procedure I ••. 
'information'; Ino referent ' ••• 'all parties'.) The factors used 
were: 
(1) phase or stage of hearing (1,2,3); 
(2) role (management, union, arbitrator); 
(3) complexity/simplicity of issues (complex/simple), 
where 'Phase' and 'Role' were treated as repeated measures. 
CHAPTER S I X 
Group Problem-Solving and Negotiation Processes 
Compared with the Arbitration Process 
Section One Theoretical Origins and Rationale for Bales' 
Three-Phase Model of Group Prcblem-5olving, Compared and Contrasted 
with Theoretical Origins and Rationalefor Douglas' (1982) and 
Morley and Stephenson's (1977) Three-Stage Model of Negotiation 
It has been argued that the success of both negotiation and 
problem-solving is indicated by the extent to which it is structured 
in terms of its movement through an orderly series of stages or 
phases (Douglas, 1962; Morley and Stephenson, 1977; Winham and Bovis, 
1977; Bales, 1953; Landsberger, 1955). The phase movement for problem-
solving groups, proposed by Bales (1951), is compared and contrasted 
with the stages of negotiation proposed by Douglas (1962) and Morley 
and Stephenson (1977), in order to establish the relative similarity 
or dissimilarity of the processes of arbitration, negotiation and 
problem-solving. It is expected (as argued in Chapter Four) that 
arbitration wi 11 be more closely related to the process of negotiation 
than it is to the process of problem-solving. 
Bales' Model of Group Problem-Solving 
The most striking feature of early models of group processes 
(Lewin, 1952; Parsons, Bales and Shils, 1953) is the extent to which 
they rely on principles borrowed from classical mechanics, whether it 
is the 'field theory' propounded by Lewin or Newton's Laws appl ied 
to social action, in the case of Parsons' theory. Although the 
origins of Bales' model of group problem-solving have virtually 
disappeared in more recent discussions of IPA and the predicted 
phase movement, the model's characterisation of group problem-
solving becomes more comprehensible, and the rationale behind it 
more evident, when it is viewed in the context of early theories 
of social action, rooted in classical mechanics. Both Parsons and 
Lewin treat the social system as something which is stable and which 
tends to maintain its equilibrium. Lewin characterises this as a 
'quasi-stationary' process, which 'I ike a river, continuously changes 
its elements even if its velocity and direction remain the same' 
(p.202). The equilibrium is maintained at some pre-determined level 
by the existence of equal and opposite forces (e.g. towards and 
against authoritarian control), where the 'resultant' of forces is 
equal to zero. Parsons relies explicitly on the Laws of Motion to 
explain the 'stability of the system: 'action and reaction tend to 
be equal in force and opposite in direction' (Parsons, Bales and 
Sh i Is, 1953, p. 164) . His 'principle of acceleration' (p.165) 
assumes that changes in the rate of process are accoun ted fo r by 
an 'input of energy' from some external sou rce, which is balanced 
by an equa I 'output' of energy from the system. Pa rsons et al also 
argue that, independently of other principles, the system has to 
resolve internal incompatible or confl icting patterns, in order to 
avoid 'low levels of integration and . dis sol uti on' ( p. 165) . 
Translated into the 'micro' level of the face-to-face group, the 
model assumes a closed system, with a finite amount of energy which 
can be expended and linear series of actions and reactions. Issues 
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concerning how the identified 'equi librium' came about, or how 
change is effected are thus essentially outside the frame of 
reference. The maintenance of the state of equilibrium is instead 
seen as the central focus for research. Bales (1953) describes the 
'problem' of equilibrium as one of 'establ ishing arrangements. 
whereby the system goes through a repetftive cycle, within which all 
of the disturbances created in one phase are reduced in some other' 
(p.123). Bales, in line with Parsons' general 'theory of action', 
differentiates four areas of importance for social interaction. These 
are described as (1) the Expressive-Integrative (Social-Emotional 
Area: Positive Reactions); (2) the Expressive-Integrative (Social-
Emotional Area: Negative Reactions); (3) Instrumental-Adaptive (Task 
Area= Questions); (4) Instrumental-Adaptive (Task Area: Answers}. 
The Expressive-Integrative Areas (positive and negative) reflect 
Parson's argument that equilibrium can only be maintained to the extent 
that the system, or in this case the group, can successfully 
integrate discordant elements, and, secondly, that increasing 
attempts at 'control', as group tasks are dealt with, result in 
opposing 'forces' of antagonism and hosti lity. 
The next stage in the development of the model is Bales' 
argument that these four areas vary systematically over time, in the 
extent to which they predominate in the group discussion. Bales 
(1951) defines these 'phases' as 'qualitatively different sub-periods 
within a total continuous period of interaction' (p.389), where the 
whole session involves the group taking a decision on a given 
problem. The phase hypothesis is stated as a movement from relative 
emphasis on 'problems of orientation, to problems of evaluation and 
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subsequently to problems of control' (Sales, 1951, p.390). At the 
same time, the 'relative frequencies of both negative and 
positive reactions tend to increase' (p.390). 
These 'phases' can be seen, fn turn, to have their parallels 
in earlier discussions of the aspects of reflective thought discussed, 
for example, by Dewey (1933), who describes 'thinking' as more 
effective to the extent that it contains 'an orderly chain of ideas 
•.• a control I ing purpose and end, (and) ... examination, 
scrutiny and inquiry' (p.8.). Bales, in transferring a similar 
process model to the group level, argued that it was possible to 
demonstrate empirically, for groups deal ing with 'full-fledged' 
problems (from problem recognition to resolution), a set order to 
these stages (i.e. orientation, evaluation and control). He did 
not, however, as later writers have done, argue that the more 
closely the group activity follows the prescribed order of phases, 
the more effective its problem-solving will be. Bales attempts 
rather, in line with the underlying principles of equilibrium, to 
establish a 'base line' account of group processes, which will 
hold true for the majority of small, face-to-face groups, where 
there is at least minimal need to mafntain group solidarity, such 
that members feel committed to act on a joint decision, and such 
that tension and antagonism between the members will be negatively 
valued. Deviation from the establ ished pattern is consequently 
treated as (I) indicative of particular kinds of 'malfunctioning' 
of the group process itself, or (i i) as resulting from planned 
interventions into the task or style of interaction. The phase 
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movement postulated is itself treated as a requirement for the 
maintenance of 'system equilibrium'. In line with the general 
closed system model, a 'problem' or 'di'sturbance t is depicted as 
being introduced into a system in the steady state. The subsequent 
group process acts to regain the lost equilibrium. Group members 
initially orient themselves to the problem, indicating that some 
uncertainty about the relevant evidence or facts exists. This 
'orientation' inevitably provokes a subsequent 'evaluation' stage, 
where contrasting criteria, which reflect group members' differing 
values, are applied to the avai lable evidence with the aim of 
reaching some agreed interpretation. The third phase is said to 
give most emphasis to 'control' activities, which concern judgements 
between different possible outcomes and the drawing up of a firm 
decision on a joint course of action. Dealing with problems of 
orientation, evaluation and control in turn disturbs the 'balance' 
of inter-personal relations in the group. Disagreement, Bales 
argues, whi 1st necessary to problem-solving, may impair the 
solidarity of the group, particularly as over time increasing 
emphasis is given to problems of 'control'. Following Lippi tt 
(1950) and Lewin (1952) Bales argues that increasing control is 
matched by opposing hostile, antagonistic forces, which on a 
'hydraulic' model of energy flow, may irrepressibly 'burst forth', 
if not relieved during the group discussion. Thus changing patterns 
of expression of tension and tension management, over time, are 
part of the same equilibrium process. Since the group has to return 
to a state of equilibrium, forces towards dissolution are matched 
by attempts to reintegrate the group, in the form of humorous comments, 
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e~pressions of solidarity and so on. Hence Bales derives the 
hypothesis that both negative and positive reactions will be at 
their peak during the final phase of the group's activity. 
Bales' Findings 
Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) was applied to twenty-
two cases (Bales, 1951), providing general support for the phase 
movement hypothesis. Acts of orientation were generally at their 
highest during the first phase, acts of evaluation during the 
second phase and controlling acts in the final phase,while the 
occurrence of both positive and negative reactions increased over 
time. 'In the absence of any compelling.rationale', as Bales puts 
it, the beginning and end of each phase were determined by cutting 
the session tapes into three equal parts. Summing across groups, 
some of which did not fit Bales' own criteria for the occurrence 
of the phase movement, the following pattern was established. 
Figure 3 
35 
Proportions of orientation, evaluation and control 
acts, in each of three equal phases of group 
problem-solving (based on twenty-two sessions) 
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On the basis of these findings, and in line with Bales' 
'equilibrium' model, he argues that 'there are certain conditions 
which seem to be more or less inherent in the nature of the 
process of interaction and communication itself' (Bales and 
Strodtbeck, 1951, p.396). Having begun by setting out a fairly 
stringent set of criteria necessary for the appearance of the 
phase movement in group discussion, Bales thus concludes that, 
in fact, something of the same movement is evident in a variety 
of groups, including those which do not deal with an entire 
problem from recognition to resolution. He seems rather to be 
arguing that the very appearance of certain kinds of acts (e.g. 
acts of orientation) is inevitably followed by certain other 
acts (e.g. acts of evaluation), the progression itself being a 
necessary condition for the eventual restoration of the group's 
eq u iIi b r i urn. 
Other Evidence Supporting the Existence of a Phase Movement 
in Decision Making Groups 
1. Managerial Decision-Making Groups, within an Organisation 
In questioning whether, within anyone decision-making 
'episode', distinctive phases exist, Witte (1972) analysed 233 
decisions concerning the purchase of data processing equipment. 
He concluded that the decisions consisted of a number of 
different operations which occurred at different times, with an 
average of 32 and a maximum of 452. Overall, a sequence of five 
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p'hases was distinguished: Problem recognition, gathering of 
information, development of alternatives, evaluation of alternatives 
and choice. This sequence was not however supported in all cases, 
or indeed for a sub-sample of the most efficient decisions. 
2. Negotiation Groups 
Although Bales never explicitly excludes negotiation groups 
from the phase-movement model, it was originally tested on 
essentially co-operative groups. It was however acknowledged that 
the evaluation of a problem involved the expression of 'different 
values and interests as criteria by which the facts of the 
situation and proposed course of action are to be judged'. 
(Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951, p.391). (Parsons, Bales and Shils, 
1953, make more explicit comments on the potentially divisive and 
non-co-operative nature of decision-making groups particularly in 
industry.) The major difference in the case of negotiation 
groups would seem to be, as McGrath and Julian (1963) pointed out, 
the explicit obligation to represent a particular party and its 
position. Clearly, the question to be asked is whether Bales' 
model or similar 'sequence' models of group processes generalise 
to decisions which are reached explicitly through negotiation. 
Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) was applied to twelve small 
firms' mediation sessions, by Landsberger in 1955. Those sessions 
judged as more 'successful', in terms of number of issues resolved 
by the end of the meeting, conformed more closely to the predicted 
phase movement. (The correlation - rho - between the ranking of 
success and number of transpositions required for the observed 
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phase movement to conform to that predicted was .58.) In 
'unsuccessful' cases, negative, hostile comments were not 
highest during the final phase, suggesting perhaps that 
successful mediation serves a cathartic function. Furthermore, 
hostility at the start of the session was negatively correlated 
with 'successful' resolution (rho - .58). Essentially Landsberger 
moved one step further than Bales, in arguing that only those 
negotiation groups termed successful in their decision-making, 
conformed to the predicted phase movement. 
Evidence of a phase movement was found, in simulated 
negotiations. by McGrath and Julian (1963). They used a rather 
different process analysis, and divided sessions into four equal 
parts of 7.5 minutes each. Structuring activity was highest in 
phases I and I I I, the 'pace' of debate increased over time, along 
with an increasing number of positive, negative and neutral 
feedback acts, both of these results providing general support for 
Bales' model. In contrast with Landsberger's results, successful 
groups showed decreasing negative affect towards the end of the 
session, and were generally more 'neutral' in tone throughout 
discussion. The timing of structuring acts was particularly 
important in this case, given that the successful completion of 
the task required the production of specific recommendations. 
Although neither Landsberger nor McGrath and Julian explicitly 
attempt to examine the effect of a third party (mediator or 
neutral chairman) on the decision-making process or its sequence 
of stages, McGrath and Julian's results suggest that the chairman 
played a vital role in the successful completion of the task, 
since chairmen were responsible for the initiation of over 90% 
of the vi tal 'structuring' acts. 
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Douglas' and Morley and Stephenson's Models of Negotiation 
The mediation process was also studied by Ann Douglas during 
the 1950s. She proposed a model of negotiation based on the view 
that members of negmtiation groups, by virtue of their obligation 
to represent a party position, are faced with different demands 
from members of problem-solving groups. Douglas' three-stage 
model suggests that the process of negotiation can be represented 
by the changing emphasis over time on the interpersonal and 
interparty aspects of the debate (Douglas, 1962). This view of 
the negotiation process has been used to make different predictions 
about the form of the debate from those proposed by Bales (Morley 
and Stephenson, 1977). 
The first stage of negotiatfon, Douglas argued, is concerned 
with setting up the bargaining range, where the party line is 
stressed and the differences between opposing party positions are 
emphasised. The second phase consists of more. subtle explorations 
of possible settlements, where those individuals present implicitly 
weigh up the chances of one or other settlement and, according to 
Anthony and Crichton (1969) and Stevens (1963) argue the advantages 
or low costs to the opponent of moving to its own position. Douglas 
(1962) comments that this part of negotiation is about the 
'estimation of the meaning of what is said' (p.547) and Morley 
and Stephenson (1977) have argued that it can be characterised by 
the increased emphasis on interpersonal aspects of the negotiators' 
relationship. The third stage constitutes the 'decision-making 
crisis', characterised by more explicit commitment to particular 
outcomes, combined with the drawing-together of an agreement on 
the future course of action. 
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Superficially, there is little difference between this 
exposition of the three stages of negotiation and Bales' description 
of the phase movement for problem-solving groups. Both could be 
summarised in terms of 'orientation, evaluation and control' stages. 
In looking at how these three components of the debate are managed, 
however, the model of negotiation emphasises that conflict between 
the parties exists from the outset, while the group problem-solving 
model focusses on the consequences of the three phases for inter-
personal harmony. 
The major difference between the proposed negotiation and 
problem-solving processes resides therefore in a different view of 
conflict and its expression. In terms of Bales' (1951) analysis, 
conflict is generated between individuals as a 'side effect' of 
their struggle to come to terms with a shared problem. In negotiation 
groups, however, the expression of confl ict between parties, at the 
outset, is presented as vital to the satisfactory resolution of the 
dispute. The early expression of differences must, however, give 
way to relatively accommodative 'problem solving' between group 
members, if the differences are to be resolved. Such problem -solving 
is generally regarded as ameliorating the conflict between parties, 
rather than producing conflict between individuals. In terms of 
Douglas' model, the first stage of lengthy speeches and emphasis of 
the 'wide divide' between the parties is an important precursor to 
the later exploration of positions between individuals. Negotiators 
could not satisfactorily explore the areas of potential accommodation 
and agreement without first demonstrating the resolve and determin-
ation of their respective parties. Not only would they face the 
challenge from constituents of having 'sold out' or faTled to do 
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justice to the merits of their own side's case (Morley, 1980), but they 
would also suffer from having failed to establish an image of sufficient 
firmness and determination in the eyes of the others, who might other-
wise expect complete capitulation to their party's demands at the 
first sign of a conciliatory gesture. 
Although the internal logic of the progression is clear, the 
possibility of reaching a mutual understanding during the later stages 
of negotiation is likely to be seriously damaged if early expressions 
of conflict between the parties are treated as indicative of personal 
hostility between the negotiators, thus undermining the personal 
relationships which come to the fore in the middle stage of 
negotiation and which facilitate the process of mutual accommodation. 
In terms of negotiation, therefore, the expression of personal 
conflict is regarded as a serious threat to a peaceful resolution of 
the dispute, and not, as Bales would suggest, as an in~vitable 
consequence of dealing with the problem. 
Using two negotiations, one in a food-manufact~ring group, and 
one concerning a group of electricians, and drawing on experimental 
findings, Morley and Stephenson (1977) extended Douglas' model, while 
still arguing that negotiation does indeed proceed through three 
stages, different in character from those proposed by Bales for 
problem-solvin~ groups. The first stage of negotiation is described 
as essentially distributive in nature and as being concerned 
particularly with the establishment of the relative merits of each 
side's case in the context of the overall power relationship between 
them. The main requirement on the indi"viduals present is to fulfill 
their role as a party representative. In contrast with problem-
solving groups, 'the information presented is geared to the 
justification of a divisive position, not to the solution of a common 
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problem' (Morley and Stephenson, 1977, p.259). The second stage is 
relatively more concerned with 'problem-solving', where the range of 
possible solutions, which satisfy criteria establ ished in stage 1, is 
examined. During this second stage, the particular individuals in 
the group are most salient as 'characters' in their own right, rather 
than as party representatives. The final stage deals with decision-
making and plans for future action. The negoti"ators strive to 
satisfy both the demands of thei"r own parties and the demands of the 
actual group members. 
In terms of Conference Process Analysis (c.p.a.) categories., the 
phase movement in negotiation is characterised by the changing emphasis 
from interparty to interpersonal forms of address and, over time, 
fewer statements indicating rejection of the opponentts proposals, 
together with a decrease in expressions of hostility and antagonism 
and an increase in praise and other supportive statements (Morley 
and Stephenson, 1977). These conclusions are in contrast with the 
findings of Bales and Strodtbeck (1951), Landsberger (195Sa,b) and 
McGrath and Julian (1963), who have argued that coping with the task 
leads to both increased conflict, expressed as hostile remarks and 
disagreements, and increased positive, supportive comments and 
agreements, which counterbalance the forces towards dissolution of 
the group. 
The opposing accounts rest to some extent on the different content 
analysis systems used by the investigators. Bales' I.P.Adoes not 
distinguish between 'personal' hostilities and expressions of inter-
party conflict, whereas c.p.a. does make this distinction. In 
relation to Landsberger's (1955) findings, for example, Douglas' 
(1962) model of negotiation would agree that a high level of personal 
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ho?tility at the start of negotiations would be detrimental to the 
eventual resolution of the dispute. There is however a more 
fundamental disagreement, which is based on Morley and Stephenson's 
(1977) view that the problem-solving aspect of negotiation does not, 
as Bales would suggest, lead inevitably to inter-personal tensions, 
but allows the conflict between the parties to be dealt with. This 
disagreement wi 11 be examined in relation to the arbitration process. 
Predicted Changes Over Time in Levels of c.p.a. Categories 
based on Morley and Stephenson (1977) and Ann Douglas (1962) 
With these contrasting predictions in mind, it is possible to 
derive a series of expected changes in the. relative emphasis given to 
different Conference Process Analysis categories, over time. Since it 
is expected that the arbitration process will be more closely related 
to the model of the negotiation process developed by Morley and 
Stephenson (1977), than to the model of the probfem-solving process 
developed by Bales (1953), these predictions are based on the 
previously established pattern of changes during the course of 
negotiation, as reported by Morley and Stephenson (1977). 
There are a number of practical difficulties involved in the 
interpretation of content analysfs materfal, since it describes 
changing patterns of debate over time, where the categories themselves 
are inter-related. (For example, if 90% of all statements are 
'Offers' of some kind, only 10% can be 'Accepting', 'Rejecting' or 
'Seeking'. If the level of 'Offers' falls, the level of 'Accepts', 
must rise.) Neither is ft easy to predfct what a 'chance' 
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distribution of categories should be, since this idea makes nonsense 
of the expected rules of discussion and argument. Nor is it easy to 
say what a 'significant' change in the level of use of any category 
should be, since significant 'change' in the use of that category is 
itself dependent upon the overall frequency of occurrence for that 
category. 
Consequently, the setting up of an expected distribution of 
categories, on the basis of Morley and Stephenson's (1977) findings 
provides a more substantial starting point for the development of a 
model of the sequencing of debate and decision-making i-n relation 
to arbitration. The arbitration hearing is unlike the negotiating 
session, to the extent that the final decision is formulated outside 
the hearing and the parties are concerned to convince the arbitrator 
of the merits of their case as well as convincing each other. 
Those disputes which are brought to arbitration originate in dead-
locked negotiation. Such negotiations may themselves be different 
in character from those which are concluded in agreement. The 
arbitration group as a whole, however, shares many characteristics 
with the negotiation group. Its members are concerned with 
justifying divisive positrons, and they have very evident obligations 
to represent a party position. If they are to continue working 
together, the sides eventually have to reach some agreement, however 
,temporary, on the issues in dispute. The content analysis of the 
arbitration hearing should therefore cast light on the essential 
similarities and differences between this process and the processes 
of negotiation and problem-solving. 
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Predicted Changes in cpa Category Levels from Stage I to Stage I I 
Based on Morley and Stephenson's (1977) findings, the change in 
character from a first distributive bargaining stage, to a second 
problem-oriented stage should be reflected in the following c.p.a. 
dimensions as indicated: 
(i) The Mode Dimension 
Increased use of statements indicatin'gAcceptance of a proposal, 
and increased use of questioning and exploratory comments (Seeks), 
should occur together with decreased use of Rejects, which has in the 
past been taken to indicate disagreements and divisiveness. 
(ii) The Resource Dimension 
Increased positive, supportive gestures and praise for others 
(Positive Acknowledgement) should be accompanied by fewer demonstrations 
of hostility (Negative Acknowledgement), which, it has been argued, are 
typical of the opening bravado of negotfation. less use of Procedural 
comments is expected, indicating that the participants have established 
the general form of the session, and are moving into a less structured 
phase. Fewer references to Limits should be made indicating less 
concern with restricting the range of options, while the use of 
strategic statements should increase, indicating attempts to persuade 
or dissuade others of the merits of a particular course of action 
(Anthony and Crichton, 1969). Informational statements should decrease, 
since the background to the case should already be established. 
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(iii) The Referent Dimension 
Increased references to Self and Persons are predicted, with a 
corresponding fall in Party references, characterising the more 
informal, exploratory nature of discussion in the middle stage of 
negotiation, where individual group members are more prominent. 
Predicted Changes in c.p.a. Category Levels from Stage I I to Stage I I I 
The ch~nge in character from the second, problem-oriented stage, 
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to the third decision-making stage i~ perhaps more difficult to predict, 
in terms of c.p.a. categories, since findings have generally been less 
clear cut. Here it is treated as primari ly impersonal in nature, and 
concerned with summarising, controlling and structuring activities, 
which define the terms of a final outcome. 
(i) The Mode Dimension 
In line with the general characterisation of negotiation groups, 
questioning or exploratory statements (Seeks) should decrease and 
conflict expressed in the form of Rejections should decrease. 
(ii) The Resource Dimension 
According to Morley and Stephenson's (1977) findings. the final 
stage of negotiation is characterised by an increasingly business-
like approach, accounting for the rise in Procedural statements, 
whilst the use of Limits, constraining the options for settlement, 
should continue to decline. A decline in the use of strategic 
arguments (Positive and Negative Consequences of Present Practices/ 
Proposed Outcomes) should be accompanied by increased attention to 
Outcomes. The level of Positive Acknowledgements should continue to 
. increase, while Negative Acknowledgements should continue to decline. 
(iii) The Referent Dimension 
Both Personal references to particular group members and 
references to Parties are expected to decrease between Stages I I 
and I II, with an increased level of Self references. These 
predictions are in line with Horley and Stephenson's (1977) findings 
and seem to reflect the rather business-like, relatively impersonal 
nature of the final phase of negotiation. 
Predicted Changes in c.p.a. Category Levels 
Stage 1 to Stage 11 
Mode 
Resource' 
Referent 
S ta ge 11 to Stage 111 
Mode 
Resource 
c.p.a. category 
Accepts: 
Rejects: 
Seeks: 
Procedure: 
Limi ts: . 
Posittve/Negative Consequences 
of Present Practtces/Proposed 
outcomes: 
Self: 
Person: 
Pa rty: 
Rejects: 
Seeks: 
P rocedu re: 
Limits: 
Statements about outcomes: 
Statements about present 
practices: 
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predicted change 
increase 
decrease 
increase 
decrease 
decrease 
inc rease 
increase 
increase 
decrease 
decrease 
decrease 
increase 
decrease 
increase 
decrease 
Posittve/Negative consequences:decrease* 
Referent 
*of present practices/ 
proposed outcomes 
Pos i ti've acknowledgement: 
Negative acknowledgement: 
Self: 
Pe rson: 
Pa rty: 
increase 
decrease 
increase 
decrease 
decrease 
Section Two Stages of the Arbitration Hearing 
Profile of the Arbitration Process 
Previous discussion of arbitration and, in particular the 
experimental findings reported in Chapter Three, have led to the 
general expectation that the arbitration process will be more 
formal in nature than the typical negotiation process. In the 
experimental simulation, the presence of an observer increased the 
participants' concern to do justice to the position of their party. 
This should be even more evident in the context of arbitration, 
where the participants are further constrained by the need to 
address statements through the Chairman. 
Overall Distribution of Acts, compared with Negotiation 
This expectation is in fact upheld by a comparison between the 
overall distributions of c.p.a. categories for negotiation (as 
reported in Morley and Stephenson, 1977, p.255 and p.279) and 
arbitration (see Tables 6 and 7). 
Just as Bales (1950) found empirical uniformities in the 
occurrence of each Interaction Process Analysis category, reading 
down table 7 a consistent pattern emerges for c.p.a. categories 
which varies relatively little from case to case. 
1. In the Mode dimension, the majority of statements were made in 
the form of Offers (x = 86.74%, S.D. = 13.53). There were few 
interruptions (uncoded units, x = 0.32%, S.D. = 0.09), reflecting 
the general formality of proceedings. On average 7.89% of acts 
(S.D. = 2.14) were phrased as questions or reque~ for information 
(Seeks); 3.9% (S.D. = 0.49) were phrased as Accepting and 1.15% 
(S.D. = 0.26) as Rejections. Comparing this pattemwith that 
established for negotiation (Morley and Stephenson, 1977), the 
arbitration hearings were more dominated by Offers, with 
slightly fewer Rejections and Seeks and a lower level of 
interruptions. This pattern reflects the more 'decorous' 
nature of arbitration, when compared with negotiation. The 
presence of the chairman encouraged a rather controlled form 
of debate. 
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~Table 6 C.P.A. Categorisation of acts in each of twelve Arbitration Hearings (in Percentages) 
c.p.a. category Case Overall Standard 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Average Deviation 
Person 
Management 43.04 36.10 33.09 29.27 29.19 28.63 30.77 19.37 21.26 26.44 27.67 21.20 28.04 9.28 
Union 32.10 47.69 36.99 35.88 46.15 36.81 28.97 36.65 25.90 08.46 20.31 33.88 32.07 11. 51 
Arbitrator 24.86 16.21 29.92 26.67 17.50 28.02 21.98 24.69 24.61 20.04 15.75 13 .08 23.96 8.12 (Union 2) 08.18 07.16 06.54 18.29 19.28 12.99 25.03 12.45 24.01 14.88 6.68 (Union 3) 15.23 20.04 23.83 07.83 16.73 5.98 
Mode 0 00.47 00.37 00.36 00.43 00.30 00.43 00.26 00.09 00.17 00.00 00.43 00.13 0.32 0.05 
Offers 82.44 91.56 84.05 88.13 90.65 86.17 85.41 83.42 87.95 87.20 91.61 94.05 86.74 13.53 
Accepts 05.21 01.69 05.82 0lt.17 01 .81 04.87 05.01 04.80 03.44 03.11 01.92 01.94 3.90 0.49 
Rejects 01.98 00.66 00.72 01.36 00.60 00.78 00.66 00.70 01.98 01.27 01.10 01.14 1. 15 0.26 
Seeks 09.90 05.72 09.05 05.91 06.64 07.75 08.66 10.99 06.45 08.42 04.94 02.74 7.89 2.14 
Resource 0 00.47 00.37 00.36 00.43 00.30 00.43 00.26 00.09 00.17 00.00 00.43 00.13 0.32 0.05 
Procedure 21.83 06.60 11. 15 11.06 05.51 09.28 07.12 06.28 09.90 06.14 06.90 07.39 9.47 3.36 
Settlement Point 00.05 00.00 01.80 00.49 00.23 00.18 00.35 00.70 01.80 00.35 02.35 02.68 0.78 1.04 
Li m its 
* 
02.50 00.66 03.42 01.25 00.83 00.82 00.79 00.61 01.64 01.49 03.38 03.75 1. 75 1. 15 
+ con. p.p.* 00.83 00.00 01.80 01.90 02.79 01.67 01.58 02.01 01.38 00.57 00.90 00.07 1.27 0.84 
- con. p'R. 02.24 00.00 03.06 04.17 07.47 03.38 02.55 05.50 10.33 04.56 09.32 00.07 4.31 3.26 
sts./p.p. * 22.09 20.18 45.02 34.09 30.32 50.18 44.04 50.79 33.48 38.23 26.81 04.68 32.99 13.86 
+ con. prop. out.* 00.42 01.83 00.00 00.98 01.58 00.18 02.24 02.09 00.52 00.48 01.85 04.48 1.35 1.24 
- con. prQP. out. 01.30 03.30 00.06 06.45 03.02 00.71 05.01 04. 19 01.20 00.39 05. 12 13.51 3.62 3.65 
s ts. 10YL" 02.45 23.48 1 1. 57 03.14 11.09 Oi.28 20.00 10.30 10.93 12.54 17.21 32.84 13.23 8.59 
+ ack.: 04.17 01.47 00.66 02.28 01.66 00.75 02.37 01.22 00.95 00.96 01.42 02.98 1.85 0.78 
- ack. 05.05 06.60 01.02 02.44 01.66 01.32 00.84 . 03.32 01.38 01.97 03.24 03.34 2.77 1.52 
. I n forma t i on 36.58 35.51 20.08 31. 33 33.56 28.84 12.84 12.91 26.33 32.31 21.02 24.08 26.40 7.47 
Referent 0 39.86 50.26 40.77 28.83 46.68 48.33 41.01 41.88 50.17 41.78 34.99 42.14 41. 19 11.04 
Self 08.86 04.99 06.53 06.78 07.09 09.17 05.58 _ 06.11 07.92 05.04 04.09 06. 19 7.02 2. 11 
Person 09.62 04.47 08.81 08.12 08.72 07.56 07.15 06.88 08.94 07.32 03.92 05. 14 7.45 0.50 
Party 35.02 35.95 37.59 50.22 32.73 30.50 41.52 41.08 30.63 42.47 50.35 37.93 38.79 6.62 
Arbitrator 06.67 04.33 05.88 05.47 04.98 04.73 04.79 03.49 04.39 04.43 06.65 08.60 5.53 0.11 
It':> 
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Notes Referring to Table6 
·Case 
1 - private company 
2 - nationalised industry I I 
3 to 12 - nationalised industry 
Since the overall pattern of category values does not differ dramatically between 
cases 1 and 2 and 3 to 12, these two were included in the overall analyses of variance • 
.,. 
+ con. p.p. - positive consequences of present practices 
- con. p.p. - negative consequences of present practices 
sts./p.p. - other statements about present practices 
+ con. prop. out. - positive consequences of proposed outcomes 
- con. prop. out. - negative consequences of proposed outcomes 
sts./out. ~ other statements about outcomes 
+ ack. - positive acknowledgement 
- ack. - negative acknowledgement 
CoO 
~ 
.,..... 
Table 7 Overall Mean c.p.a. Categorisation of acts in arbitration hearings compared with 
Morley and StephensPJ1_'~ (19UL¥I~ge_l'l~gotiatipns (in perce_n~ages) 
c.p.a. category 
Mode 
o. 
Qffer 
Accept 
Reject 
Seek 
Resource 
Procedure 
Settlement point 
Lim{ts 
Pos{tlve consequences of present practices 
Negative consequences of present practices 
Other statements about present practices 
Po~ i. t i ve consequences of proposed outcomes 
Negative consequences of proposed outcomes 
Other stqtements about proposed outcomes 
PQ~t ti,ve acknowledgement 
Negative acknowledgement 
lnfQrmatiQn 
Referent 
Q. 
Self 
pepiQn 
Party 
Arbitrator 
Grand Mean 
Ne go t i at i on (1) 
[tJ :,) 
10.20 
68.00 
09.50 
02.60 
09.70 
01.10 
10.90 
18.20 
01.80 
02.70 . 
00.20 
01.60 
48.00 
62.60 
14.50 
14.10 
09.80 
Grand Mean 
Negotiation (2) 
[N:.I] 
01.50 
79.20 
03.90 
03.60 
11 .80 
07.80 
07.00 
30.20 
01.10 
01.50 
00.90 
01.20 
47.70 
47.90 
10.20 
31.00 
11.00 
(Negotiation figures reproduced from Morley and Stephenson (1977), p. 255 and p.279) 
Grand Mean 
Arb i t rat ion 
[No IZ) 
00.32 
86.74-
03.90 
01. 15 
07.89 
09.47 
00.78 
01.75 
01.27 
04.31 
32.99 
01.35 
03.62 
13.23 
01.85 
02.77 
26.40 
41.17 
07.02 
07.45 
38.79 
05.53 
2. This is further highlighted in the "Resource dimension where 
the level of the strategic categories" (Posi'tive and Negative 
Consequences of a particular course of action) tended to be 
higher than in negotiation (Overall level in the arbitration 
hearings - 10.55% compared with 2.6% of all acts in negotiation). 
This suggests, particularly since the majority of these acts 
(7.93%) are threatening the Negative Consequences of a course 
of action, that the form of debate at arbitration constrains 
the way in which the rejection of the opponent's position is 
expressed, focussing on the use of threatening statements, 
rather than outright rejections of the other side's proposals. 
(e.g. 'If the proposed changes go ahead, our members will refuse 
to work those positions'.) 
The level of statements about Procedure is fairly high 
(x = 9.47%, S.D. = 3.36), again confirming the controlled nature 
of proceedings. The formal procedure did not, however, diminish 
the expression of praise or blame: these two categories form a 
slightly larger proportion of total acts in the arbitration hearings 
than they did in negotiation (2.1% in negotiation; 4.62% in 
arb i t ra t i on) • 
A relatively large proportion of the debate centred on 
the background context of the dispute and current agreements or 
working arrangements (x = 32.99%, S.D. = ]3.86), a result which 
is predictable given the arbitrator's status as an outsider to 
the dispute. The focus on Present Practices also reflects the 
enduring concern of arbitration with the interpretation of 
agreements. The concern with Outcomes (x = 13.23%, S.D. = 8.59) 
and Settlement Points (; = 0.78%, S.D. = 1.04) was conseq~ently 
less prevalent than might be expected in negotiation. 
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3. In the Referent dimension, an average of 41.19% of all acts 
had no specific referent (S.D. = 11.04), compared with an average 
of 55.25% in negotiation. The majority of the remaining acts 
refer to one or other Party to the dispute, (x ="5i·l't%, S.D. = 0.50). 
This is a complete reversal of the pattern established by Morley 
and Stephenson (1977) for negotiation, where the largest 
proportion of acts referred to a particular Person present 
(14.1 - 31.0%) and a smaller proportion (9.8 - 11.0%) referred to 
a particular Party to the proceedings. The relative emphasis 
given to interparty rather than interpersonal references has 
generally been used to characterise the formality of proceedings 
(Morley and Stephenson, 1977). In this case, the relative 
concentration on interparty references emphasises the more formal, 
controlled nature of the arbitration hearing, which follows a 
reasonably standard procedure. In contrast, participants at the 
negotiating table, who do not have to address remarks through a 
chairman, are more easily allowed to forget the constraints of 
their representattve role. 
In sum, the overall distribuHon of categories characterises 
the arbitration hearrng as more formal, impersonal and controlled 
than negotiation. 
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I I Three-Stage Analysis of Arbitration 
Results 
(j) Division of Hearings into Stages 
Previous stage or phase analyses have adopted the pragmatic 
approach of dividing the total number of units' of analysis into 
three, in order to establish where each stage of the process 
should begin and end. It was decided, in this case, to identify 
the beginning and end of each stage, according to the apparent 
distinctions between the three parts of the hearing process, 
which resemble the three parts of the classic debate. During 
the first stage, the party representatives present their 
arguments. This is followed by a more loosely structured 
exchange of questions and answers between parties and the 
arbitration board and finally, each side is asked to summarise 
their pr~sent position, clarifying the main areas of disagreement 
and remaining uncertainties. 
The division of the hearing transcripts into three parts 
therefore reflects the point of transition from one stage to the 
next, as described above (See Appendix 7 for Total Units in 
each case and points of division.) 
(ii) The Effects of Stage of Hearing on c.p.a. category levels 
Table 8 indicates the number of statistically reliable changes 
in category levels, over time. Table 9 gives the results, using 
the binomial test, of simply counting the number of cases (out of 
twelve) in which the predicted direction of change is fulfilled. 
The results of analyses of variance show limited support for the 
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changes between Stages, predicted on a negotiation model. 
For Stage 1 --- \ \, 4/1~ predicted differences in c.p.a. 
category levels were statistically reliable, with a further 
three changes in the predicted direction which were not 
statistically reliable. For Stage \ 1--- \ 1\, 5/12 predicted 
differences in c.p.a. category levels were statistically reliable, 
with a further five changes in the predicted direction not 
s ta tis t i ca 11 y re 1 i ab 1 e. 
On a less stringent test, simply counting the number of 
cases out of twelve in which the predicted direction of change 
occurs, the model is largely supported for Stage I --- Stage I I 
changes (binomial test, Z =-2.01, PC::::.02), with considerably 
less support for predicted changes between Stages 1\ --- I I I 
(Z =-1.0, n.s.). 
The results are described in more detail below, and 
presented graphically. 
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Table 8 
Mode 
Resource 
Referent 
~roportiona1 Use of Each c.p.a. Category, Derived from Sum Totals of Raw Scores Across 12 Cases 
S TAG E TOTAL 
(S.D.) 2 {S.D.} 3 (S.D.) 
0 O. 11 (0.09) 0.40 (0.31) 0.44 (0.40) 0.29 (0.15) 1 (Offers) 97.66 (0.92) 78.54 (3.78) 84.70 (6.41) 88.08 (3.22) 2 (Accepts) 0.60 (0.45) 6.22 (1. 32) 5.04 (3.28) 3.60 ( 1. 39) 3 (Rejects) 0.65 (0.48) 1.63 (0.88) 0.99 (0.67) 1.05 (0.41) 4 (Seeks) 0.98 (0.49) 13.21 (2.90) 8.82 (3.53) 6.97 (2.22) 
a o. 11 (0.09) 0.40 (0.31) 0.44 (0.40) 0.29 (0.15) 1 (Procedure) 5.95 (1. 68) 10. 19 (3.31) 12. 11 0.77) 9.06 (1.99) 2 (Settlement Point) 2.04 ( 1. 46) 0.38 (0.71) 0.26 (0.33) 1. 01 (0.92) 3 (Li mi ts) 2.04 (2.00) 1.70 ( 1. 78) 2.01 ( 1. 32) 1.93 ( 1. 17) 4 (positive consequences of p.p.) 1. 58 ( 1. 49) 0.92 (0.89 ) 0.95 (0.87) 1.20 (0.74) 5 (negative consequences of p.p.) 4.68 (3.24) 5.08 (4.89) 2.43 (2.66) 4.13 (3.02) 6 (other statements about p.p) 33.30 (12.54) 32.60 (15.01) 30.78 (13.97) 32.34 (12.9S) 7 (positive consequences of prop. out.) 2. 11 (2.18) 0.98 {2.03} 1.22 (1.03) 1.50 ( 1. 27) 8 (negative consequences of prop. out.) 4.80 (4.51) 4.51 (5.20) 2.96 (2.31) 4. 17 (3.83) 9 (other statements about outcomes) 13.81 (9.39) 12.76 (8.96) 15. 18 (8.76) 13.90 (8.30) 10 (positive acknowledgement) 1. 43 (0.48) 1.53 (0.84) 2.58 (1. 79) 1. 81 (0.74) 11 (negative acknowledgement) 2.37 ( 1. 56) 2.45 ( 1. 14) 3. 11 ( 1 .69) 2.61 (0.92) 12 (information) 25.78 (].57) 26.49 (9.34) 25.98 (10.90) 26.05 0.1]) 
a (No referent) 47.28 (9.24) 38. 17 (4.84) 34.99 {6.12} 40.99 (S.94) 1 (Self) 2.69 (1. OO) 8.81 (2.34) 9. 11 (3.44) 6.37 (1. 36) 2/3 (Person) 5.74 (0.89) 9.86 (1. 87) 9.94 (3.52) 8. 18 (1. 55) 4/5 (Party) 39.65 (9.60) 37.62 (5.94) 39. 15 (].65) 38.91 (6.78) 6 (Arbitrator) 4.65 ( 1. 28) 5.53 (2.39) 6.82 (2.37) 5.54 (1. 36) 
F p 
6. 05 .009 
9.57 .001 
4.97 .02 
25.27 .001 
10.76 .001 
7.50.004 
1. 92 (. 17) 
o. 17 (.84) 
4.02 .03 
2.72 (.09) 
1.53(.24) 
0.72(.50) 
1.75 (.20) 
3.86 .03 
1.28(.30) 
0.23 (.80) 
1.95 (.1]) 
31. 51 .001 
0.23 (.80) 
1.51 (.25) 
3.82 .04 
N' 
~I 
-'''-II 
Table 9 Predicted direction of change and observed number of cases which change in 
the predicted direction, in terms of proportions of c.p.a. categories 
c.p.a. Stage 1 - 2 
Category Predi tted 
Mode 2. Accepts 
3. Rejects 
4. Seeks 
Resource 1. Procedure 
3. Limits 
4,5, 
Increase 
Decrease 
Increase 
Decrease 
Decrease 
7 & 8. Positive and 
negative consequen-
ces of proposed 
outcomes/present 
practices Increase 
10. Positive acknowl-
edgement Increase 
11. Negative acknowl-
edgement Decrease 
12~ Information Decrease 
Referent 1. Self Increase 
2,3 & 7. Person Increase 
4,5 & 8. Party Decrease 
Stage to 11 
Using the binomial test, 2 = -2.01, 
p. < .02 
Observed 
12/12 
2/12 
12/12 
2/12 
5/12 
20/48 
10/12 
6/12 
7/12 
12/12 
11/12 
5/12 
c.p.a. Stage 2 - 3 
Category 
Mode 
3. Rejects 
4. Seeks 
Resource 1. Procedure 
3. Limits 
4,5, 
7 & 8. Positive and 
P red i cted 
Decrease 
Decrease 
Increase 
Decrease 
negative consequen-
ces of proposed 
outcomes/present 
practices Decrease 
6. Statements about 
Observed 
7/12 
10/12 
4/12 
4/12 
18/48 
present practices Decrease 9/12 
9. Statements about 
. outcomes 
10. Positive acknowl-
Increase 
edgement Increase 
11. Negative acknowl-
edgement Decrease 
Referent 1. Self Increase 
2,3 & 7 Person Decrease 
4,5 & 8.Party Decrease 
Stage to 11 
Using the binomial test, l = 1.0 
n.s. 
10/12 
10/12 
5/12 
6/12 
6/12 
8/12 
~t:~~t;~:h:.:J~~:~:::: :::~F= :#X~T~-:-::J:::F~:r~:~F:~:~-::f-::: :~::r:~~-t:;:E:~J::F~; :~;l:::l~:::r:: ~:::~v;: :.7.:j:: __ t:=+~:: ::::-r.:--::: 
-::::f-:~:_f.:=f:=:i;;:::F.~: :-::::£:~ ::);~:1:X=:: :~:r~J:::~b~;¥-~:c ~-:;:l:~:F~;j~:l::~t~~~J~~r;i:::;[;;gd~±,=~J;;;:~:l;if~=t~:=:;:-=r~~ 
~1~·-~~~t~!~~:1U~!:·~t_~;:~U}~~till~~~t~~2Ji~P~-t~~~;~[:~lill ~~1U.W;'Jj_:t~~ ·~r~ ~~r:~~:? ~i:~:+~:fd:::r::l'::-x;§:V~~ ~::l;:t± ;-::=V-:: ~:::l~~ :::~::: ~::F:1~:iL--:f~~: :~:=: ::~t:=t--=---:j::--=::::C 
-,-
-, 
one 
:;i~~~:r~:~f 
.: L .. 'I'--~' j+:: 'r_::~:i ~::.i 
. :-r--:.:·..r-:··· .--~.. . 
:. i ~:~f:~: -~ ~~ ~~~: ~ ··1: ~~:~: ~~~~~ ::: t~~~f~_~~f~~g~~;~-~~f~~=:~j~~~~~~~~~"!~=f-i~~f-:~l-~~fi~~1 
three oel 343012\\1 STAGE 
.. , 
_ .. ~ _. --1 ___ 1-- .- .. 
-.-.--- .. ---,- ... .. 
... . _. __ --.-,_,' ___ 0' .... , ...... . 
.....::..: 
:: i~ ~: ~~~~~:::: ~~:::-~:~~-:: .!:-= ~:r: .:1: .~.:~ ~ :~~-- ::r:~; L~:-: f: 
~~.~-----------------------===~--------J'JV'-J':' 
-_.- .-~...:. -_.--
one two three 
.\ .... ---. 
___ - .,_0 .• ~_ 
-~. :.--.~:: :;=~~:--: '-:-:~:-::::i: :: ' 
:~:~~_ . _~: -.~-. -.-. _-.-=~:rt~~t~~-
- -.. __ .- - -.::.-..;:-",-~-,-~~-
Staqe I to Stage I I 
In the Mode Dimension, the level of Offers fell from Stage I to 
Stage I I, with a corresponding increase in the level of Accepts 
(conforming to the predicted change), a small increase in Rejections 
(opposite to that predicted) and a substantial increase in questions 
and exploratory acts (Seeks, as predicted). In the Resource Dimension 
the use of Procedure increased in Stage I I of the hearing (counter to 
expectations), and the use of Limits remained low and unvarying, 
rather than decreasing. References to Settlement Points were at 
their highest at the beginning of the hearings. The strategic 
categories showed an interesting pattern of variation, although the 
only statistically reliable change was in the Negative Consequences 
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of Present Practices category, which changed in the predicted direction, 
increasing from Stage I to Stage I I. The hearings generally were 
characterised by a higher level of negative statements, threatening 
the undesirable consequences of a proposed course of action or 
pointing out the disadvantages of a current agreement, than 
statements about the Positive Consequences of actions. The two 
Positive Consequences categories, persuading the other side of the 
advantages of either the current agreement or future proposals, 
was highest at the start of the hearings, rather than increasing in 
the second stage as predicted. Those statements concerned with 
Outcomes and Present Practices also decreased slightly in the 
second stage of the hearing. The levels of Positive and Negative 
Acknowledgement remained the same in Stages I and I I, counter to 
predictions. The level of Information did not fall as predicted 
but remained fairly constant. 
In the Referent Dimension, references to Self increased 
significantly, as predicted, while references to Person and Party 
showed no significant changes. Personal references did, however, 
tend to increase in the second stage of the hearing, with a 
corresponding decrease in the number of statements without an 
explicit referent. References to Arbitrator also increased. The 
relatively constant use of Party references indicates the overall 
formality of the process, although the rise in references to Self 
and Person indicates that, even within this context, where Parties 
tended to dominate the proceedings, the second stage of the hearing 
was still characterised by more exploratory exchanges between the 
individuals present. 
Stage I I to Stage I I I 
In the Mode Dimension, the level of Offers increased slightly, 
while Seeks, Accepts and Rejects all decreased. The decreasing use 
of questioning and exploratory statements conformed to expectations, 
but overall, the level of Rejections remained slightly higher in the 
final stage of the hearing than it was at the beginning (counter to 
expectations). 
In the Resource Dimension, Procedure increased as predicted, 
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statements about Outcomes tended to increase (not statistically significant) 
while statements about Present Practrces declined slightly (not 
statistically significant). Negative Consequeces of Proposed Outcomes/ 
Present Practices declined as expected (the latter was statistically 
significant). The use of Limits and the Positive Consequences categories 
remained stable, counter to predictions that they would decrease. 
Positive Acknowledgements continued to increase significantly, as 
predicted. Negative Acknowledgements however also increased 
slightly. In the Referent Dimension, references to Person and 
Party did not decrease as expected and references to Self remained 
stable. References to the Arbitrator continued to increase slightly. 
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(iii) The Consistency of Observed Changes Across Hearings (See Table 10) 
Overall, the observed pattern of changes in category levels was 
remarkablY'consistent from one hearing to the next, testifying above 
all to the restraining effect of a standard procedure on the form of 
debate and argument. This standardisation was particularly 
noticeable in the Mode Dimension, where the level of Offers was 
always highest in the opening stage of the hearing, the level of 
Accepts and Seeks always increased from Stage I to Stage I I and the 
level of Rejects increased in all but two cases. (In .these two 
cases the level of Rejections actually decreased throughout the 
hearing.) The pattern of category changes in the Resource Dimension 
was more varied, particularly in the strategic categories, where 
arguments about Present Practice or Outcomes were more or less 
relevant depending on the precise nature of the dispute. The 
Negative Acknowledgement category was also slightly less consistent, 
in the sense that its level decreased, rather than increased, 
towards the end of hearings in four out of twelve cases. The 
Referent Dimension categories again showed a remarkably consistent 
pattern of changes, with Person and Self references increasing 
from Stage 1 to Stage II in all but one case, Party references 
decreasing in all but two cases and references to the Arbitrator 
increasing or remaining constant in all but two cases. 
Table 10 Consistency of Overal I (Average\ Changes in c.p.a. 
Category Levels in Twelve Arbitration Hearings 
Mode Dimension 
1. Offers 
2. Accepts 
3. Rejects 
4. Seeks 
Resource Dimension 
1. P rocedu res 
2. Settlement point 
3. Li mi ts 
4. Positive Consquences of 
Present Practice 
5. Negative Consequences of 
Present Practice 
6. Other statements about 
Present Practice 
7. Positive Consequences of 
Proposed Outcomes 
8. Negative Consquences of 
Proposed Outcomes 
Number of cases out of 12 
where changes occured in the 
opposite direction to thEt 
e,..f'!'~ ."'" 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
o 
7 
2 
3 
6 
9. Other Statements about Outcomes 
3 
3 
2 
4 
8 
10. Positive Acknowledgement 
11, Negat i ve Acknowledgemen t 
12. Information 
Referent Dimension 
O. No Referent 
1. Se If 
2/317. Person 
4/5/8. Pa rty 
6. Arbitrator 
2 
o 
2 
3 
f: Ck" ... ,l~ ~ ~'I',,,", c,,-hj"',\ 1<l\l(I~ Gc,,,, .. kl....,u.'" 'S~'.).t!o 1-,; D c..-.l S .... :)h 
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Sect i on Th ree The Three Stages of the Arbitration Process 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of 
the arbitration hearings is that each falls into three distinct 
stages, which are generally consistent from one hearing to the 
next. Superficially the three stages of the process are evident 
to any observer and a detailed content analysis is not necessary 
to show that each hearing follows a standard procedure, which 
moves from the presentation of arguments, to exchange of questions 
and answers, to a summary of the points in dispute. 
The content analysis itself, however, indicates that both 
Bales' phase movement and Morley and Stephenson's model of 
negotiation could be said to apply to some extent to the arbitration 
process. It is however evident from the high level of statements 
addressed formally to parties, that the hearing is not treated 
principally as an accommodative problem-solving exercise (typically 
accompanied by a higher level of personal exchange). The existing 
dispute is clearly between the parti'es represented. The arbitration 
hearing offers one method of dealing with that dispute. Yet Bales' 
three phases of orientation, evaluation and control appear to match 
the three stages of the hearing reasonably well. There is even some 
small measure of support for Bales' suggestion that hostility and 
antagonism increases during the course of the debate, along with 
positive, supportive gestures aimed at preventing the dissolution 
of the group. 
The extent to which the stages of arbitration actually fit 
Bales' problem-solving phases is, however, probably more apparent 
than real. It must be remembered that the three stages of 
15.0 
~rbitration are consciously' imposed' on the group process by virtue 
of the standard procedure in use, rather than occurring as a product 
of the particular 'problem' which is being dealt with. That procedure 
is in itself more likely to be a reflection of our society's belief 
in the value of rational argument and debate as a means to the 
resolution of a dispute than a sign of conformity to Bales' phase 
movement. 
The three stages of negotiation distinguished by Morley and 
Stephenson (1977) could also be said to match the three stages of 
arbitration reasonably well. The first stage of the arbitration 
process is essentially distributive in character, concerned with 
establishing party positions and giving particular emphasis to the 
relative merits of the case (Positive Consequences of Present 
practices~proposed Outcomes). This is followed by a second stage 
concerned with explaining the likely room for manoeuvre which the 
third party may have (Negative Consequences of Present Practices/ 
Proposed Outcomes; higher level of references to Self and Person) 
and a final stage of controlled examination of closing positions and 
remaining points of disagreement (high level of references to 
Procedure; references to Party again rise; increased use of Outcomes). 
The Overall Significance of the Findings 
In terms of Bales' phase-movement model, the face-to-face group 
is treated as a mechanical, closed system, with a finite amount of 
energy, where the 'disturbance' input, in the form of a problem, 
equals the energy output, or problem solution. The group process is 
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treated as a linear series of actions and reactions and the 
progression from one phase to the next is seen as inevitable. The 
overall philosophy behind the model is generally difficult to apply 
to arbitration. The principal difficulty, as with negotiation, is 
with the view of conflict which the model expresses. In Bales' 
system, conflict is treated as a by-product of the group process. 
In arbitration, as in negotiation, the process is itself created in 
order to deal with the pre-existing conflict between parties. The 
three stages are not emergent, as Bales would suggest, but chosen as 
a method of controlling the expression of conflict between the 
parties. The arbitration process is not about integrating the 
discordant elements which threaten the dissolution of the group, 
but about recognising the fundamental conflict of interest between 
the parties and regulating its expression by virtue of a standard, 
con~ntionalised procedure. Antagonism and hostility between sides 
pre-exists the arbitration, which in itself exists to manage and 
contain the expression of conflict. Within the constraints of the 
arbitration procedure, individual antagonisms are not allowed the 
possibility of expression, since in line with Douglas' (1962) argument, 
the outbreak of personal hostilities at the arbitration stage would 
be detrimental to the production of a workable resolution. The level 
of Negative Acknowledgement remains lower at the end of the 
arbitration hearings than it is at the beginning of Bales' problem-
solving sessions. 
It seems that there is a need to distinguish between the social 
process and the procedure for dealing with the 'problem'. In this 
case, the procedure used encouraged a very formal process. This is 
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perhaps the basic difference between Morley and Stephenson's (1977) 
negotiations and the process at the arbitration hearings. The 
existence of the conflict between sides is central in both cases, 
but the concrete expression of that conflict is different and it 
may be suggested that the arbitration process resembles a formal 
negotiation. 
The Effect of a Conventional Procedure on 
the Expression of Conflict between Parties 
The formality of conventional procedure imposes its own 
regularities on the patterning of discussion and directs the 
expression of conflict into certain confined channels. One aspect 
of that formality is the internal movement of the hearing itself 
through these stages which are more than 'notional I. The formality 
of the hea.ring has clear effects on the dialogue, decreasing the 
likelihood of interruptions, and personal forms of address and, 
partly because of the chairman's presence, decreasing the likelihood 
of exchange directly between individual party representatives on 
opposing sides. The relative grandeur of the physical setting, the 
public nature of the forum, the use of microphones and the physical 
distance between arbitration board and parties all tended to increase 
the 'psychological
' 
distance between participants from opposing sides 
and the board. Morley and Stephenson (1977) studied the effects, on 
negotiation process and outcomes, of different channels of 
communfcation, arguing that the use of the telephone increases the 
formality and impersonal nature of the proceedings, where the greater 
formality results in greater emphasis on the Iparty line ' and less 
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concern for personal relations between group members. In this 
case, the physical setting and the presence of microphones 
exerted a similar formal ising effect on proceedings, to the extent 
of outlawing the expression of personal antagonisms. 
These factors, together with the use of a standard procedure, 
regulate the expression of the conflict between sides, by requiring 
the parties to distance themselves from it and thus talk about it, 
without engaging in its exterior forms. Contrary to the negotiations 
described by Morley and Stephenson (1977), the extent of the conflict 
over preferred outcomes was expressed, at the hearing, initially 
without the use of a high level of Rejections and with few overt 
signS of hostility and antagonism. The first stage of the hearing 
was instead characterised by a high level of statements offering 
details of present positions with much reference to distinct parties. 
The justification of party positions relies not on rejections of the 
opponent's stance, but on assertions of the merits of the case. Only 
in the second stage of the hearing, when the procedure allows a less 
structured discussion of the issues, does the more common pattern of 
disagreement and conflict emerge, in almost colourful contrast with 
the first part of the hearing. This second stage is characterised 
by a greater diversity in the form of expression and arguments, and 
allows slightly more indication of underlying antagonisms between 
sides. The debate is more personalised, with increased reference to 
Self and other individuals. Whereas in mediation sessions, initial 
hostility was negatively correlated with successful resolution 
(Lardsberger, 1955a,b), in arbitration hostility during the first 
stage of the hearing is ruled out by the hearing procedure itself. 
The problem-solving element in the arbitration process did not, as 
Bales would suggest, necessarily provoke increasing conflict 
between individuals in the group, but allowed somethi.ng more of the 
areas of agreement and disagreement between the sides to be 
exp 1 0 red. 
The results suggest that, in a procedurally formal setting, a 
distinction should be made between the expression of disagreement 
and the expression of hostility (something which both Bales and 
Morley and Stephenson have used together as expressions of 
conflict), such that disagreement need not be accompanied by the 
outward expression of hostilities between sides or group members. 
In the past t~e characterisation of formality in communication has 
relied largely on arguments about the depersonalised nature of 
more formal communication. The use of a standard procedure also 
formalises the expression of conflict. The disagreement between 
sides is restricted ·in form, confining statements mainly to Offers and 
relying on comments about the positive and negative consequences of 
proposed action or inaction to convey the extent of the underlying 
conflict. Representatives of the opposing sides are consequently 
able to maintain a relatively disinterested stance, facilitating the 
resolution of the dispute. 
Conclusion 
In reality there are very few ·problems· which are non-
divisive and which conseauently could be resolved along non-partisan 
lines. Such problems are most likely to exist when the consequences 
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for the decision-makers are not serious. In the case of a long-
standing conflict of interest, in the context of a continuing 
relationship between group members, such as that encountered in 
industrial relations, the methods for dealing with the conflict 
are frequently institutionalised in order to regulate and control 
its expression. These methods constitute in themselves part of 
that 'group maintenance' function which Bales discusses. 
The three stages of the arbitration hearing are formally 
established by the conventions of a procedure which decrease the 
possibilities for innate variations according to the type of issues 
in dispute. What function does the hearing perform for the parties? 
Firstly, the procedural formality controls the overt expression of 
confl ict and may in certain cases facilitate the discovery of a 
solution to the dispute. Secondly, since arbitration provides a 
public forum for the hearing of differences, it is both an opportunity 
for representatives to demonstrate to constituents that their 
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interests are being zealously protected and pursued, and an opportunity 
for parties to reappraise their o.-In and the other side's position, with 
the benefit of a thi-rd-party presence. The third-party may give new 
emphasis to aspects of the dispute previously ignored by the parties. 
Lastly, the final stage of the hearing provides a forum for the 
re-framing of differences in the light of the arbitrator's questions 
-and comments. 
Rather than a linear series of actions and reactions, the 
arbitration process can be characterised as one part of a larger cycle 
of decision-making and negotiation, viewed in the context of the 
bargaining relationship between the parties. Burnstein (1980) 
distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous cycles, the former 
being events in the environment (economics, government pay policy, 
etc.) and the latter being events internal to the group. In this 
case such internal cycles may include the need to maintain the group, 
although this is not necessarily expressed verbally on such occasions. 
Drawing on Mintzberg et aI's (1974) characterisation, 
arbitration can be depicted as part of a decision selection process, 
embedded in routines of diagnosis, development and selection. Yet 
within itself it contains all of those elements. Whilst some of the 
issues brought to arbitration clearly concern a re-run of well-
established practices and habits, with a choice between pre-determined 
solutions, some of the issues require the creation of new solutions, 
uniquely designed to meet the particular circumstances. Those 
decisions are themselves likely to form one part of another cycle. 
The picture which emerges is not one of linear chains of action and 
reaction, such as those discussed by Bales, but a process which is 
social in nature, and which builds on and changes what has gone 
before. Pfiffner (1960) suggests that the circular nature of such 
a process is closer to 'fermentation in biochemistry •.. than 
(it is to') the industrial assembly line' (p.129). Whatever the 
political and strategic reasons for pursuing some of the disputed 
issues to arbitration, it can be argued that, in some cases, the 
arbitration hearing provides a specific means for the Ire-cyclingl 
of decisions and arguments. To the extent that this method contrasts 
with preceding and subsequent negotiation and committee stages, it 
should assist the parties in the discovery of a novel solution to 
the dispute. If, as Mintzberg et al (1974) suggest, 'complexity' is 
gradually understood through the continual recycling of the arguments 
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and issues, it may be conjectured that, where an arbitration provision 
exists, some of the thorniest disput~, requiring the greatest amount 
of 'recycling' before the achievement of a workable solution will at 
some stage, and even before the possibilities of negotiation are 
exhausted, result in arbitration. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Procedural Justice and the Process of Arbitration 
in Relation to the Relative Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
Section I 
The Nature of the Disputes brought to Arbitration 
It has been suggested, in Chapter Four, that it is possible to 
distinguish between two types of public sector disputes brought to 
arbitration, the first concerning the interpretation of a current 
agreement or the application of an established standard in relation 
to a current issue, and the second concerning a decision over the 
terms of a new agreement according to conflicting principles and 
criteria for settlement. It was also suggested in Chapter Four 
that the relative simplicity or complexity of the dispute was likely 
to be one indicator of the approach which the third-party should 
adopt in dealing with the case. For the purpose of the present 
analysis the distinction between cases is therefore made in terms of 
their relative 'simplicity' or 'complexity', where the simple cases 
are defined partly in terms of their concern with the application of 
an established standard to the current dispute and the more complex 
cases are defined partly in terms of their lack of such established 
criteria. Although it might be more accurate to describe complexity 
as varying along a continuum, the small sample size prohibited any 
finer discrimination than' the initial division between 'simpler' and 
'more complex' cases. This distinction corresponds reasonably well 
to Thibaolt and Walker's (1975) distinction between cases with 
established criteria for decision and cases which lack such criteria. 
The preface to the arbitration board's decision on pay 
restructuring proposals illustrates the board's own understanding 
of the more complex disputes: 'We have had to decide a series of 
issues which will have widespread implications for the future 
We feel we must preface our conclusions on these matters with some 
reference to the unusually complex circumstances which surround the 
••• proposals ••• Many of the outstanding issues were still the 
subject of negotiations. It is not possible to say what the 
final position of the two sides would have been. Finally some 
of the issues themselves are complex in that they involve 
assessment of changes in work pattern and responsibilities both in 
the past and in the future' (arbitration board decision, 1974). 
In the context of negotiation, two aspects of complexity have 
been distinguished (~Jjnham, 1977; Zartman, 1971; Barber, 1966), 
firstly the difficulty, which decfsion-makers face, of dealing with 
a large mass of informatton, and secondly, the uncertainty created 
by the lack of an obvious framework or set of criteria for judging 
the relative weight or significance of different and conflicting 
information. A quote from the arbitration board serves to illustrate 
the former: 'We have been presented with two claims which have not 
been advanced on the same basis. They have also produced different 
responses from the other parties concerned with the outcome of our 
decision. As a result we have been faced with four divergent views 
of the problems and events ••. together with incompatible 
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suggestions for dealing with them. • (arbitration board 
decision, 1978). The aspect of complexity concerned with the mass 
of information to be dealt with may be defined as: 
(i) the size or width and variety of issues; 
and 
(i i) the number of interested parties. 
Taken together these two features cause the number of possible view-
points to multiply rapidly (Winham, 1977). 
The 'uncertainty' which is characteristic of complex problems 
may be produced by 
(i) problems of discovering or generating information; 
(ii) the lack of an easily applicable framework for the 
ordering of priorities and justification of decisions; 
and 
(i i i) long-term consequences whi ch are not eas i ly foreseeable 
in advance (Winham, 1977)_ 
Although in the public sector arbitrations, the parties 
provided a great deal of detailed information, oriented towards 
supporting their particular arguments, the problem from the boardls 
point of view was 'how to form some estimate of the relative 
justifiability of the range of offers made, bearing in mind the 
(management IS) admission that its own evaluations were based on 
subjective judgements, • ,I (arbitration board decision, 1974). 
In contrast with the simpler cases, where appeal could be made to 
an agreed criterion, in more complex disputes the hearing and 
decision have to encompass debate about the kinds of criteria to 
be used in evaluating alternative agreements. 
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The Definition of Simple and Complex Disputes 
In the light of the preceding discussion, the distinction 
between simpler and more complex cases was made as follows. 
1. Simpler Cases 
In industrial relations terms, the simpler disputes were 
those which 
(i) concerned a single issue and decision point or a 
main and a subsidiary issue, which was related in an 
obvious and immediate way to the main focus of dispute; 
(ii) could be decided within the context of an existing 
agreement or by reference to establ ished practice; 
(ii i) had outcomes with limited and foreseeable consequences 
for the industry and industrial relations as a whole. 
(See Figure 4.) 
2 .. More Complex Cases 
The more complex disputes were those which 
(i) concerned a number of issues, which could be extensive, 
in terms of the numbers of staff and grades covered, 
and which were related to each other such that a 
decision on one issue had uncertain or unpredictable 
effects on all the others; 
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Main 
Issue 
Subsl dl ary 
Issues 
Deel s Ion 
Context 
Decision 
Grounds 
for 
deci s I on 
Implications 
for 
Industrl al 
Relations 
Case 1 
Cla!m for Increase 
In signing-on and 
-off time, allowed 
to drivers 
Gri evance ove r poor 
organisation of 
notice-boards which 
dri vers were re-
quired to check be-
fore cOllVllenclng 
duty 
Agreement for 20 
minute si gning-
on and -off allow-
ance 
No justification 
for a general in-
crease. Work study 
proposed, for 
efficient arrange-
ment of notice-
boards and other 
information 
1. Has there been 
an increase in 
duties? 
2. I f so, is extra 
ti me needed? 
Related to claims 
by other groups 
for the creation 
of a signing-on 
allowance' 
- : .. ~. ~ ...... 
Exam~les of sim~le cas~s, referred to arbi tration 
Case 2 
Claim for signing-
on and -off allow-
ance for staff In-
volv~d In contin-
uous shift-working 
Case 3 
Claim for quarterly 
review of meal and 
lodging allowance 
to replace current 
annual review 
Arbitrary fashion in 
which overtime was 
currently granted to 
staff remaining over 
at the end of a" 
shi ft 
Other agreement 
wi th groups of 
staff for signing-
on and -off allow-
ance 
No justification 
for general allow-
ance. Creation of 
new agreement over 
procedures for 
claiming overtime 
proposed 
Agreement on pay-
ment of meal and 
lodging allowance 
Six monthly review 
proposed \ 
'. 
1. Is there a 
significant "change 
over'.period be-
tween shi fts7 
1. 15 annual review 
causing hardship 
to staff, given 
high rate of in-
flation? 2. I f so, should 
this be paid for 
by regular allow-
ance? 
3. Comparability 
with other public 
~ector arrange-
ments. 
Related to drivers' 
claim for increased 
signing-on and -off 
allowance 
2. Comparability 
with other public 
sector arrange-
ments. 
Case 4 Case 5 
Claim for payment of Claim for payment of 
meal allowance to full driver'~ rate 
staff In construction to drivers' assistants 
gangs, working more qualified to drive 
than one mile from 
their booking-on 
point 
Provision of adequate Slow promotion to 
facilities for mealsl driver 
refreshments whilst 
involved in mainten-
ance work 
Agreement on pay-
ment of meal and 
lodging allowance 
No en tit I emen t 
Agreement over drivers' 
terms and conditions 
of employment 
No entitlement to full 
rate, but some allow-
ance, recognising their 
qualification, proposed 
1. Are staff working 1. Would there be a 
more than one mi Ie detrimental effect on 
distant f~om booking- incentive to apply 
on point entitled to for driver's job? 
meal allowance? 2. Are drivers' assis-
or tants wai ting for 
2:-ls the allowance promotion in an un-
payable only to staff favourable position? 
working outside their 
normal area? 
Potentially repercussive 
cJ aims by other groups 
in similar position 
:-
I 
i -
i. 
I " 
.' 
\ 
t" 
" 
I 
" 
I 
1 
en 
to 
~ FI 9ure· 5 Examples of Complex Cases, referred to Arbl tration 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case" Case 5 Case 6 
Issues Pay restructuring Provision of adequate 
proposals In terms differentials and 
Method of payment 
and consolidation 
Into basic rate 
of £6.00 pay 
Proposed changes in 
procedures for ad-
vertising salaried 
staff vacancies to 
wages grades. 
(Claim brought by 
management) 
Proposed rescindment 
of two agreements 
which allow manage-
ment to roster staff 
up to 9 hours with-
out consultation 
1. Claim for in-
creased respon-
sibility and pro-
ductivity payments; 
Main 
Arguments 
Decision 
of: maintenance of rel-
1. Payments for ativlties between 
additional re- salaried and wages 
sponsibilities; grades, in the 
2. Restructuring light of pay re-
for salaried staff; structuring pro-
3. Payment for posals 
irregular and un- . 
soci a I hours; 
4. Consolidation of 
Individual bonus 
paymen ts I n to 
bas i crates; 
5. Implementation, ".~.' 
etc. 
Equity/Justifiabil-
ity of proposals 
in terms of: 
1. Establ ishing 
relationships 
between gradesl 
di fferentials; 
2.Recognising 
responsibilities; 
3. Overall 
effi ciency: 
4. Good industrial 
relations practice. 
etc. 
Compromise between 
positions of 
management and 
unions 
Equity/Justifiabil-
i ty In terms of: 
1. Relationships 
between grades, 
pa r t i cu I a r I y 
supervisory and 
non-s upervi sory; 
2. Disruption of 
established prin-
ciples for grad-
ing of posts 
Compromise between 
posi tions of 
management and 
unions 
Implica- Covers whole work-
tions for force; relations 
Industrial between work-
Relations groups and unions; 
future structure 
of Industry, etc. 
Part of continuing 
argument about 
supervisors' . 
di fferentials in 
relation to in-
creases received 
by wages grades 
staff 
supp lement and 
effect on bas i c 
rate of pay In 
operation 
2. Claim for com-
parabilityof . 
salaried staff with 
wages grades 
Equity/Justifiibil- 'Equity/Justifiabil-
ity in terms of: ity in terms of: 
1. Psychological 1. Conflicting 
1. Rights of manage- Equity/Justifiabil-
ment to determine Ity in terms of: 
hours of working; 1. Perceive re-
importance of not expectations of versus rights of introduction of 
reducing the salaried versus employees to self- individual bonus 
basic rate wages grades determination; arrangements; 
(historical pre- over promotlon/ 
cedents): \. job prospects; 
2. Good faith of the 2. Future stabil-
parties in operation ity of the 
2. Effects of pro- ,2. Rights of 
posed payment management to 
methods on cal- widest possible 
culation of choice of appli-
bonuses, etc. cant'; 
Compromise between 
pos it ions of 
management and 
unions 
Covers whole work-
force; unions dis-
agree over 10ng-
te rm ef fee ts of 
different payment 
methods and con-
sol idatlon 
3. Difficulties in 
recrul tment 
Favours management 
proposals for' re-
form of procedure 
Related to continuing 
arguments over the 
relationships be-
tween salaried, 
supervisory and wages 
grade staff 
of "cooperative" industry; 
arrangement 3. Productivi tv; 
Favours unions 
Uncertain effects 
on future time-
tabling. crucial 
to the operation 
of the industry 
4. Stress and strain 
of certai n jobs 
Compromise between 
pos it i On5 of 
management and 
unions 
Related to continuing 
arguments over 
methods of payment 
of bonuses 
(individual versus 
group versus additions 
to basic rates) 
r 
\. 
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(j j) lacked a sped fic framework or eas i Iy avai lable 
criterion for agreement in terms of which any decision 
could be couched; 
(iii) frequently involved reference to abstract principles 
of equity and justice; 
(iv) had wide-ranging, long-term implications for industrial 
relations, including inter-union relations, which were 
difficult to forecast. 
(Se~ Fi gure 5) 
Sect i on II 
Procedural Justice and Arbitration 
According to Thibau't and Walker's (1975) model of procedural 
justice, different procedures should be required in order to deal 
satisfactorily with the two types of disputes. The simpler cases 
should be most appropriately resolved by a procedure which vests 
most control in the third party (inquisitoni,al) and the more 
complex cases should be most satisfactorily resolved by a procedure 
which vests most control in the di sputants (adversarial/negotiation). 
Without reference tocetailed content analysis, it is however 
immediately evident to any observer that, in public sector 
arbitration, a standard procedure has been used consistently by the 
same parties since the 19505. This procedure, which has been used over 
80 times to decide disputes between parties, is set down formally in 
their agreed disputes procedure. Appeal to arbitration forms the 
final stage of a machinery which progresses disputes from local 
170 
committees up to national level. The role of arbitration is not 
insignificant for the industry, since the arbitrators have the 
power to decide issues as varied as wages, hours of duty, other 
conditions of employment or proposals to vary a national agreement 
where the proposals are, in the parties' own words, of 'major 
importance'. 
As established in Chapter Five, the procedure in use 
superficially follows the form of the classic debate. An opening 
statement is made by each side, explaining and justifying their 
position (98.64% of all statements are framed as 'offers' at 
this stage, Table II). The 'claimant
' 
party (generally the union) 
speaks first, followed by the respondent (usually management). 
Both sides an~ the arbitration board may then ask questions and 
challenge arguments raised in the opening speeches (characterised 
by more varied forms of address and in particular more questioning, 
Table/I).' Finally, party representatives sum up in reverse order, 
the claimant speaking last. All hearings thus have three distinct, 
formal stages and the conventional nature of proceedings is illustrated 
by the restrained form of argument (statements are mostly framed as 
foffers', 88.08% overall, Table II), very restricted expression of 
hostility and antagonism (1.28% of all acts) and standard, 'polite' 
forms of address (38.91% of references are to one of the parties 
present, as opposed to 8.18% personal references and 6.37% references 
to one self). 
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TABLE II DISTRIBUTION OF MODES (SHOWING Ho\.J THE STATEMENT IS 
FRAMED) ACROSS THE THREE STAGES OF THE ARBITRATION 
HEARING 
STAGE 
MODE 2 3 TOTAL F. P. 
0: . O. 11 0.40 0.44 0.29 
1. Offers 97.66 78.54 84.70 88.08 6.05 .009 
2. Accepts 0.60 6.22 5.04 3.60 9.57 .001 
3. Rejects 0.65 1.63 0.99 1. 05 4.97 .02 
4. Seeks 0.98 13.21 8.82 6.97 25.27 .001 
The first obvious point is that this general procedure is 
followed, ·regardless of the particular issues in dispute, which may 
range from pay restructuring with widespread implications for the 
industry and workforce, to relatively minor claims for an additional 
ten-minutes signing-on allowance or an extra provision for a meal 
allowance, with much more restricted implications for the 
industry. This general conclusion challenges Thibaut and Walker's 
claims that different procedures are likely to be more satisfactory 
for dealing with different types of case. Thibaut and Walker could, 
of course, say in defence that perhaps the parties are not actually 
satisfied with the fairness of the hearing procedure in all cases. 
On the contrary, however, the procedure was set down by the parties 
who persist in its use, despite the practical objections to its more 
cumbersome aspects sometimes raised by the arbitrator. 
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In contradiction to Thibaut and Walker's model, therefore, one 
particular procedure may be felt to be fair, in the sense that it 
is consistently, and fairly frequently, used by the parties, 
regardless of the type of issues involved. 
Factors Influencing Preferences for a Particular Procedure 
If the choice of procedure is not based on a logical match 
between it and the type of case, then the factors which do influence 
preferences for a particular procedure must be identified. In this 
case, there are at least two reasons why the procedure is regarded 
as fair, both relating to the social and political context of the 
third-party proceedings, a context whIch is easily ignored in an 
abstract analysis of the type carri~d out by Thibaut and Walker 
(1975). The first reason is related to the parties own cultural 
background: the procedure is formally adversarial, reflecting the 
strong underlying faith, which is widespread in our society, in the 
efficacy of 'debate' as a means to the rational solution of a 
confl ict of interests. The second reason is related to the specific 
significance of the arbitration (or other third-party) forum for 
the parties' own relationship. In this case, arbitration is at the 
apex of the i ndustri a I disputes procedure. By the time an issue has 
reached this final stage, it has to be seen to be dealt wi th in a 
thorough ly forma 1 , conventionalised manner. Only if it is dealt wi th 
in this way will the process and subsequent dec i s ion be able to 
command the respect of both sides. There is a sense in which the 
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outcome of arbitration is equitable by virtue of this procedure in 
itself. This sense of the fairness of the hearing is quite separate, 
and it seems deliberately distinguished from, the grounds for the 
decision itself. Any decision must be seen to be equitable by virtue 
of the·~tandard procedure which produced it. 
With reference to Thibaut and Walker, the idealised, imagined 
relations between procedure and fairness of outcome in different 
disputes seem to bear little relation to the actual strategic 
considerations involved in the choice of a particular procedure. 
In general, the social and political context of the third-party 
process will work against implementation of a supposedly 'rational I 
model and wi 11 generate its own specific perceptions of what 
constitutes a fair hearing. In this case, attempts to vary the 
procedure would be more likely to be seen as threatening, rather 
than enhancing the fairness of the hearing. 
The Relationship between the Standard Procedure and the 
Concept of Disttibution1Control 
1. Defining Distribution of Control and Applying it to the 
Arbitration Hearings 
In practice, the meaning of distribution of control as used by 
Thibaut & Walker can be shown to be ambiguous when it is applied to 
actual third-party proceedings. A number of different interpretations 
can be made. For example: 
174 
(i) In formal terms, the hearing is clearly positioned 
in the middle of Thibaut and Walker's control 
continuum, by virtue of its overall adversarial form; 
(i i) Yet it could also be said that the parties alone control 
the procedure, in the sense that their past decision 
determined its form regardless of the issue. 
(iii) Lastly, it could be claimed that none of the actual 
participants control the procedure at each specific 
hearing, in the intentional sense that Thibaut and 
Walker appear to mean. That is the parties do not make 
a conscious choice about the appropriateness of the 
procedure for dealing with different issues, on each 
occasion. On the contrary, a form of conventional 
control is in operation by virtue of the shared 
expectations of the participants and their past 
commitment to that particular procedure. 
2. Distribution of:Control and Type of Case 
Despite these reservations it is still possible to ask whether 
the distribution of control over procedure does, in any observable 
sense, vary with different kinds of case. Taking a simpl istic 
indicator of control: the relative contributions of arbitrator and 
parties to the debate, and assuming that those who contribute less 
exercise less control over proceedings, it was found that the 
arbitrator contributes significantly less in the more complex cases 
that he does in the simpler cases (Table 12). 
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Table 12 Average Contribution~of each Party to the Arbitration 
Hearing, according to the relative Simplicity or 
Complexity of the Dispute 
(No. of cases = 12. 'Simple' = 7; 'Complex' = 5) 
Party Simp 1 e Complex F. P. 
Management 30.89 24.07 2.96 ( • 10) 
Union 30.99 33.58 0.25 n. s. 
Arbi trator 26.27 20.72 4.24 .05 
(Subs i diary Unions 11.85 21.63 - ) 
100 100 
This finding superficially gives some support to Thibaut and 
Walker's contention that the parties should assert relatively more 
control over procedure in the cases which lack specific criteria for 
deci s ion. 
The distribution of acts by the arbitrator over three stages 
of the hearing does not, however, change. The arbitrator's pattern 
of contribution in both simpler cases and more complex cases remains 
the same (Table 13). 
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Table 13 Average Contributions+of Participants, According 
Pe rson 
Management 
Union 
Arbitrator 
. ·toStageofHearing and Relative Simplicity or 
Complexity·of·Case 
Simple Cases Complex Cases 
Sta~e Stage 
.2 3 2 3 
38.26 25.31 29.09 34.28 22.14 15.77 
40.13 32.35 27.42 33.47 31.28 38.86 
6.84 39.94 31. 95 2.87 37.09 22.19 
Whereas Thibaut and Walker would presumably expect the third-party 
to take a more passive role throughout the hearing of more complex 
cases, the arbitrator actually remains highly active in the middle 
stage of all hearings. He is, in fact, consistently the most active 
participant during this second stage, and in contrast remarkably 
passive during the first stage of the hearing when the parties are 
highly active in the presentation of their case. The overall phase 
effect is thus maintained in the hearing of the more complex cases, 
and the overall procedure remains intact in terms of who contributes 
when or the roles played by the participants. 
Section III 
The Social Process of the Arbitration Hearing 
In order to understand the differences between the arbitration of 
simpler and more complex disputes it is necessary to maintain a 
distinction between the procedure used and the social process at the 
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hearing. The different types of disputes result in variations in the 
social process which are oriented not towards the production of a 
fairer hearing, but towards dealing with the different tasks faced by 
the arbitrator. 
In the past, arbitration has been treated as a process which is 
quite distinct from negotiation, because the parties surrender their 
responsibility for the outcome of the dispute to a third party. The 
preceding analysis, however, implies that arbitration is best under-
stood in terms of its position within the framework of collective 
bargaining, and according to the strategic choices made by the 
parties in the light of their overall relationship. From this 
perspective, the differin~ social processes of the arbitration hearing 
may be explained by comparisons with different models of the 
negotiation process. 
The past experimental work on arbitration has assumed a 
concession-convergence model of negotiation, leading to a view of 
arbitration as a'face-saving' device or as a threat to be used in 
inducing faster concessions from the parties. This would imply that 
the thlrd-partyaccepts the dispute at face value and, whilst 
appearing to be an adjudicator of the dispute, in fact acts as a 
manager ?f the concession-convergence process, by developing a 
tacit understaMdlng of the parties' unspoken intentions for the 
outcome of the dispute. 
In contrast,. a formula-detai I model of negotiation (Zartman, 
1977) would suggest that the process of concession management is 
only one aspect of the arbitrator's role. In terms of the ~atter 
model, the arbitrator is more likely to be engaged with the parties 
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in negotiating a ge_neral framework, leaving the detai led resolution 
of the dispute to be decided and implemented by the parties. 
It was hypothesised, in Chapter Four, that the complexity of 
·a dispute was one indicator of the type of approach adopted. In 
general it is expected that the more complex the issues, the less 
the emphasis given to details of concessions on either side and the 
more the concern with developing a common framework for negotiation. 
Parties' Statements of Position 
If the third-party is to be able to engage in managing the 
'concesslo~c~ergence' process with the parties, then the parties 
must have clearly defined, opposing opening positions. The precise 
statement of a preferred settlement point should therefore be more 
common In.the simpler disputes than in the more complex disputes. 
ThIs expectation is in fact supported (Table 14). 
Table 14 Number of Cases with Precise Statement of Preferred 
Settlement Point, classified according to the relative 
Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
Case Type 
Simple 
Comp lex 
Specific Statement 
of Preferred 
Settlement Point 
17 
7 
24 
No Specific Statement 
of Preferred 
Settlement Point 
o 
6 
6 
{Based on analysis of 30 arbitration decisions in Public Sector 
industry I, during the·period 1974-1980.)'" 
17 
13 
30 
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In the more complex d}sputes it was less likely that the parties 
would make a precise statement of the preferred outcome of arbitration 
in their written statement of case. Something like the 'concession-
convergence' process is, therefore, at least feasible in the simpler 
cases and much less feasible in the more complex cases. 
The Effects of Complexity on the Process of the Arbitration Hearing 
Results 
The analysis of hearing; is based on the twelve cases, observed 
by the researcher, where the proceedings are described in terms of 
Conference Process Analysis (c.p.a.), Morley and Stephenson (1977), 
as described in Chapter Six. 
M~in Effects of Complexity/Simplicity 
The major differences between the hearing process, in the case 
of simpler and more complex cases, are shown in Table 15. In brief: 
1. The management and arbitration board contributed less to the 
debate in complex cases, whilst the subsidiary unions 
contributed relatively more. 
2. In the mode dimension, complex cases produced a slightly 
lower rate of Accepts and Rejects. 
3. In the resource dimension, the categories which changed 
according to the relative simplicity or complexity of the 
di spute we re those concerned wi th Outcomes. In comp I ex 
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Table 15 Average proportions of acts in each c.p.a. category, 
according to the relative Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
c.p.a. category Simple 
Person 
Management 
Union 
Arb it rator 
(Subsidiary Unions 
Mode 
T:O"ffer 
2. Accept 
3. Rej ect 
4. Seek 
Resou rce 
1. Procedure 
2. Settlement Point 
3. Limits 
4. Positive Consequence 
of Present Practice 
5. Negative Consequence 
of Present Practice 
6. Other Statements 
30.89 
30.99 
26.27 
11 .85 
83.50 
4.79 
1. 32 
8.59 
15.84 
0.88 
2.02 
1. 21 
2.93 
about Present Practice 31.17 
7. Positive Consequence 
of Proposed Outcomes 
8. Negative Consequence 
of Proposed Outcomes 
9. Other Statements 
0.48 
1.51 
about Outcomes 9.51 
10. Positive Acknowledge-
ment 2.48 
11. Negative Acknowledge-
ment 2.72 
12 • J n' forma t I on 2 7 . 55 
Referent 
O. No Referent 
1. Self 0. 
2. Management Person 
3. Union Person 
4. Management Party 
5. Union Party 
6. Arbitrator 
7. All Persons 
8. All Parties 
40.96 
7.33 
3.39 
5.07 
9.01 
24.22 
5.42 
1.92 
2.06 
Case 
Complex 
24.07 
33.58 
20.72 
21.63 
85.09 
3.35 
0.83 
8.55 
13.45 
1.21 
1. 59 
1.65 
3.47 
27.14 
1. 87 
5.28 
16.60 
3.30 
2.13 
19.82 
39.32 
6.68 
2. 73 
7.10 
11. 65 
22.71 
6.43 
1.68 
2·91 
F 
2.96 
0.25 
4.24 
0.88 
2.37 
3.05 
0.00 
1. 18 
0.32 
0.40 
0.68 
0.15 
0.29 
20.20 
6.97 
2.61 
1. 36 
0.35 
3.44 
0.31 
0.31 
1. 20 
4.28 
1. 81 
o. 13 
0.63 
0.21 
1. 11 
p 
• 10 
n.s. 
.05 
n. s. 
• 16 
• 11 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
.001 
.02 
· 14 
n.s. 
n.s. 
.09 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n. s. 
.07 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
) 
cases, more use is made of both Positive and Negative 
Consequences of Proposed Outcomes and Other Statements 
about Outcomes and relative to the simpler cases, the 
amount of general Information decreased. 
4. In the referent dimension, complex cases produced a 
higher rate of personal reference to the union representative. 
Interaction between Role, Staoe and Complexity of Dispute 
Tables 16 to 22 show two- and three-way interactions between the 
role (~~nagement, union or arbitrator) of the participant, the stage 
of the hearing (1, 2 or 3) and the relative simplicity or complexity 
of the dispute. Although some of these were statistically significant 
at the. 10 level only, they are included because of the light which 
they appear to cast on the hearing process. In the more complex 
disputes, management was particularly responsible for increased use 
of Limits (confining the range of agreements possible) and made most 
use of the Negative Consequences of Proposed Outcomes. Both union 
and arbitrator made relatively more use of Limits in the simpler 
disputes (See Table 16 and 17). 
Whereas management focussed attention on the Posi tive Consequences 
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of Presen't Practices at the beginning of more complex disputes (Table 18), 
the union was most active in stressing the Positive Consequences of 
Proposed Outcomes (Table 19), and in focussing attention on the 
possible Outcomes at the beginning and end of complex disputes (Table 20). 
In general, the arbitration board were less Accepting of statements 
made in the more complex disputes (Table 21), whilst making more 
personal references to the union representatives (Table 22). 
Table 16 Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
T:t~e of 
Simple 
Complex 
Limits, calculated separately for Manaqement, Union 
and Arbitrator, according to the relative Complexity 
or Simp Ii ci ty of the Dispute 
R OLE 
Case Managemen t Union Arbitrator 
1. 14 2.34 2.50 
2.73 1. 30 0.74 
Analysis of variance, F=2.68, p .09 
(Case x Role) 
Table 17 Percentaoe of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Type of 
Simple 
Complex 
Neqative Conseguences of Proposed Outcomes, calculated 
separatel:t for Manaqement, Union and Arbitrator, according 
to the relative SImplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
R 0 L E 
Case Management Union 
1. 59 1. 49 
8.04 4.00 
Analysis of Variance, F=3.94, p .04 
(Case x Role) 
Arbitrator 
1. 45 
3.81 
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00 
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Table 18 
Stage of 
Hearing 
2 
3 
Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: Positive Consequences of Present 
Present Practice, calculated separately for Management, Union and Arbitrator, according 
to Stage of Hearing and the relative Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
Ttpe of Case 
R 0 L E Stage of R 0 L E 
Managemen t Union Arb it rator Hea ri n9 Management Union Arbitrator 
2.95 1. 61 0.40 5.29 0.73 0.00 
3.42 0.24 0.24 2 3.25 4.01 1. '7 
6.35 0.00 0.70 3 1. 57 1.02 1.22 
Analysis of variance, F=2.17, p .09 
(Case x Stage x Role) 
U":) 
00 
.,.-4 
Table 19 
Stage of 
Hearing 
2 
3 
Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: Positive Consequences of 
Proposed Outcomes, calculated separately for Management, Union and Arbitrator, 
according to Stage of Hearing and the relative Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
.!i:£e of Case 
R 0 l E Stage of R 0 L E 
Managemen t Union Arb it rator Hearl ng Management Union Arb i t ra tor 
1.07 1.20 0.00 1.68 5.lt8 0.00 
0.00 0.39 O. 1 2 1.27 2. 19 1.99 
0.23 0.88 o .ltO 3 1. 79 1.27 1.13 
Analysis of variance, F=2.19, p <.09 
(Case x Stage x Role) 
c.o 
00 
~ 
Table 20 
Stage of 
HearinL 
2 
3 
Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: Other Statements about Outcomes, 
calculated separately for Management, Union and Arbitrator, according to Stage of 
Hearing and the relative Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
Type of Case 
Simple Comp lex 
R 0 L E R 0 L E 
Stage of 
Manaqement Union Arbitrator Hearing Management Union Arb it rator 
6.42 10.09 9.38 15.35 23.47 18.78 
5.05 14.06 7.59 2 12.41 14.13 19.72 
9.14 11.92 11.93 3 7.'-16 24.74 13.33 
Analysis of variance, F = 2.56, p < .05 
(Case x Stage x Role) 
l'-
00 
,.... 
Table 21 
Stage of 
HearinL 
2 
3 
Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Mode: Accepts. calculated separately 
for Management. Union and Arbitrator. according to Stage of Hearing and the 
relative Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
Type of Case 
Simple Complex 
R 0 L E Stage of R 0 L E 
Management Union Arbi trator Hearing Managemen t Union Arbitrator 
1. 15 0.81 2.23 0.24 0.05 0.00 
6.71 9.39 3.76 2 10.83 5.69 2.61 
9.82 5.22 4.06 3 5.60 3.24 1.86 
Analysis of variance, F = 2.36, p.<0.7 
(Case x Stage x Role) 
Table 22 Percenta0e of c.p.a. Acts classified as 
Referent: Union Person, calculated separately 
for Management, Union and Arbitrator, according 
to the relative Simplicity or Complexity of the 
Dispute 
ROLE 
Type of Case Management Union Arbi trator 
Simple 2.58 1. 14 
Complex 1.90 0.91 
Analysis of variance, F = 3.99, p < .03 
(Case x Role) 
1 1 .50 
18.50 
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Interactions between-Stage of Hearing and Complexity of Dispute 
_ Tables 23 to 28 show six interactions between the stage of the 
hearing (one, two or three) and the complexity of the dispute. 
(1) In the mode dimension the relatively higher use of 
statements Rejecting other propositions in simple cases was accounted 
for by the increased use of Rejects in the middle of the hearing. In 
complex cases, there was little variation. 
(2) In the resource dimension, Limits were most frequently imposed 
in the middle of complex cases, whilst they were at their highest at 
the end of the hearing in the simpler disputes. The two strategic 
categories, concerned with the Positive and Negative Consequences of 
a current Practice or agreement, tended to vary (p <.10), such that 
although their overall use did not change according to the type of 
case, they were used most frequently in the middle of the more 
complex disputes, falling to their lowest levels at the end of the 
hearing. There was less variation in these categories in the 
simpler d1sputes. 
(3) In the referent dimension, references to the t1anagement Party 
were 'higbest in the middle of complex disputes, whereas they increased, 
although.to a .lesser extent, throughout simpler disputes. Appeals to 
the Arbitrator tended to increase throughout the more complex disputes, 
whereas there was little variation in the simpler cases (p<.08). 
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Table 23 Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Mode: 
Rejects, calculated separately for Stages 1,2 and 3 
of the Hearing, according to the relative Simplicity 
or Complexity of the Dispute 
Staqe 
= 
of Hearing 
Type of Case 2 3 
Simple 0.46 2. 12 1.39 
Complex 0.64 0.71 1. 13 
Analysis of variance, F ~ 3.94, p < .04 
(Case x Stage) 
Table 24 Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Limits, calculated separately for Stages 1,2 and 3 
of the Hearing, according to the relative Simplicity 
or Complexity of the Dispute 
Stage of Hearin~ 
Type of Case 2 3 
Simple 1. 11 1. 39 3.56 
Complex 1.03 2.S7 1. 16 
Ana 1 ys i s of va r i ance, F:. 3.62, P < .05 
(Case x Stage) 
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Table 25 Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Positive Consequences of Present Practice, calculated 
separately for Stages 1,2 and 3 of the Hearing, 
according to the relative Simplicity or Complexity of 
the Dispute 
Stage of Hearing 
Type of Case 2 3 
Simple 1.29 0.64 1. 70 
Complex 1.88 2.24 0.83 
Analysis of variance, F:: 2.66, p < .10 
(Case x Stage) 
Table 26 Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Negative Consequences of Present Practice, calculated 
separately for Stages 1,2 and 3 of the Hearing, 
according to the relative Simplicity or Complexity 
of the Dispute 
Stage of Hea ri n~ 
Type of Case 1 2 3 
Simple 2.52 3.24 3.02 
Complex 2.75 6.11 1.55 
Analysis of variance, F~ 2.90, p.(. .08 
(Case x Stage) 
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Table 27 Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Referent: 
Management Party, calculated separately for Stages 
1,2 and 3 of the Hearing, according to the relative 
Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
Stage of Hea ring 
Type of Case 2 3 
Simple 7.32 9.52 10.94 
Complex 6.77 15.62 12.57 
Analys is of variance, F =. 5.16, p ( .02 
(Case x Stage) 
'" 
Table 28 Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Referent: 
Arbitrator, calculated separately for Stages 
1,2 and 3 of the Hearing, according to the relative 
Simplicity or Complexity of the Dispute 
Stage of Hearing 
Type of Case 2 3 
Simple 5.57 4.75 5.93 
Complex 4.00 6.36 8.93 
Analysis of variance, F ~ 2.83, p < .08 
(Case x Stage) 
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Discussion of the Hearing Process and resulting Decisions 
(i) The Process of the Hearing, according to Type of Dispute 
The results of the analysis suggest that there is some support 
for the expected distinction between the social processes of the 
hearing-in the two types of dispute. - The process of the more complex 
disputes is more closely related to that generally expected of 
negotiation: more concern with the strategic implications of alternative 
outcomes, rather than present practices alone, and more personal 
comments, in this case from the arbitration board, directed to union 
representatives, who were generally in the position of claimants. 
In comparison with the simpler cases, relatively more attention was 
centred on the discussion of the nature and future implications of 
the proposed range of outcomes (Outcome categories changed according 
to type of" case, rather than categories concerned with current 
agreements and practices). The more complex disputes thus required 
a more forward-looking debate, with participants attempting to 
anticipate future consequences, both good and bad, of a current course 
of action, rather than looking to the past and present for the context 
of, and solution to, the dispute. The arbitrator appeared to be 
chiefly concerned with exploring the extent of differences between 
the parties and examining the viability of the alternative proposals 
put forward, in the light of the parties' conflicting frameworks. 
(While the unions- argued the case largely in terms of abstract 
principles of equity and fairness and demanded consideration of the 
rights of employees, vis-a-vis those of management and other groups 
of workers, management tended to concentrate on debate about the 
overall stability of the industry with particular reference to its 
financial well-being and productivity.) The simpler cases, in 
contrast, were consistently concerned with claims for improved terms 
"and conditions of employment in the context of established practices 
and agreements. They were dealt with in a more straightforward manner 
-
and involved less subtle exploration of party positions, with the 
arbitration board concentrating their attention on parties' statements 
of the 'facts' relating to the current dispute and their relevance 
or irrelevance in relation to the establ ished decision criteria (eg 
entitlement/no entitlement to a meal allowance according to the terms 
of agreement x). 
Table 29 Average Proportions of Statements classified as 
'Present Practices' (c.p.a. categories 4-6), compared 
with Statements classified as 'Outcomes' (c.p.a. 
categories 7-9), in Complex and Simple Disputes 
Type of Case 
c.p.a. Simple Complex 
categories 
Pre?ent 
Practices 35.31 32.26 
(4-6) 
Outcomes 11.50 23.75 (7-9) - - -
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(ii) The Outcomes of Arbitration, according to Type of Dispute 
Further support for the distinction between cases can be gained from 
a_qualitative analysis of the outcomes of thirty arbitration decisions 
from the same board of arbitration and parties, during the period 
1970 to 1980. 
Table 30 Types of Outcome in Simpler and More Complex Disputes 
Outcome 
Directly favours Suggests principles 
Case management or union and compromise 
Simple 14 3 17 
Complex 5 8 13 
19 11 30 
The simpler disputes resulted in more decisions clearly favouring 
one side or the other and directly stating what the resolution of the 
dispute should be •. The more complex disputes resulted in relatively 
moredeclsions which proposed a number of general principles on which 
the parties could be drawn towards a workable agreement. 
Decisions resulting from the simpler disputes were based on the 
arbitration-board's judgement of the merits of the case, in the 
light of current practice and were likely to be justified in terms 
of a simple decision rule which had been made salient during the 
hearing .. For example, in the claim for a quarterly review of the meal 
and lodging allowance, to replace the current annual review, the· 
arbitration board decided as follows: Igiven the rate at which 
inflation has been running ..• there is a strong case for more 
frequent consideration of the allowance l • In the case of a union 
~laim for payment of a meal allowance to staff in construction 
gangs, working some distance from their booking-on point, the board 
stated: -IWe cannot accept that there is a justification for altering 
the present situation, whereby payment is linked with the requirement 
for a man to work outside his normal areal. 
In contrast with these apparently straightforward decision rules, 
the more complex disputes resulted in statements such as: IWe have 
sometimes felt it would not be wise to do more than indicate the 
general direction in which we think the parties should travel' 
(Arbitration board decision, 1974, emphasis added). They were thus 
providing a Iframework l , rather than a definitive answer to the 
dispute. Such awards necessarily formed the starting point for future 
negotiatio~s between the parties on the details of their implementation. 
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(iii) The 'Framework' used by the Arbitration Board in the More Complex Cases 
The more complex disputes lacked clearly identifiable starting and 
finishing points, in the sense that pay restructuring issues, group 
differentials and relativities were continually raised in negotiations 
between the parties and presented repeatedly before the arbitration 
board. Consequently the board devised its own long-term, general 
framework for responding to these claims and con~istently interpreting 
a series of apparently ad hoc disputes, such that the resulting 
decisions could be seen to develop an underlying order and rationale. 
Since the more complex cases tended to involve less specific terms of 
reference, the board was relatively free to pursue its own point of 
view and concentrate on their understanding of the issues and concerns 
reflected in the parties' statements at the hearing. 
The parties' conflicting proposals for settlement were countered 
by the arbitration board's 'theory', ~hich viewed the continuing 
disputes as due to the industry's lack of a systematic job evaluation 
and grading scheme. The introduction of such a scheme would, they 
argued, improve effici~ncy, benefit employees who felt unjustly 
treated in relation to other groups or whose career path was presently 
uncertain, and contribute to the long-term stability of industrial 
relations: 'We think that a more systematic study of jobs, in 
the light of future (industrial) needs, would help to promote a more 
radical improvement in utilisation of manpower and equipment' 
(Arbitration decision, 1974). When the parties appeared to be making 
little progress towards job evaluation, the arbitration board 
repeatedly pursued the same line of argument, expressing particular 
concern, with each new dispute, that the parties should implement 
those sections of earlier decisions which recommended the introduction 
of job evaluation. Furthermore, they argued that disputes over 
differentials, bonus schemes, payments for additional responsibilities 
and so on, were. likely to be endless, and decisions necessarily .aa. 
poe, unless there was some possibility of appeal to established 
principles 9r job evaluation. The introduction of such a scheme would, 
they argued, alldw a consistent approach to the resolution of these 
apparently disconnected issues by providing the required context, 
or 'formula', for a 'just decision' between conflicting claims. 
It can be argued that, in the more complex disputes, the' 
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arbitration board became relatively more involved as a party (rather 
than acting as 'adjudicator') with a specific interest and distinctive 
point of view, which was pursued through the arbitration process. 
·In the course of such action, it departed from the limited role 
traditionally attributed to arbitration, to make quite extensive 
recommendations on the regulation of industrial relations and the 
industry's future. In a sense, the pattern of decisions which emerged 
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provides support for Downs I (1957) argument that 'complexity and 
especially uncertainty promote ideology in .•. decision-making ' , 
because in order to reach any decision it becomes necessary to identify 
" some rela~ely simple over-riding goals, in the light of which 
conflicting positions can be interpreted. Hence the 'ideal I of the 
systematic job evaluation procedure replaces an individual incentives 
approach, which it has been argued leads to endless series of 
comparability claims, as one group tries to maintain its position 
vis-a-vis another. 
(iv) The Different Perspectives of Management and Union 
Complexity has generally been treated as a given, fixed quantity, 
which is neutral with respect to conflicting points of view and in its 
implications for decisions. Thus Newhouse (1973) discusses the 
confusing and difficult nature of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 
the implication being that, if politicians, bureaucrats and scientists 
could only grasp the scale of the problem, the difficulties of reaching 
agreement would be overcome. Where conflicting interests are involved, 
however, it seems likely that representatives of opposing parties will 
be interested in manipulating the perceived complexity of the issues, 
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with the intention of gaining the kind of outcome most favourable 
to their own party. In the case of negotiations between African 
nations and the EEC, Zartman (1971) observed that the 'complexity 
-
~f the issues ••. delayed agreement until late in the game as members 
held out on one point in the hope of gaining a final agreement on 
an6ther f (p.56). The complexity of the issues was thus used as part 
of the bargaining strategy. The party which is able to structure the 
issues and organise material to suit its preferred perspective is in 
a potentially powerful position if it can establ ish the predominance 
of its perspective such that certain conclusions are bound to follow 
from the consideration of its arguments. Consequently the complexity 
of the dispute is not necessarily fixed and measurable, but a character-
istic of a dispute which is changeable according to the interests and 
perspectives of the parties. In the case of arbitration, it would 
therefore seem impossible to discuss the nature of complexiiy without 
recognising its significance for ~hc power relationship between the parties. 
In line with Zartman's (1977) model which describes negotiation 
as requiring the creation of a framework for agreement, the more complex 
disputes demanded that the hearing be used as an opportunity to 
establish the priority of the claimant's preferred framework for the 
interpretation of the issues. Where the dispute lacked an obvious 
applicable frame of reference (ie a current agreement or practice), 
~~hich could be appealed to in order to decide the issue 'authoritatively', 
as in the simpler cases, the arbitration forum provided a new 
opportunity for the structuring and organisation of material, such 
that the party's views on the most appropriate future course of 
action could gain ground. Previously contentious issues could acquire 
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the status of defi~ite proposals for future negotiations, by virtue 
of an arbitration award. Barber (1966) points out that the definition 
of a problem shapes the kind of-outcomes possible. The most appropriate 
strategy for each side in the more complex disputes was thus likely to 
consist of attempting to focus the attention of the arbitrator on 
particular aspects of the situation, whilst making others relatively 
obscure. 
The parties in fact draw on a variety of arguments in order to 
establish the validity of their position. The same kinds of arguments, 
about economics, considerations of equity in relation to comparisons 
between grades and jobs, and the relative merits of consistency as 
opposed to change in work practices, coul~, however, be used by 
opposing parties to justify divergent positions and to reach opposing 
conclusions. Thus an outcome considered to be equitable and efficient 
by one group was represented as inequitable and inefficient by another 
group. This applied to differences between management and unions and 
to differences between one union and another, where the unions disagreed 
over the implications of a set of proposals for the future prospects of 
their members, in comparison with other groups of employees. As might 
be expected, the general framework advocated by management differed 
from that advocated by the union. In the more complex cases, management 
portrayed itself as particularly firm and intransigent. Since the level 
of references to the management party was particularly high during the 
second phase of the more complex disputes, this suggests that management's 
own references to itself as a formal body, at this point in the hearing, 
were used to emphasise its unwillingness to be swayed by union demands. 
Its representatives were particularly concerned to set limits and. 
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confine the range of outcomes possible (the use of Limits was in turn 
most concentrated in the middle phase of the hearing) and to stress the 
disadvantages of proposed changes. It placed most emphasis on the 
-desirability of present working arrangements in the first part of the 
hearing, whilst the union was more concerned to discuss and press the 
advantages of its proposals for chang~ during the opening exchanges of 
position, paying relatively more attention to certain aspects of 
present practice in the middle of the hearing. Whereas management1s 
discussion of outcomes increased throughout the hearing of simpler 
cases, it decreased throughout in the more complex disputes. The 
tendency towards increasing appeals to the arbitrator appeared to 
indicate the growing concern of the parties to draw his attention to 
their particular point of view in more complex cases. 
In these disputes, the union side is seen to be pressing for 
change In the face of a reluctant management, protesting the constraints 
which it faces and forecasting the disastrous implications for the 
industry of the union demands. In the simpler cases, in contrast, the 
discussion was primarily focussed on the interpretation of present 
agreements and related more closely to the concrete, immediate issues 
in dispute (an increased booking-on and -off allowance, payment of a 
meal allowance, etc). The introduction of relatively wide-ranging and 
abstract proposals in the more complex cases left the party opposing 
changes (usually management) to set the limits of change and confine 
the appropriate criteria to be used in deciding the outcome to 
supposedly concrete considerations of finance. The claimant union, 
in the face of such opposition, concentrated on arguing the more 
ambiguous, indefinable points of relativities between groups, good 
industrial relations practices, employee rights and rewards for service 
and responsibility. Its aim might be described as to pose a challenge 
to the opposing party's criterion for the evaluation of proposals, in 
"the belief that the arbitration process could lead to the establishment 
of new priorities and thus shift the current status quo towards a 
position more favourable to the union". 
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Two conflicting frames of reference thus become evident. The 
management ~ttempt to define the issues in terms of economics, 
productivity and the efficient operation of the industry. The unions, 
whilst acquiescing to this perspective to some extent, were also able, in 
more complex disputes, to introduce relatively abstract considerations 
of equity and employee rights, in an attempt to establish the superior 
claims of their frame of reference. In seeking recourse to arbitration 
in complex disputes, it seems that the unions may attempt to alter the 
balance of power between sides, by using it to give new emphasis to 
their claims and to relegate the management's arguments about economics 
to the status of secondary considerations. To the extent that they 
succeed in this, the arbitration decision results in an advantageous 
starting point for negotiation, where the framework, or terms of the 
issues to be negotiated, have been decided by arbitration. In the 
case of a pay claim, for example, the decision went against the 
union's preferred method of payment, but the union gained assurances 
on the wider principles of maintaining the original basic rate, which 
management had wished to reduce without guarantees of future 
restoration. The union also gained assurances on the future consolidation 
of the £6.00 pay supplement into the basic rate of pay. Consequently 
the arbt"tration resulted in a strong starting-point for the union in 
its future negotiations with management. The unions thus appeared 
to be in a potentially more advantageous position in the more complex 
. disputes. In such cases, arbitration may not only be the last stage 
'of a disputes procedure, but also the starting point for future 
negotiation, where the claimant party has succeeded in establishing, 
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to some extent, the validity of its concerns in relation to the proposals 
of the other side. 
(v) The Re-cycling of Complex Issues 
The long-term disputes over bonus schemes, differentials, 
classification of jobs, determination of basic pay scales and so on, 
appeared in a series of references to arbitration, largely relating 
back to the initial arbitration decision on pay restructuring (1974). 
All were issues which were treated by the parties as central to 
industrial relations. They were part of the continuing process of 
defining the terms of relations between groups - between unions as 
well as between union and management. The more contentious the issues 
and the more uncertain the implications of proposed changes, the more 
those issues were continually Ire-cycled l through the parties l 
negotiatlon procedure, from year to year. The arbitration board 
assumed an influential role in deciding the course of industrial 
relations policies, by virtue of its involvement in the 1974 pay 
restructuring exercise, which had implications still unfolding and 
affecting subsequent areas of dispute. Consequently the parties 
continued to refer related issues to the board for further consideration. 
Arbitration, in this case, ceases to be the end point of a dispute, 
and becomes one part of a much longer cycle of negotiation and argument, 
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which results in a continuing series of changes in the industry. 
As the arbitration board becomes involved in long-running negotiations, 
their decisions become contentious issues in themselves. They may 
"result not only in further negotiations over how they should be 
implemented in practice, but also form the basis of further dispute 
between-the parties who disagree ove~ their implications. In turn, 
such disputes may eventually be referred back to arbitration in a 
slightly a~tered form, where the board's original decision proved 
unacceptable to the parties. The introduction of a bonus scheme for 
a small group of employees, for example, resulted in an appeal to 
arbitration by two unions whose members were not advantaged by the 
scheme. They argued that the individual bonus payment was inconsistent 
with present policy and reverted to the old system of linking bonus 
payments with individual performance. It had long been agreed that 
such systems were inequitable and generally unsatisfactory as an 
aspect of remuneration, and bonus payments were being consolidated 
into the basic rate. This policy dated back to negotiations preceding 
the 1970's pay restructuring exercise. The unions bringing the claim 
therefore argued that their members should receive a similar increase 
in pay, but added to basic rates, rather than as a supplement to pay.· 
One union in fact used the arbitration forum to present a general 
pay claim on the basis of increased productivity, whi 1st the other 
simply claimed parity with the group receiving the new bonus payment. 
The arbitration board argued that the bonus payment was actually a 
payment for additional responsibi lities undertaken by the group of 
employees and was therefore in line with a well-established principle 
in the industry. They recommended that similar additional 
responsibility payments should be made to a particular group of drivers 
and possibly to other groups of employees who might feel that they 
had a claim on these grounds. The union representing the drivers 
found the decision unacceptable, because it was generally opposed to 
"any moves towards the classification of drivers' jobs, preferring to 
distribute benefits evenly amongst drivers, and the management found 
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the decision unacceptable because of the size of the payment recommended 
and the suggestion that other groups might be in a position to pursue 
a similar claim. The renewed dispute was eventually referred back 
to arbitration, encompassing arguments about payments for irregular 
and unsocial hours, additional responsibility and changed methods of 
work, sectional bargaining, bonus and incentive schemes, relativities 
between jobs and job restructuring. 
The arbitration board has clearly departed to a large extent 
from the more traditional 'outsider' role, and has in the process 
gained an influential but contentious role, in relation to the parties. 
Summary and Conclusion 
1. Two types of dispute were dealt with by arbitration in the public 
sector industries studied: 
(i) Th~ simpler disputes were defined in terms of a mutually 
agreed framework. These conformed more easily to the traditional 
view of. arbitration as having a limited role in industrial 
relations a~d serving as the end-point of a dispute. 
Decisions tended to favour one side or the other explicitly. 
(ii) The more complex disputes were wider-ranging, with uncertain 
implications for the future of industrial relations between the 
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sides. Simple decision rules were inappropriate and the case 
lacked obvious mutually accepted standards for the decision. 
·2. Contrary to Thibaut and Walker's (1975) psychological model of 
procedural justice, the procedure used to deal with these disputes did 
. -
not vary according to the type of case: the parties' perception of 
a 'fair hearing' instead relied on the use of a standard procedure. 
Variations .in the procedure would have been regarded as damaging 
to the impartiality of the process, not as enhancing it. 
3. It is however important to distinguish between the procedure 
and the social process of the hearing. Variations in social process, 
within the broad framework of a standard procedure, allow the 
arbitrator to cope with the varying demands of the task. 
4. The general expectation that the complexity of the dispute would 
affect the type of approach adopted in the hearing was upheld. In 
the simpler disputes, the arbitrator can be described as managing the 
process of concession-convergence, where the context is set by 
an existing agreement or practice and the decision is justified in 
terms of an established standard. The arguments raised by the parties 
at the hearing surrounded the interpretation and appl ication of that 
'standard' to the current dispute. It was not, however, clear that 
the arbitrator was using these hearings in order to gain a tacit 
understanding of the parties' preferred settlement, since opposing 
positions were clearly defined in the context of established practice. 
This may be one distinction between the public and private sector 
arbitrations. In the more complex disputes, particular emphasis was 
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given to the development of a framework for negotiation between the 
parties, with the arbitrator acting more as a party to negotiations 
than as an 'outsider', and leaving the detai led concessions to be 
made in subsequent negotiations between the union and management. 
Negotiations over the proper framewo~k for agreement were not 
confined to anyone hearing, but extended over a number of years, by 
virtue of the recurrence of certain issues and arguments (differentials, 
bonus schemes, pay restructuring, etc). 
5. The complexity of the dispute did not appear to be neutral with 
respect to party positions, and the union in particular appeared to 
be able to gain some advantage, because the arbitration process, by 
its very nature, is required to take account of considerations of 
equity and fairness, which were used by the unions to assert the 
importance of fair treatment for their members. Ski lful negotiators, 
faced with a convent!onal procedure, seem to be able to use its very 
conventionality to demonstrate the firmness of their party stance 
and their unwillingness to move towards the opponent. The 
arbitrator was required to deal with two opposing frameworks put 
forward by the parties: financial costs versus employee demands for 
improve"d terms and conditions of employment. In order to sway 
. . 
financial considerations, the unions were required to establish 
the merits of their case according to considerations of equity, 
reasonable-industrial relations practices and the well-being of 
employees. The third-party is no longer able to focus on the 
establishment of areas of factual dispute in relation to the terms 
of a current agreement, but is instead faced with the need to explore 
the long-term implications of opposing positions, with a view to 
creating a framework within which the parties can continue to 
function in the future. The union was able to establish. 
the relevance of a negotiation framework 
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which recognises more than financial constraints by taking into 
account the priority of employees' needs for certain standards of 
pay and related conditions of employment. It was frequently able 
-
-to gain an advantageous starting point for further negotiation with 
management, where the terms of the negotiation are defined by the 
arbitration decision. 
6. In dealing with the conflicting frames of reference put forward 
by the parties, the arbitration board attempted to establish its own 
framework for the interpretation of the mass of detailed information 
assembled. The board thus assumed a creative and powerful role in 
relation to the parties. By virtue of its particular point of view, 
which influenced future negotiations between the contending parties, 
It resembled a party to negotiation in its own right. 
7. The more complex disputes were central to the process of definition 
and re-definltion of relations between the parties and to the determination 
of the balance of power between them. Consequently, those arbitration 
decisions, which deal with disputes over the proper criteria to be used 
in deciding what constitutes an 'equitable' outcome, are treated by 
the parties as contentious issues in their own right and may be the 
subject of much further negotiation. 
By implication, control over the outcome of particular disputes 
could be said to vary. Whilst it is viable for the third-party to 
assume control in the simpler cases, where the decision is a dichotomous 
one between two opposing positions (entitlement/no entitlement to a 
meal allowance/bonus payment, etc), in the more complex cases, because 
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the decision forms the basis for a future working agreement between 
c • 
the parties, the process of the hearing is closer to that traditionally 
associated with negotiation, in the sense that participants are arguing 
-
about the future implications of different courses of action and 
their relative advantages and disadvantages, according to the differing 
prioritfes of management and unions. - If the subsequent arbitration 
decision is to be viable in practice, the arbitrator and parties must 
of necessity share responsibility for the eventual outcome. 
8. In general the study of the arbitration process suggests that a 
reassessment of the artificial division between negotiation and 
arbitration is needed. While the impartial, evaluative image of 
arbitration functions to maintain the public acceptability of the 
process, the understanding of arbitration is actually dependent on 
the collective bargaining context from which it originates. The 
nature of the relationship between the parties determines the 
significance of the different disputes and thus affects the task faced 
by the third-party. It would be unrealistic, to say the least, to 
expect an external third-party to produce the definitive resolution, 
typically expected of arbitration in those disputes which are central 
to industrial relations. The third-party did however try to assist 
in the negotiation of a framework for the resolution of the dispute. 
Arbitration did not serve as a substitute for negotiation, but neither 
was it, as )~generally assumed, the end-point in a series of 
negotiations which ended in deadlock. Instead it was likely to form 
part of a continuing cycle of negotiations, which were necessary in 
order to deal with the highly conflictful issues contained in the more 
complex disputes. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Roles of Management, Union and Third Party in the Public 
Sector Arbitrations 
-The aim of the chapter is to examine the respective roles of 
arbitration board and parties, in relation to an established group 
of negotiat~rs who make regular use of arbitration and therefore have 
a good understanding of the process and of the members of the 
arbitration board. 
It has already been noted that the conventional procedure in use 
at these hearings resulted in considerable emphasis being given to the 
defence of party positions, rather than to concil iatory gestures 
(Chapters Six and Seven). This is in line with experimental findings 
(Chapter Three) which suggested that, contrary to normal expectations, 
the presence of a third-party did not necessarily encourage 
conciliation and compromise. 
It is not possible to demonstrate convincingly, without detailed 
interviews and observations of the negotiators outside arbitration, 
that management and union representatives at these hearings had the 
'strong' bargaining relationship described by Batstone ~ ~ (1977). 
The negotiators did, however, know each other well by virtue of their 
long history of association and were also familiar with the chairman 
of the arbiiiation board. Although arbitration was used fairly 
regularly, it became more a part of the cycle of negotiations or, 
alternatively, a routine part of the 'processing' of minor disputes 
through .the stages of the negotiation machinery. It was not evident 
that arbitration was held out as a threat by one side against thi other. 
The Arbitrator's Role Compared with the Role ·of the Parties 
In general, the part played by the arbitrator in the hearings 
'is likely to differ from that part played by management and union 
representatives. In chapter four,-the arbitrator was compared with 
thi eff;ctive negotiator, who is typi~ally able to work in terms of 
a systematic forward-looking plan which is nevertheless flexible 
enough to benefit from information gained from the parties relating 
to their current position and the differential values which they 
are likely to place on different settlements. In order to achieve 
this, 'the effective arbitrator might be expected to structure the 
session into a smooth series of steps and organise the parties to 
allow the implementation of the overall plan, rather than allowing 
the hearing to be side-tracked by trivial or irrelevant issues. 
The structuring of the hearing should in turn allow the third party 
to forestall over-rapjd judgement of the case or fixation on one 
type of outcome only. He or she should be able to initiate an 
active search for Information designed to test alternative hypotheses 
about the underlying reasons for the current impasse, canvas a wide 
range of alternatives and be able to understand the problem from the 
perspective of both sides, while clarifying their positions and 
expectations in order to determine which aspects of party positions 
remain open to change and to what extent. Such strategies may be 
particularfi'relevant in those disputes where the parties are, in 
Snyder and Diesing's (1977) terms, locked into an 'irrational I mode 
of bargaining, where the negotiators operate according to a set of 
rigid beliefs about the negative intentions of the other side and 
are determined to defend the same set of policies, even when ·to an 
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outsider they are clearly out-dated. In these types of dispute, the 
beliefs of the negotiators are.organised such that all considerations 
point to the same strategic choice and consequently they are unable 
or unwilling to change their views about the intentions of the other 
side, according to feedback received from the events of the specific 
dispute. The arbitrator should also be"less hostile and more neutral 
than"the parties (Landsberger, 1955a;b; McGrath and Julian, 1965), 
more concer~ed with directing and controlling the procedure of the 
hearing, maintaining his authority in relation to the representatives 
and, in general, evaluating the arguments put forward and the potential 
range of outcomes. 
The parties to the dispute are more likely to be oriented towards 
the presentation of the case and more preoccupied by the need to 
advocate the benefits of their preferred outcome to the third party. 
They are likely to be more antagonistic than the third party, to the 
extent that the procedure allows such expression of hostility, and 
less concerned with the immediate direction and structuring of the 
proceedings. 
Results of Conference Process Analysis of 12 Public Sector Arbitration 
Hearings, according to the Role of the Participants and the Stage of 
the Hearing 
(I) Average- Level of Contribution 
On average, the arbitration board contributed least to the 
hearings, while the major union contributed most (Table 31 ). 
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Table 31 
Average Contributions+of Union, Management and Arbitrator (in terms 
of c.p.a. categories) to twelve cases 
Management 
Union 
Arbitrator 
(Other unions 
% Contribution 
28.76 
31. 13 
21.48 
(18.63) 
Standard 
Deviation 
4.34 
10.07 
5.26 
The arbitration board contributed very little during the 
opening stage of the hearing (4.00%), when management and union 
were making their statements of case. The majority of the board's 
contribution occurred in the second stage of the hearing, when they 
were in fact the most active participants, suggesting that although 
the board's overall contribution may be smallest, this does not 
reflect a total pattern of inactivity. To the extent that the 
arbitration board takes a directive role ir. proceedings, this 
function appears to be concentrated particularly in the middle of 
the hear:ing. 
Although. the major union's contribution did not vary significantly 
from stage to stage, management's contribution decreased over time 
(Table 32 , presented graphically, p. 216). 
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Table 32 
It-Average Contributions of each Party, according to Stage of Hearing, 
in 12 Cases 
Person (S.D.) 2 (5. D.) 3 (S.D. ) F. p. 
- - -1. Management 36.16 (8.28) 
2. Union 32.31 (13.24) 
3. Arbitrator 4.00 (1.82) 
24.0-1 (11.82) 
28.26 (18.74) 
38.46 (5.99) 
23.53 (9.90) 
32.42 (10.19) 
28.05 (10.21) 
4.97 .01 
0.25 (.25) 
53.87 .001 
(ii) Differences between the Parties in Type of Statements Made (Table 33) 
In the mode dimension, the major contributing union showed slightly 
less overall variation in the framing of statements than management 
or arbitrator, making most statements in the form of Offers (92.12%), 
with 4.25% Accepts and smaller proportions of rejections and 
questions. Management made slightly more use of Accepts (5.75%) and 
Rejects (2.08%), whilst the arbitration board concentrated relatively 
less on statements Offering information (72.12%) and more on questioning 
the other participants (Seeks 23.00%). 
In the resource dimension, the arbitrator was most preoccupied 
with Procedure (32.31% of acts), whilst the parties concentrated 
more on Statements about Present Practices (management, 35.98%; 
union, 31.79%) and Information (management, 26.70%; union, 28.27%). 
Management-made most use of the Positive Consequences of Present 
Practices (3.12%), and the Negative Consequences of Proposed 
Outcomes (4.28%) whilst the union gave more emphasis to the Negative 
Consequences of Present Practices (5.86%) and the Positive 
Consequences of the Proposed Outcome (1.72%). The arbitrator spent 
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Table 33 Average Proportions of Acts, in each c.p.a. 
category, contributed by Management, Union and 
Arbitrator (12 cases) 
Management Un i on Arb i trator F 
( 1 ) (2) (3) 
Mode 
1. Offer 88.26 92.12 72. 12 18.84 
2. Accepts 5.75 4.25 2.57 9.57 
3. Reject 2.08 1. 10 0.18 24.91 
4. Seek 1.38 1.34 23.00 132.08 
Resource 
1. Procedure 7.05 5. 18 32.31 141. 95 
2. Settlement Pt. 0.80 0.70 1. 56 1.68 
3. Li mi ts 1. 80 1.90 1. 82 0.06 
4. +ve. con. p.p. 3.12 0.72 0.34 8.25 
5. -yeo con. p.p. 1. 71 5.86 1.89 7.90 
6. Oth. sts. p. p. 35.98 31.79 20.69 16.75 
7. +ve. con. prop. 
out. 0.92 1.72 0.53 3.06 
8. -Yeo con. prop. 
·out. 4.28 2.53 2.43 4.45 
9. Oth. s ts. p.p. 12.01 13.44 11.94 o. 15 
10. +ve. acknowl. 1.25 1.86 5.37 11. 45 
11. -Yeo acknowl. 1. 23 5.65 0.54 ]7.92 
12. Information 26.70 28.27 18.00 7.79 
Referent 
O. No ref. 46.06 42.07 32.69 9.27 
]. Se If 7.87 7.02 6.29 1.65 
2. Mgmt. person 0.29 2.10 6.96 43.10 
3. Union person 2.30 LOS 14.42 51. 51 
4. Mgmt. party II .80 9.94 8.59 3.66 
5 •. Union party 23.81 28.45 18.53 9.67 
6. Arbitrator 5.47 6.48 5.57 0.68 
7. All . pe rs on s 0.70 0.62 4. ] 4 15.34 
8. All parties 2.07 2.64 2.53 0.39 
(For 1 ist of abbreviations, see Table 6, p.138) 
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p 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
n.s. 
n.s. 
.002 
.003 
.001 
( .07) 
.03 
n.s. 
.001 
.001 
.003 
.001 
n.s. 
.001 
.001 
.04 
.001 
n.s. 
.001 
n.s. 
more time than the parties offering praise and positive, supportive 
comments (5.37%), whilst the union representatives made most critical 
and hostile comments (5.65%). 
In the referent dimension, the arbitrator made more personal 
references (Management Person, 6.96%; Union Person, 14.42%; All 
Per~o~s: 4.14%) and relatively fewer ~eferences to Parties (Management 
Party, 8.59%; Union Party, 18.53%). Overall the arbitrator referred 
more to the union side than to management. The parties mostly 
referred to themselves and each other formally as Parties. 
(iii) Variations between Stages, in Management, Union and 
Arbitration Board's Relative Contributions 
(Tables 34 to 46) 
Arbitration Board 
The increased activity of the arbitrator in stage two of the 
hearing is accounted for by the change from a procedurally oriented, 
directive role (Resource: Procedure, 55.75% of acts in Stage I, 
falling to 17.50% of acts in Stage 2), where the arbitrator referred 
more. to the group as a whole (Referent: Persons, 6.6%) or to 
particular individuals (Referent: Union Person, 19.57; Referent: 
Management Person, 7.97%), to a more evaluative role in Stage 2. 
Here the arbitrator asked more questions than either party (Resource: 
Seeks, 32.26%), probing the details of present agreements or 
working arrangements which were the subject of the arbitration 
(Resource: Other Statements about Present Practices, 30.76%) and 
exploring the negative implications or disadvantages of the proposed 
changes (Resource: Negative Consequences of Proposed Outcomes~ 5:32%). 
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Perhaps because the arbitrator held final responsiblity for the 
decision, he appeared to be more interested in defining the settlement 
point of the dispute than the parties, particularly in stage one 
Of the hearing (Resource: Settlement Point, 4.21%). As the 
arbitrator's attention moved away from controlling the course of 
hearing in stage one, so his acknowledgement of participants decreased 
(Resource: Positive Acknowledgement, Stage 1 - 9.95%; Stage 2 - 1.52%). 
This rather. formal politeness, consisting largely of welcoming 
participants and thanking them for their efforts, increased again 
in the final phase of the hearing (Resource: Positive Acknowledgement, 
4.63%), alongside directives to the participants as to how they should 
proceed (Resource: Procedure, Stage 3 - 23.68%). 
In the middle of the hearing, the arbitrator's attention was 
focussed on party positions rather than on individuals (Referent: 
Management Party, 11.22%; Referent: Union Party, 19.03%), indicating 
the evaluative nature of this period. 
Management and Union 
The parties to some extent showed the reverse pattern. Both 
management and union tended to agree more with each other and with 
the arbitrator's comments on their respective positions, as the 
hearing progressed. The parties were particularly oriented towards 
persuading the arbitrator of the validity of their view of the 
issues in qi.Jestion, during the first part of the hearing (Resource: 
Positive Consequences of Proposed Outcomes, Management - Stage 1 -
1.32%, Stage 2 - 0.53%; Union - Stage I - 2.99%, Stage 2 - 1.14%; 
Resource: Negative Consequences of Proposed Outcomes, Management -
Stage I - 6.28%; Stage 2 - 2.65%; Union - Stage 1 - 2.83%, Stage' 
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2 - 2.57%). Their participation during the second part of the 
hearing was directed towards satisfying the demands of the arbitration 
board for clarification and re-examining the extent and variety of 
the differences between them. 
In contrast with the arbitrator, the parties made more personal 
references as the hearing proceeded, with the most noticeable change 
occurring between stages one and two. 
Union references to the management representative were highest 
in the middle of the hearing (Referent: Management Person, Stage I 
0.35%; Stage 2 - 4.09%), and declined in the final stage (1.87%). 
Management references to the union representatives increased throughout 
the hearing (Referent: Union person, Stage 1 - 0.70%, Stage 2 - 2.43%. 
Stage 3 - 3.74%). As previously noted, however, unlike the typical 
picture of negotiation, references to parties did not decline 
consistently over time. In stage two of the hearing, each party 
referred more to itself than it did to its opponent, with references 
to opponents decreasing from stage one to stage two (See Tables 
44 and 45). 
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Table 34. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Mode: 
Accept, calculated separately for Management, 
Union and Arbitrator's contributions according 
to Stage of Heari n~ 
Stage 
1 2 3 
Role Management 0.77 8.42 3.06 
Union 0.50 7.85 4.40 
Arbitrator 1. 30 3.28 3.14 
Analysis of variance, F ::. 4.07, p<::.008 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
Table 35. Percentage of the c.p.a. Acts classified as Mode: 
Seek, calculated separately for Management, Union 
and Arbitrator's contribution, according to 
Stage of Heari ng 
Stage 
2 3 
Role Management 1.48 0.93 1. 73 
·Union 0.17 2.35 1. 50 
·Arbi trator 9.22 32.26 27.51 
Analysis of variance, F -: 19.61, p .c:... 00 I 
( I n"t"e'ract ion between Stage and Role) 
Table 36. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Role 
Procedure, calculated separately for Management, 
Union and Arbitrator's contribution, according to 
Stage of Hearing 
Stage 
2 
Management 3.79 6.93 
Union 4.02 5.04 
Arbi trator 55.75 17.50 
Ana 1 ys i s of va r i ance, F :: 21.68, p <...001 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
3 
10.44 
6.46 
23.69 
Table 37. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Settlement Point, calculated separately for Management, 
Union and Arbitrator's contribution, according to Stage 
of Heari n9 
Stage 
2 3 
Role Management 1. 48 0.41 0.50 
Union 1.40 0.34 0.38 
Arbitrator 4.21 0.31 0.16 
Analysis of vari ance, F:: 2.81 , p , .04 
Interaction between Stage and Role) 
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Table 38. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Role 
Other Statements about Present Practices, calculated 
separately for Management, Union and Arbitrator's 
contributions, according to Stage of Hearing 
Stage 
2 
Management 38.02 34.03 
Union 35.96 29.92 
Arbitrator 0.76 30.76 
Analysis of variance, F = 12.83, p ",-.001 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
3 
35.90 
29.49 
30.56 
Table 39. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Role 
Positive Consequences of Proposed Outcomes, calculated 
separately for Management, Union and Arbitrator's 
contribution, according to Stage of Hearing 
Stage 
2 3 
Management 1.32 0.53 0.91 
Union 2.99 1. 14 1.05 
Arbitrator 0.00 0.90 0.70 
Analysis of variance, F = 3.26, p ~ .02 
.(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
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Table 40. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Role 
Negative Consequences of Proposed Outcomes, calculated 
separately for Management, Union and Arbitrator's 
contribution, according to Stage of Hearing 
Stage 
2 3 
Management 6.28 2.65 3.91 
Union 2.83 2.57 2.20 
Arbitrator 0.00 5.32 1.97 
Analysis of variance, F ~ 5.50, p L .001 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
Table 41. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Resource: 
Role 
Positive Acknowledgement, calculated separately for 
Management, Union and Arbitrator's contribution, 
according to Stage of Hearing 
Stage 
2 
Management 1. 16 0.78 
Union 1. 55 1. 61 
Arbitrator 9.95 1.52 
Analysis of variance, F= 8.38, p ~ .001 
_ (Interaction between Stage and Role) 
3 
1.81 
2.41 
4.63 
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Table 42. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Referent: 
Management Person, calculated separately for Management, 
Union and Arbitrator's contribution, according to Stage 
. 
of Hea ri ng 
Stage 
2 3 
Role Management 0.33 0.20 0.34 
Union 0.35 4.09 1. 87 
Arbitrator 7.97 4.61 8.29 
Analysis of variance, F = 4.41, P ~ .005 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
Table 43. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Referent: 
Role 
Union Person, calculated separately for Management, 
Union and Arbitrator's contribution, according 
Stage of Heari n9 
Stage 
2 
Management 0.70 2.45 
Union 0.04 1. 49 
Arbitratqr 19.57 11.65 
Analysis of variance, F = 5.21, P ~ .002 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
3 
3.74 
11.65 
12.02 
to 
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Table 44. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Referent: 
Role 
Management Party, calculated separately for Management, 
Union and Arbitrator's contribution, according to Stage 
of Hearing 
Stage 
2 
Management 7.46 16.28 
Union 9.BO B.70 
Arbitrator 4.01 11.22 
Analysis of variance, F:=. 3.96, p ~ .ooB 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
3 
11.68 
11. 33 
10.55 
Table 45. Percentage of c.p.a. Acts classified as Referent: 
Role 
Union Party, calculated separately for Managment, 
Union and Arbitrator's contribution, according to Stage 
of Hearing 
Stage 
2 
Management 33.73 17.34 
Union 26.50 29. 10 
Arbitrator 18.21 19.03 
Analysis of variance, F = 5.57, P ~.OOI 
(Interaction between Stage and Role) 
3 
20.36 
29.75 
18.34 
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.1 .' 
.' ... ; 
.:·.:-,:.-·:.~~_c;p.a. Acts classified as Referent: 
:~l~ulated separately for Management, Union 
·.;,.i·a.rf~~ontribution, according to Stage of 
Stage 
2 3 
.. It 0.08 0.99 1.04 
0.02 0.80 1.04 
. , 6.66 1.92 3.84 
. ~ ;i; .f "'ri111ce, F:: 4.28, p L. .006 
,::. n b!t~~~~ Stage and Role) 
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Discussion 
In many senses, these public sector cases provide an example 
of 'well-practised' arbitratioA. The procedure has been used 
sufficiently frequently, and the arrangements are sufficiently 
familiar to the participants, for the process to run without many of 
the 'min6r' difficulties of control and direction which are likely 
to face inexperienced representatives with an ad hoc board of 
arbitration. 
It might be argued that the chairman of the arbitration board, 
who featured in 10 out of the 12 cases, is able and effective, in the 
sense that he has retained his acceptability to the parties, who 
jointly agreed to his appointment, over a long period, consistently 
producing decisions which the parties have been able to negotiate 
over, if not implement outright. 
In gen,eral, expectations about the differing roles of arbitrator 
and parties are upheld. The arbitration board were the most neutral 
participants at the hearing, making particular use of polite, 
supportive comments in the early and late stages of the hearing, 
while the parties tended to be more hostile and rejecting and more 
concerned with pressing their point of view and emphasising the 
advantages of the party's position. The generally low level of 
hostility however suggests that the parties were not, in any obvious 
sense, operating from an irrational, over-restricted perspective of 
what the op~6~tunities were. 
The arbitration board clearly had formal ~uthority for 
controlling and directing the proceedings to the extent that they 
required such direction. The fact that it was the arbitration 
board who were able to refer to group members personally, particularly 
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at the beginning and end of the hearings, suggests that, apart from 
encouraging a relatively harmonious approach to the meeting, the parties 
were also expected to defer to the authority of the arbitrator, while 
continuing to address each other formally as parties. It was 
noticeable that a personal comment was made to the arbitration board 
on only one occasion: that of the chairman's birthday. 
The available evidence does suggest that the arbitration board 
is operating in a similar way to an effective negotiator. While 
allowing the parties the forefront of the stage in the opening and 
closing stages of the hearing and adopting a role which is primarily 
procedurally-oriented (indicating the order of proceedings, 
maintaining control and exercising a kind of formal politeness 
towards group members), the arbitration board takes the central 
role in the middle of the hearing. At this stage, the board 
expl icitly turns its attention away from individuals to the parties. 
Party positions are evaluated and examined in greater depth, 
exploring the extent of differences between sides and the potential 
negative consequences of a decision which favoured changes in present 
working arrangements. During this period the role of the arbitrator 
shifts from one which is essentially concerned with the process of 
the hearing to one which is centred on the immediate task focussing 
on the substantive issues in dispute, examining a range of alternative 
accounts of the underlying reasons for the impasse and exploring the 
possible outcomes. 
The parties, on the other hand, appear to take a different 
course through the hearing. Morley and Stephenson (1977) commented 
that the use of the referent Other appeared to indicate the progress 
of negotiation. This category (demonstrated here by union references 
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to Management Person and management references to Union Person) 
appears to fullfil a similar function in the arbitration hearing. 
Unlike the negotiation process, however, party spokesmen continued 
-
·to make a high level of formal references to their own party 
throughout the hearing, in justification and defence of their 
preferred course of action and in responding to the arbitrator's 
questions and challenges in the second stage of the hearing. 
Nevertheless, formal references to the opposing party tended to 
decrease as the hearing proceeded, while personal references to the 
Other increased, suggesting that progress through the arbitration 
hearing is indicated by the changing relationship between own 
party: other person references. In this case the ratio own party 
other person changed from 32.34 in phase one of the hearing to 6.94 
in phase two. 
CHAPTER NINE 
Ad ~oc Arbitration- a Series of Case Studies 
Introduction 
One of the most perplexing features of the British Advisory 
Co~cil iation and Arbitration Service arrangements for ag ho~ arbitration 
is that unions and management choose to use them as a means to end 
their dispute. Unlike standing, permanent arbitration provisions, 
like those in the public sector, the ad hog arbitrations are less 
an expected and fami liar feature of industrial relations between 
the parties and more an aberration. Those cases studied here were 
largely the result of failed concil iation attempts, but even so it 
is somewhat surprising that negotiators are wi Iling to allow an 
unknown outsider to decide some potentially important aspect of their 
future relationship and agree to abide by the decision before the 
hearing takes place. 
The obvious contrast between the public sector cases and the 
ad h~c arbitrations is the relative inexperience of the representatives 
in the ad hoc cases, compared with representatives in the public 
sector arbitrations. Representatives are unlikely to know the 
arbitrator and will have had I ittle or no previous experience of 
the arbitration process. As argued in Chapter Four, they are 
consequently· unlikely to be able to make such skilful and strategic 
use of the procedures as that made by the experienced representatives. 
The ad hocarbitrations therefore serve as an interesting contrast 
with the public sector cases and illustrate a number of points 
made in Chapter Four, which views arbitration in the context of 
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collective bargaining. 
A number of expectations may be stated at the outset. 
Arbitration should in general be treated as part of longer-term 
-
negotiating strategy, although the relative inexperience of 
representatives may affect their abil ity to present a convincing 
case, if they are adversely affected by the evaluative public image 
of arbitration. In these cases it is suggested that this image is 
likely to have a dominating effect on the performance of union 
and management representatives, affecting the formulation of the 
terms of reference to the third-party, and hence the type of case 
which is heard, as well as the process and outcome of the hearing. 
This should in practice cut across distinctions between types of 
case (distinctions of the Istatute law'/'common law ' variety) 
tending to make the disputes appear more uniform than they are, in 
order to make them conform to the common idea of an arbitrable 
dispute. 
In such circumstances, the arbitrator appears to have a number 
of choices. He or she can either capital ise on the uncertainties of 
the parties to Impose his or her authority and make a decision which 
is accepted by them because of that perceived authority or he or 
she can try to deal with parties
' 
apprehensions and conduct the 
hearing in a relatively informal, relaxed manner, which seeks to 
understand the 'problems' behind the dispute and resolve those, 
without too much concern for the precise terms of reference. If 
the parties are however operating according to the terms of Snyder 
and Diesing's 'irrational' bargaining mode, both of these courses 
of action may prove very difficult, and in the long-term ineffectual 
as a means to the resolution of the dispute, with the experience~of 
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arbitration simply being one more event to be interpreted in terms 
of a 'master-script' according to which each side regards the 
other as fundamentally bad, untrustworthy and ill-intentioned 
-
towards itself. 
Ad hopArbitratibn Cases 
Nine private arbitration hearings were observed and discussed 
with arbitrators and ACAS officials. Each case study comprised 
statements of case from each party, notes of the hearing organisation 
and debate, which were as full as the researcher's variQnt of speed-
writing would allow, a copy of the arbitration Award and, in six 
out of the nine cases, notes from an informal discussion of the case 
with the arbitrator or chairman. The cases were heard between June 
1976 and February 1978. Two cases were heard by single arbitrators 
and seven cases by ad hoc. boards of arbitration. Hearings varied in 
length from one hour and nine minutes to two hours and forty minutes, 
with an average length of one hour and fifty-one minutes. 
The Nature of the Issues 
All of the nine cases were framed in terms of an established 
rule or ~greement and required the third-party to give an interpretation 
of that agreement, in relation to the particular dispute. The claims 
either asked the arbitrator to interpret a specific agreement or 
asked for a decision relating to which side held responsibility for 
breaking an agreed grievance procedure. In this sense, they could 
all be said to concern 'disputes of right', although other issues 
lay behind the terms of reference in some, if not in all, of these 
cases. This disjunction between the way in which the terms of 
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reference to arbitration were framed and the actual reasons for the 
dispute suggests that the parties were required to engage in a 
certain amount of strategic thinking in order to make the terms of 
the dispute resolveable by, and appropriate to, arbitration as 
presented by ACAS. This appeared to mean that the dispute should be 
limited to certain relatively narrow issues, possibly reflecting only 
one aspect of a more extensive conflict, and set in a specific 
context. 
Types of Issue and their Terms of Reference 
1. Terms and Conditions of Employment and Other Pay Matters 
Five out of the nine cases can be described as concerned with 
the terms and conditions of employment. These were, in many senses, 
the most straightforward issues from the point of view of the arbitrator. 
Each required a decision on one point or two points only and was 
related to the interpretation of a specified agreement, the terms of 
which could be drawn on to frame a decision, which in four out of the 
five cases, was almost a foregone conclusion. 
Case One A Joint Industrial Council 
Terms of Reference: To decide whether the Pay Board Advisory Report 
No.4 on London Weighting is relevant to the Working agreement of 
the Joint Industrial Council. 
Description of Case and Outcome 
This was the simplest case and was heard by a single arbitrator, 
after being referred from conciliation. Provision for arbitration 
was written into the JIC constitution. The union side of the JIC 
wanted the employers' representatives to recognise the applicability 
of the Pay Board's London Weighting report, directed first and foremost 
to the public sector, to their companies in the private sector. 
Current pay policy prevented any money being involved in the claim 
at the time. 
The union representative argued that the Pay Board report was 
applicable to the private sector, that a traditional payment of a 
'Lpndon differential' already existed in the industry (up to now, 
-ZOp above JIC minimum), and that the high cost of living in London 
justified an increase in this 'London rate'. On grounds of equity, 
the union claimed their entitlement to a london Weighting, because 
of their comparability with other groups in the public sector, whose 
minimum-rates are determined by Whitley councils, and argued that 
the Companies themselves accepted the applicability of the London 
Weighting, since they had given evidence to the Pay Board. Although 
pointing out their willingness to consider the matter in the context 
of annual pay negotiations, management claimed that the Pay Board 
Report was ~ot applicable to their industry, because the JIC set 
only minimum rates of pay, rather than determining national wages 
scales similar to those operating in the public sector. Thus companies 
situated in London were already paying a competitive rate, above 
JIC minimum, in order to obtain labour. The imposition, through JIC 
agreements of an extra London differential would mean that some 
employers would have to leave London. The arbitrator's decision 
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was against the union and reasons were given in the Award. It was 
argued, not according to considerations of equity such as the union's 
case was grounded in, or in terms of economics, such as the management's 
case was couched in, but in the narrower sense, literally according 
to the terms of the Pay Board Advisory Report, which described the 
kind of national pay structure to which the report on London Weighting 
should apply. This was a uniform grading scheme, with an incremental 
scale beyond the age of eighteen. Since the JIC merely set a rate 
for forty hours below which no one should be paid, the arbitrator 
decided that the agreement did not satisfy 'the criteria for private 
sector applicability of the London Weighting as defined by the Pay 
Board and by the Secretary of State for Employment' . 
Case Two An Industrial Training Board and APEX 
Terms of Reference: To determine a union claim that, having regard 
to the agreement of 1974, the Board made a genuine error, contrary 
to what was in the minds of the parties at the time of negotiating 
the agreement, in that the Threshold Payment for the rise in the 
Retail Price Index for the month of June 1975 was not paid until a 
date after the 1st August, 1975. 
Description of Case and Outcome 
In this case, the success of the union depended crucially on 
the Inclusion, in the terms of reference, of the phrase 'according 
to what was in the minds of the parties at the time of negotiating 
the agreement l , and-the clause in the previous annual wages agreement 
which provided for the payment of an indexation amount according to 
rises in the cost of living, to be paid 'from the first of (each) 
month following the rise in the (Retail Price) Index'. In practice, 
a~ the union representatives pointed out. the payment had been delayed 
by a month in each case. The relatively late publication date of the 
RPI figure meant that the relevant data could not be fed into the 
computer early enough for the salary adjustments to be made. Hence. 
for the sake of administrative convenience. payments were made one 
month l~ter than they should have beeh. The union passively accepted 
the change. because they foresaw no undesirable future effects. With 
the introduction of pay policy, from 1st August 1975. however, the 
Training Board wished to off-set the indexation figure, resulting 
from the June rise in RPI and paid on 1st August. against the £6.00 
payaupplement. According to the union. the payment was actually due 
on 1st July and should not therefore be off-set. Hence. the union 
argued. there was'a genuine error, contrary to what was in the minds 
of the negotiators at the time of the agreement. in that the June 
increase was not paid before 1st August'-. The employer unsuccessfully 
pursued the claim that the actual method of payment, originally 
adopted for administrative convenience, was established through custom 
and practice, and therefore constituted a variation in the agreement. 
The arbitration board decision once again relied on the terms of the 
written agreement, which showed that lit was the intention of both 
parties to pay cost of living increases in the month following the 
rise in the retai I price index'. Consequently the indexation payment 
for June 1975 fell due in July 1975, and. by implication, need not 
be off-set against the £6.00 pay supplement, under pay policy 
operative "from 1st August 1975 
Case Three Metal Manufacturing Company and TGWU 
Terms of Reference: To decide whether the entitlement to the three 
additional days of holiday granted to employees in 1975 resulting 
from the JIC agreement of 23rd October, 1974 which states lAs and 
from 3rd September, 1975. a further three days annual holiday with 
pay will be granted bringing the total annual holiday entitlement to 
twenty working days'. 
OR 
Whether this agreement to the three days resulted from a local 
agreement applicable from 1st January, 1975 and as a consequence 
justifies the union claim for an increase of 55p per week to be 
added to the £5.45 wages supplement in the JIC agreement. 
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Description of Case and Outcome 
The arbitrator was asked to decide whether three days extra 
annual holiday, granted in 1975, arose from a JIC agreement 
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or a local agreement. The significance of the claim lay in its 
implications for the employees' rate of pay. If the holiday entitlement 
~rose from a local agreement, operative from the 1st January, 1975, 
as the union argued, there would be no need to off-set this benefit 
against the £6.00 pay supplement available under government pay 
policy. If, as the employer argued, it arose from a JIC agreement, 
operative from 1st September 1975, it· should be off-set against the 
£6.00, as in fact already determined by the JIC annual agreement over 
pay. The union case depended on the argument that a document distributed 
by the employer, detailing holiday entitlement commencing 1st January 
1975, constituted an agreement (although the union conceded that they 
had had no 'part in the drawing up of the document and had in previous 
years objected to its being labelled as an agreement). Since 
negotiations at local level had traditionally concerned improvements 
to JIC agreed minimum terms and conditions, the terms of the annual 
holiday agreement/document were said to constitute a better condition 
of employment than that set out in the JIC agreement. The union 
argued that the three days extra holiday should not therefore be 
off-set against the £6.00. Management argued that the union had 
never actually produced any evidence of a local agreement, and that 
furthermore they had stated at JIC disputes committee level, that the 
holiday entitlement did arise from the JIC agreement. 
Since the employees of this particular company were the only 
group seeking to disagree with the JIC agreement on pay for 1975-76, 
the claim probably resulted from local shop-floor dissatisfaction, 
causing the union officials to pursue the claim to arbitration, where 
the obvious decision, that the three days holiday entitlement 'did 
not result from a local agreement applicable from 1st January, 1975': 
(Arbitration Award) was made. At one level it is clearly unsatisfactory 
to claim that three days holiday, granted a year before, should be used 
to decrease the amount of money available for wage increases in the 
following year. Within the narrow perspective of arbitration, however, 
and given the kind of argument which the union tried to make in 
acquiescing to that perspective, there could be no other conclusion. 
In giving reasons for the decision, the arbitrator pointed out that, 
in other circumstances, the union might agree that it would be 
ldangerQus to say that the "guide" over-rules the agreement, where 
it is quite clear what the agreement means'. The arbitrator applied 
the terms of the agreement literally, and advocated the value of 
establishing such consistent practice in industrial relations. 
Case 4 A Bakery and URTU 
Terms of Reference: To determine whether, in all the circumstances, 
the company is justified in adjusting van salesmen's commission to 
take account of the increase in bread prices since the introduction 
of the two-thirds: one-third commission scheme in October 1974. 
Description of Case and Outcome 
The arbitration board was asked to decide whether the company 
was justified in adjusting van salesmen's commission to take account 
of the increase in bread prices, since the introduction of a new 
co~mission scheme. The union argued that the commission scheme, 
whereby the driver was paid commission on one-third of the value of 
his or her total weekly sales, was self-adjusting for price increases. 
The introduction of a regulator, by the company, meant that they 
entirely controlled the levels of commission, and thus set commission 
earnings- at an arbitrary and inequitable rate. Management, on the 
other hand, argued that the union had always known that management 
reserved the right to adjust commission according to bread price 
increases. According to custom, "It is a universal practice within 
the baking industry that where van salesmen have monetary commission 
schemes, these are adjusted in order to neutralise ... the effects 
of bread price increases". Furthermore the regulator used was not 
arbitrary, but agreed by a working party with representatives of 
both management and union. Given the nature of the commission 
agreement, and given that the union had already assented to the 
operation of a regulator, by virtue of its participation in the working 
party and given the existence of a very similar arbitration award 
which also discussed the adjustment of commission earnings according 
to bread price .increases, it was difficult to see why the union 
brought the claim to arbitration. In its written statement, the 
company says that it "appreciates the constitutional proprieties 
observed by the Union in bringing this matter to arbitration". This 
suggests that the source of the dispute is as much between salesmen 
and union officials as it is between company and union. The salesmen 
refused to·accept the operation of a regulator, although the union 
officials were involved in its calculation. Consequently, union 
officials pursued the issue to arbitration. The arbitration took 
the responsibility from the union officials, who would otherwise 
appear to be fail ing to meet their obligations as representatives 
of the salesmen. In this case, the narrowness of the terms of 
reference: which asked whether the company was • justified in adjusting 
commission", ensured a defeat for the union. 
Case 5 Car Transportation Firm and TGWU 
Terms of Reference: To consider a failure to agree concerning the 
correct interpretation of a local agreement on the introduction of 
15 metre trailers for car transporters. This agreement was signed 
on 22nd June, 1970. It refers to payments to be made for the 
carrying of each car 'over and above the normal previously considered 
car carrying capacity of the 13 metre trailer' and to determine this 
issue in accordance with the schedule attached. 
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Description of Case and Outcomes 
The fifth decision in this group seems at first sight surprising 
and unpredictable. The trade union side disputed the interpretation 
of a local agreement, which had been operative for the past seven 
y~ars. The agreement originated in the replacement of thirteen 
-metre car transporter trailers by fifteen metre trailers, and stated 
that a bonus would be payable to car transporter drivers, for each 
car carried 'over and above the normal previously considered cary 
carrying capacity of the thirteen metre trailer'. The union wanted 
to claim that the normal load of the bId thirteen metre trailer was 
five cars. Consequently bonus payments should be paid for every 
sixth and seventh car carried. For the past seven years, bonuses had 
only been paid for every seventh car carried. That this interpretation 
had not be challenged by the union was demonstrated clearly at the 
hearing by -the production of agreements, signed by union officials, 
describing normal working as the carrying of six cars. Subsequent 
to a previous dispute, concerning the payment of a double bonus when 
drivers were away over-night with the same load, a union official 
had made a written amendment to the original agreement, stating that 
'every seventh car carried is subject to payment, above confirmed by 
management •.. '. 
Why pursue this apparently inexplicable change of interpretation 
to arbitration? The management statement of case hinted, and it became 
clear during the hearing, that the drivers had taken industrial action 
after discovering over a cup of tea that other transporter drivers 
employed by the same firm, but in the north of England rather than 
the south, received bonus payments for every sixth and seventh car 
carried. Instead of making an argument for parity with the northern 
drivers, however, the union statement of case, as prepared for 
arbitration, did not mention the origins of the dispute, but preferred 
to argue the case by claiming that the normal load of the old 
thirteen metre .trailer had always been considered to be five cars. 
The union side was obviously constrained to some extent by its views 
on the proper use of arbitration, such that its claim was made on 
the rational basis that thirteen metre trailers carried five cars 
only. The case seemed even more abstruse, but in a sense revealed 
the inventiveness of the union, when the researcher discovered that 
the employer had already conceded the union's claim for bonus 
payments on every sixth and seventh car carried. The union however 
wanted b~\ pay for the past seven years of, what they now regarded 
as, lost bonuses. This cast new light on the union's reasons for 
arguing the case in the way they did: if they could show that normal 
meant five cars, they would be justified in claiming arrears on the 
bonus payments. Since the management had already conceded the first 
point, the arbitration board, although it was not supposed to know 
about the existence of the concession, could hardly decide against 
the union. All that remained was to decide how much bik pay should 
be awarded. The arbitration board settled on £250, the figure which 
the union had indicated as acceptable to their members during 
conciliation, and which constituted the only compromise decision 
emerging from this group of cases. Thus despite the fact that the 
union had a dearth of supportive arguments and made little use of 
what they did have, they successfully achieved, through their use of 
arbitration, something they were extremely unlikely to achieve 
through negotiation. 
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2. Union Recognition 
Case 6 Engineering Company and APEX 
Terms of Reference: To determine whether the monthly staff employed 
in the Sales Department should be included for collective bargaining 
purposes_ in the Month I y Staff Recogn it i on Agreement. 
Description of Case and Outcome 
Although unusual because of the infrequency of such references, 
this case was essentially similar in pattern to the others. The 
chairman of the arbitration board.described it as J· a very, very simple 
issue •.. Y, and said he 'found it difficult to believe that it needed 
a Board of Arbitration to solve it'. The union wanted the company 
to include the monthly-paid sales staff for collective bargaining 
purposes in the Monthly Staff Recognition Agreement. The reference 
came less than a year after the initial agreement. Management claimed 
that the office-based and field-based sales staff should be treated 
as one unit, in· which case union membership was very low: two out of 
a possible total of sixteen. If however, office-based sales staff 
were considered separately, the level of union membership became 
two out of four. Since the union already represented other monthly 
paid office staff, the arbitration board reasoned that, because of 
the similarity in terms and conditions of employment between office-
based sales staff and other monthly paid office staff, and the 
distinctions between the office staff and outdoor sales representatives, 
'those four members of the monthly paid sales staff should be 
included for collective bargaining purposes in the Monthly Staff 
Recognition Agreement ,l (Arbitration Award). In discussion with the 
researcher, the chairman of the board commented that "all we were 
doing was ensuring that the company followed a fairly common 
{industrial practice, of treating office sales staff and outdoor 
sales representatives as different groups of employees. He also 
commented that in this case he saw arbitration as performing an 
educational function, advising the management, in particular, of a 
practice which was common to most firms. The case appeared to be 
very straightforward, with no hidden inter-union rivalries and no 
apparent reason for management's unwillingness to allow the four 
staff to be represented collectively by the union. Each already had 
the right to individual representation. The union based its case 
heavily on what was considered to be good industrial relations practice, 
while the company argued that the union could not claim to be 
representative because of the low rate of membership among the whole 
sales force. Recourse to arbitration was likely to prove successful 
from the union's point of view, if it relied on arbitration as an 
interpreter or reflector of current industrial relations practice. 
On this occasion the external authority of the arbitrator was used 
to lend weight to the union's claims of what constituted common 
practice. 
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3. Dismissal/Disciplinary Issues 
This group of three cases was quite distinct from those already 
described. The references were concerned with the dismissal of an 
employee or the appropriate action to be taken by employees or 
management, when an agreed grievance procedure is violated. 
Case 7 Film Processing Company and ACTAT 
Terms of Reference: To consider whether the action proposed by the 
company, in relation to the declared intention to dismiss Mr X, a 
member of the union, for a work error is deemed to be justified having 
regard to all the facts. If found to be unjustified to consider all 
these facts and award. 
Description of Case and Outcome 
The most straight-forward case in this group concerned a claim 
by the union against the proposed dismissal of an employee for a 
work error. None of the cases discussed previously concerned any 
extensive dispute about the facts of the case. Similarly, in this 
case, unlike the other two in the group, there was little dispute over 
the events which had taken place. An employee had seriously, and to 
some extent irrepairably, damaged a large part of the only copy of 
a new feature film, at the negative pol ishing stage. The company 
claimed that this was a matter of gross carelessness, since the slow 
rate at which the machine worked was such that the employee's 
inattention must have occurred over five hours or more. The company 
claimed that this amounted to gross misconduct, justifying dismissal. 
Their prestige and perceived reliability had been seriously damaged 
in the eyes of potential customers and they feared for their future 
if the same man was allowed to return to the polisher's job. The 
trade un~on side did not choose to dispute the employee's 
responsibility for the damage, although questioning to some extent 
the reliability of the polishing machine and how far it is possible 
to detect polishing errors immediately. Instead it concentrated on 
arguments couched in terms of disciplinary procedure, asking whether 
the error constituted gross misconduct, by appealing to precedent, 
emphasising the employee's previous, long-standing good work record, 
questioning whether there was any intent to damage, (in fact the 
company agreed that the act was not deliberate) and criticising the 
company's disciplinary procedure for being too vague and imprecise, 
such that the employee was not aware of the potential consequences 
of his error. The reference to arbitration appeared to be the 
result of a genuine impasse, which both sides were concerned to . 
settle. The arbitration board's decision was a compromise. The 
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employee was suspended without pay for four weeks, followed by 
reinstatement in the same job. The board commented that it took 
into account the man's previous good record, and the lack of 
'arrangements for supervising production and producing the final 
copies of negatives and prints)". The latter point was not emphasised 
or_even discussed by either party during their statements. It was 
an argument given weight solely by the arbitration board, presumably 
relying on what they assumed to be good management practice in 
general. 
Case 8 Food Processing Company and TGWU 
Terms of Reference: The arbiter should decide whether: 
(a) the company/union communication and settlement procedure had 
been exhausted prior to action being taken by employees, bearing 
in mind the circumstances surrounding the situation. 
(b) the company's decision not to pay was correct. 
(c) payment should be made for the eight hours stoppate of work 
by cold store employees. 
Case 9 Plant Contracting Company and AUEW (C) 
Terms of Reference: To determine whether the AUEW (C) or the company 
prevented the terms of the procedure for the avoidance of disputes 
from operating. 
Description of Cases 8 and 9 and Outcomes 
The. remaining two cases in the group were startling by their 
contrast with the other references. Principally they asked the 
arbitration board to attribute praise and blame with respect to 
the conduct of the parties towards each other. Perhaps these two are 
perfect instances of what Jenkins and Sherman (1977) mean when they 
say of arbitration: 'the probability is that the verdict will be a 
compromise offeri~g comfort and caster-oil to both sides in relatively 
equal measures'. In these cases however, the danger is obviously 
that the experience of arbitration, and a decision which explicitly 
favours one side or the other, could simply confirm the parties' 
previous belief in their own righteousness. As the chairman of one 
board pointed out, the two sides were 'more interesting in proving 
their case than in solving the problem ... '. Curiously enough, these 
were the least evaluative sessions in the sense of atmosphere~ 
conduct and outcomes. Both resulted in a compromise decision, the 
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main aim of the arbitrators apparently residing not in any ideas of 
retribution but in bringing the parties back together amicably and 
suggesting how they might both conduct themselves more reasonably in 
future. Both disputes were complicated because they involved a 
number of inter-related issues, the actual events were controversial 
ang disputed, and the issues themselves symbolised a struggle for 
supremacy between management and union. The first dispute (Case 8) 
had escalated to the point where for the management, it symbolised 
their right to manage. The arbitration board was asked to decide 
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three issues: firstly, whether the dispute procedure had been exhausted 
before the employees took strike action; secondly, whether the company1s 
decision not to pay for time lost during the action was correct (the 
employees did not leave the site, but did refuse to leave the works 
canteen and were subsequently clocked-off by management); thirdly, 
whether payment should be made for the eight hour stoppage. A long-
standing grievance over working conditions fuelled the action. The 
cold store employees concerned had, previous to a company merger, 
had access to free tea. Employees now had to pay for their tea and 
access was more limited by canteen opening times. Eventually, due 
to what the union described as management's inaccessibility and 
general unwillingness to discuss the provision of tea during canteen 
closing times, the cold store workers decided, spontaneously it 
appeared, to stay in the canteen, where three of them had originally 
been refused tea because they were five minutes late for their break, 
until the problem was resolved. The union argued that the men were 
not on strike, but merely refusing to obey supervisors' instructions 
to return to work. They were, the union said, locked-out by the 
company, who clocked men off during their official break-time. The 
decision not to pay for time lost was therefore incorrect. Management's 
main source of distress was the claim that the employees continually 
flouted the agreed grievance procedure. They argued that the shop 
stewards and men had acted irresponsibly in refusing to return to 
work, pending the implementation of procedure, that it was the union's 
responsibility to pursue the grievance over the provision of tea to 
the next stage of procedure, and therefore the men were on strike. 
Consequently they were clocked-off, because the company believed in 
the maxim no work: no pay. In general, the union was more interested 
in the wider issues surrounding the procedural one, and keen to show 
the bitterness felt over the provision of tea. Management preferred 
the narrower interpretation of the terms of reference, restricting 
the decision to procedural issues and concentrating on the union 
violation of procedure, from which narrowly defined dispute it could 
clearly have emerged the victor. The whole lengthy history of events 
preceding the occupation of the canteen indicated a general lack of 
foresight on the part of management who seemed to have either 
seriously underestimated the strength of feeling over the issue. Both 
sides appeared to have little respect for the other, with first one 
and then the othe~ acting precipitately. The eventual result was a 
confrontation over the principles of the right to manage versus the 
right to organise and act collectively. In such cases arbitration 
appears to serve as a trial of strength for the parties, who are 
unwilling to back down. The arbitrator would have to be blessed 
with unheard of skills in order to resolve such a dispute, and would 
have to-far outstep his or her limited authority. Perhaps this is 
why the Awards in this and in the remaining case offered compromi"ses 
which were most concerned with the settlement of the immediate dispute 
and with making suggestions for future improvements. The board 
decided as follows:-firstly that procedure had not been exhausted 
prior to the action taken; secondly, that in the circumstances lithe 
company's decision not to pay was technically correct (my emphasis) 
and thirdly that payment should not be made forI the eight hours 
stpppage. Payment should however be made for l~ hours to all 
employees ..• clocked off by the company from 11.15 a.m." 
(Arbitration Award). The chairman of the board defined the decision, 
to the researcher, as dependent on whether management acted too 
precipitately, and described the Award as a reasoned compromise. In 
commenting on the decision in the written Award, the board says 
"we are not fully satisfied that the men would still have refused to 
return to work had management been able to make a firm offer to deal 
with the issue in the next stage of procedure at that time, when the 
dispute related solely to the provision of tea and not also to the 
question of payment from 11.15 a.m. ••. In the light of the company's 
offer to discuss the question of payment at the Stage C meeting, we 
cannot condone the men's renewed decision not to return to work". 
The last dispute (Case 9) was probably the most irresolveable. 
The focus for the dispute was the dismissal of one man for allegedly 
falsifying time sheets (though this was not mentioned in the terms 
of reference). Behind the reference lay a confrontation between 
company and union which according to the union, challenged the union's 
right to exist and which resulted in a twenty-four week strike/lock-
out and the closing down of the firm. Admittedly the closure 
seemed to have offered the perfect opportunity for the sacking of all 
the original employees and the creation of three new firms, using 
the same equipment, but with the old names replaced. The employer 
appeared to be looking for an opportunity to harass a particular 
group of unionised employees, the union was keen to show its strength 
and determination in the face of what was seen as arbitrary and 
vindictive action against it. The owner of the company, a single 
minded entrepreneur, made all drivers, who were called out on strike 
in support of the dismissed man, 'redundant'. Subsequently, the 
two depots involved in strike action were closed and new companies 
created. At the same time various slurs were cast on the reputation 
of each party. The union suggested that the owner was inept in the 
conduct of industrial relations and the company provided various 
letters .indicating that the union had made official a strike 
which was supported only by a small minority of trouble makers, its 
chief i~terest being to damage the employer rather than represent 
the interests of the members. A good many letters, signed and 
unsigned, were produced to support both versions of the events. 
Altogether a very confusing, contradictory and suspicious picture 
of relations between the parties emerged. The only point on which 
both sides seemed able to agree was that 'Malpractice is the name 
of the game' (Un~on official). The arbitration was reduced to 
ridiculous proportions by the terms of reference, which asked the 
Arbitrator to assign praise and blame. By this late stage it was 
extremely uncertain that either side could gain anyting from the 
claim. The parties appeared uninterested in the resolution of the 
dispute, the company no longer existed and the employees had other 
jobs. An ACAS official suggested that the employees were possibly 
seeking compensation. The arbitration was apparently used, by the 
parties, with the aim of inflicting further damage on the opponent: 
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a spiteful objective, as the board chairman described it. The Award, 
which was not implemented, concentrated on presenting a balanced 
judgement of rights and wrongs and tried to advise on what the board 
considered to be reasonable future conduct. The decision moved 
beyond the originally limited terms of reference to discuss the 
inyestigation of the initial dismissal and the strike and recommend 
the re-affirmation of the agreed disputes procedure both in letter 
and in spirit. 
Discussion of the Effects of the Evaluative Image of Arbitration 
on the Process and Outcomes 
There are a number of ways in which the ad hoc arbitrations 
could be conceptualised. This discussion however focusses particularly 
on the impact of the evaluative image of arbitration, since this 
provides a major source of contrast with the public sector cases. 
(I) The Effect on Terms of Reference 
The most obvious effect of the evaluative image of arbitration 
on representatives who are relatively inexperienced in its use, is 
on the framing of the terms of reference of the dispute. All of the 
cases were cast in terms of identifiable procedural or other current 
agreements, such that each could be decided as a Iyes ' or Ino l 
choice between two alternatives (eg Should the office-based sales 
staff be included for collective bargaining in the Monthly Staff 
Recognition Agreement? or Was the company justified in adjusting 
van salesmen's commission?). In this sense, the parties seem to accept 
a restricted'legalistic
' 
use of the process, rather than adopting 
a wider, problem-solving orientation. Presumably the disputes 
would not have been described in these terms by the parties, without 
resort to arbitration, suggesting that ACAS officials and the parties ' 
views of the process affect the way in which the dispute is eventually 
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defined, casting it in terms of a proposition which is in fact open 
to an 'evaluation'. Certainly the terms of reference chosen have 
important implications for the range of outcomes possible. A 
"-
"relatively minor omission in the reference itself can change the tenor 
of the decision. In the case of the van driver's commission issue, 
the narrow terms of reference, which ·asked whether the company was 
'justified in adjusting ••. commission', precluded an award on the 
obviously over-restrictive nature of the adjustment used. The 
chairman of the arbitration board, in discussion with the researcher, 
said 'we all agreed that we had to make some adjustment .•. but 
that the existing regulator was too tight ... Ideally we should have 
I iked to tell the two sides that the regulator was needed but that 
they should get together to debate the adjustment figure again, to 
allow the van salesmen more. Unfortunately the terms of reference 
did not allow this '. The prologue to the Award tried to indicate 
the board's view: 'One (objective of the commission scheme) is the 
maintenance of the real value of the incentive elements •.. ' By 
allowing the restricted terms of reference the union lost an 
opportunity to make some significant gains. 
(2) Parties' Statements of Case 
The definition of the dispute in turn affected the arguments 
which the parties could legitimately use to defend their case. If 
the dispute "is treated as though it is open to adjudication, this 
implies that arguments which provide evidence of the 'correctness' 
of the party's view of events and their preferred outcome must 
be pres_ented. The parties written statements in fact varied in 
length and quality from a few sketchy paragraphs to fully documented 
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case histories with appendices detailing relevant agreements, disputes 
procedures and so on. The ACAS leaflet, on the preparation of written 
statements of case for arbitration, states that each party should provide 
--
la clearly set out exposition of their case and •.• include in it all 
the important and relevant pOints I. Written submissions help the 
parties 1 in presenting a more logical-and forceful case at the ... 
hearing I. The statement it says should contain (i) history and 
background of the dispute; (ii) background to the company and union 
representation; (iii) arguments supporting or opposing the claim; 
(iv) a summary of the case emphasising essential points. 
The requirements of the statement, as described, assume considerable 
ability in the construction of a convincing written argument. One 
or both sides may have little experience of such a task and the 
logic behind the claim may be contrived to suit the perceived demands 
of the arbitration process. The obvious instance of such a contrived 
argument is the reference involving a car transporter firm, where 
the union claimed that the normal car carrying capacity meant five, 
not six, cars, despite the fact that the agreement had operated on 
the basis of a bonus paid only for every seventh car, for the previous 
seven years. 
The arbitrators themselves tended to be dissatisfied with 
written statements, saying that they gave too few supportive 
arguments, failed to explain why the arbitrator should Award in a 
particular way, or simply omitted too much of the history of the 
dispute. The details were seen as particularly important when the 
events were in dispute: a coherent written statement of events, 
however, is exceptionally difficult when the history itself is 
incoherent and the actions irrational. In these cases, (eg food" 
processing/cold sto~e workers and plant contractors) the demands of 
logical exposition resulted in a certain structured coheren~ being 
given to events and a spurious rationality being imposed which was 
not there at the time and which gave the cases a peculiarly incomplete 
air. As the chairman of the plant contractor's dispute said, 'The 
hearing followed the normal rules, but the dispute had no rules at 
all"'. 
The cases deal ing with terms and conditions of employment all 
involved written statements which attempted to show the existence of 
an agreement and/or its meaning or applicability, in relation to a 
particular situation. The perceived requirements of a coherent 
argument sometimes led parties astray and resulted in poorer 
presentations than might otherwise have been possible. In the 
bakery dispute about the adjustment of van salesmen's commission, 
the union tried to prove that there was no agreement about the 
introduction of a regulator, despite the'fact that such an agreement 
obviously existed. Their case consequently appeared weak. Had they 
concentrated instead on the incentives element of the commission 
scheme, they would have been able to present a more convincing 
argument. The incentive element had clearly declined in proportion 
to wages; consequently the regulator was excessive. 
In general, the style and choice of arguments can have a 
disadvantageous effect, for one or both sides, on the outcome of the 
arbitration. In these cases, the van salesmen suffered by virtue of 
the union representative's lack of foresight in agreeing to such 
restricted terms of reference and then acquiescing to this definition 
of the dispute, rather than introducing wider-ranging issues about 
the underlying principles of the incentives scheme. Narrow or 
248 
restricted terms of reference may of course also be used to advantage, 
if they exclude certain considerations from the arbitration (eg the 
management's preferred view of the cold store workers' dispute). 
(3) The Behaviour of Representatives at the Hearing 
All hearings were conducted in the semi-adversarial/semi-
inquisitorial fashion described by Lockyer (1979). The parties were 
asked to present their arguments to the arbitrator or board. Each 
could ask questions and answer points raised by the other side and 
the arbitrator also asked questions and commented on the submissions. 
(i) Does Arbitration benefit Management? 
The results of experimental work indicated that the third-
party's presence changed the role relationship between sides, 
enhancing the performance of management. 
Decisions made through arbitration did not consistently favour 
one side or the other, but the third-party in the experiment was not 
responsible for the decision. His effect was rather on the style of 
debate. The nature of arbitration demands a certain skill in the 
presentation of a lucid and convincing argument. Neither side had 
a monopoly on this skill. Two employers used lawyers to present 
their case, which to the arbitrators seemed long-winded and tedious, 
or suffering from over-kill, yet the parties own attempts were also 
sometimes regarded as poor, or amateurish. Skill in presentation of 
case was not, however, all important. In the dispute over car 
transporter bonus payments, despite the chairman's initial opinion 
that the union had at best, a poorly argued case, and their own 
admission towards the end of the hearing that they had no case: 
(Chairman: • Why then has six cars been regarded as normal (carrying 
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capacity) for the last seven years?' Union: 'The drivers understood 
that six was the normal carrying capacity •.• Then they met certain 
(other) drivers I.), the chairman was somehow convinced, during the 
--
hearing, that five cars was normal capacity for the old thirteen 
metre trailer and the union received a proportion of back payments 
for~ losi bonuses. Thus although skill in presenting an argument was 
evaluated by the arbitrator, it was not the sole determining factor 
of success. 
(i i) The Effect of the Third-Party on the Salience of the Role 
Relationship between Parties 
As suggested by experimental results, the parties
' 
expectations 
that they, and ·the case which they represented, would be evaluated 
by the arbitrator or board did affect their behaviour at the hearing 
and the salience of their role relationship. The third-party forum, 
the arbitrators acknowledged, results in both sides being Ivery keen 
that the arbitrator should see the issues through their eyes I 
(arbi trator). 
Representatives tended to focus their attention on the 
presentation of a 'rational
' 
argument in support of their favoured 
outcome .and.according to the types of supportive statements which 
were legitimised by the restricted terms of reference. 
Concentrating on the exposition of the case, for the benefit 
of the arbitrator, in turn leads the parties to define the relation-
ship between the~ in formal terms. Hence, however familiar the 
representatives were outside the hearing, the role relationship is 
made salient over the personal relationship, during arbitration: 
agreements are made by management and union; management clocked men 
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off; the union official is called in at Stage C of procedure; the 
union knew that adjustment would be made for bread price increases, 
and so on. 
The formal relationship between parties is maintained through 
the strictures of procedure, which requires statements to be addressed 
through the chair. Although this practice was not uniformly 
followed throughout the hearings, since the arbitrator decided 
initially who would speak when and what kinds of statements or 
questions were acceptable at what stage of proceedings, the parties 
were always aware that they were being directed to behave in a 
certain way, eg I ... Following normal practice, s ha II ca 11 firs t 
on the union to present their case ••• The order of march then 
if management will show great forebearance and not butt in, but note 
down any points which they might have arising from the union submission, 
they will then have the opportunity to elucidate any points .•• 
I shall then calIon my colleagues for any further points which they 
might have to put to Mr X (union). Then I shall calIon Mr Y 
(management) to put the case for the management and suffer a similar 
ordeal at the hands of ourselves and the union I shan't close 
the hearing until I have an assurance that you have all said all that 
251 
I you wish to say ... This might involve some departure from procedure . ... 
The aim of the arbitrators in pursuing such a procedure was to 
. preserve sufficient formality to prevent any expression of hostility 
between side~; which they regarded as detrimental to the settlement 
of the dispute, and to provide sufficient flexibil ity for the 
discovery of the necessary details of the claim. Interventions by the 
arbitra~or during the hearing, such as derogatory references to 
conversations breaking out between sides, or other reminders to 
parties of their purpose, served to renew the arbitrator's control 
and discourage invective and abuse. Although some hearings were less 
formal than others, the only real exception to the pattern was the 
-
plant contractor's dispute, where participants ignored the arbitrator's 
attempts at control, referred to each other by first names, and 
surrerid~red the attempt to make clear"who held what position for the 
benefit of the arbitrator. Those present at the hearing seemed to 
be generally indifferent to the changed context and determined to 
continue insulting each other. 
Some of the parties were clearly wary of the procedure and of 
speaking out of place, apologising for their inexperience and hesitating 
over what kinds of statement to make when. The forum was sufficiently 
unusual to produce a type of social desirability effect, whereby 
the parties set out to conform to their perceptions of the 
arbitrator!s wishes, presenting themselves as responsible party 
representatives, who conducted themselves reasonably, (stressing their 
past good record of industrial relations), knowledgeable in industrial 
relations practices (quoting ACAS guides on disciplinary procedures 
and so on) and, on the whole, not openly abusing the other side, 
but convinced of the merits of their case. 
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The preceding analysis (sections I to 3) suggests that the 
symbolic interactionist view of the hearing, developed in Chapter 
Four, is supported by the nature of the process. Representatives, 
-
of both management and union, do indeed go beyond the 'official task 
rules' of arbitration (stating their position, answering questions), 
in order-to present what they believe to be a convincing performance 
at the hearing. The 'unofficial ground rules' in this case, are 
directed towards creating the 'right impression' for the implied 
evaluative audience of the arbitrator. To the extent that this 
creates a conflict between the presentation of a well-formed, logical 
argument in support of a claim, which may bear little resemblance to 
the underlying dispute, and the presentation of the self as both an 
able negotiator and a trusworthy individual, representatives did tend 
to lose sight of, or misrepresent certain aspects of the dispute which 
were particularly relevant to their success at arbitration. 
(4) The Arbitrator's Role and Behaviour 
As might be expected, the maintenance of the credibility of the 
arbitration process was treated as an important aspect of the 
arbitrator's role. All third-parties appeared particularly concerned 
to demonstra~e to the parties, their competence to decide the issue: 
'asking technical questions calms things down'; 'asking questions and 
summarising points of common ground shows you understand' (Arbitrator's 
comments). Another arbitrator commented that the chairman should have 
absolute control over proceedings, describing this as one aspect of 
the arbitrator's perceived legitimacy, which comes from the 
attribution of faith to those handling the case (Arbitrator). The 
same chairman demonstrated that he sensed the importance of developing 
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and maintaining the faith of the parties in the authority of the 
arbitrator, when he commented that'it never ceases to surprise me 
that they will hand over particular issues which may involve great 
, 
cost to them, should they lose. The arbitrator must show to the 
parties that he or she knows the consequences of deciding one way 
or the other. 
All arbitrators, to some extent, assessed the strengths and 
weaknesses of the parties' cases, commenting on the extent to which 
they had no case or only a weak case, but they also assessed the 
strengths and weaknesses of each side's representatives: their 
ability to construct an argument, develop a theme, emphasise the 
important points and so on. An important part of this assessment 
was possible only through the hearing, where the arbitrator gained 
indications of the credibility of the parties (arbitrator), through 
various non-verbal cues. It is not difficult to see why the parties 
are concerned to present the relationship between them in a positive 
light. The arbitrator interprets the quality of response to his 
or her questions as much as the content of the response: one 
chairman (in the cold-store workers dispute) described management as 
touchy on certain issues, in particular the incident of the lock-out. 
In response'to a question about whether management had acted 
. . 
responsibly in clocking men off so quickly, since a sit-in on a 
university campus would not necessarily result in the expulsion of 
the students,·the manager had responded with a comment on how with 
respect he was running a business and not a university. 
, 
Someone 
else might have explained reasonably that no, he didn't feel that 
, 
management acted precipitately, because •.. (arbitrator). In this 
case, the quality of management's response (You could tell they were 
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I 
worried, arbitrator) was an important factor in the decision that 
they had acted too precipitately and that the employees involved 
should therefore be paid for a proportion of the time lost. 
(5) The Arbitrator as 'Effective Negotiator' 
Aroitrators differed in the extent· to which they were able to 
maintain control over the hearing and hence structure the session into 
orderly stages to allow a proper examination of the issues. As in 
the public sector cases, the second stage of the hearing was 
particularly concerned with the assessment of the credibility of 
parties and their positions and was thus crucial to a satisfactory 
outcome. One arbitrator described this stage as a departure from the 
earlier coherent presentation of cases, into a stage where I isolated 
points are thro~n up, many of which are irrelevant ... and produce 
misunderstandings on both sides as to the importance of a point '. 
The effective arbitrator must be able to distinguish between relevant 
and irrelevant arguments 'which are normally in the ratio one to 
three, relevant to irrelevant' (Arbitrator). At this stage, the 
arbitrator must also attempt to probe behind the arguments for any 
hidden disagreement and may explore the criteria to be used in 
reaching a settlement. The nature of the decision may be subtly 
indicated, by the focussing of the hearing around particular 
questions: ' It all boils down to ... determining whether your JIC 
is covered by paragraphs 152, 153 or not I (Arbitrator). A summary 
such as this one indicated the direction of the arbitrator's 
reasoning and, unless it was quickly challenged, was usually followed 
by a rapid summation of main points of disagreement by the parties 
and the close of the hearing. 
Not all cases were, however, amenable to such direct summaries 
of the decision point. Although generally aware of the need to 
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'ask the right questions', the arbitrators did not always see themselves 
as successful in their attempts. In two cases, arbitrators felt that 
they should have pursued certain questions which were central to the 
decision; but which were lost sight of during the hearing. These 
issues tended to be particularly concerned with definitions of terms, 
such as error or normal, which happened to be central to the decision. 
Or they may have been issues concerned with the taken-for-granted 
background to the case, such as the operation of the shift-system in 
the cold store workers dispute over tea-provisions, or the examination 
of the parties
' 
actual working knowledge of an agreed disputes 
procedure in the plant contractors case. 
This point indicates the difficulty of proceeding under an 
inquisitorial system, where the issues are less than straightforward. 
Arbitrators commented that with the benefit of clear written evidence 
and coherent statements at the hearing, they were better able to 
formulate the right questions. When there was too much diffuse 
evidence, and the relative importance of different pieces of evidence 
was not apparent, the arbitrator or board was to some extent at a 
loss. Cleaily, in some of these cases, a very simple procedure was 
adequate. The criteria for decision were already established by 
the parties: the applicability of a report, the representativeness 
of the union; "the proper definition of collective bargaining unit, 
the particular clause in an agreement. It was much less easy to 
identify the right questions, when the chairman was asked who is to 
blame or whether the company was justified in dismissing an employee. 
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(6) The' Irrational I Cases - Can Arbitration Help? 
It was suggested in Chapter Four that the effective arbitrator 
may have to deal with the 'irrational' disputes by widening the terms 
-
of reference of arbitration and adopting a more integrative, constructive 
approach to the definition of the dispute. The last two cases in the 
group observed here indicate the difficulties and potential dangers 
for the third-party in adopting such a role. Both cases were highly 
emotionally charged and the third-party was asked, not simply to interpret 
an agreement, but to deal with disputed accounts of the events 
surrounding the grievance and industrial action. Both could be said 
to be examples of management and union representatives with a 'weak' 
bargaining relationship, in as much as the lack of respect and trust 
between the two sides was evident and the main purpose of resorting 
to arbitration seemed to be to further threaten and harass the other 
side. These disputes were clear examples of the 'irrational bargaining' 
mode, in the sense that the parties wanted the arbitrator to assign 
blame for the cause of past events and thus establish the 
'righteousness' of their own position, rather than being willing 
to discover a course out of the mutual distrust in order to improve 
the terms of their future relationship. The third-parties in these 
cases were however unwilling to adopt an evaluative stance, preferring 
instead to produce a compromise solution which would enable the 
'parties to overcome the dispute and continue to work together. 
Presumably a ~ecision which explicitly favoured one party's version 
of the events would be particularly damaging in such cases since, 
by allowing the dispute to be seen as a 'win/lose' confrontation, 
it WOUld. most likely be interpreted by both sides as further evidence 
of the morality of their view and, for the 'losing' side, of the' 
biased nature of arbitration. 
Attempts to widen the terms of the dispute and adopt a more 
mediatory, integrative approach to the hearing may however be 
"interpreted by one side or the other as an illegitimate attempt by 
the arbitrator to step outside a preferred 'masterscript ' and thus 
may be regarded, not as a constructive move, but as a political 
tactic ensuring their defeat if that wider perspective does not 
favour their position. This point is illustrated in both of the 
highly disputed cases. In the equipment contractors dispute the 
owner of the comapny preferred a wider view of the terms of reference, 
allowing the third-party to I consider what this dispute is really 
all about, (which is) whether Mr G was unfairly dismissed I (Employer). 
In the food processing case, the cold-store workers preferred the 
wider view over the narrower interpretation of procedure. Both of 
these atte~pts to extend the arbitrator's powers of decision-making 
were resisted by the other side, because such a step appeared to 
operate against their interests. In the latter case, particularly, 
restricting the arbitrator's authority to a judgement in terms of 
a procedural agreement, and eliminating the wider grievance, meant 
that the decision was bound to favour management. The union's 
salvation lay in the inclusion of a term which asked the board of 
arbitration to bear in mind the circumstances surrounding the 
situation. 
Although"the third-parties in Cases 7,8 and 9 (Case 7 - dismissal 
of film polisher) attempted to adopt a more integrative approach to 
the dispute, their success was limited according to the extent of 
the antagonism between the sides. The more integrative approach 
appeared to be acceptable to the parties only when the pre-existi~g 
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confl ict had not seriously damaged the underlying relationship 
between management and union, as in the dismissal of the film 
polisher (Case 7). During the later part of this hearing, the 
~rbitration board began firstly to explore the union's views of what 
behaviour would constitute gross misconduct and then asked both 
sides about a range of possible outcomes, in the attempt to find 
an acceptable settlement point. (What sanctions lay between a 
warning letter and dismissal? What precedents existed for suspension 
without pay? Were there other jobs which the man could be moved to?) 
This approach was possible because of the willingness of the parties. 
Even in this case a certain amount of latent antagonism emerged 
when, after a very calm and conciliatory exposition by the main 
management speaker, one manager reacted quite violently to a suggestion 
of discipl inary action less severe than dismissal, with a statement 
to the effect that he would never allow the man to touch a negative 
film again. This provoked hostile comments from the union side to 
the effect that management regarded this as a win/lose confrontation, 
and bel ieved that if they didn't get rid of Mr P other employees 
will think they can get away with poor work. Management in turn 
countered the accusation with statements about the low turnover of 
staff in the company, and their will ingness to abide by any decision 
of the arbitration board. 
The integrative approach was less successful when the conflict 
had clearly affected the personal relations between sides and the 
issues were strongly disputed as in the cold-store workers action 
and the plant contractors case. The latter case in particular 
demonstrated the most extended 'abuse' of procedure, since despite 
any attempts by the third-party to impose order, the hearing merely 
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became more heated and disorderly. In general the overt expression 
of conflict between sides was met with diversionary tactics by the 
arbitrator, in the form of technical questions, or directives over 
·the adherence to procedure. The arbitrator tried to divert the 
parties from their mutual slur tactics by stating that he would 
question each in turn in order to establish at what point grievance 
procedure had broken down. The parties however proved too antagonistic 
to be completely constrained, to the extent that one employers' 
association representative who was there purely in the status of 
observer requested 'control through the chai r and not a general 
interchange '. Clearly where the extent of the immediate conflict is 
uppermost, the hearing must be carefully controlled, if the arbitrator 
is to gain any understanding of the events and potential range of 
outcomes. 
Although it was suggested that the effective arbitrator, 
confronted with parties in a very antagonistic, irrational conflict, 
should be able to widen the definition of the dispute,. allowing a 
more flexible, open-ended approach, in the light of these cases it 
might be added that the arbitrator also has to recognise when this 
will be acceptable to the parties and when attempts at positive, 
integra~ive strategies will simply be reinterpreted by one or both 
. . 
sides as detrimental to their 'best interests' in terms of the damage 
which they are able to inflict on the other side. Instead of being 
able to provide the outsider's 'rational' view-point the third-party 
may find him or herself caught up in the same definition of the 
conflict as that pursued by the parties and consequently used by 
the par.ties as further encouragement of a mutually destructive 
encounter. 
(7) Different Arbitration Styles 
Although some arbitrators did appear to vary their approach to 
different cases depending on their perceptions of the parties· needs*, 
most seemed to develop a distinctive style which was relied on 
regardless of the issues. Arbitrators came to the hearings with 
distincf views about the purpose and conduct of the arbitration. 
They formed opinions about the party spokesmen (integrity, ability 
to argue, willingness to settle, and so on). These differences were 
reflected in the hearing procedure and, in more unusual cases, 
possibly in the kind of decision reached. Their stylistic preferences 
depended on their view of arbitration and whether they saw the process 
as a limited, adjudicatory one or as a more broadly-defined, problem-
oriented one, where the ·real issues· had to be uncovered during the 
course of the hearing. 
This was the most obvious dimension on which arbitrators differed. 
One arbitrator took the evaluation of cases very seriously. He saw 
the arbitrator·s role as relatively passive, preferring to allow the 
parties to structure their cases as they saw fit. He was not inclined 
to assist a less able representative in the presentation of arguments, 
or drawing out of points which he felt may have been favourable to 
that party, but which had been poorly argued. This person interpreted 
the terms of reference as a precise limitation on the extent of his 
* One arbitrator, in two different cases, took a narrower view 
of the hearing in a case concerning the interpretation of an 
agreement, that he did in the dismissal case (film processing 
company) where the hearing was used to discover a decision which 
would provide a satisfactory resolution for both sides. 
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authority, and, in the case of a board of arbitration, dealt with 
the decision itself by a specific procedure. Where the side-members 
disagreed, he asked each to explain grounds for their decision, and 
-
then weighed their arguments along with those from the two sides, thus 
creating a second arbitration with the chairman taking the final 
decision~ Another arbitrator, while ~iming at an orderly hearing 
preferred the informal, 'even at the price of a little disorder '. 
He did not believe that the decision should constitute 'Articles of 
unconditional surrender'. His approach to the board's decision was 
that it 'emerged, a bit like (at) a Quaker meeting where the 
result was understood '. The chairman assumed that the side-members 
agreed: '(I said) can I assume we all answer this in the same way? 
There was no dissent '. Another chairman, wary of exercising too 
much influence, said that he tried not to express an opinion on the 
outcome until both side-members had spoken, and another arbitrator, 
who described arbitration as solving a problem, preferred to find 
common ground between two dissenting side-members, so that all were 
in agreement over the final decision. Another felt that dealing with 
a board of arbitration was an inferior method of settlement and 
preferred the flexibi lity possible when a single arbitrator met with 
the parties and adopted a mediatory role, which allowed the award to 
emerge during the hearing, deriving the principles for the decision 
from his understanding of the terms of the parties' relationship. 
As Fleming's (1965) work indicated, personal differences 
between arbitrators were less likely to influence decisions in the 
most straightforward cases, wehre the award rests on what two 
arbitrators referred to as a legalistic interpretation of a clause 
in a report or an agreement. It is, however, conceivable that 
decisions in more complex cases, like the cold-store workers dispute, 
where the particular issue became a focus for the more extensive 
underlying conflict over union and management principles, could be 
made differently by different arbitrators. In this case, the 
chairman of the arbitration board felt that the decision depended 
on whether management acted too precipitately. He queried the 
management spokesman during the hearing, over whether even if one 
side deviated from agreed procedure, the situation was necessarily 
improved by the other side taking punitive action (ie clocking the 
men off). It is conceivable that someone who believed in a strong 
disciplinary management ethos would have been less inclined to view 
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the employees' apparent frustrations with any sympathy. Alternatively, 
an arbitrator who preferred to take a legalistic/judicial approach 
to claims may have adhered more strictly to the terms of reference 
(as the arbitrator did in the van salesmen's commission dispute) 
and awarded the union nothing. 
Conclusion 
It has been argued that the evaluative image of arbitration 
has observable, and sometimes detrimental, effects on the behaviour 
of party representatives who have I ittle or no previous experience 
of the process, in terms of the definition of the dispute, statements 
of case and conduct at the hearing. 
Taking~he terms of reference of the cases at face value, it 
was clear that the arbitration process, as presented to the parties, 
tended to make the disputes appear more uniform than they were in 
practice. All were couched in terms of an agreement or disputes 
procedure and appeared to be amenable to a decision between two' 
interpretations of a particular section of that agreement. 
In practice, however, it was clear that, as in the public sector 
cases, characterising arbitration solely as a judicial, evaluative 
process is too narrow a view. In effect, there were two varieties 
of arbitration in these cases, as there were in the public sector 
cases. In this instance, the simpler ~isputes were those which did 
not appear to reflect an extensive underlying conflict between the 
parties and which were consequently soluble according to the terms 
of an existing 'rule' or criterion. When it was clear that the 
immediate conflict went no further than the particular issue in 
dispute (as in the group of cases dealing with terms and conditions 
of employment), the hearing concentrated on the statements of case 
and examination of the immediate dispute. The arbitrator, relying on 
his perceived authority, generally adopted a 'legalistic' stance, and 
the decisi~n was made according to a strict interpretation of the 
agreement presented by. the parties for consideration, or in the light 
of criteria established through current industrial relations practice 
(union recognition). The one decision which does not fit easily into 
this framework was the car transporter drivers' claim for increased 
bonus payments, decided, according to the ACAS secretary, more for 
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the sake of expediency than equity. In this case, lying behind the 
interpretation of a term in the agreement, was the drivers' dissatisfaction 
resulting from their discovery that another group, employed by the 
same company,"received more bonus payments for cars carried than they 
did. This case suggests that where the decision is in some sense 
predetermined by actions already taken by management or union (in 
this case, management's concession of the union's first claim, even 
before arbitration), the award will seek to be consistent wit~ the 
parties' actions, rather than being consistent with the more general 
practice of arbitration itself, where the decision can be couched 
in terms of the criteria given by the parties' own agreement. The 
-
political decisions, in this sense, are partly oriented to satisfying 
the perceived needs of the parties and partly oriented towards 
maiAtalnlng the credibility of arbitr~tion: if the decision is 
unacceptable to the parties, their potential faith in the process of 
arbitration is undermined. The third-party in this case appeared to 
be displaying some tactical skill of the variety discovered in 
Chapter Four, where it was suggested that, in the simpler cases the 
arbitrator was likely to manage the process of concession convergence 
on behalf of the parties, by developing a tacit understanding with 
them of an acceptable settlement point. 
In this instance, those cases which were more complex in the 
sense that they involved general principles of management/union 
rights were also those in which the parties were most antagonistic 
towards each other, and wanted the arbitrator to pronounce on the 
'rights' and 'wrongs' of certain actions. The arbitration board 
was less interested in a strictly evaluative interpretation of 
the terms of reference and thus, rather than deciding who was to 
'blame' for past events, was more concerned to provide a remedy for 
the animosity between the parties. The attempt to perform the 
problem-solving/mediatory role, demonstrated in the dismissal/ 
discipl inary'cases, was, however, limited by the extent to which the 
procedure (or the chairman's individual style) could successfully 
contain the antagonism felt between the two sides. 
Overall, the nature of the arbitration appeared to be dependent 
on the participants' views of the process. (Here ACAS seemed to . 
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exercise a certain amount of discretion in assigning different 
arbitrators, with differing views of their role, to particular 
cases.) The effectiveness of the process as a method of dispute 
resolution is likely to depend on the initial objectives of the 
parties. Where it is used for damaging political ends, as a way of 
furthering, rather than resolving, a crisis in industrial relations, 
it is likely to be at best irrelevant. The parties however showed 
a certain amount of ingenuity in their use of arbitration, and in 
terms of negotiation strategy, union representatives had some 
success in establishing arguments which would probably have carried 
little weight in open negotiations. A weakly organised union was 
also able to gain through the use of arbitration, by borrowing from 
the status of the arbitrator to bring pressure to bear on an employer, 
in order to establish common industrial relations practices. Finally, 
the process may be used to gain a concession when negotiation itself 
could produce no further benefits (car transporter drivers) or to 
demonstrate the assiduous defence of members' interests by union 
officials.who may in fact believe that they have no case. 
In sum, the use of arbitration appeared to be limited only by 
the inventiveness of the participants and the relative inexperience 
of party representatives. As in the public sector cases, the 
significance of arbitration was best understood according to its 
significance for industrial relations between the sides. 
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Conclusion 
Third-party intervention has an uncertain status in British 
lndustrial relations. Suspicion of bias or government interference 
and long standing traditions of voluntarism ensure that management 
and unions are cautious in its use. Yet as an area of study it is 
interesting not only because it is regarded as a civilized means to 
control and regulate confl ict, but also because of the insights 
which it can offer into the bargaining relationship between parties, 
at a moment of impasse and public expression of strife. 
In particular the field study of arbitrated disputes which has 
been reported provided a valuable opportunity to study aspects of the 
social process which takes place behind the public, institutional 
representation of third-party intervention. It has examined the 
ways in which the institutional arrangements for arbitration are used 
and managed by the participants. 
The third-party is traditionally depicted as a neutral figure 
whose presence and skill encourages the parties to adopt a conciliatory, 
cooperative stance. This public image, it has been argued, exists 
partly because of the ambivalence felt by the parties towards his or 
her role, and functions to protect the third-party from criticism, while 
also suggesting the special skill necessary for the role. The 
evidence brought forward in the thesis has considerably undermined 
the common assumption that the third-party has an ameliorative, 
conciliatory effect on unresolved conflict. The experimental evidence 
indicated that even a silent third-party is sufficient to change the 
nature of the agreements reached (in this case, in a direction 
favourable towards management). Both experimental and field study 
evidence indicated that the third-party's presence and role, as 
understood by the participants, instead of encouraging a cooperative 
approach to the issues, resulted in greater intransigence in the 
form of increased emphasis on the role relationship between the 
sides and less immediate concern for the personal relationship. 
The third-party was treated as an evaluative presence and 
representatives were keen to impress' upon him or her the strengths 
of their own party's case. 
The move from experimental simulation to observational field 
study was justified in terms of the wealth of descriptive and 
exploratory material which it has provided. The field study has 
also been profitable in that it demonstrated the consistency of 
a number of previously observed occurrences in one-case studies, 
across a larger number of cases. The use of observational method 
has provided a different perspective from the more traditional 
questionnaire and interview methods, which have at least two 
disadvantages: first? people tend to present themselves in the 
most favourable light possible to an interviewer, and second, 
respondents may not always be sufficiently aware of their own 
behaviour to be able to describe it afterwards. This was certainly 
a problem which the arbitrators faced in trying to give a detailed 
accouni of their conduct of the hearing. 
. . 
Moreover, arbitration has consistently been described by 
practitioners as a semi-judicial, evaluative process, able to 
produce an impartial decision, based on the reasoned evaluation of 
cases. It has consequently been treated as a process which is 
quite distinct from negotiation and set apart from collective 
bargaining. It has been argued that this public image of arbitration 
is necessary in order to maintain the parties' faith in the credibility 
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of the process as a means to the resolution of their dispute. In 
order to understand the social process of arbitration, however, the 
long-standing division between negotiation and arbitration must be 
. revised. Evidence from the field study of arbitration has repeatedly 
affirmed that, far from being a distinct process, the nature of 
-
arbitration cannot be understood apart from the collective bargaining 
process of which it forms a part. Placing arbitration in its social 
context of. bargaining and negotiation allows a more elaborated 
understanding of the process than has been possible previously. 
The findings from the field study of arbitration, in both long-
term publ ic sector arrangements and private sector ad hoc arrangements, 
have clearly reaffirmed Douglas' (1962) argument that orderly 
movement through a series of stages is a predominant characteristic 
of the process of third-party intervention which ends in agreement. 
The three stages of arbitration by virtue of the formal procedure 
in use, were more evident than those characteristic of negotiation, 
where they have been described as notional. Movement through the 
stages was consistent from one case to the next and from one type 
of case (simpler and more complex) to another. 
In the public sector cases, where the availabil ity of a verbatim 
transcript of the proceedings made it possible to carry out a 
detailed content analysis, the process was compared with Bales' 
hypothesised phase movement for problem-solving groups and Morley 
and Stephen~on's (1977) model of negotiation. It was expected that 
the stages of arbitration would be more closely related to the stages 
of negotiation than problem-solving groups, because of the members' 
obligation to represent a party position. Although the detailed 
predicted changes in c.p.a. - categories were not uniformly 
supported in the arbitration hearings, nevertheless the overall 
form of the stages of arbitration was more closely related to the 
stages of negotiation than to the stages of problem-solving. In both 
. arbitration and negotiation, the process is created in order to 
deal with and regulate the pre-existing conflict between parties, 
-
although the concrete expression of that conflict differed between 
the two processes. Conflict was not, as Bales would argue, an 
inevitable by-product of the group process. The procedure used at 
arbitration encouraged a very formal process, which allowed the 
parties to talk about the conflict from a relatively disinterested 
standpoint, rather than engaging in it. The expression of inter-
personal hostility was minimal, because of the constraints imposed 
by the conventional procedure. 
The first stage of the hearing can be described as essentially 
distributive in nature, after Morley and Stephenson (1977), and 
is concerned with the presentation and justification of the parties' 
demands. The second stage of the hearing is more concerned with a 
detailed examination of positions, with the arbitrator taking a 
strategic role and paying particular attention to the possible 
disadvantages of the alternative outcomes put forward. The final 
stage was most concerned with a re-evaluation of party positions in 
the light of the preceding debate. Although references to parties 
remain relatively constant throughout the hearing, indicating the 
overal I formality of the process in contrast with negotiation, 
progress through the hearing is indicated by the contrasting 
movements of arbitrator and parties. The arbitrator's role does not 
parallel that of management and union, but is quite distinctive. 
He was throughout particularly concerned with directing the procedure, 
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maintaining an atmosphere of polite formality and questioning the 
party positions, in order to discover their reasoning and justification. 
In the first and final stage of the hearing, the arbitration board 
. adopted a relatively passive, process-oriented role, particularly 
concerned with welcoming and thanking the individuals present, while 
providing the opportunity for the development of party positions. 
In the middle of the hearing, however, the arbitration board became 
the most active participants, adopting a party/task-oriented style, 
turning their attention to probing and exploring each side's case 
and demanding an appraisal of the alternative outcomes available. 
The parties, on the other hand, portray almost the reverse pattern 
of movement. As in negotiation, the use of the Referent:Other 
appeared to indicate progress through the hearing. Formal references 
to the opposing party tended to decrease as the hearing progressed, 
while personal references to the other side increased. 
Further support ,for the argument that the social process of 
arbitration is best understood in terms of the bargaining 
relationships between parties was provided by evidence that the nature 
of arbitration changed according to the type of case and the 
distribution of responsibility between participants for the outcome 
of'the hearing. As predicted, the more complex the issues in dispute, 
the less likely the arbitrator was to take the traditional role of 
'adjudicator'. Contrary to Thibaut and Walker's (1975) argument 
that different types of case required different procedures for their 
satisfactory resolution, the standard procedure in use acted as a 
'guarantee' to the parties of the fairness of the hearing. The 
nature of the relationship between the parties determined the 
significance of different disputes, which resulted in variations' in the 
task facing the third-party, rather than variations in procedure. 
The different tasks in turn affected the social process of the 
hearing. The two varieties of arbitration which result are best 
. understood in terms of two contrasting models of negotiation: 
the 'concession-convergence' and 'formula-detail' models. In the 
simple~ disputes, the arbitrator was'more likely to act as manager 
of the concessions for the parties, according to a pre-established 
criterion. In the more complex disputes, which could extend over 
a period of years, the arbitrator resembled a party to negotiation, 
with the major aim of creating an acceptable framework for future 
negotiation between sides, where the detailed implementation of 
the decision would be subject to negotiation by the parties. The 
process of arbitration in these cases could only be understood 
in terms of the parties long-term relationship and as one part of 
a continuing cycle of negotiations, dealing with issues of equitable 
treatment and industry finance, which are central to industrial 
relations. 
The distinction between cases was upheld in both public and 
private sector cases, although as expected the distinction between 
cases was less clear cut in the private sector ad hoc arbitrations, 
where the disputes were presented to the third-party in terms amenable 
to an evaluative decision between two distinct outcomes. The more 
complex cases, however, were those which concerned emotive principles 
of management and union rights. Arbitrators attempted to construct 
a framework in terms of which the parties could overcome their 
mutual distrust. The success of this approach was, however, limited 
by the hostility between the sides. The third-party needed to act 
as a specially skilled negotiator, who is able to overcome the narrow 
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perspective which the parties have adopted and re-introduce a 
more integrative approach. The most hostile disputes appeared to 
be instances of a weak bargaining relationship, where arbitration 
.was used as a threat by one side against the other. 
The third-party was more able to adopt the role of skilled 
negotiator in the public sector hearings, where the participants 
evidently had a much stronger bargaining relationship and had 
established a basis of mutual respect. Particularly in the more 
complex disputes, the third-party was able to adopt a flexible 
approach to the issues, search for and appraise alternative outcomes, 
identify potential areas of common ground and examined the future 
consequences of different decisions. Not all of the arbitrators 
in the ad hoc cases were equally skilful in this respect, with a 
number recognising the important questions only after the close of 
the hearing. This raises the question of the extent to which the 
character of the public sector hearings which shared the same 
chairman depended on the particular abilities of that individual. 
Perhaps all that can be said with confidence on this point is that 
the chairman was certainly an example of a skilful negotiator, 
in so far as decisions resulting from the tribunal were dealt with 
serious)y by the parties and proved continuously acceptable over a 
long period. His abilities perhaps benefited from long-term 
involvement and experience, an advantage not open to those acting 
as ad hoc arbitrators. The conventional procedure preferred by the 
parties in the public sector cases could also be said to exert a 
constraining effect on the chairman's style. Indeed it should be 
asked whether the lengthy exposition of cases which preceded each 
hearing did not sometimes detract from its usefulness as a m~ans of 
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solution of the dispute. No doubt the parties would reply that 
this presentation in itself constitutes part of the assurance of 
the fairness of the hearing. 
The relative experience or inexperience of representatives 
at arbitration affected the use which they were able to make of 
the process. The more experienced participants treated it as part 
of collective ~argaining, while inexperienced representatives were 
more affected by its evaluative image. Inexperienced representatives 
appeared particularly concerned with creating an impression of 
themselves as both able negotiators and trusworthy individuals, for 
the implied evaluative audience of the arbitrator. This sometimes 
resulted in the creation of a spurious logic for the dispute which 
bore only slight resemblance to the original issues and, occasionally 
led representatives to over-look practical arguments which were 
important to the success of a claim. 
In general, the thesis has reviewed arbitration from the 
perspective of bargaining and negotiation, in order to show how 
different models of the negotiation process can enhance the 
understanding of arbitration. In doing this, it has also raised 
reciprocal questions about the status of those models. In 
particular, the field study has shown that the concentration of 
research on concession-convergence models of bargaining is 
unjustifiably restrictive. Much less is known about development of 
frameworks or 'formulae' used by negotiators to justify preferred 
settlements than is known about the details of concessions within 
the context of an agreed framework. Yet the establishment of a 
framework, as demonstrated here, is crucial to the resolution of 
particular disputes and negotiations over the appropriate frameworks 
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to be used in governing the relationship between the sides may 
be reiterated over many years, in many different guises. 
An improved understanding of successful negotiation, and 
. successful negotiators, is likely to result only from more concern 
with this essentially social-psychological arena, where the terms 
- . 
of the conflict are first negotiated and the parties strive to 
define and adjust mutual expectations of each other's demands. The 
skill of the negotiator resides in his or her ability to develop and 
establish the credibility of a preferred framework, whether this 
places economic consideration above employee welfare or the needs 
of one group above the needs of another. Such a skil I extends 
beyond the 'official' negotiation table, to arbitration and other 
formal and informal meetings between participants. Arbitration 
is an integral part of that collective bargaining process and can 
only be understood in that light. 
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Stage 1 of the hearing 
THE CHA I RMAN: Good morn i ng, 1 ad i es and gent I emen. I f I can say "we I come" 
in spite of two facts: one, that we are here on a Monday morning, and 
two, that we are in the middle of a heat wave. That is the way things 
turn out sometimes, and I think we have to put up with it. 
May I begin by introducing my colleagues, Mr C and Mr H; Hr H, 
the Secretary, you probably all know. As far as procedure is concerned, 
I think people here actually know how we usually operate on these 
occasion-so We try to treat things as· informally as possible, as this 
seems to be the best method of getting the various issues exposed and 
explored. Perhaps, when we come to the questioning, cross-questioning 
and so on, we could direct that through the Chair, just for clarity. 
We have to thank you for the agreed statements on the background 
and factual comments, and also the separate statements of case from the 
two parties. I think that these, as usual, are helpful in setting out 
the issues, ad we are grateful for that. What we shall do is to ask 
Mr Sand Mr G to take us through the main issues and arguments, and 
perhaps, if you would like, on the first round you might take the 
opportunity just to comment on what has been put by the other side; 
then after this first round there will be a number of issues, I 
think, which will emerge and which you will want to discuss further, 
and which we shall no doubt want to ask some questions about as well. 
I think, looking at the time, that we shall quite probably be able to 
get through this this morning, so we shall not make any arrangements 
for a break for lunch. Obviously we will allow whatever time is 
necessary to get through all that requires to be got through, and we 
can come back if that turns out to be necessary. Meanwhile we shall 
proceed on the basis that we can finish round about lunchtime. 
Are there any other questions on procedure? (No reply) Very 
well, could I ask Mr G now to kick off. 
(Union) Mr G: Thank yo~ Chairman. Professor H, members of the 
Tribunal, the claim that is outlined in the terms of reference we have 
submitted before you is concerned with the interpretation of the 
Government White Paper, "The Attack on Inflation", in the Annex, in 
the extract from the TUC entitled "The Development of the Social 
Contract", where it refers to the fact that the pay element, which we 
know wi 1·1 cover the period 1st August 1975 to 31st July 1976, should 
be £6 a week to al I full-time adults aged 18 and above, pro rata 
for part-timers and juveni les. It is what "pro rata" for juveni les 
means, for 16 and 17 year olds in grades represented by the Civil 
and Public Services Association, that we are particularly concerned with. 
In the terms of reference is given our interpretation of what we 
believe "pro rata" should mean: that 16 and 17 year olds should receive 
a pay supplement determined by calculating the percentage that the 16 
and 17 year old pay scale points are of the 18 year old point on each 
pay scale (which, of course, is the lowest point under the Government/ 
TUC guidelines that can receive the maximum £6 pay supplement), and for 
that percentage, once it has been worked out, to be applied to the £6 
to determine the actual supplement to be given to 16 and 17 year ·olds 
in each grade. As regards the full details of the percentages of the 
£6 that we are claiming, the amounts are only actually given in the 
terms of reference,· but the actual percentages of the £6 that we are 
claiming for 16 and 17 year olds are given on page 9 of the joint 
factual information. They are shown in contrast, on page 9, with the 
percentages and cash supplements that have already been offered by the 
If I can now turn to page I of our case, in paragraph 2 we make 
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the point that there have been no meaningful negotiations between 
ourselves and the --- on our claim. We believe the --- have deliberately 
ignored-outside evidence of pay supplements given to 16 and 17 year 
olds in other areas of comparable employment, and that they have also 
refused to take into account the movement of the Retail Prices Index 
since the 16 and 17 year olds' last pay supplement which was on 1st 
Apri 1 1975. 
In paragraph 3 we show the very small amount of money -
£135,000 odd - involved in meeting our claim, and we give the very 
small percentage when you express this amount as a proportion of the 
CPSA wages bill. 
Paragraphs 4 to 7 give the history of the CPSA claim, which we 
believe illustrates that the --- have not considered our claim 
seriously. Our. claim was subject to excessive delay, and at no stage, 
in our view, was there any real negotiation on the claim. We 
consider that evidence of the unwillingness of the --- is shown to some 
extent in the minutes of the very few meetings that took place 
on the claim, and these are reproduced in Section V of the joint 
factual information. The delay was such that the --- had to agree to 
payout the pay supplement cf £6 to 18 year olds and above, before we 
had actually received.a firm pay offer for 16 and 17 year olds. We 
think that this can hardly be considered a satisfactory situation. To 
this day we have not received any explanation for the delay in 
responding to our claim. 
In paragraphs 8 and 9 we show how the --- have attempted to impose 
upon the CPSA grades the basis of the settlement reached between the 
Union of --- Workers and the --- for 16 and 17 year olds in grades 
represented by the Union of --- Workers. We argue that if the --- had 
worked out a common basis for determining the pay supplement of 16 and 
17 year aIds, and if they had written to those --- trade unions 
representing such staff, before any negotiations had started on any 
of the one individual claims submitted by trade unions, then we 
perhaps would not now feel so bitter at the ___ IS attempt to impose 
the formula used by the Union of --- Workers upon us, because we would 
have had an opportunity to influence the --- thinking, the 
attitudes, before it began its negotiations with the first union that 
got involved in dJscussions for this group of staff - that is, the 
Union of --- Workers. We do not believe that the --- in fact had 
worked out an approach to the pay of 16 and 17 year olds ~rior to 
receiving the Union of --- Workers claim. Otherwise we believe it 
would have attempted to sort out an agreed approach with all unions, 
and there is a machinery, the Council of --- Unions, to work out an 
agreed approach. The --- have done this once before through the Council 
of --- Unions - for example, on the decision whether to make the £6 
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supplement superannuable or not. Agreement was reached on that 
point through the Council of --- Unions prior to any negotiations 
getting under way. In our view, the --- received the Union of ---
Workers claim for 16 and 17 year olds and accepted it without amendment, 
and they have then tried to impose it on all other unions representing 
l~ and 17 year olds, regardless of other considerations. 
Can I say that we have got no quarrel with the Union of ---
Workers on this matter. They drew up their claim quite separately 
from us. We have no idea how they approached the issue. Our concern 
(which may be different to theirs) has been to safeguard the value of 
the previous pay settlement as far as the pay guidelines will allow. 
There is no relationship between the criteria used in Sorting out 
recent Union of --- Workers pay settlements over the past couple of 
years, and those for CPSA. As will be seen from a quick glance at 
page 10 of 'the joint factual information, the Union of --- Workers 
have a pay settlement date of 1st January compared with a pay settlement 
date of 1st April for CPSA grades. In the 1975 pay settlement for 
the Union of --- Workers grades there was a cost of living threshold 
clause, wh i lei n , ... 
Stage 2 of the hearing 
(Union) Mr G: It seems to me to be rather a fly way of trying to 
say "consistency". If we adopted the same approach as regards 
the pay at age 20, then the amount, for example, for a clerical 
assistant, would be the pay supplement due as a proportion of the 
-20 age-point, which would be £4.13 instead of £3.40 and for a 17 
year old it would be £4.47 instead of the offer of £3.61. We 
must take into account what happens to these people at the age of 20. 
Can they, for example, stay on the age 20 point for ever? They 
cannot. - They must move to another sC'ale at age 20. However, when 
you reach the maximum of the clerical assistant grade or the 
clerical officer grade you are stuck there unless you are promoted 
to another grade. We must take into account that this is a training 
grade just as our junior scale is a training grade, and after a 
period of service they will move to another scale where they will 
receive the adult rate for a fully trained operative. Therefore, 
the --- Union has been able to negotiate a better formula than that 
of the --- Union. This was a mutually agreed and negotiated formula 
and it explodes the myth that the --- has had internal consistency. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: The question of the maximum for the grade and 
the age at which it is reached is obviously most important. I want 
to be absolutely clear on the facts. What is the age concerned? I 
know that in the paper it is shown for the grade under discussion, 
but as regards the --- Workers, what is the age at which it is 
considered that the maximum applies? I should 1 ike similar 
information as regards the --- Union. Do people reach some sort of 
break-point and move on to a new scale? Where does the scale cease 
and where ~o you really get on to the other rate? 
(Management) Mr 5: As I have said, as regards the --- Union grades, 
the scales are age-pointed from 16 to 20. After that the people 
concerned do not go on to a new scale - they are regraded according 
to whatever they may be. 
(Arbitrator) Mr H: Is that done automatically? 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: So the rate for ages ceases altogether at 20? 
(Management) Mr S: Yes, I think that at that stage they go on to 
another ~radewhich itself may be age-pointed. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: Is it or is it not? 
(Managemen t) M r R: I t depends on the job. I do not have the de ta i 1 s 
with me. In' some industrial jobs the adult rate applies at 18, 20 
or 21. The point is that once apprentices finish their apprenticeships 
they go on to something else. In our view that would not be strictly 
comparable with the people on the junior clerical assistant scales, 
because they are not going through the same sort of training programme. 
(Arbitrator) Mr H: What happens to these people at 217 
(Management) Miss B: They go on to a higher grade which is not age-
pointed. 
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(Arbitrator) Mr H: As I understand it, it is being argued that the 
appropriate maximum for the purposes of this calculation is the 
maximum of the T2A? 
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(Management) Miss B: In fact, it does not make any difference because 
the maximum of each of the eight grades involved in the calculation -
·all employing juveniles - are identical. r mean that they are 
identically age-pointed from 16 to 21. The significance of the trainee 
technician or apprentice grade is that the majority of juveniles are 
employed on that grade. Therefore, when one weighs up the different 
producti of the arithmetic in respect of each grade, the scales fall 
predominantly on the arithmetic for the trainee technician apprentice, 
because that is the grade in which the majority of the juveniles 
are employed. 
(Arbitrator) Mr H: $0 the original offer was based on the maximum of 
the T2A1 
(Management) Miss B: Yes. 
(Arbitrator) Mr H: Therefore, in terms of internal consistency, that 
was the original view of the ---7 
(Management) Mr S: There are some six or seven --- grades employing 
juveniles, but the great majority of people are T2As. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: We now know that the relevant age which has been 
agreed with other parties is 20. What is it for the --- Workers7 
What is it for each of the grades which we are now considering? 
(Management) Mr $: The agreement with the was in relation to the 
maximum of the scale, which in their case happened to be 20. We did 
not say, "Iet us take the 20 age point" and relate it to that -
(Arbitrator) Mr C: That is my point. It is incidental, but it is 
interesting. At what age does that maximum fallon the other people 
concerned - the --- and the other grades? 
(Management) Miss B: The main grade is --- and the age is 21. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: What is it based upon? 
(Management) Miss B: For the --- and PA it is 21; for the postal 
equivalent of the CO it is 25. It is the maximum of the scale which 
if you were age-pointed all the way would correspond to 25. For 
the --- it would be 23 and for one other grade known as the OT02 -
the Overseas --- Operator Class 2. They are not actually age-pointed 
all the way. Age-pointing stops at 21, but there are points above 
that to which people progress. Therefore, there is a range. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: Therefore, the regular incremental system stops 
at these ages? 
(Management) Miss B: No. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: What is significant about them if it does not stop? 
As I understand it, it is not rigged for age. 
(Management) Mr S: These are the ages when the people in the various 
grades reach their maximum. 
(Management) Miss B: That is, if they had come in at the bottom of 
the scale and progressed up. 
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·(Management) Mr S: They are not age-pointed all the way up. As regards 
the ---, the formula was in relation to not the highest age point, 
but the maximum of the scale. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: Give us some ages· for the people who are under 
discussion now. 
(Management) Mr R: 1 am not sure that we understand your question. 
Our approach has been consistent because there are a variety of pay 
scales. They all have age-pointing towards the bottom end.of the 
scale, but they all progress to totally different maximums. In the 
case of the --- and the --- the approach was to relate proportionate 
increases to the maximum rate. It so happens that in the ___ IS case 
their scales are far more straightforward and rather similar to the 
type of situations that arise in industry when you reach the adult 
rate at 20 or else where, as in the case of the T2A, 20 is the top 
of an apprenticels scale. They are the only people whom we specifically 
employ as apprentices. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: I am sorry that you do not understand the point 
that I am trying to make. It is important that you should understand 
It. I am asking typically at what age do people reach these points. 
I am fully aware of the fact that you do not have regard to age. 
We have been told that typically the age concerned for the is 20, 
for the --- 21, 23 and 25. What typically are the ages of the people 
with whom we are concerned in this claim? 
(Management) Miss B: Let us take the example of someone age 16 at the 
bottom of the age-pointing scale who progresses by normal increments 
to the maximum of the scale. For a CO the relevant age is 23 years . 
. In the case of smaller grades like typists and data punchers it is 
less easy because there is a degree of dependency upon technical 
proficiency, such as improving speeds. However, I suppose that 
typically it would be 21 to 24 - somewhere in the middle. 
(Arbitra.tor) Mr C: Is it common ground that we are talking about 
ages between 21 and 24? 
(Management) Mr C: As regards the 16 and 17 year-olds who come in, 
certainly in some cases they have to reach certain typing standards. 
If they do not some will be sacked and they will never reach the adult 
rate. However, I. suppose that that could apply to the odd apprentice. 
The key point is that the --- side said that the large bulk of the 
juveniles in the --- grades were in the trainee technician apprentice 
grade. I think that Miss B said that? 
(Management) Miss B: Yes. 
(Union) Mr G: When we talk about the maximum of a grade, we normally 
mean a point at which people may stop for some years. That is the 
point which they have reached for doing a particular skill and unless 
they are promoted or attain more qualifications they will not move 
on. However, people do not stay on the 20 point. They cannot stay on 
it year after year. The maximum points used in the --- case, which 
they are trying to impose on us, are points t~at people can stay on 
f~r a number of years. Therefore if you reach age 20, having survived 
·the apprenticeship, then you must go to the technician class to a 
grade which has a three-pointed scale. My understanding is that the 
--- are arguing that it is like having one scale, because you have 
to move on to that scale and therefore you should have determined 
the 16 and 17 year-olds l pay in relation to the maximum of the 
Class 2A which is £56.80, compared with the 20 year-old point on 
the training scale of £40.37. You will appreciate that it will make 
a significant difference in what percentage of £6 supplement you 
will be paid, whether you take the 20 year-old point or the 
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maximum of 'the Class 2A. We are saying that that is not consistent 
with the approach used as regards the ---. They had a different 
negotiating basis. Therefore the __ ~IS argument about internal 
consistency falls down. That is why we argue that our claim should be 
treated on its merits, taking into account all the other considerations. 
The --- made the point that it was as much up to the unions 
to take the initiative in relation to getting internal consistency 
as it was for the ---. That is rather unfair. Our primary concern 
is not internal consistency. Our primary concern is to get the best 
deal for our 16 and 17 year-old members and to ensure that the pay 
rates that we fixed over a year ago - so far as incomes policy will 
allow - are not diminished in up-to-date real value terms. It is the 
--- that has put forward the objective of internal consitency. That 
is why it was up to them to take the initiative. They had over six 
months to write to all the unions concerned saying that they would 
like an internally consistent approach for 16 and 17 year-olds and 
that they would like to adopt a certain formula which they hoped 
could be agreed amongst the unions. The --- knew that it had one union 
with an operative date on 1st January. Our operative date was 1st 
April. The --- had an operative date on 1st July. Therefore, it 
knew that it could get itself into a fair old tangle if it wanted 
internal consistency because it would be dealing with different time-
scales and with people putting their claims in at different times. 
Therefore, that argument is not particularly solid. The --- say 
that they are not bound by the agreement that they reached in Apri I 
1975, because ,pay research had been suspended. I see no reference in 
the ag reemen t to pay resea rch. The ag reemen t says: liThe As soc i at ion 
have also agreed that, with the introduction of restructuring, the 
rates of pay in the Civil Service or movements in such rates will cease 
to have special relevance in the determination of the pay of the grades 
they represent .11 I t does not say anyth i ng about the rate of pay as 
determined by the. Pay Research Unit. If it had meant to say that it 
would have done so. The wording is precise. 
The --- knew in advance that that agreement had been reached. 
That agreement supports our view that the --- should have taken the 
initiative at some early stage after the White Paper was published, 
to try to get a common approach, if they felt that that was their 
overriding objective. 
(Management) Mr S: Obviously, within the --- there are different 
structures of grades. Some grades are represented by the Association, 
some by the --- and some by the --- and other unions. There is no 
common pattern. As regards the 1976 pay settlement and the increase 
for the juveniles, we have in each case related it to the maximum 
of that grade. As we have tried to explain this morning, in the 
.-~- it happens that the maximum is age 18, but in the ---, for example, 
the range is 21 to 25. We have tried to give you the picture as 
regards the Association's grades. There has always been the common 
pattern of relating it to the maximum. 
(Arbitrator) Mr H: Why did you argue that the appropriate maximum 
was T2A initially? 
(Management) Mr S: do not think that we did argue that. That 
came out this morning. 
(Arbitrator) Mr H: As 
offer to the ---7 
understand it, that was the basis of your 
(Management) Mr S: The first settlement was with the --- which does 
not represent the T2A grades. 
(Arbitrator) M~ H: YOu were then trying to get internal consistency 
and were arguing that the appropriate maximum rate in the --- case 
was T2A7 
(Management) Mr S: Yes. 
(Arbitrator) Mr H: you were knocked-off there, so you are no longer 
internally consistent~ 
(Management) Mr S: In our view we are, because the maximum of the T2A 
grade -
(Arbitrator) Mr H: YOu did not settle in relation to the maxum of the 
.T2A grade; you settled in relation to the 20 year-old point. 
(Management) Miss P: The basis of the ---'s discussions with the ... 
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Stage 3 of the hearing 
common sense in having some real discussions. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: There were discussions on superannuation? 
.(Union) Mr G: Yes. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: And it was made superannuable? 
(Union)Mr G: Yes. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: It was easy to agree because everyone got what 
they wanted. You agreed that it should be superannuable, but 
there were no "full-blooded" negotiations. 
(Union) Mr G: All sides agreed that it should be sorted out before 
negotiations started. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: We keep being told that we shouldnot take any 
notice of this table. I am puzzled about the reference to the Water 
Services. The Water Services look so arbitrary when they refer to 50 
per cent., 75 per cent., and 100 per cent. As I understand it this 
was a carryover into the clerical area of a relationship established 
in the manual area. 
(Management) Mr R: The fact that the figures are so clear reflects 
the per cent rate for the manual workers. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: You are saying that the manual worker is on 50 
per cent., of the 18 year-old rate? 
(Management) Mr R: Yes. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: That is the pay he receives. 
(Management) Mr R: From the information I have, they are on 50 per 
cent., of the adult rate at 16; 75 per cent., at 17. On the white 
collar side there are no specific rates for age relationship, 
therefore it is just a question of taking It and 17 year-olds, 
whatever grades they are in. 
(Arbitra'tor) Mr C: I understand. I thought that 50 per cent was 
rather low. 
The Chairman: We have come to the end of our questions and in 
terms of discussion we are beginning to get into the area of 
diminishing retur.ns. Do you wish to make any further. comments, 
Mr G? 
(Union) Mr G: We have become rather upset about these negotiations 
because the --- have tried to impose a claim by another trade union 
on which there were no negotiations, but which was accepted, on 
us without real negotiations. We believe that to accept an offer on 
a similar basis would undermine the pay rates that were agreed in 
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April 1975 and would be inconsistent with the sort of pay supplements 
being paid to juveniles outside, especially in the Civil Service as 
regards which the --- agreed only in the last round of negotiations 
that the pay rates in the Civil Service and the movement of pay rates 
were specifically relevant to the pay of clerical staff in the ---. 
T~e --- have justified this on the ground of internal consistency. 
·1 hope that we have examined what happened with the --- in sufficient 
detail to show that the --- have not been consistent in their 
negotiations. They have agreed a different formula for the --- which 
has meant that they will get a higher amount than has been offered 
to us. -Therefore, if there is no internal consistency, our claim 
should be examined on its merits, on the basis of outside settlements, 
the movement of the RPI and the Civil Service settlement. We ask 
the Tribunal to award in our favour. 
(Management) Mr S: A few moments ago the question of superannuation 
came up. It is superannuable and. as a result 18 year-olds and 
above have 6 per cent., deducted from the £6 and they receive £5.64p. 
Sixteen and 17 year-olds are not on a superannuation scheme, so 
there is no deduction. Once again I refute the suggestion that the 
--- has acted inconsistently as regards the We do not share that 
view. Apart from that, I do not think that we have anything to add 
to what has already been said. 
The Chairman: Thank you very much for helping us to deal with this 
issue. At first sight the matter seems simple, but when you look 
into it, it is not so simple. We have an understanding of the issue. 
We shall adopt the usual practice of reaching our decision as quickly 
as possible and letting you have the information. The final report 
will come later. Thank you all very much for helping us. 
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.Case 12, 
Classification - Complex 
Stage I of the hearing 
Union I: When my Executive Committee considered the outcome of the 
negotiations that had taken place at the Staff National Council they 
decided to refer the matter to the National Tribunal and my Society's 
prjncipal arguments in support of its claim for a substantial 
percentage increase for its member grades are as follows:-
1. A reduction in rates of pay as proposed by the 
Board would further distort the relative position 
. of -- staff and other grades'as determined by an award 
of the National Tribunal as set out in Decision No 42. 
2. There is no obligation imposed upon the Board by the 
voluntary incomes policy to prevent them giving an 
assurance that immediately they are free to do so the 
proposed allowances would be incorporated into the 
basic rate of pay. 
3. To accept the Board's offer would return the parties 
to the position following the "Agreement" when all 
bonus and mileage payments were frozen at the rates 
in operation prior to 8 July 1968. The N.T. accepted 
the Society's submission that all mileage and enhanced 
payments should be calculated on a current rate of pay and 
this recommendation was incorporated in an agreement 
with the Board. 
Dealing with the argument listed as No 1, I must reiterate what I 
said to this Tribunal on another occasion. Following many months 
of negotiations and discussions, between the parties, the National 
Tribunal made one of the most thorough examinations ever undertaken 
of the -- pay structures. Two years have now elapsed and if we 
accept theproposals of the Board there would be a further distortion 
of the relative position of -- staff and other grades as determined 
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and set out In Decision No 42. I have indicated earlier in these 
submissions that the settlement reached during 1975 distorted established 
relationships and in Appendix No 1, I am setting out details of 
representative grades which show that since mid-1974, there has been 
a disturbance of the pattern set in the basic rates of pay by the 
temporary allowance of August 1975, and how the relative position would· 
be further affected by the proposed supplement. 
My second principal argument is a statement of fact. Whilst Governmentl 
TUe Pay Policy Agreement set out what can be paid during the negotiating 
year 1975/76 there was nothing within that agreement which prevents 
an employer giving the assurances that I am now seeking. 
Dealing with my third main argument, if the proposals of the Board 
are accepted, then there would in all but name be two rates of pay. 
One would be an inclusive rate payable for time worked within the 
standard week, (but not for associated enhancements, allowances 
or mileage payments) which would be pensionable, paid for holidays and 
count for sick pay. There would be a separate rate for the purpose 
of calculating enhancements. This is the same position as that which 
applied following the 1968 IIAgreement" . For some six years there 
we re two ra tes of pay, the IIpre-.Ag reement" rate wh i ch was used for 
the purpose of calculating mileage and bonus payments and a current 
rate for other purposes. Everybody agreed from the experience that 
was gained during that period of time, that this was an entirely 
unsatisfactory arrangement. The trade unions and the 
management agreed that there should be consolidation. And when the 
issues were referred to the National Tribunal there was no disagreement 
between the parties on this particular issue. 
Yet here we are, some two years later~ reverting to a situation which 
previously the parties agreed should not exist. Whilst acknowledging 
the constraints imposed by outside bodies there is nothing to prevent 
the Board giving a categorical assurance that immediately the restraints 
have been removed the supplement would be consolidated into the basic 
rate of pay". I ask this tribunal in its findings to direct that this 
should be done. 
Management: Mr Chairman and Gentlemen, the claim before you is 
unusual, when compared with the other matters dealt with by the 
National Tribunal in recent years. It is about certain pay structure 
principles and about action to be taken at some time in the future. 
It is not about the amount of money, since I think it true to say 
there is no disagreement amongst the parties about the size of the 
pay increases which were due to start on 26 April 1976, but it is 
about the way in which the money should be calculated. It is also 
about assurances for the future. 
In this industry we all have a great respect for our Machinery of 
Negotiation, and for the help which the Tribunal has been able to 
give in the resolution of problems. Nevertheless the Board regrets 
that this particular claim has been brought to the Tribunal for two 
main reasons. 
The first is the very practical point that it has considerably delayed 
the payment of increases which the Board has offered and which should 
now have been operative for 14 weeks. This is especially unfortunate 
at a time when inflation is affecting every household budget. 
The second and much more fundamental point is that the Board is 
concerned that the Tribunal is being asked to del iberate upon the 
action which should be taken by the parties to this Machinery at some 
unknown time in the future. I shall develop in more detail later 
why I think it would be unwise for any of us to be committed in such 
. a way, but my reason for introducing the point at this early stage 
is to question seriously the suitability foraTribunal ruling of this 
part of the Union claim. 
If J could go over the background. In order to understand the setting 
of the claim and of the Board's response it is necessary to refer 
back to two previous Tribunal cases, and outline the events which have 
followed. Copies of the documents and minutes I shall mentioned, 
Decisions 42 and 45, and Minutes 560, 571, 572, 575, 576 and 577, have 
been provided to the Tribunal. 
Decision 42 dated 24 July 1974 was the culmination of a major pay 
restructuring exercise. The negotiations which followed were concerned 
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with matters of interpretation and application rather than principle, 
and the conclusions-reached are recorded in Minute 560. Its 
significance, in the present context, is that the Union ar arguing 
that the relativities established by 42 are endangered by the form 
taken by the Board's offer in the present 1976 pay negotiations. 
This line of argument is projected into Decision 45, of 29 May 1975, 
and its outcome. The negotiations which followed,recorded in 
Minutes 571 and 572 and involving four separate meetings, were 
extremely complex, but in the end it was agreed that the 1975 general 
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pay settlement should take the form of a two stage increase effective 
from 28 April 1975 and 4 August 1975 respectively. The last negotiations 
were on 20 June 1975 and the last of the Trade Unions signified 
acceptance on 1 July 1975. The two stages consisted of raising the 
42 (560) rates of pay by 271% and 30% respectively at the two dates, 
the only addition to this being that from 4 August 1975 a non-enhanceable 
temporary allowance was also added to (560) rates of pay of £36.00 
and under, tapering from £1.30 per week at the lowest rates to 5p 
per week. With the exception of this temporary allowance, therefore, 
the settlement preserved the percentage relativities established in 
42/560. The actual rates agreed are those shown in the schedule to 
Appendix "A" under the heading 'present rate'. 
At the time thi.s settlement was effected none of the parties was 
aware of the imminence of the announcem-nt of the Government's policy, 
and publication of the Attack on Inflation White Paper (Cmnd. 6151) 
11 July 1975 or the concept of the voluntary restruction of pay 
increases to a cash £6 limit in the year I August 1975 to 31 July 1976 
which was set out in Cmnd. 6151; more specifically that it would 
provide, in Clause 5 of the Annex to the White Paper, for the offsetting 
against the £6 limit of any pay increases effective from I August 1975 
onwards. 
As soon as the implication of this policy became apparent and before 
payment of the second stage of the increase had been activated, the 
Board wrote to the Trade Unions, on 16 July 1975, as follows:-
"I am writing to advise you that on the basis of the 
information at present available about the effect of 
the White Paper published last week it would be the 
Board's intention to pay currently the increases which 
are due to come into effect on 4 August 1975. " 
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Stage 2 of the hearing 
... That is what you are saying, is it not, that the principle should be 
reinforced as a desirable principle rather than that the Board should 
say that they are going to do it at any particular point in time? 
What you are really asking for is that these principles should be 
. guaranteed? 
(Union I) Mr B: Yes. The reason is this, of course, that although 
Mr W said he would be pressing for i~ only in April, the Government/ 
TUC guidelines do not coincide with our dates for salary increases. 
They are from August to August; ours are from April to April. Will 
we have to wait from August to April before we can do something? 
This was the hint given to us by --- in the negotiations. If I 
may say s~, they did not tell you this. When they gave you certain 
extracts this morning of what was said in meetings those extracts -
and I do not blame them, of course, that is their job - suited their 
case, but if you look into the full shorthand notes of all that 
was said in the meetings, then you see they hinted of this particular 
issue and, as far as we are concerned, when they quoted certain 
things this morning they were taken out of context. I do not want 
to take this out of context. What I want to say is this, and this 
is one of the points, that immediately, because it is a national 
agreement, it is permitted for this amount of money to rank for 
enhancements, etc., then it should automatically be introduced, Chairman. 
I am asking the Tribunal, therefore, to rule on this particular point, 
and it is not any negotiating promise for the future, as the --- have 
argued today. It is for the --- to honour the existing national 
agreement. 
The Chairman: I think I see your point. The next point relates to 
something which was said by several of the parties. The Board, I 
think, said this, that there was a point in these negotiations, before 
the issue came before the Tribunal, when it appeared to them that the 
Society almost accepted, or appeared to be about to accept, the 
position as it was advanced by the Board, that it appeared to them that 
they were prepared to make some kind of undertaking in respect of the 
2! per cent., that they would do that as soon as possible, and that 
they were prepared to say that they would, as you say, negotiate in 
the future on the rest of it, and you appeared to them to be prepared 
to take this away and look at it, and subsequently you came back and 
referred the matter to the Tribunal. It has been suggested to us 
that this was a ratherabrupt event and what you are really being asked 
is why did you not go back to the Board and say why you now tell us you 
could not accept this proposal and why did you not try to get into 
further negotiation with them to see if you could get any further on 
that, rather than appearing to renege on the position, as they saw it, 
you adopted and tome to the Tribunal? 
(Union 1) Mr B: That is a very good question on the evidence that 
has been laid before you by my two colleagues on my right, but they 
only gave you extracts from the minutes and you know as well as your 
colleagues must know that in negotiations all kinds of methods are 
adopted to endeavour to extract, how you could easily just take.a knife 
and chop a part out to suit your particular case. I will submit to 
you, Chairman, that they have endeavoured to chop out of those 
negotiations certain words to suit their case today. If you take it 
all in its full context you will see what we were driving at in the 
negotiations, and the shorthand notes of the meeting, if there are 
any such things and I do not think there are, would bring out the 
f~ll context of what we were arguing. I want to make it very clear 
. to you there was no abrupt ending. We were very firmly on two 
principles, that we thought it was categorically wrong - we used the 
words psychologically wrong - to deduct from existing basic rates of 
pay a sum of money, and secondly, we thought it wrong that people 
should be hinting of negotiations in·the future on what should be a 
national agreement implementation, and as they had accepted that it 
was the basic rate of pay, we were endeavouring in our way to resolve 
the situation the best way we could in the negotiations to try to 
achieve those two principles. All they have extracted from the 
minutes are certain points of view used in debate and argument. 
I would submit to you that in minutes it is the final decision that 
matters, and we made it very clear before the end of those meetings 
that we could not see our way clear to accept the way that the 
--- Board were going. But we do not just go into negotiations to be 
flat-footed. We go into negotiations with reality and discussion 
and, therefore, we tried our best to see if we could find a solution. 
(Arbitrator) Mr 0: I wonder if you can help me here, because what you 
have said here, is there something in some minutes we have not seen 
or some records we have not seen that would help us on this point? 
(Union 1) Mr B: do not know whether they would, as far as I am 
concerned, because if you took every little word that was uttered, 
you would have reams and reams of paper, because there are all kinds 
of things said in negotiations. We have our brief shorthand notes. 
Whether the --- have their shorthand notes I do not know, but I ask 
you to take my word for it. Believe me or believe me not, that is 
entirely up to you, naturally. What I am saying to you is whatever 
utterances they have endeavoured to quote this morning are utterances 
which were part of a negotiation argument and not assurances given. 
(Arbitrator) Mr G: Could I ask on the same issue something I found 
a little bit of a problem. To make it very simple, your union is 
taking a different line from the other unions we are listening to. 
I am trying very hard, and have been this morning, to follow exactly 
why that is .. I have listened again just now to you to see whether I 
can get the complete story. Do you think you have personally given 
the Tribunal every point of substance which has led you to certain 
conclusions which differ from those of Mr Wand Hr M? Is there 
something else you would like to mention? 
(Union 1) Mr B: ·May I say through you, Chairman, to Mr G it is 
extremely difficult to fully appreciate what would convince me 
and what would convince you and, therefore, I can only hope I have 
given you everything which I believe is a relevant issue. Briefly, 
I would say the fears of what happened previously, which drove us, 
as a trade union --
(Arbitrator) Mr G: 
(Union 1) Hr B: Yes - into conflict for three or four years, which was 
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a terrible thing which we do not want to happen again, and secondly, 
the fear that we have that there is in this, when accepting the new 
basic rate of pay and telling us what it is and what would be negotiated 
in the future for enhancements, etc. - the same principle, I think -
the fear that our people have of reducing existing basic rates of pay 
t3 achieve perhaps something which could again go back to this principle -
·we call it Penzance. I think those are the basic reasons, as I tried 
to point out in our case to you this morning. There is nothing else 
that I could throw in to help you because if I said we do not trust 
them you would say it does not matter, that is a negotiating point. 
We do trust them but we are fearful of what they are saying to us now 
on this particular issue for the future. 
(Arbitrator) Mr G: It is the reduction of the basic rate of pay, of 
which you made a great point, but in fact we have been assured it 
is a myth,' that there is no physical reduction in the amount of money, 
that it is the normal rate of pay plus £6. On this particular issue 
would you like to comment further? Let us assume you have not 
convinced us. 
(Union 1) Mr B: It is not a myth. I want to say right now here in front 
of you that the figures they have given you, of course, are correct. 
There is no need for anybody to put that on paper because we all know 
what the social contract says, that we can only increase our earnings, 
unfortunately, by (6. That is a fact of life now. 
(Arbitrator) Mr G: And that nobody will suffer. 
(Union 1): Mr B: Now. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: On the Board's proposals. 
(Union I) Mr B: Now. If you mean suffer you mean exactly now? 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: Yes. 
(Union I) Mr B: No, but I am asking you to see exactly what it means 
for the future at the present time, without going into all these 
figures, through enhancements, through his mi leage, his overtime, his 
Saturday afternoons, his Sundays, and the 10 per cent. you gave him as 
a result of a responsibility allowance, earns £7, he gets £6. That is 
it, and.so what we are saying is we understand that now but we do not 
want that cut off in the future which is cut off at the present time. 
{Arbitrator} The Chairman: But you are agreeing particularly with the 
Board, and I think also with Mr W, who put a considerable amount of 
evidence in to us to show, let me put it this way, that it does not 
matter how you play it - play it your way, play it their way - and 
I think Mr W made this point, at the end of the day the money in the 
pay packet this time round is the same. Whether you play it your way 
or their way the money is the same. Do you accept that? 
(Union 1) Mr B: But it is not just for this time round. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: Do you accept it for this time round? 
(Union 1) Mr B: At the moment. Never mind "this time round". That 
is too wide a statement for me. At the moment it could not affect it 
their way or my way - at the moment. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: At the moment. 
(Union 1) Mr B: I do not know what is going to happen next month. 
Neither do they. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: r.t the moment. 
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(Union 1) Mr B: Correct, but it could mean, Chairman, as I have proved 
in the figures at the back of my submission, a tremendous loss to men 
at any time that something else happens. Neither you nor I nor Mr W 
nor the --- know what is going to happen at any time in the future. 
We saw what happened in the House of Commons last night. 
(Arbitrator) Mr 0: There is a point made in the evidence submitted 
by the --- that because of certain occupational characteristics of 
no overtime, Sunday workings and so on, some members would have 
substantially less than the £6. I think the words are "substantially 
less". 
(Union 1) Mr B: I would like to mentioned through you, Chairman, to 
Mr 0 the other option, the option which has been ruled out by 
the --- by ourselves, the --- and ---, the option of one man subsidising 
the other. That is what we are trading when the negotiations start 
in the future, which you have resolved for us in Fiat 42. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: I have one other question that I have been 
asked to ask you. If you look at the evidence again, it was suggested 
to us, I think particularly by Mr M but suggested by others, too, 
that there have been agreements signed in other parts of the ---, 
for example in the workshops among supervisors and so on, which embody 
the principles of this agreement in the sense that it is being 
advanced by the Board, and I take it that --- has been a party to those 
agreements? 
(Union 1) Mr B: No, we have not. I want to make this very clear also, 
that as. far as the statement made about representation of ---
employees is concerned and who represents more than others, I am not 
interested in that argument. I want to place it very clearly before 
you as a Tribunal, and I stand by this any time, that as parties to the 
assurance we are all equal and I do not gain any more strength than 
anybody else and I do not wish ever to say that. What I want to say to 
you is this. Whether we like it or not wage negotiations are placed 
in the --- Staff Joint Council - and I made this clear - general section 
meeting or, if we do not go there, the --- Staff National Council level, 
where all parties are equal. I t does not matter whether you represent 
1, 2 or 122, and I shall never use that argument. I want to make it 
clear that the grades you are talking about now are not in the machinery 
that we are in. They are in a different section from our machinery and 
not the grades that we are in. When I say ··we" that is the three unions 
here. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: It is really just the --- shopmen they are 
talking about? 
(Union 1) Mr B: I think it must be so, mostly grades which ---
represent, but we are not party to it. 
(Union 2) Mr M: If you are asking me what meant -----
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: You might as well come in now, Mr M. 
(Union 2) Mr. M: I was trying to do, Mr Chairman! Mr B is quite right. 
--- are not parties to certain sections of the machinery. Both the 
--- and we are. For example the workshop supervisors were joint 
parties to the agreement; --- were joint parties; professional and 
technical staff. We are the only parties to the agreement, the 
---. I was only mentioning this to try and throw a ray of light on the 
immediate problem. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: I see. It is just that it appeared to one 
or two of us when we were going through what you said that it might be 
the case that it was being suggested that --- had been party to an 
agreement of this kind. That is not being suggested? 
(Union 2) Mr M: That is quite right. 
(Union 1) Mr B: No. 
(Arbitrator) Mr C: Mr M. your submission. paragraph 21, page 7, was 
the one which seemed to give that impression. Would you like to 
comment on that? 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: This is really the paragraph that led to 
this problem. 
(Union 2) Mr M: Is this not just what we have been talking about? 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: Yes. 
(Arbitrator) Mr G: " •. for the staff covered by today's hearing 
this is what bothers me. 
II 
(Union 2) Mr M: This means we are talking today about the people who 
are in the --- machinery of negotiation and consultation. to which 
all three of the unions sitting here today are parties, but there are 
various,other machineries on --- where one can say we have no ---
drivers at ---, we have no --- drivers among the workshop supervisory 
staff, as distinct from the power staff. in which the --- are not 
parties, and if I have misled the Tribunal on this I am very sorry. 
What I was trying to do was to indicate where the --- were involved 
we managed to reach accommodation with the ---. 
(Arbitrator) The Chairman: I think those are all the questions we 
have for you. Can I turn to the Board. The first question that I 
have relates to page 17. paragraph 42 and this raises an issue that 
I have already raised with Mr It is really in this paragraph that 
you are talking about the cumbersome administrative problems of dealing 
with this kind of individual week by week settlement. You say: lilt 
would involve the calculation of an individual offset for each employee 
each week •• 11 and at the bottom of this page you say your best estimate 
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is four months "even if all programming resources were taken off other 
productive work". -What we are really asking is whether you could 
amplify this a bit, because in view of the fact that you have already 
certain computer facilities at your disposal for dealJng with problems 
of this kind, in line with what Mr B said earlier about the kind of 
things you will have to do in relation to the next pay policy, do you 
really want to tell us it would take you four months to do this? 
(Management) Mr W: You will, I think Chairman, appreciate that I am not 
a computer expert. At least, if you did not appreciate it before you 
can do so now. I am not. I am advised by the experts concerned this 
is the amount of time it would take and it is not just a question of 
ampl ifying present payroll systems. It means, in effect, that you 
have completely to re-write the payroll system so far as the computer 
is concerned and this is what it would mean. It would mean four 
months to do just that. It would mean stopping all the other work 
that you want to do as an on-goi~g procedure in relation to the computer. 
Can I just comment on the second phase of the anti-inflation policy. 
I do not quite see it in the same way as Mr B does. If you accept 
in the first place that you cannot have more than £6 in the first 
phase, the second phase says, in effect, you can have 5 per cent. of 
your earnings, with a minimum of £2.50 and a maximum of £5, so what you 
do is you woul.d do the calculation in the same way as you do it today, 
and the way we hope you will agree we should do it, and you simply 
add 5 per cent. to that and you get 5 per cent. with a minimum of £2.50 
and a maximum of £4. So we do not really see any complication about 
doing the second phase calculation. We do not see us having to go 
back over every individual in the way Mr P has described unless you 
forced us· to do it. 
(Arbitrator) Mr 0: 
experts here today 
do not suppose. Chairman, there are many computer 
(Management) Mr W: I have one behind me. 
(Arbitrator) Mr 0: But I assume that the people who would have the 
responsibility of doing this would be, by and large, the staff who 
are organised by Mr M, in fact. He refers to this in paragraph 15, 
page 5, that they have conducted an examination. I wonder if I might 
now come to Mr M and ask him what that examination was in this particular 
area, because I assume it is his members who actually undertake this. 
Stage 3 of the hearing 
(Union) What I am saying to you is this. We wi 11 do that but we are 
rather disturbed to think that something which is already a national 
agreement the Board cannot say yes to because it might cost them 
(27m, and other people say: "We do not want to be a party to it 
"because we might want more." Well, if it is more we will get more. 
We will have a go any time to get more. I want to point out to you 
as a Tribunal that we cannot say how hard we wi I I fight and we 
cannot ~etermine how the --- Board will react. I would submit to you 
as a Tribunal that your job - and it" is not for me to teach you or 
tell you but I am sure you will know - will be to see that existing 
agreements at least are honoured. The existing national agreement 
tells us in no uncertain manner that the basic rate of pay will be the 
amount of money that will be enhanceable. If there happens to be some 
legislation poured out by the Government - one perhaps does not call it 
legislation but it is a moral type of legislation I mentioned this 
morning - all we are saying is that we have the country's future at 
heart like everybody else, although we argue. We understand the 
economic crises of the country, although we will argue to try and 
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deal with them in a different way from the way they are being dealt with. 
All we are saying is when we are permitted - 'we" being all of us in 
the negotiating team - to apply - I could have worded it differently -
the national agreement, then it will apply. What we are doubtful 
about at the moment is that we are going to sign an agreement now, 
Chairman, that is saying to everybody that we do not really accept 
that there is a national agreement but we will ne90tiate it in the 
future. 
Chairman, you asked the --- Board, would you be prepared to implement 
it all if a satisfactory settlement could be reached. That was your 
question to the --- Board and I was a bit surprised at their answer, 
but very pleased, when they said yes, they would have done. That is 
what they said. Therefore I am saying if they could do it because it 
would have reached an understanding in negotiations, they could do it 
now, and I see nothing wrong in your recommending that they should, first 
of all, reach an agreement that that 2t per cent. could remain on basic 
as now, because everybody proved to you, and I am not arguing, it does 
not make any difference to the money now but does in the future, and 
the follow-through could be deducted, because the only argument against 
that has been complication in working it out. I have been endeavouring 
to prove to you that they have to do it anyway. The national agreements 
make it extremely clear that the enhancements will be based on the basic 
rate of pay. 
Chairman and members of the Tribunal, I do thank you for the patience 
you must have had in listening to this case. I am sure of this, that 
you have ignored" those remarks of the --- Board in the early stages of 
today when they were telling you they could not understand why it had 
come here and it seemed petty and all that type of thing. I am sure 
you must have grasped by now that there is something more serious in it. 
I thank you for your patience in listening. I, on behalf of my 
organisation, await with interest and anticipation the wise decision that 
I know you will give and the right decision, because I think it is so 
clear and if you examine the evidence we have placed before you you cannot 
but award in our favour. 
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Let me close by saying this. Yes, I am greatly concerned about 
the delay in the implementation of wages for this year. My members 
and I could use the same argument as has been used about other things. 
We have been talking about principles. My members are affected. 
My members' spending power is reduced. My members are just as concerned 
but they have been prepared to wait until a principle which is extremely 
. important to us has been dealt with, and an issue which is extremely 
important to us, that is the reduction of basic rates, has been dealt 
with by this Tribunal. I know how complicated your task is and I 
hope that you will make your decision as speedily as possible. I 
am sure in my mind of the decision and, therefore, we can then enter 
into an agreement with the --- Board early and see to it that the 
--- workers get their just rights, or a little bit towards their just 
rights that they are entitled to as a result of the wages legislation 
we are in at the moment. Chairman, I ask you on behalf of --- to 
award accordingly, because --- is not flippant about this, we are 
extremely serious. 
(Applause) 
The Chairman: Thank you, Mr B. I would like to thank Messrs B, W, 
Wand M for giving us the usual straightforward hearing of their points 
of view. I would also like to thank our assessors, Messrs P, B, R 
and B, for their help and assitance and, of course, we may be going 
back to them subsequently. I woulJ like finally to give an undertaking 
that we shall consider with great care, and I hope expedition, all the 
points you have raised and shall give you our answer as soon as we 
can and without delay. Thank you very much. 
Appendix 2 
Extracts from Arbitration Awards, in Simpler 
and More Complex Disputes (Chapter Seven) 
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SI~WLER DISPUTES, 
DECISIO:\' ;'~l).':'U OFTII E 
TIUBU!\'AL 
37. Thl! j • case is in es~('ncc nn nrgurncnl frorn histM),. II is hased 
on the principle Ihat in the pa~t a w(Jrb;r customarily went home for a mcal 
dllrin~ his nortllal working day. Where he was unable to get home for his 
meal thi~ was an :Itypical !>itlJatiull. for which he was compensaled by 
payment of a meal a 1I0W,1ncc. For the sake of convenience. payment of that 
allowance was tied 10 his ah~ence frllm his normal station. 
3S. Although fhe basis (or the payment of the allowance has not been 
c:h<il1gcd. the siluation in which the allowance was initially introduced no 
. longer applies and it is dilficult tn sec its rl'le\,anec'to pn:sent..<fav 
contlitions. when the customary p;lI!ern is for men lIot to co home for a 
ml"al during the working day. If we we:'c tb grant the j ; claim. this 
would not .lIla Ih:11 siluation. The of!l)' effect of meeting the claim w(luld 
be to extend the al10\\'ancc to a I.Hgc number of workers forcontinuing to 
take their mCClI in their usual way. i.e. "on the job". 
31}. The . argument rel;ilivc 10 the' 
[,amine .... doc~ not :lppcar to LIS 10 oe relevant bccall~e the meal 
allowallce~ raid 10 them arc oa~ed on special circumst:lnces. allied to IIIC 
po~it i(llt III 11;~lric\ Shop men. As we lJ IIderst;I"" iI, thcse a ll(lw;t Itn:s WCIC 
conc~·dl·d hy the and accepted hy the . •. on the understanding 
that the a~lccl11Cnl to pay them would not be used as a basis for ~cekil1g 
similar provisions for othcr grades of staff. 
40. I" 1111 the circumstances. we cannol accept Ihat Ihere i~ 
juo;lificatiol\ (or ':Iltrrin:: thr prro;rl1t situation whcrchy pll)mrl11 i~ lillked 
with rhl' r('quill'lllclll (or a lIIan 10 work (l1I1~ide his norlll;)IIHra elf Hork. 
41. In condusion, we feel Ihal we must express our concern that 
adelj U:ltc (;, \..lIi t i~s for mea I hrc:! ks for a II of 1111' ""'11 ill mohi Ie f.:Il1!!~ should 
he prm i<.kd withollt further delay. The •. have cxpn:ssetl their 
intentions 011 thi~ point. floweH'r. we recommend that thl.'~ shuuld gi\'e 
priority 10 the pro\ i,illn of (he mohilr cahin~ and thllt thc~e should in all 
C8!ot'S conlain :!dequale fadlitirs for taking meals "on the job", . 
42. We should like to place on record our thanks to the parties for the 
clarity with which lhey presented their e\'idenr~ We should also like to 
lhank lin: Assessors and our Secret:!!')', Mr. . 
(Signed) 
(Si~ncd) .' 
-~Chairman) 
, 
, 
, I 
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Pi,CiSIO?\ :". ,,:. ~)fTHE i. 
T I,W U r,,;\. L 
37. I ~ . .: ,LI;:!! wt: h:l'.~ !t' con~iuer:s f.,'r ~i~n;Il~'-',H~ tiOlt;' I'm 6 
~I.i:f t:~ 1->,; ;;or·!I;..l,.,:j ~r:)r.l iG 10 ~(; ;;lililiil.!>. :";0 lilal we could lully 
aprreclate the point:; madl! to us by tb: par:ies during the course of the 
h~arintl. \\e in\'ited the ASSC~.SNS to ft.-commend a Ilumhcr of' . 
depot .. : ;Jnd sig:ling-on point.; wh:::h we might visit. In cioing this. we asked 
that the dl!Pl'ts sekcted should form a repre~entati\c cros~-~fction, ta ~ing 
into accollnt si7e of the depot. type of traffic, Rq:ion anu extent of area 
covcrt:d. I n the 12 depots which we visited, we watched a numher of drivers 
sign-!'n and questioned them closely about the prol1lems which they hJd to 
o· .. e rl'~) me. 
I 3~. Fr(lm the information which we gathered, our conclusion is that 
r thue i~ no gt:ncr~1 casl! for an incrt'as'!., We wcre impressed with the 
&ldequ;Jey of signing-on urangements at many of the depl1ts we visited and 
at the~e it was clearly possible for footplate staffln ci~n on in 10 minutes or 
less. At the other extreme. the situation at .n particular was far 
frorn .. atisfactorv.lndeed, there were problems at a number of depots (e.g. 
at ;. ;;. . where the absence of a supervisor for part of the time 
,. I. t' . '" .: I ._ ............ ". ( .1 ........... ·,,1,1 .• ""1.. ,-,-, •• 1,' 
largely he overcome hy adequate reorganisation . 
.19. We tlwrcfore recolllmend that the r:1rties should undertake:! ioint 
c:\ercise in Or!!ani~ation and Methods Study. Ihe aim of which would he to 
e~tahli:.h and to site in Il)ri~:al order. the variou'i pClillt~ to Whir:h a driver 
should go in sivninp-nn. Particular attention should h(, r.iven to the 
following poinls: 
(i) diaJ:rllms should he i ... sut>d to Ihe men in ,tl!lIel"pt"ir.ning-on 
lilll!'''. CarL' ,111111111 hL' Ink(,11 to rn"II/"(' thnt cli:lJ:1 :tnt .. nre 
han(h'd in "h('n Ihr mrn sign-off III noid the prohlcl11 o( 
mi"ill)! diar-rams which, "C "ere told, (/(:cur~ lit ... Hme ,Jepoto;. 
Sparr copirs of the diagrams should be relained IIllhe signin2-
on point, to be is'iued whrre the original diaj!ram is not 
nailahle, 50 AS to ob"iale l11el1 them'il'h'c~ ha\'il1~ to copy (lut 
delail .. ; 
(ii) "hue more than one case is 3\"a ila hie for the ui~pla y of not ic('s 
olher than lale nolict's, con .. ideralion should bt' directed to 
arranl:in~ the notiers so fhnt they art' allocated. \\ hert' 
pmc;ilrle, to srp:mtle C:l'it'S according to criteria decided 
locally, e.J:. by arra, by !>uhj('et matter, or hy date of 
appearance. Cllrt should be laken to rnsure Ihat all notice .. lire 
fully \i!>ible in the appropriate notice cases, which should be 
clrarly labelled, wilh the late notice case painted rt'd. All cases 
"huul" be locked to en!\ure security of information. Old 
nl)lices should be remoHd re2ularly; 
(iii) Ihe la)'olll of sil!ning on points should bt' the 5uhject or 
parlirular sllldy lind where, as at 'he premises are 
clearly umlliisfaciory for Ihe purpose, allt'ntion shollld be 
direcled to reorj!ani ... alion of the premises or eHn to 
fchou,ill!!: 
(iv) allention ~hollid ht paid to the particular prohlt'ms \\ hich 
rxbled at J a liS. ari<;inl! from the lack of a ~econd 
locollIol i"e depot !ill perini end I'll t. 
40. Nevertheless. evcn after reorganisation. we cannot be certain that 
there will not still bc insta tll:CS (c,g. beea usc of engi n'Ccring work (Wer if wiJc 
area for an extended period) where drivers need more than 10 minutes to 
sign-on. This is a matter for the: and where they are satisfied that a 
case exists ror atemporary increase in the signing-on time - and this may 
well relate only to some of th~ diaframs worked from a particular depot -
they should make such overtime payments as are necessary so as to ensure 
that the additional signing-on lime is 3\'ailaolc. 
41. The Assessors provided us with valuable aid hoth in agreeing the 
arrangements for our visits to the various locomotive depots and in 
accompanying us on our visits. We wish to place on record our thanks to 
them (or their assistance, as well as to our Secretary, Mr. 
February 1978 
(Signed) ~ 
(Si,medl '-
. """airman) 
• 
-' 
oJ 
.'; 
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~[)RE CmlPLEX DISPlJI'ES. 
S9 
SUMMARY. OF TilE TRIBUNAL:S AWARD 
J7R. PaYlllellt for Additi(///(/! RC'Jl'omihililit'J 
(a) Drit·crJ. The Tribunal awards a sum equivalent to 
10';( of the driver's basic rate to be paid in recogni-
tion of all the items of additional responsibility, 
adduced in the evidence of the parties. (Para. 109). 
(b) St'cl111dI1lCIl, The Tribunal awards that the percen-
tage increases for second men contained in the 
Board's offer should be retained. When working 
driving turns all second men should receive the full 
driver's rate inclusive of the 1070 addition. (Para. 
III ). 
(c) . f. The Tribunal rec-
ognizes that there is merit in the ~ oS claim in 
respect of additional responsibilities in ba.sic rates 
and recommends that all guards receive the present 
basic rate (If conductor guards with an additional 
responsibility payment to the common l!r~dc of 
guard of 5% of the present basic' 
rate. (Para. 113). 
(d) Olll('/" , b (if'llc/cs. The Tribunal consid-
ers that in OIO:HJ terms the relativities bt!t\veen 
payments to difTcrent grades contained in the 
Board's offer (excluuing drivers and _J rcp-
resents a useful indication of the extent to v. hich 
improvements on payments to other grades might 
be effected: but the Trihunal would not favour any 
payment fN additional responsibilities in excess of 
IOJl ortlle bU'iic rate of any particular graue. (Para. 
117). 
179. Restrtlc(/lri1l1: /01' Salaried Staff 
(a) The Trihunal awards that the C.O.I maximum rate 
of pay bc .lttaineu at the age of 21 (ano t he grade of 
clerical assistant discontinued) and that the CO.l 
pay sC(lle bc reduced frol115to 2 years. (Para. 119). 
(b) The Tribunal awards that payment of I J igher Graue 
Duty allowances should be milue to clerical stalT in 
cases where 25% or more of a man's normal time is 
spent working in the higher grade. (Para. 120). 
(e) The Tribunal awards that the Board's proposal to 
allocate 2% of supervisors' pay bill costs to pre-
serve the supervisor's differentials over the grades /" 
supervised should be imoroved to take account of 
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__________ 180. PO)'I1lC'llt for [rrl'gu/ar (lnd VI/socia/flours 
(a) The Tribunal a~\'a~Js an i~crease in th-e proposed 
payments for irregular and unsocial hours to JO'/t. 
7~'2<;t and 5% of the basic rate with p3yments to be 
made according to category and on an individual 
basis. (para. 129). 
(b) The Tribunal recommends that the payments for 
irregular and unsocial hours m .... arded by the Tri-
bunal sho~ld be included in the first stage of the 
restructuring programme. (Para. 130). 
(c) The Tribunal awards against the' , claims 
(Para. 131). 
(i) That irregular and unsocial hours payments should 
be paiJ for week-end work Cl"d week-day work 
from 18.00 hours to 08.00 hours. 
(ii) 
(iii) 
That existing "on ca"" allowances should be 
impro .... er..! to match the maximum payments for 
irregular and unsocial hours. 
That irregular and uns(lcial hours payments sh(luld 
continue to he paid in periods of public holidays, 
sickness ano annLlal leave. 
(d) The Tribunal awards in favour of raising the exist-
ing 10% Aggregation and Commuted Allowance to 
15% and the existing 2~% allowance to 7W;f. 
(Para. 133). 
(e) The Tribunal awards that payment fOJ both work-
ing on rostered days free from duty and on rest days 
should he paid at the higher of the two present rates. 
(Para. 134). 
181. C onso/iclat ion 
(a)" ;. Grade.'i. The Tribunal awards in favour 
(II tne orfer of' the Board that all r _ h()nus 
l'chcmes and all mileage payments for "turns liP to 
199 miles should be withJrawn anJ consolidated as 
the Board proposes into the basic rate. (Para. 138), 
but increased by 7% (Para. 156). The Tribunal also 
awards in favour of the Board's prClposals for "buy-
.ing out" residual bonus earners (Para. D9) and in 
favour of the arrangements proposed by the Board 
for the continued payment of long mileage pay-
ments for turns of 200 miles and over. (Para. 140). 
(b)' •. The Tribunal awards in favour of the 
Hoard's consolination proposals for ~ • inc1url-
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(c) Olher C .: Gl'lIcles. The Tribunal m\'ards 
in favour of the Board's consolidation proposals for 
other C' ' grades. (Para. (42). 
(d) Salaried St({rr. The Tribunal awards in favour of the 
Board's offer to increase the pay of salaried stafT by 
4~2t;:r. (Para. 143). 
182. Estah'iJhcd SllItll.'i 
(a) The Tribunal awards in favour of the Board's pro-
posals for Established Status. (Para. (44). 
(b) The Tribunal feels that any retlul.:tion in the stan-
dard working week for salaried grades would be a 
step away from the declared policy of equalising 
conditione; of service and therefore decides against 
the - , . s claim. (Para. 145). 
(c) The Tribunal considers that it would be inconsis-
tent to introduce lieu bonuses for periods of leave 
when bonus payments arc being withdrawn else-
w~ ....... The Trihunal therefore decides against the 
" .. claim. (Para. 146) .• 
183. Slll.r:ill.c!. The revised staging programme proposed by 
the Tribunal is set out in paragraph 150. 
J84. ImplelllcnTatioll /)11((' 
(a) The Trihllnal awards that all changes in pay arising 
out of the first stage of the restructuring programme 
other than consolidation, should be calculated in 
terms of current rates i.e. those <lprlying from 29th 
April, 1974 - and excluding all threshold pay-
ments. (Para. 154). 
(b) The Tribunal concludes that btlck-dating should be 
timcd to coincide with the introduction of (:urrcnt 
Icvel" of pay - i.c. payments rnaoc under stage one 
of the restructuring programme should be 
implementcd from 29th April, 197.t. (Para. 157). 
(c) In the case of consolidation the Trihunal suggests 
that the net increase in pay (after adding th~ con-
solidated amount, calculated bv reference to exist- . 
ing rates, and deducting all bonus and/or mileage 
earnings) should be back dated to 29th April, 1974. 
Those who suffer a net decrease in pay as a result of 
consolidation should not be affected by the back 
dating arrangements in this respect. I n their case 
this aspect of back-dating would be waived. (Para . ./ 
IS8). . 
tor,.. n 
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ques of job analysis and job evaluation on the foot-
plate has bel'n impressed upon Tribunal. The 
Roanl must be prepared to work without delay 
towards reaJi..,tic proposals in this regard to put 
before the Unions. (Paras. 165; 1(,(,). 
(b) The Tribunal consiJcrs that there is scope for initia-
tives concerning incentive schemes uesigned to 
iml'lr'lve utilization of labour and equipment on the 
(Paras. 167-169). 
(c) The "inDullal thinks that a more systematic study of 
jobs in the light of future . nceds, would hclp 
to promote a more radical Improvement in utiliza-
tion of mallrower and equipment in other areas e.g. 
- among permanent way staff or within large sta-
tions. (para. 170). 
(d) The parties should consider moving to a situation in 
which it is accepted that general settlements con-
tain a substantive reform element. In normal cir-
cumstances the negotiations determining the 
annual settlement would be the forum within which 
the parties should attempt to agree their overall 
priorities in an integrated way. (Para. 175). 
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DECISION A': OF THE TRIBUNAL 
41. As we understand the position of the I " thpv ~re 
L1~king the Tribun~1 tf'I a-~'ard in favour of two changes in the r 
offer: 
(a) the rate used to calculate enhancements should be the rate 
operating from the 4th August, 1975, It is accepted that the 
effect of this Oil e:1rnings would require reductions to be 
made in the £6 supplement .t!lowable under the terms of the 
T.U.C. pay Guidelines. These should be calculated on an 
individllal basis, dependent on earnings entitlements in 
citch pay period: 
(bl the should undertake to incorporate all pay supple-
ments mto basic rates of pay "immediately legislation or 
~oluntary pay codes" permit. 
42. Afta careful consideration the Tribunal has decided that they 
cannot recommend any alteration in the r • 's offer in respect of the 
first 0fthesc prorsals, We fully appreciate the desire orthe / , 
to avoid a position where it can be argued that the increases of 4th 
; August have hccn rcuuced or abolished, but we cannot agree that their 
Sllgg~'SlioIlS are likely to lead to less problems or fewer difficulties. 
Whil<;t \\c appreciate that in respect of enhancements I - ' 
/llcmhen. rn~y consider that they are al a disadvantage as compared wilh 
I the previolls position. we have to make our decision within the paramet-
: ers of thl' Government's pay policy, which has been est:1blishcd in 
'consultation with the T.U.C. and .... hich is supported by all the parties 
"ho urrea red before us. In this respect, we would point out that some of 
, 's memhcrs would, unucr the tcmlS of their daim. be cnli!-
h:d to aml)Unts in excess of the £6 limit prescribed in the White Paper, 
43. It i~ admitted that in terms of the immeuiate effect on pay 
nothing is to be gained by the . 's proposals. Yet it would 
1I1l\.foubtedly reqllire considerable additional work. The ,,-
informed liS that unless payment of the supplement was to he m;lde in 
'UTears. they wlluld need to introduce a major re-organisation of their 
p;I)"wfl S) stem. This would take a consiJcrable time. Thcir best esti-
mate was "fllllr months even if all programming n:solln.:es were I;\ken 
l,ffother prodllcti\'e work". They also pointed out that "there wOllld be 
nl) way of hridging the intervening period and we would have no way of 
(;alculating arrears. " . other than \:ly c1eril:al eCfllrt". It seems to us that 
even if the ~, '. has exu!.!l!crated what is involved, we must assume 
there would he some de b)~ 'imd thi s wou Id not he well received . 
44. But it is also clear to us that the proposals of the '- i.;. 
"ould produce problems i:1 terms of presentation to the indiVidual 
worker. Pay slips would need to show the effect of the August increases 
on particular enhancement payments and the basic t ate. The total effect 
.... ould then need to be subtracted from the £6 entitlement, to indicate to 
workers the sum that was left to form the actual surrlement paid. The 
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we feel that if an attempt were made to provide all the information 
required the result would be complex .and diffkult to follow. 
4.5. The other unions argile that this would produce misunderstand-
ings and allegations of unfairness which they would have to ans\ver. We 
can see why they favour the much simpler and more easily understood 
propo<i;ds or the Bllard. Of cOllrse it \\,1l111d hllw hecn possible to 
producc a le<;s complex scheme, if the parties had favoured one of the 
T.U.C.'s slI1-!gestillOs for "averaging out" the effect of the August 
in~1 c,,"';:s. But we flllly :lrprcdate why this was cl)JlsiJered all in:lrpro-
priate meth0d, given the varying pattern of earnings on the railway, . ~. 
indeed we wnsidcr that the parties were right to reject a solution along - ) 
these lincs. WI' thpr('(orc fl'cl that we must choose hctween the propos-
als of the. . and the offer of the 
46. E4ually important is the need to ensure that railw:lyrnen ret.1in 
the full value of the £6 supplement for the purpose of calculating holiday 
entitlement. sick leave and pension payments. This can best be don,. hv 
a return to the pre-August rate along thE' linE'S sllggested by the' 
On the first issue raised by the I -' the Tribunal therefore 
awards that thr rate We'd tn calculate' el/hallCe'meflts should be Ilia' St'f 
Vllt ill t/'e 's la,~t v.rrcr. Till' 161'l'r I\'c'c{ iI/crease • prodded fllr in 
till' T. V.C.·s Pay Guid('lilles. shollld fake 'he form of n standard StiP-
pIC'IIII'II' 
47. We tum to the second proposal of the I '., which 
invites us to decide that consolidation should be regarded as a first 
priurit ... · ;'0; ""Oil a'i pay guidelines pennit. The first point to make is that 
the . '. is right to stre"s the prohlcm<; that inevitahly arise .... hen 
suhq;mtial payments IIr(' intr(llillced which dn nt.t COllnt for the rllrrl)Se ,~J 
of enhancement. If premium payments for uvcrtimc. rest day ..... ork and 
other perilld<; arc rcaliqi~ ilnd functional they ollght to move in step with 
paYl11l'lIts made rllr 110rmal hours in a ~t:tndard wlll-king "'('('1\. Oth('r-
wise their relntive value is reduced ami the rationale of the payment \ 
stru~tllre is undermined. 11\ this ~CII~C a gOlJd eil'iC can alway ... he made 
out fof' the eal!Y (t.lIhl,lidatil'll oLII! ('{'rille; "rlllll1·enh:lIKt'.I"k 1':1)'I1I.:nt. 
Con'iidcration'i (lC thi'i kind innucnccG the Tribunal when it dccided to 
r('c<'nlmrnd that irregular and unsocial hours pavments ~holiid he caku-
'1,,11,:1.1 l,y rderen(c III basi( rates. The l:. is fully jllstifil'J in I .\ 
i 
reminding the Tribunal of what Report42 salll on thi,; suhject. "owevcr, 
we havc 10 take into accollnt the factors which J:::tve rise to thc existcnce 
of the present £6 supplement, and other dcvelopments since th:l! time. 
They are reh!vant to the appropriatenes<; and justifiability of recom-
mcnJillg the total consolidation of enhancements as soon as circum-
st~nces permit. 
48. The fact is that the T.U.C., in agreement with the Govern-
ment,.formulated the £6 guidelines without provision for enhancement. 
The policy that emerged, and which is accepted by all the parties, .. ' 
appearing before us, rules out consolidation for the twelve monfns-- -,,-
........ a.~.... r£ ... .... 1 ... _ •• _ .......... _ ••• t o_ .• l ..... ~ _ ••• 1_ .. orr, 1 " _ •• J .. L ... 
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- August, J 977. They envisage a furthe.r wage-round based on another 
non-enhancement supplement - i.e. a 5 per cent increase in individual 
earnings. subject to upper and lower cash limits. No provision is made 
for consolidation of this year's flat rate supplement. 
49. We should perhaps point out that it is no part of our task to 
pronounce on the utility, or effectiveness. of particular forms of incomes 
polic" "T'1."se matters arc only relevant to this reference because the 
•. is asking us to recommend that pay supplements should be 
incorporated into basic rates as soon as incomes policy permits. We are 
therefore bound to take note of the fact that as the policy guidelines are 
written at preser.t they appear to rule this out for a year or more. 
50. But this fact affects another argument that we have to consider. 
The £6 c;upplement represents a disturbance of the relativities estab-
lished as a result of Decision 42 and maintained in last year's settlement. 
A commitment how to consolidate the whole of the £6 supplement, as it 
!>tands. might be said to constitute recognition of the fact that the parties 
now wish tu move away from those relativities. Yet this may not be how 
they feel when the moment arises and incomes policy becomes more 
l1exible. It could be that all the p<!rties will prefer to negotiate an 
:tgreement which attempts to return to the 1974 position in respect of 
rebtivi!il's. Ev.:n if this is not thought hl be desirable, or other f3ctors 
make it impossible. they may wish to deal first with certain outstanding 
problems that have arisen in respect of particular grades. The fact is that 
we have no way of knowing how far, in the future, the parties will want 
to regard the consolidation of the £6 in its present form as their first and 
over-riding priority. What we do know is that the ~ •. calculates that 
the cost of placing the full £6 a week on basic rates, and allowing this to 
rank for enhancements, would be about £32m a year as indicated in the 
Assessor's letter - i.e. it would add 3.9 per cent to the cost of 
the paybill. I t has been put to us that we should not appear to pre-empt a 
sum of this size so far in advance of the declared needs and wishes of the 
parties at the time. 
51. Finally, we have to have regard to the fact that the 1 
. made certain statements and offers in respect of future consolidation. 
They arc sct out in full in the r - 's evidence and need to be stated 
again at this point: 
(a) the':" -. did not regard non-enhanceable supplements as 
a satisfactory part of the railway pay structure; 
(b) if it would assist in reaching a satisfactory settlement (the 
r .,) would be prepared, when circumstance~ permit, to 
consolidate that part of the supplement which restored the 
basic rate to that which was operative from 4th August, 
197.5. and they could then consider ways of consolidating 
_ ___ the remainder of the supplement; 
(c) the ;. 1. would be prepared to consolidate in principle 
hilt tlw method ltnci ":-tt~ to h,~ far fltlltrl' n"{l,lI;:I!i"n 
319 
1.5 
way 10 meel the . position. as we understand it. We think that 
if it were clarified. and extended in some respects. it could represent the 
basis for a reasonable settlement. 
53. I n the first place. the statement recognises the problem') that 
inevitably arise when substantial payments are introduced which do not 
count for enhancement. \Ve have said that these problems should be 
appreciated and avoided wherever possilJle. Because of the position it 
adopts in respect of enhancement5, the ~ ',. quite properly offers to 
commit itc;elf to the princiole of consolidation. This was one of the 
rc:que<;ts made by the " . in negotiation. although we think it is 
capilblt~ of being stated hy the; in a more satisfactory way. 
54. Then. as an eamest of its good intentions. the . made a 
more detailed pled!!c in r('''pect of a relatively small part of the £6 
supplement - i.e. that part which is required to restore the efr..:ct of the 
Augllst increase. The - . informs us that this would represent an 
annual cost of abo lit £~m - i.e. 0.6 per cent of the pay bill or roughly one 
sixth of the fulll.:O~t of comolidation. We consider that this pleugc could 
al<;o he made in a more <.:oncrete form . 
.5.5. At the hearing. we asked why the ~ .' felt that an offer nlong 
these lines had to be confined to approximately one pound in six. The 
. .·s nnswer. if we understood their position, was that to go further 
would he to prc-jlHl!!1! future priorities nnd propose more than would be 
acceptahlc to the other unions. We appreciate why they took this view, 
but fed that the principles underlying paragraph (b) may be capaQle of 
being develnpel.! in a way that dl'es not give rise to these ohjections. In 
this re~pec' it is worth noting that the paragraph does stipulate thnt the 
.·s willinple~'i to implement partbl consolidation is contingent on 
their belief that a move of this kind would "assist in reaching a satisfac-
tory settlement". When examined Oil this point the j" .i. appeared to 
be saying that they wOlild have no ohjection if the other unions had no 
objcl.:tion. We think they are right to adopt this attitude. We consider 
that all parties should now nccept the need for some degree of consolida-
tion as so~m as incomes policy permits . 
.56. We also think that agreement on the union side is bound to 
remain the Clucial factor in the timing of any further consolidatitlll. The 
. must continue to kc:ep its options open for this reason ahove all. 
However. we think there is a case for trying to strengthen the general 
commitment to t01A1l consolidation as soon as possible - so long as the 
parties remain free to respond to future developments. With all these 
considerntions in minl.! we recommend that the and the unions 
should consider amending the current offer of the; . to give effect 
to the p~oposals in 'our decision below. 
57. The Tribunal awards: 
(I) that all parties should state that non-enhanceable supple..-· 
ments are unsatisfactory as a permanent feature of pay 
.. _.. .... . - .,.... . ., 
(2) that they should also agree that as a result they are. ill 
principle. committed to the complete consolidation of the 
proposed £6 supplement; 
(3) that at the earliest opportunity conformable with T.U.C.-
GO\l~mment Guidelines, or statlltory requirements. the 
. '. shoull.! he pledged to consl,lidate that part of the £6 
supplement which restores the basic rate to that ' ... ·hich was 
operative from -lth August. 1975; 
(4) that at the earliest opportunity conformahle with T. U .c.. 
Govt:mmcnt Guiddines or statutory requirements the 
>. and the unions should agree to give earnest and 
serious consideration to the need to consolidate in full the 
remainder of the £6 supplement. 
. 
. 
I 
" ;:' 
I • 
, . 
320 
DECISION Nt!. (,0 Of' THE i • TRIBUNAL 
A, Till' I'irrIlIlHtllll('('.f (~r 1111' all'/lrt! 
99. We have been prt'~ent~d with two -c1aim~ whkh have not 'been 
advanceu on the same hasis. Thcy have also produced uifferent responses from 
the other parties clln~ernrd with the outcome of ollr Decision. As a result we 
have been faced with f(.ur di\ergent views of the prohlems and events whkh 
proulll.:ed t h;.:~e I efcrences. togctnl~r with incl1mpat ihl~ slI!!gest ions fN dealing 
with them. More impllftant still. the differences hct" crn the parties have 
sometimes bren taken to a point where they ha\e ruled out the ba~is for 
compromise proposals. We have abo been warned that other solutions would 
be !'>elf.Jd~ating. sin~e they wOlild l!ivc rise to further claims designed io cancel 
out their eflects. 
100. We do not parade these diflicllltic:; before the parties to elicit their 
sympathy for us in our "I'pointed task. We do so brcause we feel we mllst 
preface our award hy pointing out that the circumstances surrounding it are such 
that they rule (lut any form uf ~clllt:menl. IInle'~ the parties are prepared 10 
mollify atlea~t some of their adopted positions in the light ofollr Decision. We ~ 
fully accept our responsibility t-o I'l'llpose a solution that is compatihle with the 
future ~tabi1ity anu prosperity of the railw;ty indll~try: yet we wish to rt'srond to 
thllse who we feel have established a case on the evidence presented to us. We 
know that the parties will :lccept that \I.e have tried to prot.!uce a balanced set of 
propmal~ after long and careful clln~iJcratitln. We urge th('m to con~ider ollr 
Dc,i~ion with their lISual care. Given a readiness to compromise. we feel it 
r'!"resent~ the b:l~i~ fM a sollltion. It is our unanimous verdict. 
------ -101. We have taken the vicw that the best way to present the award i~ oy 
consiuering the arguments advanced (or a change ill the pre~ent situati!.n under 
three separate heading~. We deal first wit h the argument based on 
comparahili:y. before going on to consider lIther arguments based on 
rwJII.:tivity ant.! resf'lllnsihility. 
B. Tilt' ('IIII/!'lIf11hiJity cl'J!/lll/c'"f 
102. It has heen pilI to liS. most notahly by the' \. in their submission. 
that the payment made to pay train guards represents a disturbance of 
estahlish"d uifferentials th"t must be correctru. Tht.!ir claim relates to t he grade .. 
they represent. but the ',. h:lve made it clear that any movement among 
the~e graues would result in claims advanced on behalf of other staff covered ry 
the 1956 Machinery. On this basis. the claim for comparability is a case for a 
general movement in the pay structure. 
103. As we see it. there are six arguments against II deyelorment of thi~ -
kind. In the first pl:lce. there seems to be no reaSllll why such a proces~ shtluld 
ever end. For ifwt were toconcedc the: substance (If the . claim. and the I. 
were to agree. it would be difficult for them to re~lst II further srate of 
claims designed to restore comparability to other groups. There would also be 
nothing to prevent the pay train guards from seekins to restore their lead over 
other guards. A precedent would also have been set for further parity demands • 
.. ,I'A~ .. " .. r It n"rli~'lIlar NOliI'! ilf wtlrkrrs rcceivl',llIny additional payment for 
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UI."lI~II'" 1'111. of': M'"gl11 III 1111:«:1 1I1a11ll'JCl'lIvC ;111,. IIIIS J llllllilaillul:~ mIl \\ hlllo 
undermine it in a way that would be ruinously expensive and difficult to conlrol. 
, . 
. ' 104. Secondly. we arc reluctant to accept that a general movement is 
>, nc:edcd. ·or.fIl~lified. tCo deal wilh Ihe conseqllence~ of payme:nls maJe 10 no more lhan N per cenl l'" YCI Ihe case for comparability assumes Ihal be:cause 
Jlay Ir;tin gllilrJ~ lin !tome HOCI lurns. involving abllut J .6()O men inllny wCl:k. have 
received pa~' inl'reases which, we were told. in some ca~er'i i!vcntge no mllre Ih:tn 
55p lIlLty. Ihere shlluld be 1I hlllli movemenl.jn I'll}' which Ihe ' cllkulale 
wllilid (u~1 Ihem a funher (~KIll, 
IO~, Thirdly, Ihe P;I)'Illl'llls made hI pay Irain gllards do not afh:~'t ba~ic 
r.lle~; Ihey 11II-.e Ihe form or .. ~lIpplcmenl or hOllllS, As a result. the S'lnlC guard 
mOl\'. Jcpe:ndenlupunlhl: allm:i1l1l1n ol"dulie:s wilhin his n>~ler. re~'ei\'\: I hI." 
all,m:JIll'l' and l'\ll\lmi~,i"1\ IlJl 11Ile \b~' alld Icwrl \11 hi, 1I1\!inary b;I\i.: rale 
on th'e next. We wOllld he: rdud,lnl hI aj!ree 10 a gen«:ral movcment in ha,ic r.lles 
~. ilS II respunse: lu un irregular anJ un.:vc:n paymenl uf Ihis I..ind, 
111(., 1-'I'llIthl) .• 111.1 1lI11~1 illlp"rlanl IIf all, w..: h"ve Illh.:rwlllhe pay Ir;lin 
~lIald, al W'" ~ and have heen ahle 10 ~"nl rasl whal I hey do wilh whal we know 
of Ihe work (II" olher . AI!hollgh we were nul u~ked 10 lIssess the 
jllsliti;lhilil)' Ilflh..: • :'~'lIklllcnl. or ils ':III1lP;II"hilily wilh Ihe 
!'elll.:menl on ",'onslliidalion" ilri~il1g 0111 oflhe aCl'eplilnce 1)1' Deci~ioll No, 4:!. 
our lIb!oenations lead liS 10 believe Ih,,' Ihe payments made: undc:r Ihe: new 
:It;r":l'm..:nl Can be rq;arded;ls \:ulllpcn~alillil 1'1'1' aJJiliullall',,:~plllbihiliIICS Il\er 
t· hnd ahovc Ih",c undertaken by the j!cncralily of: ~s, We Iherdore consider 
Iheir con,cqllcnce!> under Ihis heading. when we come 10 1.'(lII~idcr Ihe c .. ~e for 
ch:lIIl:!c 1)l1lh..: basis III' adtlilillllal r.:srvnsibilili..:s - i,c, al p,ll'''graph 117 bcl,,\\', 
107, Fiflhly, alt hough we ilccept I hal one of the aims (If Ihe Reslllll'luring 
PrllrOsals, at the time of Dccisi"11 Nll, 4~, was 10 e~lablish and pr..:servc a 
brll;IJI~'·based ~tabililY llfb.lsic rale relillivilics, it dues not ~1:":l1Itll us II'ill il \\as 
Ihe intention oflhe Jlilrties ill thilt timc 10 (reel.c 1I11 ilspel'ls of the pay ~trllcture. 
~o Ihal il,'oilid not adapl anJ re:lclto new d~'mands and reqlliremenls, Indeed, 
Ihe ;lnd Ihe . have bOlh quoled a nUlllb.:r of ca~es where 
neces~ary chilllges hiJ\'e been introduced. The;: '.T. ilSl'If. in Deci~ion No, 
42. !ollprorteJ Ihe nt:ed fllr" A FUlilre Programme of Reform" , In panlgrarh 168. 
Ihe ~ .1', said Ihal consolidalilll1 wllUld: 
"re!ouh in a pay struclure which t:onlains virtually no dements 
tle~igncd to mainlain and improve Ihe ulilisalion of manpowc:r al1d 
rquiplllent. It is also dear Ihill nOI hing will be done 1\) rew:lrd 
pcrform,lIIce Ilr cncourilge or induce (he acct:plance or change or 
ne).ibJlil),. In our opinion the~e are m:lllers whil:h should exercise Ihe 
allenlilln of Ihe B'lilrJ in Ihe years ahead. Some lIr iJll of Ine:nl slIrd), 
mll~1 form Ihe ba~is ofit~ fUlure aims and obje:clives wilhin the: conlnl 
of a nl'w reform pr'lgramme," 
It seems 10 u, th:11 the claim lilr cI,mrar<lbilily. ,IS il hilS been pre~enl ... J 10 liS in 
b these hearin!!~. wOlild prevenl flirt her neces~"ry change and adaplOIlion for the 
, sake of Ihe: rrllle:':liull of J"kl':llli,u~ which have <tl,e:ady been 1lI0Jili ... J by lhe 
c.:on~ent of Ihe p'lrties, 
JOS, finally, il mif!hl be illgucd Ihal in the circumstan~'es a more logical 
arproilch "lIulJ be: to think in tC:lllI~ or pllrily W ilh 1I nutillnal rale for _' 
i.e. is rilte which took inlu lIC~'ounl Ihe faclthitl (he great majllril} of. ,Jo 
not receive any benrlllS from Ihe agreeme:nt allhe moment, 
altlwugh one iJay they mighl have: the OrpOrhllllt~' ofbccollling I 
rre~umably some approximation of such a notional rale could be computed by 
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U \ l:ragi "11 1" c)cIIII. ,I ullU\\ alKC s and h"'l11~ :J!l'J L1i. illi IIg IlIi, ~IIIII ,nIl) tllc 
tOlal numbcr of l . employed on L . ' •• But the sum involveLl 
would be n lrining amounl and the effect. in terms ora comparable movement in 
basic rates clsewh~re. would be negligible indeed. Moreover. such a proposal 
wuuh] still be open to most of the objections raised above - e.g. the argument 
th,,' 'he most "pproprj"te way to regard the additional p:lymellls made to. . 
is :IS compensation for addition,al responsibilities not pl;ll.'cd upon 
the maJorrty tlf thc grade. 
lOY. We tlu'rt'fllre cundude rur all the rt'3SIIIlS !ot'l out in parill:raphs 102 to 
. JIIII abuH. thaI the d.lim fur chiln~e on Ihe Rrounc!s of cllmpurahility IIlUS! fail and 
'H~ so a"ard. 
C. 1'111' Jllrlclllllil'ilY ,,,/.:,,1/1,'/11 
110. The i1r~lImenl for change on the grounds of increased prlldlKtivily was 
advanccd by the . '. on behalf of the. _ grades. As we 
tllHlcr,tll(1I1 tlll:i,. case. it rested on three cllntcntion~. First. the drivers' 
cllntrihllti(ln to improved productivity since 1974 had been ~rcatl'r than that of 
any othc:r grade. In support lIt' thi~ contention. the .' -. . •. cited such 
(h.'vdopmcnts a~ high ~pccd working. uilTcfl'ntialline speeds. hcavier loads. 
impro\~d utilisation ofrollin~ ~tock, new forms of traction. signatling. braking 
and !)O lln. Sll~'h devclorm.:nts would not have been possible wit!lllut the full 
"(I·operation of foo!platc st:lfr and the. . it~elr. Second. ( 
were t\l'c',ted to accept additi,ln:tl responsibilities, increased strain and more 
f1c>.ible wllIl..ing in the interc~t s of higher proJuctivity; they also wen: expected 
It) aglcl' to further reductiolls in manpower. In this. the. '. . claim. 
dri\'ers are more involved in the burdl'lls oftcchnological change lIlan any other 
grade. Final/y. the.. ... '. contendell that the P s rrorosab for 
linking ray to 1'roducllVh, "' luture were unacceptable to them - not least. 
bccause they took the form of an overall supplement to basic rates \I hich was 
dependent on factors outside the control of drivers. What they demunded was a 
~cparate increase for fOlltpl;!te starf which fully recognised their srccial 
contribution to 1'ast and future productivity. 
I I I, There would seem to be four arguments against this proposal. In the x 
first pbcc. we do not know of any acceptable way of determining the relative 
contribution of .taffto overall productivity improvements. The' 
tells us thilt. in terms of staff reductions, these grades ha\'~ made less 
contribution than other. grades. They also !lay that the formula of 
1'a~~enger/freight tonne·miles per driver shows a decrease of 4.8 per cent since 
1~74. But we cannOI accept either of these measures as an objective guide to the 
rd:ltive contribution made by - staff and we a1'preciate that the 
concluloions thev n"in' 10 are not acceptable to the . On the other 
hand. the • have not provided us with alternatiw m~thods of 
c;.Jcul:Jlion that support their claim. What they have L10ne is to cmrlia~i~e the 
extcnt tt} which SOIll,' drivers are beine affected by the new wod .. ing methods 
th:lt make increased productivity possible - without spellill~ out the 
""he41l\':Il\.:e~ in term~ of their relative worth.lndced.the, . have 
not even provided us with 3 preci~e cI:tim in moncy terms. They have said that 
this is a mailer we must decide after consideration of all their evidence. 
11~, This blings II~ to the second argument agiJin~t the. 
rnlpo~al. It follllWS from Wh:lt has been said :tb,wc that if"e were III d~ciue th'll 
a Sep:lr.lte p;lyment of a given size should be paid to staff. and the 
. acrecd to abide by our Decision,lhe Wily would be open 10 furthl'r claims 'L 
and counler·c1iJims on behalf of other occupational croups - man~' of whom 
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mighr well argile Ihal Iheir contriOlllion 10 productivily \1'ItS al least liS ~re;lt as 
Ihal of the fOOl pialI.' grltues, We know of no way in which we coulu give guidance 
IIllhe par\i~, on IHI\\' tll d~;11 with SUl:h dairns. although the)' w\llIld threaten ~tilJ 
flirT her Ihe 11m;]" st;lhililY of oa,ic r;lle relativilies Ihal we have aprel'lI \\ .... i one 
of the m;lin objeclivcs of the 1()74 review. 
113. Then there is Ihe fOil' I that it seems to Us that the very nalure ofrail\\ay 
w(lrk illililaln ;I!!ain\t attempt' 10 apportion cO"'rihlltitln, IowaI'd, improved 
performance on it grade by grade basis. As the. Jrgues. productivity gains 
on the railways ;Iri~c as the result of H complex of inter-acting uecisions unu 
re\pon\e\. This process begins with management investment. planning and 
innovation. bUI it u~ually involves many lIther grades besiues fOC'lplate staff 
beforc il is l:llmplcted - e.g .. S.& T. technicians. signalmen. pcrmallentway 
staff. controllers and so on. In this sense we have to accept the. 
description of productivity improvement as essentially a "teum e!Tort". This 
means that a strong argument can be mllue oul for regarding the conlribution of 
the worl-force 10 improved prouuctivity in a way that facilitates a team 
approa,h. We ('\)nsider that this constitutes a third argument against a separate 
scheme f,)r footplate gmues. 
II':. or cOllrse. it JIles not follow from this that we accept the; 
view of the present proposals for an overall Bu~iness Performance Scheme. 
Indeed. in Decision No. 61 we examine the criticisms made of the proposed 
~ehemc hy ;IIIIIIe fililw:!), unions unc.l we prOr1l5C II number of changc!I. What we 
feel we can say at Ihis point is that in our view an overall scheme of this type is a 
more IIprrorriate \Iay of linkins P:lV to productivity Ihan the sectionalised 
rr(lpo\;ti·, au\'ann:d by the " ~. 
II~. finally. we have 10 say that. insofar as the /! :. hased their 
('lise on grollnd~ of aduitional uuties. more intensive working and audcu strain. 
we tlke the view that such developments arc best assessed on grounds other 
than their contribution to hi!!her prouuctivity. We certainly do not consiuerthat 
in them\elves dc\'elormcnt~ .. r '''is sort constitute a case for a ~eparate 
producti ... ity paymenl for ..; staff. They arc much more rea~onahly 
-4-. regarded as arC!"ments in lavour of increases in pay on grounds of ,,,ilii';"":!1 
respon~ir.ility. Inueed. similar arguments were advanced by Ihe I 
on thi~ b:l,i\ at the lime of Deeision No. 42. We therefore eonsiucr them in detail 
under this headin!: in the nexi ~ection of our Award. 
II fl. :\ tc':w 1\ hile. Wt l'onrlude IhHI for all Ihe reasons set oul in pa ragra p'ls 
111 10 115 the claim fur a change on j!rnunds uf produclhity musl fail and we so 
a~'lIrd. 
D. Thl' IIddil;OI/(// r('jl'/lI/JihiIiIY (/1'/0.'1111/('1/1 
117. We have said that although we have n(lt been a~ked to rc-as~ess the 
justiliHbility of the. • settlement. we consider that. for Ihe 
purpos('s of this reference. the payments arising out of it are best re{:!:1nlcd as 
compeno;alion for 'lduilional responsi"i!;.i... We therefNe feel that we are 
entitled 10 con~idcr how far the I .• claim can he justified on similar 
grounds. !f :lny case can be maul' out under this heading there would be no 
'- ~round~ for regarding it :IS a signal for a general movement in basic rales. It 
wOlild al~o not rule out the introduction of an agreed and a1'1propriate scheme to 
link pay to improved prQdI 1r':"::,. With these thoughts in mind we examined the 
'ar~uments of the ; .. ". . ,i. wilh great care to see if we could agree that a 
case had been establisl.ed. 
• t •• "I .... '.1' .. _ .. ,:.1 
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-n:~['on\ihility n!Tel'tin!! all fnOlplate staff. What we were faced with wa .. an 
argllment that a limited nUlnher (If drivers had been required 10 work morc 
ifltl'n~ivcly. (If under ((\mlitiIlI1S of greater strain, wilh more hurden\ome 
re~p()nsihilitie'i. :," II result (If particlliar development .. which at times only 
affected a relatively small numher of driving tUfM - e" r.: •. 
_ .• lg" .;e'i.th(' .,IIc:t 
( ,... lind so on. Other rl;mned changes were said to be likely 10 involve 
addition,,1 respllnsihility and strain at SlIlIIC tillle ill the futul'c - e,g. the 
inlrodll~'lion of revCl'\ihle . . 
11\1. We in"[,ectcd examples ofallthe~e developments in company with our 
Assessors ltnd tried to decide how [i1r a cJilim clluld be estahlished in each case. 
This led to our second conclusion: much of what we saw was before the 
when it was considering the ~ '3 offer for "Payment for 
Additional R/,c",on"ibilities" in 1974. On that occasion. it will be remembered. 
the I • asked for changes in the past and fllture content of driving 
work to be recognised under ckven headings. including Ihe trend 10 increased 
speeds. sreed restrictions. intensified suhurban working. medical strain and 
new forms of traction. The; .ook the view that there was a case for an 
IIdditinn;11 responsihility paymenl roughly Iwice that suggested by the Board. 
but il wenl on to the point out that Ihis shnuhl be paid "in recognition of all I he 
item~ of additional re~pllnsihility udduced in the evidence of the parties". 
120. We hove dC'cld~d Ihal we lire un,,!'!I.: It' form II vicw "boutth/: pllhiblc 
impact of planned or future changes which were nol then operalional. We 
consider that we would only be justified in recommending further payment if we 
were convinced that one of two c(lnditi('I1~ applied: 
I. the lle!!ree of responsihility involved in any I'\articular case wa~· 
significantly undere!;timated at the time of Decision No, 42; or 
2. subsequent developments h:Jd resulted in new eX:Jmples of 
significant addition~ to re~ponsibility that were not taken into 
accollnt lit the time of Decision No. 42. 
12 I. After furlher careful consideration of the evidence 10 which our 
attenlion was drawn il is our unanimous conclusion that there is one instance 
where tllle orother of these C(lnditilll1!l is met. This is Ihe case of; driving, 
We fully appreciale that the operation of:' was. in some sense, 
'taken inlo account in the 10 per cent Award in Decision No. 42, but it was not 
po,sible for the ~ " memhcr~ al that time to ohserve the impact on the 
.driven' job orspe~d~ "(,."ore than 100 miles an hour. We have now all been able 
to observe this .. : ·n in operation from Ihe " and we have 
all been equally impressed by a numher of faclors: 
(a) the cost and 1I0phistieation of the equipment involved; 
(bl the need for more intense observation of conditions (' 
(c).lhe limitation of braking distances when confronted with sudden 
hazards~ 
Cd) the extr~ pressures involved in time,keeping; 
(e) the considerable responsibililies for the comfort and safety 
AU these factors appear 10 us to consitute a case for an additional payment for. .lw ~ 
.. ..peeds of over a hundred miles an hour. . 
..... ... .r ~ . ..... ... ___ A L ..• ! .. ! ....... _L 
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I he rc/;:ri\ e \'alue of t he additional responsibilitil:s involvcd, in l:(lmpari~lln .... il h 
the" dUlic~ p"rfurmcd by the gcneraliry of d~ivcrs, As a rl'sull. we lind \H' (':In 
n'('uIIIIIII'llIlthat fllr' ' .1l1 mllre Ihan I()() lIIiks all IHlIlr, 1111 luhJitiunal 
pa) menl h justified. This should he equallfl 25 per nnl of Ihe basic nile per IlIrn 
per ':.: 
113, or cour~e then" "re several ways in which slich entitlements could be 
dislributl'u ;rmong~t .f! stafT. bUllhcre arc broadly t" 0 aJternati\'c,~. In the 
first rlace. they cOlllu lake ,,,,. f'}rm of separOlte allowances. cnnlineu to the 
dri\ers who al'lllJllr drive ,.,~,. .In the second, the parties might prefer 
to lotallir the slims invohed and average them Ollt amongst drivers in general. 
or drivers ;Ind assi<;tant onvers. or all t ~ stafT. After careful cono;idc:ratilln 
we com.iuer that" e wi!>h to recommena the first alternative to the parties, 
124, \\'t' ('(In,idt'r thlll all drhers \I hn art' r<'quin'd to drhe at more than 100 
mill'S lin hnllr in a j!h en turn sh'luld re('ei\ e 3 SlIppli,'ml'lIleqllal t025 per cent of Ihe 
dri\ us' 1I;:,i,' rate rur the turn in 'Illestilln. (Gh,'n the drhcrs' pH's,'nt rate or pa~'. 
this \Hmld rc~~lIlt in a pa~'nH'nt ur£3,I~ pl'rdriHr per turn,) This seems to lI~to he 
~~ rl'a,,,nahle reCllmrcn~e: for the adultional responsihilities involved. It 
IS also in line wit h a \\cll·e~ta!llishcd practice on the railways or pnwiding extra 
•. payment f,'r dllties \\ hi.:h ar~ sit;nifkantly more responsihle than tho~e reqllirL'd 
to be pcrf\)rmcd hy the ~('neralitv ofa ~iven grade, We have already said that the: 
payment \ recent Iy matle te are best regarded as one examrle of 
this rral:til:c, Another e:lIamrie IS the extra ra~'mcnt made for oriving motor 
vehicle~: ,1I\,,,her is the pral:tice of ra}ing the 1'1111 drivers' ratc to drivers' 
m,~i'tanh \\ 111.'11 Ihey underlake: drivinJ; ulltics. (Indeed. it is possible to lHj!lIe 
t h(ll Ihc e \ j,ting mileage :rlh)wan,e for oriving turns over 100 miles is yet nnofher 
illu~triltilln Ilf the rrinciple in action.) 
125. Because i!Jlcriveslro~s~lCh :,._~~e.lY accerted principle. we do nnt 
vieW Ihe lir~t ;rltcrnillive as any kinu Ilf pre,cuenl, In ranicular. it is not a form nr 
"d,.cc;r.""';un" - ur e\'Cn II nltlV': in that directi,)n, We flllly appreciate the 
:-,'s oppo\ition to iJlI forms of classification, I n Decision No. 42, the 
.• ' " went out urits way 10 ~Iress thilt it had been impressed "by the variety 
allu ...... re of exi~tin1l drivers' lasks and Iheir close inter-relationship". It said 
that there was no "simple alternative way" of or~anising this work and 
concludcu:-
". , ..... e wcre imrressed t-y Ihe practio:al ui-je,lions which the 
. and the dri\ cr, themselves were ahle to rai,e to the 
rOIl ha le:lll""· iol.'as outlined at our hearings, We also symralhise with 
the .'s llb.ic~'tion~ to pror,'~al~ "hkh they think are 
htlllnd 10 red lice thc di\'cr~ity of driving w\)rk, making it more 
mlln0f(\nllll~ and b0ring," 
126. 11 ,hllllid be e)'plaineu that the: present j .•. Dt:cisioll is ",'I 
,ceJ.:in~ 10 Ikpart from thi~ ~encr;.J ro\itioll. We arc not sllf'.!!e~ting that there 
~hollid he a ~cr .. rate class of drivers. enjoying a sredal rate for work that is 
rcgarded a'i r;lrt;\,'lIlarly rc~ponsihJ.:. What we are propo~ing is fully compatible 
with the e,i~tillg link sy .. tem and the rre~cr\'ation of flexibility and diversity in 
Jrivin!; WM\.., It would I"~O be capable of development and extension where 
there: are significant additil)ns to responsibility either now or in the future, There 
may also be clerical !;rollps who have been significantly afTe.:ted by similar 
chan!;e~ in technolosy - c,S, th.1se concerned with preparing schedules for 
merry.so.round trains. If so. it is open 10 the Unions to pursue Ihese matters 
through the usual channels. if they wish to do so, 
..... . ,' 
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eom,eqllence.thcy mOlY 51ill wi~h 1\1 ari!lIe Ihalthe slims ari"inlt 0111 of our Award 
roholllJ he di ... lribllted :lOlO"~\t :111 uri\'er~. or c\'en all . §taff. We have 
saiJ why we fa\,IllH a morc dil cd rclalinn ... hir tll'lween :Iuditional resron,ibility 
and raymcnt in thi .. instanl·c. 
STRESS AND STRAIN 
I~I!. So far ollr "ward ha~ tried to lleal with thc ray claims thaI f(lrm the 
basis of this Decision under the broad heading,; of comrarability. productivity 
anJ resronsibilitv. However. we have been cnnciollS Ihr(lughoutthat one asreel 
of Ihe I claim was likely 10 receive less than ils due regard if il had 
10 be rnnlalOed enlirely wilhin this framework. We refer 10 whal the 
• J • had to say ahoul the effecI of slress and slrain 011 the fOOlpl<lle on 
their members' heillth nnd expectalion oflife. We believe thallhere ma~' well be 
a sreci<ll rroblem here: but we arc not convim:eJ Ihat it is one Ihat can be settled. 
or even Jenlt wilh. wilhin the conlext of a claim for more money. 
12'J. We realise that this i~ an uncharted area. where proof is lacking as to 
the etTects of stress amI slrain on a drivers' health. But it can surely be said that' 
the rhy ... ical requirement of the driver'sjob are such that he has to meet higher 
standards thnn is the case wilh olher types of work. It follows from this 
thaI w hell driven are withdrawn from their worl< on account ofhYrertension. or 
some (IIhcr disability. they are less likely' to be able to return to their normal 
work "flcr a reril\d (If tre;llment or re!ll Ihan is the ,a~c with other gT:ldl'S, In 
olher WC'fds. Ihe consequences of even minor di~ahifjties are more 1:lsling and 
uamal!ing in their clt~e. There i~ aiM) evidence thai il i~ of len difIicuh III fil them 
i011l olha work. 
130. We therefore conclude Ihal becallse of higher health standards, 
fllol r1llle staff 1m' .. , '''caler risk in holuing Iheir emrlC'ymcnt Ihan olher railway 1. 
grades. The ... =. ~ce Ihis l'ircllmslan,e as an argu",.:nt iiI favour 
of iocre:tsing ray. but it is our view Ihal ray is not Ihe answer 10 Ihe probkm, 
Whlll is re~lIired is some way of reducing risks. or Iheir l'onscl/llel1l:es fOI 
rarticular drivers. We tin nllt con ... iJer thallhis Dl'cision is an ilprrorrialc rlace 
for us to make rllsilive suggeslion ... or rroposals. under one or anolher of the~e 
headinG~. although we are not unmindful of the fact that IWo of thc references 
awailing (lIlT nllcnlion have SlIllle relalion 10 the problem of slress and slrnin 
IIm('III!,1 lootrlale .. latT Rnd we prornse 10 deal .... ith those references al the 
·earlic .. 1 rossihle moment. Our roint. allhc momenl. is simply I hill. while we uo 
nol l'lIn,ider Ihal the I :. ;lIglllllcnls relaling to he;dlh halarJs 
.con<'lilllle a ca<.e for I! IIi III! furt her Ihan we have uone in this ()e(isillll. we would 
n('1 wanl to he Ih(lul!ht to he dismis .. ing Ihem Ollt of hand. hlr Ihis rCa~(ln. We 
have r(pposed Jisl'ussillns IlI11ng the lines sci (lut hdow. In fad, \lr Tl'ClIllIlIH'nd 
Ihul Ih~ pnrli('~ ~hflllld I!ive url!l'nl cllndderalinn 10 Ihi:o; maller, so thallhl'Y may 
drol" ilh 'h~ hasic rrohlrm In It~ ('ntir('t~· as sCIon as \\ (' ha\(' issllrd ollr D('cision~ £In 
Ihll~r .~(l('l'Is IIf il "hkh h3\·r bl'l'n rrfl'rrrd 10 us, "hirh, as" r IIndrrsland thl'llI, 
dll 001 d('ol "ilh the prnhlrm.~ ... hole. There are several pos,-ible ways forward 
which 'he flar.lie~ should review. One approach would seem 10 lie through movcs 
i,. 'h~ tiirection of earlil!r relirement - as we were told is Ihe case on the French 
' •. Anolher aprr?ach would involve more r~"ularised arrangements for 
IIccommodating ex-drivers in other forms of: • employment. 
E COI,c1I1J;OflS (lI/,t JII'~I"'tJry' 
J3 J. We have said lhat we consider that there is no basis for an agreed / 
_ solution to Ihe issues raised in these IWO references unless those involved are -
"r""',r ... 1 'f' ", ... Iir" •• I,.." .... ,.. ..... ,..r .~ .. : .. .. ,I ....................... :.;,...... \.' .... :r .i- .......... ... 
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the ruture stability and prosperity of the indllstryand the merits of the case. The 
key lirs in regarding the recent scull'men! for ',; as compensation 
for adJiliOlJ;J1 rrsrun~ibilities. We can then ask whelher Ihere are any other 
i;roups who would he able to sustain a similar claim on similar lines'! \Ve have 
l!iven our reasons for deciding th:,t driving at more than a hundred miles an 
hour involves a ~ub'Iantial addil ion;II re\f1{ln\ihility. and we have suggested that 
there may be other groups where there may be a case to be dealt with hy 
up-grading, We have also said why we consider that the payment of additional \Jl respon~ibility aIlOW;\lll:es. on a turn by turn basis. i\ in no sense a departure from 
established practi..:e. 'I remains for us to recommend our orooosais 10 Ille 
parties. and to t har.k bot h the Assessors and our Secretary. 1 
132. We can summarise our Decision as follows. 
I. Th(' dllill/ for (/ /:('I/('rlll I'll." 11101'('11/('1/1 01/ Ihe Rr()I1I/J,t (~r 
('OIl1parahility i,l' I/O; .w.\Iaill ('J. for 11/(' rt'aSOfI.f S('I Ollt ill 
partl,.:r(l(lia /0310 /OR ahm·t'. 
2. Thc ell/illl for a separ(//(' 1'11.1'11/(,1/( for _ Rrw/('s. till 
/:r/""II/J of f'r"dIlCI i I'i(y. is 1/01 .111 S(lIilll'''. for 1111' reaSO/l,t .H·( 0111 ill 
f'lIrtI":rrll'iH III 1/1 115 ahtll·c. 
3. W(, r(,C'/I/lIIII(,II'/ 11/(11 for t/I'idll": , til /I/orl' IIItlII 100 mill'S (//1 
IIl1l1r (III atfdilitlllall'I/.\'II/(,1I1 is jIlJliti('J. Thi.t sIIoIIIII b(' eqll(liltl 2.5 
p'" ('('1/1 Ilf II/(, ha,fiC' raft' per IlIrll 1'C'r dril'c'r. 
4. W(, r('c'(/IIIIIII'IIIIIIIalllll'Jc' ('llIillelll('lrl.L (/IIIO/lll1ill/:. (1l'C'ordill": 1(/ 
ollr ('al( II/til iOIl.f I" £.1.14 fiN dl'il'('r 1'('" "'" ,{ I/lJ/lId tali ('IIII'.{Ol'1II I~r 
separale' {l1/" i"c'IIlifioblc (I/lOII·(/II/1·S. ('olll;/ll'd 10 Ihosc' dr;"('n 
11'110 (lrt' fI'clllired 10 IIl1d('rt{/~(' I"" (ld.lilioll(l/ rt'sptlllsihililic's 
illl·ll/red. 
S. II 1//(/.1' he IIItI( ,WIIIC' ol"er grollps 1I((I'('ll'd hy 111(' elllilll ('tJ/lIJ 
c,Hah!i,lh (/ .fill/illlr ('aJ(, Ill/ J!rtllllld.l of II ddil i,," II I rt',I1Jt111SihililY -
('.J!, i/I II"(/YS di,I('II'ufC/ ill P(/f(//:I'III,II 126. ~r IIIi.f is II", nlst'. il is 
{If'C'II 10 ,''(' I'lIl'Iies /0 c/l'(1i wi, II til" is.wc' ,11 roll}: " lire 110/'11/111 
('IIf11I1/d,I' (/11.1. ira dtlilll iJ jl/,llijied. IIP-/:flIJilll! lI'o,,1d J(,C'III I" hl' 
,",' IIIIHI apprilprill/l" sol",iol/. 
6. TIr('rt' .rll",,'" b(' dis(,IIHiOlIS h,.III·('I·1I I/'l' (//,,/ 11r" 
"l'IlIo(lrilllc' ,,"im/J 10 dl'o/willl lilt' pmhl('11/ Illal ari,H'J ","ell (I 
,lril'('r is I/O IOIlj!l'r ahle 10 I'l'f'forll/ 11r(·/,,1I "11110:(' o(d""'i"J! ,/lIlic's 
jor r('(/SOIlS ,~r"I'(/IIIr. TIII's(' cli,u''',I.fiillIJ JllollliI ('.(I'/lIrl'. (/I"ol/j!JI 
l111Il" f'tI,uihilili".I', l1Il' (/f'proat'lu',f .fIIJ!J:C'.fud ill plIra/:rrlplr '30 
"bm'l', - i.r. ('or/\' ,,'li'l'lllcl// 0"'/1110'" ,cJ:lI/ariuc/ (lrrllllJ!/'II/"lIf,f 
jor (lI'colllmod(;,in/: ('x-clrin'rs in other forms (~{ , 
emp/nYI//('nl. 
Signed: . (Chairman) 
r' 
.. 
October 1978 
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Appendix 3 
Anova Tables, with cell means and standard deviations, 
referred to in c.p.a. Analysis of Arbitration Hearings 
(Chapters Five to Eight) 
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- Appendix 4 
Typica1 Seating Arrangements at the Arbitration hearing ( Ad hoc Arbitration 
Case Studies, Chapter Nine). 
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Appendix 5 
Extracts from Parties' Statements of Case 
(Ai hoc Arbitration Case Studies, Chapter Nine) 
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CASE 5 
Union Statement. 
DISPUTE ON THE PAY}lENTS DUE TO TRANSPORTER DRIVERS OPERATING CAR 
TRANSPORTERS WITH 15 ~ErRE TRAILERS. 
1. As referred to in 'Undisputed Facts' the Company operated 13 metre 
trailers until legislation allowed the introduction of 15 metre 
trailers in 1970. 
On the 22nd June, 1970, a local agreement was signed between the 
Transport & General ~orkcrs' Union nnd : . ' .... -'-~:;" management 
(Sec Appendix 1). This "·as in two parts:-
(a) The driver received an hourly payment for driving a 15 metre 
trailer (11/- per hour) and, 
357 
(b) For c~ch car carried etc. as referred in 'Undisputed Facts', 
Dagcnham depot delivered the production of one of Ford's largest 
locations, and until the introduction of the 'Baby' Ford Fiesta, 
the production of that depot was such that the size of the 
vehicles produced, only made it possible to carry 5 vehicles on 
the 13 metre trailer. 
~. During April 1970, an agreement was signed (See Appendix Jl of 
Dngenham to destination to Oagenham, five cars carried from Oagenha~ 
but six C3rs only carried out of I1alcwood or elsc, .. here. The reason 
for this b~ing the length of car as produced by Ford Motor Company 
other than their factory at Dagenham. 
). f-lajority of 'Work during this time 'Was Ford Hotor Company Cortinas, 
Dagenham, Essex to the Midlands. The smaller cars produced at Ford 
Hoto~ Company at Halewood (Lancashire) or by other manufacturers in 
the Midlands 'Would obviously not be transported to the North or 
Midlands by Dagenham based transporters. 
4. The Company attemp~ed to carry three Oagenham produced vehicles on the 
bottom deck of the 13 metre trailer, by the use of 2 sloping ramps 
on the bottom deck, but the Company were forced to abandon the 
project because of damage to vehicles and the safety factor, which 
shop ste~ards made representations to the management. 
5. In the other major producing area ·which the Company refer to; this 
payment has been made since 1970. 
1 
~ ,_. • .-.;.' ~ - J '-. - :.,L"II ,"' 
_,..:.; .. ," -:-c_ .. :_-~ ".G ... r.:l Lr-.c: J)':>.(j~nJrt ;,. 
- ---- ------ ._. __ .,. -_._. __ ., --._--------- -_. 
- The -Company.-.- - ~ .• i ·j·d 
--.-----:.:......:.-.~----..... ---:! . .':,..:::.- • 
r T' . I' • \. h I· • .' " 1.C1ere ~s ;;L:r;)(Il,,:(.~ .. _C:l~C:~O os /,ppcnchy. 1 FI "Joint Paper" 
by the pr.1rbcs :5 ... :t. ;-.. 111[; cut the umH!.:putcd 'facts_I. 
1. Doth ~~rtlc~ ngrce lh~t from June 1970 until the present 
the p:J.y~:jO"':rl1:s to tl1 G t r;-;rl [.:portcr 11!'1 vcrs at r;.3ecn}}QI:1 ho.ve 
b<;en 1~i:." .... 1e ~:ccol'din8 to thc C():ilp::ny I s int'::1~[Jrct3 ticn of 
the: D:1[;c:nLe:rn Local le:ccclllcnt of 22nd J LlD"~ 19'10, :;nd not 
accorc.: il1[; to the interpretation rJO'.·/ cjdVOnCl~d by the Trade 
Union. D~th parties also aeree that from June 1970 to 
Oclob.~:r 1':J'/'/, 3. pC'r:iori of over 7 yezrs, tlw intc!r'pretation 
of thc J\c.;rc('i;~()()t by the CO~;lp3ny .... 'ent uncl;:;J.lctl,32d by 
thc 'rl~<.ld c Union. Thc /\e;rcC~ll1Cnt is a t'~ach:::d as Apr (·ndix 2. 
2. In thC5~ c5 rCl.~;:::it~nccs it is thc cO:rlt.en1,~.an of th~ 
Con,p;-~nyV:;);:' ::'bc !)l11',lcn of proof of ;:n C·!"·J.'or .in 
fnterprcL3tion .shou.ld r'cst on the T:cz~dc Union . 
. 3. Wc contend also that the Union is obliB~d to prove two 
distinct and scparA.te fccts and th'3.t its case fails if 
it cannot convince thc pancl on eith~r co~nt. 
4. Firstly ~"t is oblig~d to demonstrate that thc nor~al 
car can'Y in3 capacity of t!1e 13 r::8tre c:r::::il.:·!" .i.n J1..~nc 
1970 ':)8 S 5 cars end that this fact \'.;8 S c10Ell'lv r0(';l~[:::1.t. sed 
at th!! til:'.C c.nj accr:pted a3 such by both p21'tics. ..... 
5. 
6. 
Secondly if it can convinc~ the p~nel on th53 count: then 
\'/C contC'11d th~.t the UClion T!1USt cx()1:1in '\':l"ly .i t allc·:.'cd o'vrJr 
7 years tr.. I.?lapsc Gcfc're chall:,;i:sir.g the :i.ctel"pre ta"eicn 
on which ths 19rcc~cnt has been imp18~(nt~d. Custom ~nd 
pr~ctice is a powerful principle in industrial dis?Ut8S. 
"/e n~% the YJ:-nel ·to cons:Lci.rJ!" 11::,·.·.' it ~ .. '~)uld r.:;3,ct if ·the 
si tU:1tion i'/35 :cC'vcrse'=i in 'Glat the Co::'!pany ',\'3S cIa j.ming 
that for OVC!' 7 y~ars i';; h8d p:;id to i ts d~.ivcrs E:r,~OU!'1ts 
in exc.ess of. tne cc.rrect inter'pret8tion of the Asrc~;n2nt. 
In thcl:::e circt:J:1stanc<;;s ':.'e sugGest that ~ e;/0.i-j j f i:he 
CO:il~a:-1",' 11(·;::;·)(jS ~r.3tl2.d in::o!'ltro'd:rti bly that its 
. . int.t;rrl":?-;;'~·~'..'j;' ':;:;'5 2'b::;alu.tely corrc:ct, it .1.5 h~D:}ly 
itJpro~:.::ble thc.:.t a P,:;l::.)l of /::'cj ·tl·::(i:CY·S • ... 'C) .... ~J.d i·.1.!"1cl in 
its :f~V~1)[' - ~i 't.r!(;T' i fJ C":;:ardh'lg re:trcbfK'ct.J.· .... e finD.r!ciEt.l 
ad'·u'.!'···'''::-·ll···~ or 1· ... '("11' .:""".. "'1"-'" "-'1~ ir'·I':)!·····r·-·J·:"'-;o .... '" _!,.,... .... ..., ..... ,.. .. __ ~ ~.......... ."" . .1 o;J L.,. t.. J \,,; _ .... 'w c.; ~.. t,...; ..... ~ l... ... 
es·:·;;.!·""'! ',c;',:-'~ ... ·r 1'11,...· .. 0'" ~.·."\~i p,..;._r.·j··j .'r· ':~lC"'l (~ ~",.., !O'.~.,., .. ,,\r)t.:.~ .J..·''\"lr ... _ •• ...,,- ... _. __ ""J "" .J\of •• J ".-' .. - -~':' ......... - .... : ..... - ,-., ...... _'- .. -: ---:" _-
the i\.4turc. C'...1sto::1 ~~r.d r!~c,C'C1CC" "'o~:1.Q·.l.!!ost ce~~Jsl:1.Ly~ 
":c ~U(!~c.st) c··/.:;r·ru}e c11 !jt:lf~:" cvnsi.:i2r;J·:':ions in thE:se 
C i n.: v':::::) t.c I!C~~:';. 
. ..... 
In,:h ... ~i.:i':t,=ll rc:J.-=-.-c.if.)!.IS c.':l.~r:(~.:-,c!':tr hI'.; ~~t \'!~:itt~'ll by 
r.o' j""j '~0r:"' '7'~'.~" ')",0') ~:,.: _J_(,}", ..... ~ '. Jl'0.-; i"'-::" +·,. .. ···j2 1"": (,1-'; ,·;'.5 
......... _ ..... _ .. ' ..... ~ ' ..• c ....... \,. ..... ~ .I ••• ; ..... ~c., "".(.L _." •• _ .... ; • ..-1 
, ... -. , 
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7. 
8. 
2 
would.sec~. ~s.? result, the principle of custom und 
prCictJ.cC 11:-Jpll~.ll.y rec()e,;ni!Jcs tJ!at there is a 
:'c~:;~~;~J.si b.~?.~: ~Y. ~n . bo~:h l)··jrLies i.:? (;11~111L:LJGe clcc:l'ly . 
.:lnyt.llng Ll!<.d, l" bellcves to hnve been a !.1i.sint.c'rpr'ctation 
of on 3erccm~nt by the other party 3S soon as it is 
a\·mre of the c:d.stenc~ of any d~:-3pute. If either party 
docs !lot do [)O ~'/e bell eve that In practicc it concedes 
its riGht to do so at a later date. Any elemeht of 
ambi Guity'ln any'\industrial relations BGrcc:rnent - no 
!l1attc:r how 2t1cicnt ond no !!latter how hallm'Jed by custom 
and prDcticc - would otherwise bacome a potential 
focus of industrial conflict which would in g0ncral 
be incap~ble or loeical resoluticn because most of the 
evidencc on 1\'h1ch a decision couId be based vJould 
have been lost with the passage ot time. 
Since. thc siGning of the Local A:;recrnent at Dagenham 
"Jh~ch is tl)C subject of this d.ispute over? ye<lrs have 
elapsed end the '·J.('i ttcm record that remains of .indtlstrial 
relations nCBotiations in this period is limited. The 
Company's case is that in June 1970 both partics 
recoenJsod the normal car carryinG cClpacity of the 13 
Jnctre tr::ll1Gportc:c. 3S bEdn.g 6 cars. In our opinion, the 
eviJcnce presented below provcs the following points: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Beforc June 1970, 13 metre trailers carrying 6 cars 
were operating out of Dagenham. . 
In Dec8!ilber 1969, both parties consid~rcd normal 
working of these 13 metre trailers (which at that 
time constituted the Dagenhar.1 fleet) to be r(.:prc~ented 
by thc carriage of 6 cars. 
During the period bet\'leen June 1970 and October 1977, 
the Union had no reason to be in any doubt of the 
fact that 'che threshold for extra car payments to 
transportcr drivers ~3S the seventh car carried and 
not the.sixth. 
-4. The Union' ~ Shop StC'o'.'ard for the transporter drivers 
section at Dagenham in June 1975, was in no doubt that 
Agree~ent both before and after this date related 
extra car payments to the seventh car cG.rried c.nd not 
to the sixth and that this fact was clearly and 
exp1ici tlyaccept ed by him at that time. 
This evidence is presented in paragraphs 9 to 13 
inclusively belcw. In paragr2p~ 14 we have adrted a brief 
note of explanation as ·to what ~e believe led the Trade 
U · 't ',. d' t nl.on l.n 01:.:1S l.SpU e. 
9. . He agree that i'n the mid 1960' s, ":he:n ,13 me-l.:re tr~ilers 
were first introduced, they carried 5 cars - 3 on the 
top deck and 2 on the lo~er one. However, because of 
the prod~(;t.i vity b~ncfi t involved, the CU:"1!psny 
im~~diQtcly devote1 ~o~sidGrable cngincE~i~g effort to 
d~visin~ a satisfactory modification th&t would en~ble 3 
r:'Il"-:: tn 1)(3 (~:11'rlcd on the shN"t·.::r lo",',er dr.:;d:. '1":.'0,. 
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10',';01' dc..:L:~~ ;.:;ci one ', ... j. Lh '::~"'~'_!l:Jl()n CJ Ull 1·.1~1.' 
. '- i) :.; _ • _ _ 1 l: cl r 
1."; : ,j () i' i., j ! .,,) 10 ' .. ~. J' ~ l, ..; :: • [ , 1 J ' .,:;' ( L ~ ~ \' C -'" , ,. '1 Y :.; 1 ,.~. 
!r,odi!i.r;cl t:3.iJ.er~ to CCir~"Y 6~ cars' - ([;~eet;i)pU!1("l.i;' v 3 ). 
In tno 1'~01)".:.h of h3Y lS69 Govc-rrrr.ent lceisJ.a tion \'.'as 
in t:r'rylucl'U to P01'i1i'( the u:;e of 15 l:I(~tre Ll'~lilcr:3. This 
penn U;.t?U the COJi:p:,ny to y:-:~('ns! i tG 13 metre Ll'ailc:rs 
to contInue to carry six cars ond more. It wos not 
pel'Jni::.;sible to exLe:nd the lc..:n~th of the 10vJer dccl\ by 
thc fu~l- 2 In{.Jt:ces (from Ij rnc Lres to l~. !Detre!:;) bcc"1use 
of restrictions on the ovcrh .. 1ng permittcG. beyond the" 
rear axle. Howcvbr, it was possible to fit extension 
flops of lcniJ l.h 2 t 6". Thecc fl~lps then mad.e it 
post:iJble to carry three cars on the Im'wr dock in the 
flat 110:'3itio:1 ;'l~~ \'1011 as thr.:'e cnrs on the top deck. 
A phoLoc.i.':lph of a traiJ.er of 13 !~ ... ;-Lres H1od.ifiHl \'J.i.th 
thc~:e 2' G" (,:xtc.:nsi.on flaps is attached as /I_ppendix ,~. 
~'he COI.'lpanyt s Fleet of 65 tr~nspo!ters in 1969 \'Jas 
almost exclusi v.ely of a type thot permit ted" this 
extcnnion to be used. Virtually all trailers as a 
rcsul t hod been J[;odi.ficd to carry !':':ix curs by the end 
of 1969. Apart f:r.'oln a short period of three "lecks 
at the end of lSG9 ~nd early 1970, when there \'JRS a 
~ispute (~ce p~raeraph 10 below) on the safety of 
carrying three cors on the lower d.eck it was the 
Ilorma 1 Pl'tlC Lice throuGhout for siy. cars to be carried 
on thcse aclc\pted 13 liletre transpor ters. 
10. In 1969, just after the comp~Jny had CO:7lp1.cted the 
equippin~ of all its stand.ard 13 metre trailers \'Ji th 
2' 6" extension flnps there '.·,'<),S a short industrial 
dispute on these trailers. The Tr8de Union claimed that 
it was difficult to chain the third rear car securely. 
The dispute ~as resolved within the same day by the 
Cor.-:P'=:.l1Y I s c5:cCe;f;";r;nt to fit an addi tionaJ. cho in 2nd 
acc~pting the fact that the drivers would only carry 
five cor's until such time as the chain '.·.·as .fitted. 
Since this was a very minor modification which could 
be c:::.rricd out e:nsily and quickly 0.11 the? Co~,'!pany' s 
standard 13 ~ctrc trailers had becn fitted with a 
cC1ain of lh.is tYVe "Ji.thin t.hree \'/Ce!;::s. The a0 reemcnt 
cstabli.shcd .that, provided a safety ch3in was fittcd to 
Jhc 10','JeT U eck, nor;r.nl wo:c~dng, _q:~)) C). t1y;_d2~.~;.ifj·S':~:L~:§ 
the carrin~e of 6 c~rs, would reSl~C. A photocopy of 
thi s agrcC;:j-;;cnt -is o.tfached :J.s Appendix 5. \'le ask the 
Arbitrators to no:e that nGither this 2.[:;reemcnt nor 
the Al,;l"cc!:j:nt of June 1970 reJ.a ted to ~pucifi(:;d rr.odels. 
Both refer only to tlcars" and to v,1hat \·{as ycnsidered to 
be "norm9.1". " 
11. A 15 metre trailer was obtained and u3ed for manoeuvrability 
tests durj.ng 1969. When these tests proved satisfactory 
the CO;!iF311Y pl<~cod ol"dcrs for a m.u;,":::€i.' of 15 metre 
trailers, the first of which arrived in January 1970. 
The ~e vehicle s -\';c:c:"e cepa ble of carry5.ne seven cars) four 
on the top deck "'1nd 'i;hrec: on the lo· ... 'er dec1<.:, and this \;'::'.5 
. OJ""" c')r ''-,''''''"\ i"J~-;:n -L"'11'"' r"'~ ,.,·j·l· n a 13 riF.'~·CY·e ·~rc.ile:C8 '.'J~-jich 
'" u J..\w.t,,; """~_~ ... ·" .. _A~...;;Iv-~..) ·0-
C8r:o.ied tlu'ce on ~hc l':C'TJ deck .snd th-rce on the b-:tto;'j 
de r.k 'j'j ... I:'> d'," ; ., r. "'-(3 C 0'01 .- ~ r:u ('n t 1 \' (I I':T; -: j):1 cd en rxt r.; 
,.'. . .. - •• - • - - • .. ._ ......... _ .,. .J ~ - • ... ... .. ..~".. • 
payr:lent bt~Ce..L!!;0 tl-.ni ':, n:-oc c~rrying (/1:) ttrJ\d.·i;.:l.C~lCll c:~~~: 
,"hila thec.;~ '"l(~:"'O":'; ""+.:.-.., C' .~or,·H ""u,'d ':'~"l-:"l CO"J,Y::tl '" (;C!":.-'.l.F;:'! 
, ... ""tj .... ..L.~ l",J .. ..,.I •• ..., -'. L. "-" __ ..... "' ..... "- II, -.J 
six C£.l'G 0:4 its flc~.; t of 15 r;1e"trcc tr,tns[J:n~c~rs ~ "C;~:r'C; 
,.., . ., ~l~~ -1"(''"\ u~ "'l~'(' ':'Ii'-J" .... i,·I~(·..., --11 -j-"',() '-J"-:- '-om d"c'" :'~('r,·oi.·· :-,t5 Cl~2 
• 'I • , • ., _\""..:. I~ •• " ..... ___ • _It,,; I,., '-' ..... I ' .... ,.. \,.. \.. .... • .... '.J -
I 
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12. 
"Jcre c~;:lplctcd on 22nd June 19'10. The :iBTeci::cmt 
tllCIl 1'l.~3chcd pro'Jidcd a h.'i.~hcr b;: ::;5.c t·:~tc for dl'i vers 
op.:~rilt in!,: 15 1/:.)1.,1'0 trd 11:::1(11·' CC.'l':;· ["\..>~·:1I·,lle'.·(· OL'L 1 
- • 'oJ .. I.",) • ..10\·} J::::l~y 
C[.ll'S "Liley '·.'(~r0 (;(t1Tyin[~ on n po.rtj cular' 'Lt"'l' /). It 1 
' n. GO prov:ld cd for an 3.dditJo!1'11 TjQyr:1·:-nt of six o~ld coh'] 1 . L- .") L. l.n~s 
on any trip ,,:hen tl1c 15 nc Lre tran::;portcr ":3.8 carryfng 
the addi tiqnal C<:1r of "lhich it \'J[tS c.iJ.pablc as per, 
Appendix 2. > • 
\ 
The Local J\grCO!Jlcnt of June 1970 ':.':JS not made and 
immed.i.r!tely fO!'Gotten. The a ttochcd ffic.:mo da Led 20:l:h 
July, 1910 (f..ppcnrl ix 6) :..:lim'!s th3t :Lt "IHS the focus 
of cons:i.dcrahlc cl.iscussi.on and ba:cL;:1inine rlur.ing the 
period of its introduct.i.on. Thbre .is hO'\'levc-r, no doubt 
that the thrc:;nold for cxtra car p:1ymcnts from the 
outset lFlS j,n pr.:tctice beon thG seventh car carried. 
There j.s no record of any challc-r..?;e frO:.ll the Trade Union 
to thi s j nterprc!tation. lillY diEcrcp(jncy b0b;ccn ·\vhat 
the 0r!-,ploycc bel loves in his cntitlcrr.cmt zed 'vhat he 
has been paid c:m be and j. s normally a rnat tor for 
immediate representations ·to M3nagcmont, often with a 
shop scn!ard l)l"·c~ent. l'~o rcpl'e:JCl1'L:a i.;i ve of tile Union 
has clai!ncd th::l-~ c:t any tine from June 1970 until 
Octol)cr 19T1, :'iDj l.;r.Jn~pol'i.;er driver protested (:ven 
verbally that hc had been wronGly paid. 60 articulate 
and outspoken drivers would hardly f~il for 7 ye~rs 
to notice ar: underpayment or fail to question it. 
13 .. Seven years have not elapsed without reference to the 
Agrccm·2nt nor without challen8e from the Tr::J.de Union on 
particular other aspects of its applicution. ~l!~re are 
a liQitcd nu~ber of occ3sions wh0re a transport8r driver 
outbound with a load from DaGccl18m is involved in a 
journey that is rr:co[;niscd as being of 2 days du:cation. 
"fuethel"" such a journcy in':ol ved ene sin81e cxtr3 car 
payment (because one trip only was jnvolved) or twice 
the normal extra car p8.YDcnt \bE;;c;:~use of the 2 days 
driving) i.s not covered by the Agrccncnt. Only a 
-small fraction of the trips involve 2 d3yS driving and 
- this situa~ion.wos probably overlooked by the people 
who framed the Agrecine:nt. In June 1975 the question 
became a bone of contention. It ''l!!S scttlr:d 011 13th 
- June, 1975 by the agre8!J;cnt that .fro:n this date on':.'r;irds 
double the normal extra car pa~nent would be provi~ed 
for a 2 day t~ip involving extra cars, ~ut that no 
retrospective payments "lould be r:;ade for the fact that 
it had not been paid this way previously. The Trade 
Union negotiator W2S Mr. M. Dulicu in his capacity 
as the Shop St0ward of the Transporter DrivGrs S2ction. 
No typewritt0n version of this addendum to the 
Agre€!:ient. ",Ias rr.ade but E'r. Dulieu 2.nnotatcd his copy 
01' the ori o-ina.l Local ,An-rcement carefully 2nd explicitly 
o (.j .. • t ,"' 
with 2 new clau~e. He then siencd and datcQ 1. ~ne . 
Company has a photocopy.oI this a.nnota1..cd dccum8n~. ,A 
Copy i s provided c:S Appe!1Clix 7. 1 t_ r:h?,""~-:-b~Y2~~. ?2.'2~):: 
that 2 t thi s .-} ':!t:? the 1,.;115.0':1 f;, r~~·n:rC[:(.!'1tTl:l v.o q~..:.cr'~ 
-------, --.. --..... -~ ... -.---- -_.-_ •• ~-'.--- -:e' •• " .-. 1·":-"·:-~'''·1··---'-1 ,.. ~.,:,:, ... ,.'. , ... ,,:: tranf:,~j()rlCr ~! ~"J. '.' e l"'S r':'CG :,,::n.1.. ~(;,J (~>::::'.I. J.(;~ ;:,_ V :-~.~I,:".;'=.:!':"~_::: • 
-.--------- ------ •. _ ... r ...... __ • __ · ••••••• ___ ._ ---, ""., .... n .... , 
that -en'" e···~·,..·q c--,.. D-:"IV;"""·'Y'·,:o ··;.'·'r.-:. ~n ""~'-'''I"!C·C OJC!18 ~:_·-.'e .1· .. 
---- ~-!;..::..-::'--::--.~-~-:-~.:.~~~';;.~.:::~ . .:..:..-...;:..:-...:..~ . .------_ .. -. 
cur C2 !."r'~I. ~.:) ::::'1Q T'!O-( 1"::'!'" ,:;) ;':1:.J1. . 
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thc di!:.pute [lro~e. It i~ our conLci1ti.on th;lt it "/as 
t:ci~r~0.recl by tIlC coincidence of 2 f;~I.;tors j n the ;\utw;)n 
f I f!"'( ,m ,. . . t o -../1. liW J_.I_1·~· i-,'r.J,s n tL'L'~)Or<:ry reduction of 
"" output fruJn Ford' s D~CC'Dh:!IJ1 plant '"h i eh hod the effect 
of r.1:1re j r!(1l1y rC'c1ucinG the carnin[,s of the D;"!r;cnham 
tr;:3~:.;porL~r Liri-:ers. Tb?, second \'/:15 their di~covery 
du!,~nG Un.s pcrJ_od that -..:.ne tr~H1!3pu!'lcr dr-i vcrs 
at thc Cor:jp~my' s other D1:3jor deport jn II:llc\',lood \.,;cre 
y. recclv.i.nG cxtr\it Cf1r payments for S 3:5 \'Iell -(-~s for 7 cars. 
The clnim, we believe, was initially presented bocause of an 
underlyIng desire to achieve immediate parity with 
drivers at: the COIIl;J3ny' s JIalC\'Jood plr.mt. Retrospection 
\'13S not rHmtioi:wd. 111e Compnny then dC'Inonstrated 
conclusively 'tha'~ in the 1910//1 period Dascnham and 
Halc~oo1 had negotiated totally different local 
3eree~cnts ·on the introduction of the 15 metre transporters: 
(Dl1[jcnlliJ.rn h8d obi:.alned a higher bnsic rate than Hale,·.'Ood. 
1'h).5 sl:~:1:"l diffe:ccnce In uo.sic rates for tranf3porter 
d ri VOl'S behlC..'en D:lgcnham Dnd HaluvJOod. drivers has 
continued to the end of 19'17. lIa1~\-:ood ho.d :3truck a 
bareain on extra car paYMents more favourable to the 
drivers than that struck at Dagen113.m). The claim from 
the Union at Dn~cnham then appears to have become 
tr..-;nfj:nutcd for the first time into a challer~E;e to the 
inteJ.~lJL·c La Lion of the Local AgrCe!iicnt of Jt,nc 1970. 
At this ·time also the first demand for retrospective 
pUYlllen Ls ":as Inode. 
l5i The Union's delay in challenging the Company's' 
interpretation of the 1970 agreement has a further 
effect. If the panel finds that the Union's contentions 
are rieht it will or rnsy be open to the Union to claim 
back pa'~n(;-nts .for its rr:c;;:oers frc~:1 1970 to date. This 
raiscs ~wo fundamental difficulties. Fist, by no means 
all 1;he pr<:sent transporter drivers have b8cn employed 
continuously throughout this period. Secondly, the 
Cumpany's pay roll records only go back to 1974 and 
the Comp~ny has no means of calculating the m;.!lJber of 
cars carried by each driver beyond that yenr. A-t best, 
therefore, the p3nel_.~ould only m3ke a rough estimate 
of the enoropriate back pnymcnt which "}O"llld aJ.:;:ost 
certainl~·be wrong and would prejudice the Company, while 
unfairly 1c~~fiting existing drivers with short or 
relatively short periods of service. Within the broad 
teri1~s of reference of the panel the Con.p8.ny therefore 
advances these furthGr reasons for inviting the panel 
to reject the Union's c~aim. 
Dated thc I j.tf-. day of January 1978. 
-
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CASE 9 
BOARD OF ARBITRATIOU BET';[~EN . , INDUSTRIAL SERVICES 
. -
. AND THE JJ·IAIDPJ1ATED UNION OF ENG!NEERn~G WORKERS (C.S.) • 
" 
.--" . 
. 
\. 
. -:-'~. STATEMEl;r' OF CASE OF 
A. U • E. W. (Cm~STR'C'CTI0I1AL SECTION) 
......... ,I.i 
. . "- .. 
, \ .' 
"' ..... ~----
- ,. 
1. On the 14th December, 1916 1-:r. C: . vas inctructed to tako & crane 364 
><. 
to :Co~_Crane Bire. In nccordance with the fim' s_.no~~EJ practice 
there was negotiation on the length of running tlIJe to be allowod Slld, 
after discusGion, this was agreed at five hours. This is recordod in 
Document No o 10 
2. Mr. G: i returned to Slough Depot shortly after midnight on the 
15th December, 1976 to find instruotions for his next job at l~, Slough, 
at 7030 a.m. on the 15th December, 1976. Accordingly he prepared the 
crane immediately and left the yard for home at 12.45 on the 15th December, 
1976. He returned to the yard at 4.30 a.mo , i.e. three-and-three-quarter 
hours later. 
3. At the end of the week Mr. G completed his time sheets in respect of 
the Coventry Crane Hire job and the Mars, Slough, job. 
4. This document, DocUI!lent No.2, sho .... s that Mr. G- - completed the time sheet 
for Coventry in accordance with hie agreement ... i th Mro .- ., recorded 
in Document NOe 1. Document No. 2 also recorde the time booked for the y~ 
job, 1.e. one hour each way travelling tioe • The job card for the ~~S job 
.. _ .... 
is attached (Doc~ent No o 3)0 
5. On the 21st December, 1976 Mr. ~ in the presence of Mr. 
- Union Shop ste ... a....""d, accused Mro G· j or falsifying his time sheets in respect 
of the Coventry job and suspended y~. G 1 fro:= work on full pay (which he 
had never received). Mr. r - infoI"Ced the Union's Divisional OrganiBer, 
.... 
6. On the 5th Janua..ry, 1977 M=. It":-' . ... 1th Mro " , the Deputy Shop Steward 
.... :J.lch~ a. to see it there was aIrJ'. change in Mr. "(.. . I. •• 
attitudo and was told by Mr. that he wa.s consulting hie legal. departmento 
refe~d to Section 10 of the Consolidated Crane Agreement. 
(Document No o 4). 
',10. 
365 On the 10th January, 1911 Mro . " D1v1s1o~ Organisor, 
met with 1'1Z'. at the Slough Dapot togothor .,1 tb. Hrc. 
and Y1Z'. : 
• Mr. \ :, explained the implications of the 
~ployment Proteotion Act and tho Conso1idatod Crano Agree~cnt. 
" : ~ response .... &8 a refusal to ro-emp1oy r1Z'o 
to which }1r, i" 3sponded that in those circumstances all 
A.U.E.~. (Constructional Section) worker. wsre .... ithdrawing their labour. 
At no time did Mr. G:" ,. depart from the agreed formula and system la.id 
down and evidenced by Docuoent No. 6 .hich sets out the agreement for 
booking travelling and rigging' time. 
Industrial Services is a member of the Contractors' Plant 
Association.' That association has an agreement .... lth the A.U.E.~. 
(Construotional Section) knovn as the Consolidated Crane }~eecent. 
(nocuoent No.4 already referred to). 
11. Seotion 8 lays down disciplinary procedures and Section 10 provisions 
for the avoidance of disputes. 
12. B7 Section 8 a verbal 'Warning shall be given to the operatiTe ot the 
- 13. 
employers' dissatisfaotion. No suoh verbal warning was gi von. Nor 
Va8 the Union (Shop steward) notified., It ~s not blow it a:rq entry 
. 
was made in the operative's record for no such doc~ent has been provided. 
Indeed until this d~epute no employee nor indeed the Union ~as a~are ot 
the existence of such record. 
Further by section 8 (2) no further verbal wa.rn1ng confimed in 'V2'1t!ng 
vas given to Mr. G,"· or his Shop Ste~ard. 
14. BySeotion 8 (4) in the eTent or alleged gross industrial mlsconduoi the 
"~plo"'6r i~' req,uired to investigate as quickly as practica.ble, (andit 
366 
fair hearinb of the o~erative ani the local rcprese~tative of the Union. 
Mr. G:: :\ 'Was sUspended on the 21st December, 1976 but there .... as no 
fair hearing indeed there 'Was no hearing <:.t all. 
15. -- Nor 'Ulldo:!" Seotion 8 (5) was Mr. G,.. 'Warned that an investigation 
into alleged gross industrial misconduct 'Was taking place. 
16. Under Seotion 8 (4) in the eTent of alleged gross industrial misconduot 
it is intended that the local representative ehould be present. Unlike 
other SectionD the 'Words "Shop Steward" are not indicated. This c1ear1,. 
means that it is the Full-Time Official of the Union 'Who should be present. 
The intention is to make the Union officially aware of the seriousness of 
the cr~ge and its possible implications on the relationship between the 
employer ~~d the Union. 
17. Section 10 of the Consolidated Crane l~eement is headed "Procedures for 
the Avoid nce of Disputes". po The prinoiple lying behind this oection 
1& that there should be no action taken by either side until the procedure 
agreement has been exhausted. 
18. In the present case it is clear that as early as ~~e 21st ~~cember, 1976 
a dispute existed. In accordance with Seotion 10 (3)(c) the matter 'Was 
referred to the local official of the Union, ~~o Winterilood, by the 
Shop steward, fol1owiLg the" meeting with Mr. Richard. Baldwin when ~1r. Griff 
vas IJUSpended. 
..... ... , 
19. In accordance with Section 10 (3)(d) 11r. W.~ ... . notified the General 
Secreta.~ of the A.U.Ea~. (Constructional section)o 
, , 
20. On the 11th January, 1977 acting innccordanoe 'With Section 10 (3)(C) 
the General Secretary wrote to Mra J of the Contractors' Plant 
Association (Document No o 7) suggest ~ a meeting in an ;l.ttempt to 
210 It was not until the 2nd February, 1977, three weeks later, that 
a reply was received from the Contractors' Plant Association 
(Document No o 8). The Union vae unable to accept the terms for 
a meeting', ~eli a full return to work, for the Union's Ar~ent 
vas that ~ndUBtrial Services has not complied vith either 
-Section 8 or the terms of Section 10 0 A letter dated the 7th 
Februar.r, 1977 (Document No.9) vas sent sett1.ng out the Union's 
attitude. 
367 
22. Shortly before that letter vas received a meeting took place at 
the Head Office of the A.U.E.W. (Construotional Section) vith 
the Assistant Ceneral Secretary and Mr. _ •.•. ,,-J ..... At 
that meeting the Assistant General Secretary reaffirmed the Union's 
desire to see the provisions of the Consolidated Crane Agree~ent applied 
but Y.r •• refused to reinstate Mr. c.~ 
, 23. A further meet~ took place on the 27~ January, 1977 attended by 
" and his Legal Adviser, }tr. :. At that 
meeting Mr. .~ through his Solicitor 8e~ re!~ed to 
reinstate Mr. C: mt said the,.- vould resoind their dismissal 
contained in Document No 5. and. offer hila a ~ equivalent to redund2.ll07 
pay. That offer v~ not acceptable to the Union. 
24. On the 9th February, 1977 a letter from the Contracto~' Plant Association 
25. 
. 
(Document No. 10) vas received by the A.U.E.V. (Constructional Section) 
stating that . Industri~ Services had offered to suspend 
Mr. C'.' . until a central Conference could take place. No such 
suspension was in fact ever cffered as set out in paragraph 22, the only 
offer made vas a sum equivalent to redundancy pa;y. 
SUMMARY: National Agre~ents such as the A.U.E.W. (Constructional 
Section)/Contractors' Plant Association 1s designed to avoid preoiselr 
-the situa,tioD which has arisen in this case. 
" 
" 
, ! 
~ .. , ,,' 
" 
. '. 
26. Section 8 laya dc~~ 10 very. clear terms consiotent with the 368 
reco=mendations set out in the A.C.A.S o guide exactly ~hat should 
be done if an e~ployer haa any complaint about the conduct of one 
of his employees. Yet Seotion 8 vas never complied vith b.7 
Industrial Services. No verbal warnings were given, 
no follo~up written varnings were given and the local Official 
vas not involved in the way that Section 8 intended nor was the 
Full-Time Official involved until after a written dismissal ~aa 
given. No enquiry took place and notification given of its 
existence nor vrus l"1.%'. G' . and the Official ever given a hearing 
so that l':r. G' • could present his version of the dispute. The 
only meeting of any relevance was when 1'1.%'0 G : vas suspended yet 
if the charge was gross industrial misconduct the procodure of enquiry 
followed by a hearing was never adhered to. At all times Mro G. 
has denied falsifying his time sheets, no evidenoe has ever been presented 
aDd most iclportantl;y Mr. G: haa never been given the opportunity of 
defending himself againsto 
27. Seotion 10 is designed to bring 10 the Ful1-T~e Officials and the Read 
Office of the Union in order to deal with matters quick17 to prevent 
industrial action occurring. It is clearly designed to matntaiA the 
Btatu~quo pe~ding discussion at employer/head office level ~et Br 
Industrial Services have never at aD7 the been prepared to re!.nsta.te 
and to allo~ th~rocedure to operate • 
. '
11th July, 1917. 
" ' 
" . 
, ! 
,I 
-'" 
\ 
Dra!t J~:;?~ 
7.7.77 369 
'. !.ndustrial Services and A::algamatcd Union oi' ~giL.eering 
Reference to Arbitration. 
i:or~ers 
1. The original dispute betllJeen ourselves c.:ld the AUE\~ sterns 
from our discissal of one of our Crane Drivers employed at our Slough 
Depot n:u:ely , "\ for alleg~d fnlsification of his til!:e 
sheetG. \1e had !'eason to believe that til:le sheets were not being filled 
in correctly. On 1.12.76 we ~ote to Mr. G:-iffin on this subject regarding 
allebed ~~~crePancies in bis time sheet for the week ended 25.11.76. Coil 
herewith. On 14.12.76. we issued ~ fo~l written notice to all drivers at 
Slout;h ~pot regarding correct completion of ti::le sheets - copy l::erewi the 
2. On V~d.neBd.ay 21.12.76 { , .... as S'UI!l:loned to the office together with 
the Slo'J3h Shop Ste .... ard 1 J and Was interviellJed by Hr. r 
regardins the tice sheets he had put in for the 14th/15th and 16th December. 
It ... as put to 14!:l 'by H:r. : _ that he Was claicing a total of 15 hours 
for the Coventry job he had been ecployed to do .... hereas in fact he .... as only 
enti tIel! to claic 13 hours 35 t:ins. havin; arrived back at our SlO'.)gh Depot 
11.30 p.o. and leaving 11.35 p.m. on the 14th De(emoer and not 1 a.m. on the 
15th ~~c::lber as sho\o1ll on his time sheet.: , denied this. Hr.:: .~, 
poi~ted cut there vere t~o indepe~d~nt witnesses as to hie tir.e ~f arrival 
back to t!le Depot but .:.~" :..: c:ainta;ped his denial. ~:r. a. ~ also alleged 
aecord.i~g to his ti!:e a~eet \ l .... as clai.!::iz:.g a total of 1n Loure fo=-
"'~jnesdaJ" the 15th Decez:::ber 1976 all at double ti::e rate (r..o 4- tours 'break) 
whereas the correct total ..... as 11'; hcr.uos. 8 hO".lrs flat 33- hc-...u-a o7erti::;e .. 
Like...,-{-ae in respect of ThursCay the 16th ~eecber 1976 t: elsi=ed he 5 
started .. 'ork at 8.a.o. -whereas accordin.g to ~ r-ecord.s he did r.ot a..~ve i!l 
the Depot lmtil 8.30 a.::1. ~~. E, ' :l told the ~tter ""o~ld be' 
investisated further and meanwhile he vas suspended on full ~e. 
3. After Chris~ o~ Tuesday 4.1.77 having considered the ~tter carefully 
Hr. • . met ri th a Y.r. 
representative of the AurJ ~.r. 
, .. - .. 
.. -.-.- -.~-
~ the area orgciser and the lccc;.l 
."" 
, (snop Steva;rd) a.=.d Deputy S'tSard 
-'4 _ 
'. COLe .... as diseu.ssed vi th P..r. \,;; =-' '- and Hr. B. 
indicated he "lllS minded to dismss G, . fer this faldfication of Lis time 
sheets whic1l .... e considered alUountod to g:-oss macor-duct justi:fyi~g iz:.stant 
dis::U.ssal. Hr. \i. '. var:ed there \:ould be trouble and in fact Mr. R(.~. 
1 
said ":iSht ~ere On strike" • Dep-.lty Stei.::a...""d !t and Hr. WI ! (local 
orgalliser) looked very sunrised and Davis Eaid uwo t hacg on a c:i.:lute Ires" 
but ~ . !:'.ada his 'Way to the office door a!ld repeated "we're on strike". 
All three o! them 'Walked out of the yard arguing 'loudly as they ""alked 1.:1' the 
road. Later ,p , ;,:':": (Steward) said to ce "lve had to do this Richard, Tony 
is Qy best friend". I re:plied tl'l.,at this is totally unacceptable Wld. art 
J 
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situa~ion befo:,c a central coLIerence could be co~~~ned. ~e:,c vas 
£~:;'';;ii;q' ... ~n'ny a ,"ote te.ken on tre -c:'..!~~tic~ c! :1 :;~:':'::'= t:r-1 C:.lt of 43 =:::1 
"'ho voted te~ 'Were in faV~ur of strike action and in fact the Am,; men at· 
our SlO'Jgh Depot have been on strike ever since tben. 
4. O.:! \:~c:.:.czcb.Y'5.1 .. 77 '.Ie delivered ";ritten notice to G~ . inform:;; 
bie he .... as di£cl.szed fort:l:Jith - see copy letter attached. 
5. On ~uc6d.ay 25.1.77 r.ot\dthstallding 11 clear z:a.jority vote asaf.n,at st:::-il:e 
'by 33 to 10 the oen at our Stockton D:pot .... ere instructed to CO::le out on 
stril~e by tl:.eir U!llon the ATJEJ ar.d have been on "strike ever since. On tha.t 
SaDa day our l·!r •...• ..,:- '0' ' :j cet r.epresentaUves of the A"fJE.of for furthe:-
discussions and it ""as agreed that a full scale ceeting should be ~nve~ed 
at the Headquarters of the AUDI at Claphao tha .follo .. 'ing day T'.nursday tha 
27th J~ 1m at lihieh r ,n would be present and r..lso our legal adviser 
vith Hr. B 
6. ~ Thursday 27.1.77 'We atte~ed the caeting at the Union Eeadq~rs at 
Clap!lam and put fOT\ll'<ll'd our c.:l.Se rega.~in~ the dis::::d.c;sal of . 
'Who \;a,G present nt the oeeting as was Er. the Slough Shop Steward 
nnd Eaveral other Union Representatives headed by Hr. n the .Azsistant 
Secretary of the ATJDi. After more than t'Wo hours discussion durir.g 'tlhich 
C'''r~ t"..ain t..:U..:led tL.at he md simply z=ade an honest oistake on his title "beet::! 
and \Ie t:a.inWned it WaB delibrate falsification tnere ":as a brief adjoarll-
:lent co that we could consider putting forward &I1 offer in an atteltpt to 
resolve the dispute. The ceeting was reconvened and 1ie said \Ie were l're~d 
to reinstata the four cen ~ho bad been die=issed na=ely Roberts, Banner, Ei~gro· 
end Dyer and take back all tba other cen on strike C-..1t we 'Were r:ot pre;.a=cd 
to rei::..!:tate G J but that \:e wo-Illd ~.y l:i!:l an ez bl"'a~::t. lJar-ent e~ui"{a1c:lt t, 
his rec!~da.ncy.~ in z'ctu..""=l :01' .... hich ,.e wanted the strike action E'USJ'enc~d 
nnd the ter-...3 of the :lotiee dated 14.12.76 ""tich we had issued to all e.rivers 
regardir...g the ccc;>letion of title sheets strictly observed in the future. T:.is 
cffer \,'",3 Ni''.:.Sed by }1r. S- '.&!l wto insisted O!l tl::e total rei~ta.te:e~t 
of Griffin a=.d \"'ho also ~ee it clea!" t~t he \.'.:;s not interested in follo...-i::¢ 
the proced~e·laid down in Sectlon X of the Consolitated Crane Agree:ent 
for 'Os avoi~ce of disp-'.ltes l:.!l.less ~d ~"ltil Griffin 'Was rirst rei. .... stated. 
The ceeting therefore achieved nothing and the strike or u.dustrial action 
baa continuedfro~ teat day. 
7. As a result of disC".lSsiollS 'With the Contraetors Plant Associat!on C?A 
to ""hi~ 'We b~lo~ .r~~~er atte=?ts were ~de by the~ during FebrJ3-~ 
to sat the AUI:J to concur in the 'co~v~nino of a Central. ConfeNnce 
but they ::let wi. th no core success than we did beca.us"e the AW.l continued 
to i~i6t that before they would atte~d any Central Co=ierence Griffin 
must be rei~tated. Ve would refer the Board of Arbit~tO:5to the letters 
free the AU~ to the CPA of 7.2.77 and 14.2.77 copies herew~th and th~ letter 
!ro::1 the AU2 .. 1 to Wa.""i.n~ Ltd. clau.:d 2.5.77 - copy herewith. In J1.:1le 1977 
the CPA issued a statecent setting out their version or these events - copy 
bere .. "ith and the AUEJ iseued a circular in reply dated 14.6.77 _ cO'OY herevith. 
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8. On 21.3.77 :,~ __ . ~de applicatic:l to the Industrial TribuncU. for 
cC:lpeuation (NOT p_~:mSTAT~~:T) for ul'lfair disc.issal and on 12.4.77 'We filed 
our reply. A d.:lte for tb.e h~aril:g of his a;:;Jlicatic:l •. :as event\;illy f~~j 
for Tuesday 21.6.77 at the London Regio~~ Office of the Industrial Trib~ 
lr.lt on 13.6.77 G~ ",:rotc! to the Tribunal stati::g that 1:9 \.'is=ed to \:i t~a"" 
biB a~lication and we ~ere so inforced. On 22.6.77 ~e received the official 
decision ot the IndU.6trial Tribunal to tho effect that "the I:!t'>nlicntion '53 
.. 
dic::lir::sed O!l ,,;1 tbi!'C'l.\-:~ by the p.:~~licD.ntlt. 
9. Heanwhile follo ... "ing several inforItal oeetings and discussions between 
the representatives of the CPA and AUFJ a cajor ceating ~as convened and 
took place on Tb-.:.rsday 26.5.77 attended by O".lr Hr. 1:. .:l, Repres(!=.t.:lt!vc~ 
of J...UE,J, CPA a:ld E::gineering ~ployers Federation. EO'c:ever no ll.zreeoent 
cO"~d be reached because the AVEJ maintained their re~~a1 to proceed to 
Central Co:rl'erence as provided by the Consolidated CraLe AgrE:eI!:~nt unless 
.e first reinstated ~ 1 \.'hich .... e refused to do. 
10. Industrial ~ction had escalated and tr~atened to becooe nation viee 
an a result of :which folloiNi!l$ further disC'" ... ~sions oot ... een oursolves the 
CPA and the A.u::.I it .... as agreed the situation be referr.;;d to arbi tratior! 
and that ACAS be inTi ted to act as mediators - see CPA St.1.te::ent dated 17.6.77 
berc ... 1. th. 
SU'?2aS$l c;r.s : 
~e ~nsolidatp.d Crane AgTee~ent .... as co~cluded and si~ed bj the CPA end A~ 
on 9.7.76 (Co¥y enclosed herewith) 
S~ct5.c~ 111 cc~t:~d::...."!s IGe~e!""'l Cc::ditic~sl ~.::d ~':.::J f:~c-tic~ 8 l':'!!;"o? 11 !'1'!"t'?3 
to discipli.:::.a.-J" proeec!u..-e az:.d the ~arI:.i:lOS .. :::ri.ch seoul.: be si Ve!l beth to 
, . 
the cperat!:ves and the U:UO:l Representatives. \1e c:.llnt.ai!l ti:..at our let-;~:" 
to G J dated 1.12.76 aDd the notice of 14.12.76 cc,=.ntibted S".lch 
var--1.Il.o-s .• 
In €'"'.:b-'V'''''''~,=~ 8 (4) ::'.':"e 12 relatinz to a.11e;cd s:-css ciseoz:o-::ct 
. . 
it is provided ~ t on illvestiga tion sb.all take :place OLd \ ... ne:-e the 
decision is for su=:a.ry distissal it shall be given i:l .... :-i -:l.:lo. ~;e Wrl'tri:-. 
that the l.!lvestigation carried out by us, the meeting ... "ith ~ - - 'l end t:'e 
Sloubb SbopSte .... ard on 12.12.76 e.nd our subsequent letter of distissal dated 
. wll9 
5.1.77 a CC;;t o:! .tich.1sent to :... s - Shop Stewa-~ (Local Representative) ,! 
co=stitote proper ~otice in aecor~ce with ~e p:"o7isio~ ot t~t su~cectio~. 
U:'!.ccr 8 (\"i) it is provided thtlt an app~a1 t:.2y be r:ade by the o~rative i!l 
accorda=ce ... ~th tea proceeure fo: avoidance of Ci~~tes set out in Secti=-!l X. 
~~c'tio~ X ?!-cee:''.:..~ for the Avoid~ce of D:.~":rltes piovides fi).r negotintic::s ,I 
for settle::ent of disputes and t::aiDterri"nea of nor=al wo~~~S curinS the ;:rocass 
ot such ~egotiatic=s. It is stated specifically i!l Sectio!l X (1) ~t t~e=e . 
·~':c::.s 
shall be no s~o;page of vor~ or ot~er in~~trial actio!l ~til the p:o~w-
of the lX="Ocadure laid do ... rn UIldel' Section X ~ve bee::l exhausted. 
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2:::=-:""". ~ (,q Prt--tidea tr .... ,.t if nfter ne~otiatio!lS be-;; ... een the (:cployee 
£.rid his union on toe one ht:.Dd und the D:Jployer on tho other hand the C3.tt€:r 
still rc~ \m!'ecolved then it r:a.y be referred to the E:cecutive of the 
UniC!l ~d tl1~ C?\ cr.ci /lei t:lcr wdy l·~. tI.i~n refer tee r::attl?r to a Cent:-ol 
Co:ll'c!"(:nee fo!' cettleoent". 
It it:; o''-X cC':,,:';~::..tion tl:.at \o.'e \Jere entitled in aecorC.ance ... 1 th the ~Ovi6icn.a 
of Ssctio!l 111 (8) (iv) to dicoiss Griffin for cross oluconduct. ~e 
ful"t~er fi'.:1.:rl t tnat nOilnere in tho Consolidated Crane A;ree:::ent ie it 
G~tcd either e~1?rcssly or icpliedly that the Section X procecure for 
the av~idw~ce of dic?Jtea can only be invoked provided the e~ployee 
concerr.cd is rei~tated. On the contrary we contend that Section X cakes it 
C! 
clea.;" t~t ~o:-....:U. \Ior:.dn; c!ull continue until the pro.eaure has been exh.:1.u:;ted. 
~'he :.~ at ill ti::es refused lllld ctill refuse to attend a Central Ccnfere~-:e 
-. is reinstated. 
'w'e c.rlnt.1in t."lat is a breach by the AUF:.~ of the procedure laid dO'".ll in 
Secti • .,n X for the OlVoid.aDce of disputes. T!:e AUF:.'l the~fo!'C p:-evented the 
Scctic~ X proced~ ~ operating. 
DATED this lI1tdaY of July 1977 
, , 
" 
Appendix 6 
Extracts from Arbitration Awards (Ad hoc Arbitration, 
Case Studies, Chapter Nine). 
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INTRODue Tl O~ - Case 9 
1. -By minute dated 6 July 1977, the AdvisoiY, Conciliation &- Arbitration 
Service (ACAS) referred for settlement by a Soard of Arbitration a difference 
between - -; Industrial Services ~ (the Company) and the Amalgama ted 
Union C?f Engineering Workers (Constructional Section) (AUEW (e». The 
Soard consisted of . '; OBE, MA, independent Chairman 
appointed by the ACAS, Mr : - ., nominated on behalf of the employers' 
side, and Mr J CIiISC, nominated on behalf of the workpeople' s 
side. 
-2. The terms of reference were: 
liTo determine whether the Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers (Constructional) or . Industrial Services 
prevented the terms of the Consol idated Crane Agreement 
procedure for the avoidance of disputes from operating. 1/ 
SAC K GROlJND 
3. On 21 December 1976, a crane driver, Mr A G; , was suspended on 
basic pay by SIS, on the grounds that he had allegedly falsified time sheets. 
On 5 January 1977, SIS wrote to Mr GI . , Informing him that further 
investigations had indicated that he had been guilty of gross misconduct and 
that h:? v'vas therefore dismissed. 
4. Fol 100Ning a meeting on iO January 1977 betvveen representatives of SIS 
and the AUEW(C), other employees at the Companyl s Slough depot stopped work 
in support of a demand that Mr G should be reinstated, pending consideration 
of his case under the industry's procedure. Four of the strikers were subsequent-
-
. Iy dismissed on the grounds that they had broken their contract of employment 
with 815. On 25 January, employees at the Company1s Stockton depot joined the 
stoppage. 
5. In subsequent discussions, AUEW(C} complained that in deal ing wi th 
Mr G:-' --; case, BIS had been in violation of procedure. The union insisted 
that the case must be dealt with In accordance with the provisions of the 
conso; idated Crane Agreement (CCA), but the parties were unable to agree 
--arrangements for doing this and in June 1977 agreed to refer their difference to 
arbitration. 
.- 2-
-. ," 'OM. . 
ftz' • ~ ', .... 'nz ft, .. n" 
MAIN REPRESENTATIONS SY AUEW(C} 
6. The Union maintained that in dealing with Mr G, case, BI Shad 
not adhered to the disciplinary provisions of the eCA to which, as members 
of the Contractors' Plant Association (CPA), SIS were party. In particular, 
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BIS had not given Mr G, a verbal warning of their dissatisfaction, nor had 
the Company nC?tified the shop steward as r~qulred by Section III, Clause (8)(b)(i) 
of the CCA; there had been no verbal warning confirmed In writing in 
accordance with Clause (8)(b){ii); the provisions of Clause (8)(b)(iv)(v) relating 
to gross misconduct cases had not been followed, as Mr Gr j had not been 
warned that his case was being investigated, nor had there been a fair hearing 
of the employee with a full-time official "present. Furthermore, action had 
not been taken under Section X of the CCA. 
7. In givIng official support to the stoppage, the AUEW(C) aimed to persuade 
SIS to reinstate Mr G , pending resolution of his case under the CCA 
procedure. The AUEW(C) did not dispute that a man could be dismissed for 
gross misconduct, but they were concerned that such cases should be dealt with 
In accordance with what they regarded as good industrial relations practice, 
as ,laid down in the CCA. 
8. SIS had not only failed to adher'e to the procedure under the CCA. They 
had also failed to observe what was regarded as good practice in industry 
generally with regard to disciplinary cases, as laId down in the ACAS Code 
of Practice. 
9. I twas cor:nmon practice in the industry for crane drivers to claim hours 
additional to those worked; the practice was so generally followed and so 
widespread that while accepting that It was a malpractice the AUEW(C) did not 
consider that It constituted gross misconduct. 
10. SIS alleged that its crane driver employees had been notified that 
falsification of time sheets would merit instant dismissal. Many crane drivers 
had not been aware of the notice Issued by the Company, as this had not been 
issued to employees on an Individual basis, but had been posted on notice boards 
"where it had, In one Instance, been obscured by other papers. The AUEW(C) 
had all along made clear to SIS that if they had any complaints about time sheets 
or other malpractices they should raise the matter with the Union, but the 
Company had never done this. 
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11. In dismiss.ing Mr C" --; SIS had not made him aware of his rights of 
appeal against dismissal under eCA procedure. 
MAIN REPRESENTAT10NS BY SIS 
12. The Company contended that Mr (- s offence constituted gross 
mIsconduct and that SIS h3d followed CCA procedure for handling such 
cases, in which the procedure provided for an appeal to be made on behalf of 
the employee to Central Conference. BIS were quite prepared to go to Central 
Conference, but AUEW(C) had refused to do so unless Mr Griffin was first 
reinstated. 
13. The AUEW(C) had contended that the practice of claiming for time not 
worked was so widespread in the industry t~at it should not be classified as 
gross misconduct, but BIS could not share this view. In fact, a notice had been 
issued on 14 December 1976 warning all crane drivers that they would be 
instantly dismissed If they were found to have falsified their time sheets. 
14. Mr C. had thus, in common with ail the other crane drivers, been given 
a general warning; he had been interviewed regarding his offence In the 
presence of a shop steward on 21 December; he had been told in writing on 
5 January of the reason for his dismissal. Thus, the Company contended, they 
had done everything required of them under the CCA in relation to cases of 
gross misconduct •. 
15. As to the AUEW(C) contention tha t Bl S should have made Mr Griffin aware 
of his right of appeal, his contract of service made clear that he was employed 
In accordance with the provisions of the CCA; furthermore, the Company had 
wrItten separately to him on 5 January notifying him of his right of appeal. 
AWARD 
16. It was clear from our terms of reference and from the statements made 
at the hearing that both the Employer and the Union regarded the Consolidated 
Crane Agreement of July 1976 as the basis of their relationship and considered 
themselves bound by its provisions, at least from November 1976, when the 
firm applied for membership of the Contractors l Plant Association •. In particular 
they accepted the rules embodied in Section III (8) Disciplinary Procedure and 
Section X (1)-(4) Procedure for the Avoidance of Disputes. 
·t 'i_ 
17. We find, however, that the Employer: 
(I} - did not toke adequate steps to inform all hi s employees 
of the Agreement and its provisions in relation to their 
Contract of Employment; 
(ti) did not follow the Disciplinary Procedure laid down in 
the Agreement as carefully as he should have done, especially 
with regard to giving adequate warning to an employee whose 
behaviour was considered to be unsatisfactory and informing 
him of his right of appeal; 
(III) In particular, did not give Mr Griffin a fair hearing as 
required by Section III (8)(b)( iv) of the Agreement. 
18. At the same time we find that the Employer had the right to dismiss 
Mr G. r after first suspending him for alleged gross misconduct. 
19. We find that the Union, for their part, 
(0 resorted to strike action too early and too precipitately, 
and long before the Procedure for the Avoidence of Disputes 
had been exhausted; 
(Ji) did not adequately assist Griffin to appeal against his 
dismissal; 
(Itr) insisted on his re-instatement, which they had no right to do, 
before participating in any discussions or negotiations for the 
solution of the dl spute. 
20. Our conclusion Is that both the Employer and the Union were responsible 
for actions which prevented the procedures from operating, and for violating 
the Agreement, in letter or in spirit. 
. RECOWMENDATIONS 
21. Our terms of reference related to the responsibility for violating the 
Consolidated Crane Agreement, and we have found that both parties must bear 
[ 
[ 
.£ 
[, 
! 
[: 
[~ 
II 
[: 
1 
r 
some responsibillty. It Is not justifiable, however, for either side to refuse f 
-.1. 
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to negotiate for a solution of the dispute on the ground that the other side has 
violated the Agreement. Nor is It reasonable for either side to lay down 
cond it ions, such as tha t the s tr ike mus t be ended or tha t G- ,must be re-
instated, before it will even meet the other side and consider possible solutions 
to the ,dispute. We have been acutely conscious throughout this hearing, that 
the urgent need is not to apportion blame for what has been done and not 
done in the past but to resolve the dispute and take steps to re-establ ish good 
relations in the future. To this end we strongly urge that the following action 
should be taken: 
(a) by the Company: 
(I) to suspend Gr , on full pay (that Is, average earnings 
for the four weeks before he was dismissed) from the 
date of this award until his case is settled; and to re-instate 
the four other workers who have been dismissed; 
(ti) to ensure that in future important letters to employees 
. 
are sent by recorded delivery post; that copies of such letters 
are handed to the local representative of the Union; that 
important notices to staff are issued to them individually wi th 
their pay s lips and tha t al I notices are posted on notice boards 
fixed in appropriate places; 
(iii) to send copies of this Report and Award to all employees 
and to officers of the Contractorsl Plant Association. 
(b) by the Union: 
(I) to call off the strike immediately; 
(ii) to send copies of this Report and Award to all trade union 
members, shop stewards and union officials concerned. 
(c) by the Company and the Union: 
(i) to have the alleged gross misconduct of G investigated, 
as a matter of urgency, either by a Central Conference (section 
X(4) of the Agreement), or by the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service, or by an independent body; in order that 
the case may be settled one way cr the other; 
-6-
(i i) to summon a Central Conference, as soon as Gin 
case has been settled, to discuss matters on which there is 
dispute, and to try to resolve them in a spirit of give and 
take; 
(Hi) to re-affirm acceptance of the Consolidated Crane Agreement, 
and to undertake to follow its provisions in letter and in spirit. 
SignedJ (C ha i rrr. an) 
'-, 
-' 
'-7 -
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IN TRODLC TI ON Case 4 
1. By minute dated 18 February 1977, the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) referred for settlement by a Board of Arbitration 
a dl fference between' 
the I 
I, . t Bakery (the Company) and 
UnIon {URTU} The Board consisted of 
.. 
ACAS, Mr . 
,'., '. independent Chairman appointed by the 
I, nomInated on behalf of. the employers' sIde and 
Mr r· J, nominated on behalf of the workpeople's side. 
2. The terms of reference were: 
"to determIne whether, In all the cIrcumstances, '" 
Nottingham, are justified In adjusting Van Salesmen's commission 
---_._--_._._---- -. 
to take account of the Increase In bread prices since the 
Introduction of the two third one third commission scheme In 
October 1974". 
BACKGROUND 
3. The Company, a wholly-owned subsIdIary of : Limited, 
employs 67 van salesmen to deliver its products to grocersl shops, to supermarket 
and to other sales outlets. 
4. Before October 1974,' the Salesmen were paid commission on sales achieved 
above a certain level, known as the datum figure. The datum figure was 
determ Ined by the circumstances of a par!fcular round, so as to take account of 
factors such as the number of calls Involved, the mileage covered and the 
number- of hours worked. 
s. This commission scheme had been evolved before the URTU had become 
responslbl e for negotiations on behalf of the salesmen. Subsequently, following 
their assumption of that resp<?nslbillty, the union had negotiated a fresh commlss i . 
scheme with the Company. This scheme, Introduced In October 1974, had been 
slmflar to schemes In operatIon In other companies within the .. 
Group and had provided for the p~yment of commission on one-third of the sales 
Qf the Individual salesman. 
r 
~--... ----
.-
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When the price of bread h'ad been increased on 22 February 1975, the 
company had appl ied a."regulator" to adjust the amount of ccxr.miss ion payabl e, 
with the aim of ensuring that salesmen did not benefit from the increase In 
price, with no concommitant increase in productivity. The Company took similar 
action. In respect of subsequent increases In bread prices, but in August 1976 
the salesmen refused to accept the further application of the regulator, on the 
grounds that It was causing them to lose commission. 
7. A sub-committee composed of three representatives from the Company 
and three from the union was set up to look Into the matter and recommended 
the use of a percentage regulator rather than a monetary one, but the salesmen 
rejected this suggestion. The Company nevertheless implemented the sub-
committee's recommendation, not only In respect of the August 1976 bread price 
increase, but also in relation to three subsequent increases, while the issue 
was being dealt with In procedure. However, as no agreement was reached, 
the Issue was referred to the ACAS for arbitratIon. 
MAIN SUBMISSIONS BY TI-iE UNION 
8. Although the scheme whIch had been In operation prior to October 1974 
had contained provision for salesmen to raise grievances about Us opera tion, 
when the union had become responsible for negotrations, they had found tha t on 
sorne rounds the datum figure operated unfairly against the roundsman concerned. 
There hCJd in fact been widespread dissatisfaction wIth the datum figure aspect 
of the scheme, the salesmen being particularly critical of the scope that this 
afforded management for bringing an indlvldual salesman's earnings into line 
with that of his fellows, by enabling the Company to adjust the datum figure If 
tt'ley consIdered that a mans s earnings were too high. I twas thi 5 widespread 
-dlssatisfactior) that.had led the URnJ to seek to negotiate a fresh scheme. In 
the union's view, it was fully understandable that the salesmen should disllke 
the concept of a "regulator", which they saw not only as being similar to the 
datum figure in Its. effoects, by giving the employer the opportunity to exercise 
undue control over their com·mlssion earnings, and hence restoring the anoma •. 
removed in October 1974, but also as destroying the principles of the ",'.'o-third, 
one-third scheme. 
9. The basic concept of that scheme had been that the datum figure waS self-
adjusting. During negotIations on the schem.e, the Company had stated that they -. 
reserved the right to make adjustments to It should the price of bread be 
Increased, but the union had not agreed to the use of a regulator. 
) 
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10. The earnings of some salesmen had fallen when the new scheme had been 
Introduced, but they had ~ccepted thi s on the understanding tha t the naJori ty 
of their colleagues would benefit. The union contended that the appl ication 
of the regulator had reduced the sums qualifying for the top band of commission 
and had thus had cons; derabl e effect on the pay of sal esmen who were, In 
some cases, the .same men who had suffered a drop In earnings in 1974. 
Typically, commission on one round had fallen by £3 between December 1976 
and March 1977. 
11. When the union representatives had approached the Company, the 
management had conceded that the use of the regulator had a detrimental effect 
on the salesmen' s ~ommlsslon earnings. This view had been substantiated by 
the joint working party, the union members of which had Insisted that any 
arrangement for adjusting commission earnings should operate more fairly. 
The result had been a somewhat complicated formula based on a percentage 
regulator. This formula had not been acceptable to the union members, but had 
been applied as an Interim arrangement while ne90tiations contInued. 
12. The URTU considered that one of the main criteria for the successful 
operation of a payment by results scheme was that it must be simple. This was 
not ~he case with the regulator system which was not understood by a large 
number of the salesmen. Another essential for a commission scheme was that 
It should generate a reasonable proportion of the gross earnings of participants 
Since 1974, however, the proportion of earnings from payment by resul ts had 
fallen In relation to basic pay. 
MAIN SU8tv\ISSIONS BY THE CO'v1PANY 
.13. The Comparyy recalled that the initiative for changing the commission scher 
had come from th.~ union. In agreeing to negotiate a fresh scheme, the Company 
had made clear that whatever scheme was Introduced, they would continue to 
make adjustments to nullify the effect of any increases in bread prices. Thl s 
was In line with the common practice in Companies where bread salesmen wei'':: 
paid commission on cash sales. The findings of the Board of Arbitration would 
thus be of immense importance for the baking Industry. There was no justificati 
for the union's assumption that there would be Increases In commission under thi 
-. ·two-thirds, one-third scheme. 
... -
f.t· 
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50 far as the regulator was concerned, the Company accepted that the 
I , . .-'T:lJla was compl i,cated, ~ut It was necessary under the clrcums tances and 
~~I.' jo;nt wor king party had been unabl e to devl se a I ess complex arrangement. 
;..c l1cmes such as that introduced in October 1974 needed fine tuning but the 
Co-npany <!id not accept that they had over-adjusted to cOllpensate for bread 
rice increases. They could not accept the salesmen's view that no adjustment p , 
should be made when bread prices were raised. 
15. The union had cl aimed that comm ission earnings had deteriorated in 
relation to the basic; rate between 1974 and 1977, but the salesmen received an 
average weekly increase In commission of £1:49 on the Introduction of the new 
scheme and commission which had been at an average of £17:17 in May 1974 had 
averaged £21:45 for week ending 5 February 1977, £19:84 for week ending 
12th February, £20:06 for week ending 19 February and £21:80 for wee,k ending 
26 February 1977. 
16. It was not true that the management could manipulate the regulator to 
restrict earnings, as asserted by the URTU. The regulator now in use derived 
from an agreement within the joint working party and Its principles of operation 
flowed from that agreement. 
17. The Company recalled tha t the salesmen had operated the revised 
commission scheme for almost two years before the question of adjustments 
had been raised as an issue. It was true that there had been a technical 
difficulty as to how adjustments should be made but this had been overcome by 
the jOint sub-committee. 
AWARD 
18. We are aware that a commission scheme such as that operated by Turner 
--- ---.. ----_ .. __ . __ . 
and Son has to attempt to achieve a number of objectives. One of these is the ? 'fJ 
---.-.-... ------... ~.. . -' _.. " 
malntalnance of the real value of the incentIve elements in the scheme. Another' 
--------------_.- .. -.~ .. --.... ...... -_. . ..... --.... ........ . . 
objective is that changes In bread prices should not resul t in windfall gains or , 
---------. ---_.. -- - ." - --. - . : 
losses to van salesmen. These and other aims have to b~_balanced against eacl, . 
-..... -.--~.- .... ---.-.--'-.-.- . '--- .... 
~~r and presumably were taken into acc,ount by the joint working party. 
-----~-~----~, -.",.. .  --
..... ,..""-
n~ Issue 0." whi ch we have to deci de is c. narrower one and is limited 
!- mS of reference. On that Issue, and after careful consideration 
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1
')0(" I.'"idcncc, we have come to the conclusion that In all the circur:,nstances 
~" were justified in adjusting van salesmen's commission to take '< 
f Increases in bread prices since the introduction of the two-thirds, 
,. ,oJ,1 0 . 
! d commfssion scheme • 
... ."..rr' r 
"~$ch 1977 
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Appendix 7 
Table 18 Total Numbers of c.p.a. Units, in each Arbitration 
Hearing Transcriet, and their Points of Division 
into Three Phases 
Case Total No. of Units No. of Units No. of Units No. of Units in Phase 1 in Phase.2 in Phase 3 
1920 488 716 716 
2 1363 510 426 427 
3 1668 694 487 487 
4 1842 683 579 580 
5 1325 569 378 378 
6 2811 1026 892 893 
7 2275 766 754 755 
8 1146 278 434 434 
9 1162 532 315 315 
10 .2281 973 654 654 
11 2814 1498 658 658 
12 2989 1483 753 753 
